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ABSTRACT
This dissertation attempts to study the irrationalist and existentialist trend in the history of 
Russian thought through the Silver Age perception of classical Russian literature. The main 
focus is on the most controversial representative of those currents of thought -  the 
philosophical writer Lev Shestov (1866-1938).
An examination of Shestov's legacy from a literary perspective is offered -  an approach 
which, as we argue, is crucial in interpreting Shestov’s works. It also appears novel in 
comparison with more conventional treatments of this thinker as philosopher or theologian. 
The main objective is to explore the literary dimension of Shestov's creativity and its 
interplay with his philosophical ideas. We examine Shestov’s works dedicated to classical 
Russian writers, which represent a bridge from literature to philosophy, and attest to his 
ceaseless journey in this direction. Our main conclusions are derived from Shestov's 
ambivalent treatment of aesthetics. The thesis explores the paradox that Shestov is 
appreciated more by artists than by philosophers despite his predominantly applied 
treatment of art (resulting from his view of philosophy as a form of art rather than science). 
This stance frequently leads Shestov to misinterpret literary texts, while the nature of his 
philosophy, we argue, remains essentially artistic.
Part I of the thesis provides a conceptual explanation of the legitimacy and vital importance 
of taking a literary approach to Shestov. Part II substantiates our main arguments through 
case studies of classical Russian writers. Using a combination of formalist, intertextual and 
biographical approaches, it examines Shestov’s treatment of these writers in relation to the 
existing critical literature.
It is hoped that this dissertation will shed some new light not only on Shestov's life and 
work, but also on the literary heritage of certain major nineteenth-century Russian writers, 
as well as on the existentialist and irrationalist trend in the history of Russian thought.
ix
PREFACE
In writing up the thesis I have followed the University of Bath Specifications For Higher 
Degree Theses. I have also adhered to the MHRA style guide as much as possible. The 
primary sources, which this dissertation draws on, include works by Lev Shestov, written 
originally in Russian, as well as a substantial body of texts by Russian writers, both 
classical and contemporary. The secondary sources also contain a considerable number of 
Russian texts. Other non-English materials quoted herein include French and German 
sources, as well as occasional quotations in Ancient Greek. I quote Russian texts in the 
original, as much as possible, and provide translation for other foreign texts (into English, 
and on occasions into Russian). Wherever possible I give official translations; otherwise I 
provide my own (by default, unless otherwise stated).
Although I predominantly use the original Russian for titles and quotations, when referring, 
in English, to a Russian name, I use the Library of Congress transliteration system. 
However, for simplification, and due to long-established conventions in the spelling of 
well-known names, I have opted to shorten Russian surnames ending in ‘ii’ to ‘y’ (for 
example, Dostoevsky instead of Dostoevskii), and to write Tolstoy instead of Tolstoi. For 
the same reason I have omitted diacritics. However, all these simplifications apply to the 
main body of the text only: in the references and bibliography I adhere strictly to the 
Library of Congress transliteration system in the spelling of Russian names (in Russian 
sources). If an unconventional spelling of a name occurs in an existing book or article I 
keep it as in the original.
In the footnote references I normally give the full reference when the item is first 
mentioned, and thereafter use a short title and a surname only. It is then easy to check in the 
bibliography for the full reference (rather than searching through the thesis for the first 
occurrence of the item). In the cases where there is just one work quoted by an author I 
only give the author’s surname after the first mention of the source (i.e. after the full 
reference). If more than one work by the same author is quoted in the thesis I give his/her 
surname and the relevant short title every time. However, if there are two works only by the
same author, and one is quoted frequently, whereas the other is only referred to a few times,
I give the author’s surname only to imply the first work (frequently quoted), and when 
referring to the second (rarely quoted) work I provide both the surname and the short title. 
This convention is used in the following instances:
1) AikhenvaTd Iurii, Review of Lev Shestov’s book Ano<peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, (63) 
P yccm e BedoMocmu, 7 March 1905 (the title is used)
Aikhenval’d, Iu. I., ‘HexoB’, A. 77. Hexoe: Pro et Contra. Teopnecmeo A. 77. Hexoea e 
pyccKOu Mbicjiu Konija X IX  -  Hanana X X  e. (1887-1914), Anthology, ed. I. N. Sukhikh, A. 
D. Stepanov (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo gumanitamogo 
Instituta, 2002) (the surname only is used, after the first occurrence)
2) Bakhtin, Mikhail, Aemop u eepou. K  (pmoco(pcKUM ochoqom eyManumapubix nayK (St 
Petersburg: Azbuka, 2000) (the title is used)
Bakhtin, Mikhail, IIpodjieMbi meopnecmea JfocmoeecKoeo (Moscow: Alkonost, 1994) (the 
surname only is used, after the first occurrence)
3) When the surname only (Martin) is used it refers to: Martin, Bernard, The life and 
thought o f Lev Shestov, Introduction to Lev Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem, transl. Bernard 
Martin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), 11-44
4) Milosz, Czeslaw, ‘Shestov, or the Purity of Despair’, Emperor o f the Earth. Modes o f  
Eccentric Vision (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1977), 99- 
119 (the surname only is used, after the first occurrence)
Milosz, Czeslaw, ‘Eopi>6a c yaym teM ’, Hocucj) EpodcKUu: mpydbi u dnu, eds. Lev Losev 
and Petr Vail’ (Moscow: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1998), 237-247 (the title is used)
5) Valevicius, Andrius, Lev Shestov and His Times: Encounters with Brandes, Tolstoy, 
Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Ibsen, Nietzsche and Husserl (New York: Peter Lang, 1993) (the 
surname only is used, after the first occurrence)
Valevicius, Andrius, ‘“Celui qui edifie et detruit des mondes”: Leon Chestov et le post- 
modemisme a partir d'une lecture de Tolstoi’, Cahiers de Vemigration russe 3 (Paris: 
Institut d’Etudes Slaves, 1996), special issue ‘Leon Chestov. Un philosophe pas comme les 
autres?’, 133-140 (the title is used)
During my research on Lev Shestov’s creative legacy I have produced several publications 
and forthcoming publications related to various aspects of my thesis.1 I have given papers 
relevant to my thesis topic at symposia of the British-French Association for the Study of 
Russian Culture in Bath in October 2003 and in Paris (in October 2001 and October 2002), 
and at the BASEES conference in Cambridge in March 2003, as well as at the VII World 
Congress of ICCEES in Berlin in August 2005. I also gave a presentation at a research 
gathering at the Russian bookshop ‘Les Editeurs Reunis’ in Paris in May 2002 during my 
Entente Cordiale Scholarship to the Sorbonne which I held in 2001-2002 to work in 
Shestov’s archive. I have also published papers and given conference presentations on 
topics closely related to my research on Shestov, but which have had to remain outside the 
scope of this thesis (such as Lev Shestov and twentieth century writers: Joseph Brodsky, 
Marina Tsvetaeva and Venedikt Erofeev).
1 Aspects of Chapters 3 and 6 of the thesis are included in Qlga Tabachnikova, ‘The Treatment of 
Aesthetics in Lev Shestov’s Search for God’, in Aesthetics as a Religious Factor in Eastern and 
Western Christianity, eds. Wil van den Bercken and Jonathan Sutton; Eastern Christian Studies 6. 
(Leuven, Belgium: Peeters Publishers, 2005), pp. 179-195; Olga Tabachnikova, ‘The Religious- 
Philosophical Heritage of Lev Shestov in the Context of Contemporary Russia and the Wider 
World’ (forthcoming in the Heythrop Journal: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology). 
Another work related to Shestov’s biography is R. Fotiade and O.Tabachnikova, eds, Unpublished 
correspondence between Lev Shestov and Boris de Schloezer (a fully annotated edition) (Moscow- 
Paris: Russkii Put’ -  YMCA Press, forthcoming in 2008). I am also currently preparing for 
publication an edited volume, A. P. Chekhov through the eyes o f Russian thinkers: V. Rozanov, D. 
Merezhkovsky, L. Shestov and S. Bulgakov. Modern perspectives.
I would like to thank the Department of European Studies and Modem Languages at the 
University of Bath for providing a grant to pay my part-time fees during the years 2000- 
2005 and for sponsoring my attendance at the international symposium on the philosophy 
of A. P. Chekhov in Irkutsk in August 2006. I also wish to thank the BASEES Research 
and Development Committee for funding my participation at the VII World Congress of 
ICCEES in Berlin in August 2005 and for supporting my attendance at BASEES annual 
conferences in Cambridge, where I have been able to test my research findings.
I am also grateful to my supervisors Professor Rosalind Marsh and Dr Peter Wagstaff of 
the Department of European Studies and Modem Languages who have provided continuous 
help and support during my work on this dissertation. My thanks also go to my family and 
friends for both moral and practical support, as well as stimulating discussions and 
encouragement.
INTRODUCTION: 
Lev Shestov -  beyond classification. Preliminary remarks.
The topic of our research is the Russian-Jewish thinker, philosopher and writer Lev Shestov 
who remains one of the most fascinating and controversial figures in the history of Russian 
culture. Bom in Kiev in 1866, Shestov emigrated to Paris in 1920 where he wrote his most 
significant philosophical works and where he died in 1938.
In his writings Shestov provided a systematic critique of the whole history of Western 
speculative philosophy and laid a foundation to what later became known as existentialist 
philosophy. He started his philosophizing from an analysis of literature, especially of 
classical Russian literature, and gradually moved towards purely philosophical writings.
His works were prohibited in the USSR and it is only now, with the fall of communism and 
the active revival of religious thought in Russia, that Shestov's writings are being 
republished and enjoy a growing interest among the general public, together with other 
Russian philosophers of the Silver Age, who have also hitherto hardly been available 
within the country. Yet Shestov remains, as he always was, a solitary figure in Russian 
thought in particular and in world culture in general.
Indeed, as we shall see, it is even problematic to classify his intellectual heritage precisely: 
was he truly a philosopher, or rather a theologian or a writer? There is no real agreement on 
this issue. On one hand he is known as a philosopher of tragedy, and some say, like 
Galtseva, that he was ‘3K3HCTeHUHajiHCT, noflBHBiiiHHCJi 3a#ojiro ro  3K3HCTeHijHajiH3Ma’, 
others assert, like Zenkovsky, that Shestov's philosophy is only superficially existential, but 
is in fact theocentric and truly religious. However, when he emigrated to France he was
2 Renata Gal’tseva, OnepKupyccKou ymonmecKou mucjiu X X e e m  (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p. 77.
3 npoT. B. B. 3eHbKOBCKHH (archpriest V. V. Zen’kovskii), npo(J)eccop EorocnoBCKoro 
npaBocjiaBHoro HHCTHTyra b napu^ce (Professor of the Theological Russian-Orthodox Institute in 
Paris), McmopuH pyccKou (pwiococpuu (e deyx moMax) (History of Russian Philosophy, in two vol.), 
(Paris: YMCA PRESS, 1948-1950). The references in the sequel will be given to a Russian 
republication of the original book: B. B. 3eHbKOBCKHH (V. V. Zenkovskii), Mcmopm pyccxou
1
discovered by the emerging French existentialists and Camus later wrote about him in Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe (The Myth o f Sisyphus, 1942).4 Moreover, Shestov's response to Husserl's 
philosophical ideas was one of the first in France and made a significant impact on the 
resonance that the phenomenological movement received in that country, with far reaching 
consequences for the whole of modem French philosophical thought.
Many debate to this day whether he was a philosopher at all, judging by his unscholarly, 
literary style and, more crucially, by the fact that the roots of his philosophical ideas grow 
out of the depth of classical Russian literature (Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Turgenev, 
Pushkin) as well as the works of Shakespeare and other world classics. His books written 
on literature are regarded by many as literary criticism of high quality and originality. Yet, 
from his later works and philosophical statements he may in principle be interpreted as a 
theologian or even a preacher, although this view is not normally shared. To our mind, a 
definite classification here is pointless. The truth, as usual, lies in the middle -  he was all of 
the above and therefore cannot be pigeon-holed.
In his essay ‘Shestov, or the Purity of Despair’5 written in 1973, Czeslaw Milosz speaks of 
the remarkable bravery with which Lev Shestov attacks the eternal questions of human 
existence, arguing against virtually each and every living or dead existential thinker and 
their theories and perceptions of the universe. ‘Few writers of any time could match his 
daring, even insolence, in raising the naughty child's questions which have always had the 
power to throw philosophers into a panic’,6 -  writes Milosz. As a result Shestov cannot be 
regarded as part of any school or movement, he is broader than any label and bursts out of 
any boundaries.
cpunoco(puu (e deyx moMax) {History of Russian Philosophy, in 2 volumes), (Rostov-on-Don: Fenix, 
1999), p. 366
4 Albert Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe {The Myth o f Sisyphus), in Essais (Paris: NRF/Gallimard, 
1965).
5 Czeslaw Milosz, ‘Shestov, or the Purity of Despair’, in Emperor of the Earth. Modes of Eccentric 
Vision (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 99-119.
6 Ibid, p. 103.
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This is well summarised by Taras Zakydalsky: ‘Shestov's asystematic thought is like a 
many-faceted gem: to be appreciated it has to be viewed from many different angles [...] As 
long as one does not attempt the impossible -  to give a complete and definitive 
interpretation of Shestov -  one can construct an interpretation that is both consistent and 
illuminating’.7
However, the situation with Shestov studies remains essentially unsatisfactory. Not because 
there have been doomed attempts to give an impossible ‘complete and definitive 
interpretation’ of Shestov, but rather for the opposite reason: the attempts made so far 
appear rather fragmentary and certainly scarce in comparison to what this thinker really 
deserves. Despite the widely acknowledged opinion of Shestov's importance for the history 
of European thought of the 20th century he remains largely under-researched, especially in 
the English-speaking world. It is quite possible that the very characteristics by which he can 
be truly distinguished, which make him so interesting and important, are responsible for 
Shestov being omitted from mainstream philosophical studies and overall more avoided 
than highlighted.
Amongst these characteristics there is first of all Shestov's adogmatic style of thinking, his 
being forever unconventional, straining himself to the limit to find his own, very personal 
way to the truth. His friend and translator Boris de Schloezer wrote in 1922:
Away from these regular troops [of conventional philosophy] there are partisans, free spirits, 
adventurers. Having left the big road they throw themselves audaciously across the brambles, 
prickly bushes and savage copse which surround the main route. They fight fearlessly [...] They try 
to clear and mark new trails [...] And what they discover [...] they cannot communicate to others [...] 
because their experience is so intimate and special, so profoundly personal that it cannot be 
translated into common formulas. [...] Amongst these outlaws of thought, Pascal and Nietzsche are 
probably those whose action was most felt, and not in the milieu of scientists, but that of artists and 
poets [...] I cannot see among our contemporaries anyone apart from Leon Shestov who could be 
named in their company.8
7 Taras Zakydalsky, ‘Lev Shestov and the Revival of Religious Thought in Russia’, in Russian 
Thought after Communism: the recovery of a philosophical heritage, ed. by James P. Scanlan 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 153-164 (p. 158).
8 Boris de Schloezer, iUn Penseur Russe Leon Chestov’, Mercure de France, 1(X) (1922), 82-115 
(pp. 83-84).
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Indeed, Shestov’s originality was bom out of his persistent and uncompromising refusal to 
borrow the ready-made ideas of others, the existing self-evident ‘knowledge’, of his 
determination to be faithful to his own perception of the world which came as a result of 
intense efforts to think independently, to search on his own, to get to the bottom of things. 
This led Shestov to his very personal philosophical discoveries which landed him in 
opposition to the majority of the mainstream philosophers and made him fall outside any 
classification. ‘Among the outstanding Russian philosophers of this century, Lev Shestov 
was the most isolated [...] thinker. His exclusive and steadfast concentration on the tragic 
fate of the individual in this world as well as his skeptical “adogmatic” style of 
philosophising placed him outside the main trends of Russian philosophy’,9 writes Taras 
Zakydalsky.
One of the most important distinguishing features of Shestov was the truly existential 
nature of his ideas. This should not be confused with Existentialism as such, as David 
Gascoyne warns, which is ‘the post-experimental intellectual exploitation of the experience 
of existing’. The existential philosophy of Shestov is ‘actual spiritual activity [...] Shestov 
believed philosophical activity to consist in absolutely undivided truth-seeking, and this he 
could not reconcile with telling people they need seek no more, [...] but simply attend his 
classes and pay the proper fee at the end of the term. [...] To adopt the role of a teacher of 
this kind, would have been altogether in contradiction with the inner position, the adoption 
of which is a necessary prerequisite of Existential Philosophy, properly so-called’.10
Yet another peculiarity of Shestov which alienates him from the rest of Russian philosophy 
is his tendency to avoid burning social questions. Given Russia's turbulent history such 
questions traditionally preoccupied its thinkers, of whatever school or direction of thought, 
and in one way or another Russian philosophers inevitably addressed political and social 
issues. Shestov's reluctance to turn to these questions in his philosophy is even more 
surprising if we take into account his background in jurisprudence and economy as well as
9 Zakydalsky, p. 153.
10 David Gascoyne, ‘Leon Chestov’ in Death of an Explorer (London: The Enitharmon Press,
1980), pp. 127, 128, 131.
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the dominant ideas -  notably Marxism -  of that time. We shall take a closer look at these 
phenomena later when considering Shestov's biography and the specifics of his epoch.
Perhaps the last, but not the least reason for Shestov's relative obscurity is his manner of 
exposition by which, instead of constructing his system explicitly and making direct claims, 
he expresses his ideas in terms of a polemical relationship with other philosophers, 
presuming the reader's knowledge of their teachings. This indirect and implicit discourse 
undoubtedly complicates the understanding of Shestov's writings and even makes them 
virtually incomprehensible to an unprepared reader.
However, what makes Shestov an object of our study is above all his obvious literary talent, 
not only syntactical and linguistic, but also, and equally, semantic (that is to say, in the 
content of his ideas as well as in their form and style of expressing them). This hypothesis 
will unfold gradually in the course of this dissertation, since it is precisely the literary 
perspective on Shestov that will be the focus of our study.
As we said before, despite all these distinguishing features, or perhaps largely due to them, 
the existing corpus of Shestov studies is by no means comprehensive. This situation has 
been pointed out multiple times, but not much has changed over the years.
Vasilii Zenkovsky in his famous History o f  Russian Philosophy mentioned above, stated 
the importance of Shestov by saying that he is a figure of the same stature as his friend and 
contemporary Berdiaev, but much deeper than the latter.11 Yet he gave only a couple of 
references to papers written on Shestov (Berdiaev's, Lazarev's and his own), saying that the
i o
literature on Shestov is extremely poor and these are the only writings known to him. 
However, he was obviously unaware of some more research on Shestov which, although 
indeed scarce, was still existent. This included a PhD thesis by a Dutch scholar, J. Suys, in 
1931, and several publications by Boris de Schloezer in leading French journals such as
11 In the original Russian Zen’kovskii described Shestov as ‘bo  mhotom  onem. 6jiH3Koro EepaaeBy, 
ho ropa3AO 6 o jie e  r jiy b o x o r o  h  3HaHHTejibHoro, neM EepAaeB’ (Zen’kovskii, II, p. 365).
12 See Zen’kovskii, II, p. 365.
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Nouvelle Revue Frangaise and Mercure de France. A lot of publicity was attracted to
Shestov's name by his only disciple - a French poet of Romanian-Jewish origin, Benjamin
Fondane, who promoted Shestov's ideas with real vigour and enthusiasm and, amongst
11other things, composed a very valuable factual source -  a book of memoirs on Shestov. 
Generally Shestov's name was well known to the French intellectuals of that time and 
Albert Camus's The Myth o f Sisyphus, mentioned above, basically represents an open 
polemic with Shestov. References to various writings on Shestov of varying length and 
importance can be found in the full (to date) bibliography composed by his younger 
daughter Natalie Baranova-Shestova and published by the Institute d'Etudes Slaves in Paris 
in 1978. Also, introductions to the English translations of Shestov's books were written 
respectively by John Middleton Murry in 1916 (to Anton Tchekhov and Other Essays)14 and 
by D. H. Lawrence in 1920 (to All Things are Possible) .15
Still, back in 1949 David Gascoyne wrote about representatives of Existentialism:
It is extremely seldom that anyone refers to the one great thinker who can justly be described as a 
representative of authentically existential philosophy, Leon Chestov. [...] While it would be untrue 
to say that Chestov remains quite unknown in this country, since three books of his have been 
translated and published here [...] it is still necessary to say that this great, profoundly disturbing 
Russian thinker [...] is unjustly neglected and his importance altogether underestimated.
The situation had not changed much by the 1960s when Bernard Martin echoed the above 
opinion:
Lev Shestov belongs to the small company of truly great philosophers of our time and his work 
deserves the closest attention of all who are seriously concerned with the problems of religious 
thought. Unfortunately, Shestov's stature has not hitherto been generally recognised nor has his 
work been widely studied. Even in Europe -  where his genius was acknowledged by such figures as 
Nikolai Berdyaev and Sergei Bulgakov in Russia, Jules de Gaultier, Lucien Levy-Bruhl and Albert 
Camus in France, and D. H. Lawrence and John Middleton Murry in England -  he did not enjoy 
any great popularity in his lifetime and now, a quarter of a century after his death, his writings are
13 Benjamin Fondane, Rencontres avec Leon Chestov (Paris: Plasma, 1982).
14 Lev Shestov, Anton Tchekhov and Other Essays, trans. S. S. Kotelianskii and J. M. Murry 
(Dublin: Maunsel, 1916).
15 Lev Shestov, All Things Are Possible, trans. S. S. Kotelianskii (London: Martin Seeker, 1920).
16 Gascoyne, p. 128.
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little read. In America his name is practically unknown to the general ^public, and even many 
professional philosophers and theologians are unacquainted with his work.
However, Martin himself made a huge effort to introduce Shestov to the English-speaking 
world in the 1960s and 1970s by writing about him and translating several of his books into 
English.
Today Shestov's books are translated into many world languages and almost the entire 
collection of his works has been re-published in Russia itself. ‘The amount of his writings 
and the sources in which they have been reprinted indicate that there is a wide and growing 
interest in Shestov's ideas in Russia’18 writes Taras Zakydalsky in his aforementioned 
article ‘Lev Shestov and the Revival of Religious Thought in Russia’ where he also gives a 
coherent overview of Russian research on Shestov. He points out the extreme scarcity and 
obvious tendentiousness of Shestov studies in Russia before perestroika and remarks on a 
‘noticeable increase in the quantity of interesting work on Shestov's philosophy’19 in recent 
years. Amongst the researchers who have made the most original contributions to Shestov 
studies are such leading scholars as V. Azmus, V. Erofeev, N. Motroshilova, V. Kurabtsev 
and A. Akhutin. Interesting and valuable analysis has also been provided by R. Galtseva, L. 
Moreva, V. Kuviakin and A. Novikov.
Shestov’s continuing importance for Russian studies and beyond is, in particular, in 
providing a bridge between different cultural eras. On one hand his problematics is rooted 
in classical Russian literature; on the other his premonitions foresaw the most significant
tVidevelopments of 20 -century culture with its horrible spiritual dangers. Indeed, as Leopold 
Sev wrote in 1909, in raising the most important questions in the most distinctive way 
Shestov crowned the evolution of the whole Russian literature of the preceding half
17 Bernard Martin, A Shestov Anthology, ed. with an introduction by Bernard Martin (1970); 
Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Nietzsche, trans. with an introduction by Bernard Martin (1969); Potestas 
Clavium, trans. Bernard Martin (1968); Athens and Jerusalem, trans. with an introduction by 
Bernard Martin (1966). Publication data for all these: (Athens: Ohio University Press).
18 Zakydalsky, p. 157.
19 Ibid.
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90century. On the other hand, using the words of Russian writer Viktor Erofeev, Shestov,
91just like Kierkegaard, became a certain “corrective” of the epoch. Such prominent cultural 
figures of the Russian Diaspora abroad as Professor Nikita Struve, when naming those
thRussian philosophers whose contribution to the development of Russian thought in the 20 
century has been of utmost significance, places Shestov next to Sergei Bulgakov, Semen
99Frank and Nikolai Berdiaev. As Taras Zakydalsky observes, post-Soviet Russian society 
has yet to learn to live in uncertainty and to liberate itself from dogmas of all kinds, and
90
‘there is no finer teacher of this than Shestov’. Yet, as Zakydalsky points out, ‘much more 
attention has been devoted to religious thinkers such as Vladimir Solovev, Nikolai Berdiaev 
and Pavel Florensky than to Shestov’,24 which brings us back to the situation described by 
Shestov scholars decades ago.
In a broader -  European and even world context -  there exists at present a certain body of 
publications on Shestov amongst which there are very few books fully dedicated to him (at 
best he gets a chapter in a book of a more general character, or a critical introductory essay
9 Sin an anthology). In English, to our knowledge, there are only two scholarly books written 
exclusively on Shestov: by Louis S. Schein, The Philosophy o f Lev Shestov (1866-1938): A
9£
Russian Religious Existentialist, 1991 and by Andrius Valevicius, Lev Shestov and his 
Times: Encounters with Brandes, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Ibsen, Nietzsche and
20 Leopol’d Sev, ‘HoBaa K Hura JIbBa IXIecTOBa’ (‘New Book by Lev Shestov’), Russkaia MysV 
(1909), 61-67 (p. 67).
21 Viktor Erofeev, “‘OcTaeTca o,zmo: npoH3BOJi” (Ohjioco^ hh oflHHonecTBa h jiHTepaTypHO- 
ocTeTHHecKoe Kpeao JIbBa IIIecTOBa)’ (“‘Only One Thing Remains: Arbitrariness”; Philosophy of 
Solitude and Literary-Philosophical Credo of Lev Shestov’), Bonpocu numepamypu, 10 (1975), 
153-188 (p. 186).
22 From Nikita Struve’s recent interview on Russian television, and from my personal conversations 
with him in Paris during my Entente Cordiale scholarship to the Sorbonne in 2001-2002.
23 Zakydalsky, p. 162.
24 Ibid, p. 161.
25 Apart from the aforementioned anthologies specifically devoted to Shestov, edited, translated and 
prefaced by Bernard Martin, see also Essays in Russian Literature: a Conservative View: Leontiev, 
Rozanov, Shestov, ed. and transl. E. Roberts Spencer (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1968) and 
Great Twentieth Century Jewish Philosophers: Shestov, Rozenzweig, Buber, ed. Bernard Martin 
(New-York: Macmillan, 1970).
26 Louis S. Shein, The Philosophy of Lev Shestov (1866-1938): A Russian Religious Existentialist 
(Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991).
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Husserl?1 1993 (even though there have been several PhD theses over the years dedicated 
to Shestov, but none of them evolved into a monograph). As was mentioned, the situation 
may be slightly better in Russia, because, to use Zakydalsky’s words again, ‘interest in 
Shestov has grown rapidly among Russian intellectuals’ and Shestov’s works have been 
extensively republished. However, even though the amount of scholarly papers and book 
chapters on Shestov is consequently rising, monographs fully dedicated to him have yet to 
start appearing (with the exception of L. Moreva’s Lev Shestov). More books have been 
written where Shestov's name shares the place in the title with other thinkers, but again the 
number of them in English is extremely limited, and the situation in Russian is not 
significantly better. Those books which prevail amongst the latter came out in Russia 
during Shestov’s life-time, such as Griftsov’s Tpu MbicnumejiR. B. Po3moe, ff. 
MepeotcKoecKUU, Jl. LUecmoe (Three Thinkers. V. Rozanov, D. Merezhkovsky, L. Shestov), 
1911; Zakrzhevsky’s, nodnojibe, ncuxonoemecKue napajuienu (ffocmoeecKuii, Jl. Andpeee, 
0 . Conoeyd, Jl. LUecmoe, A. PeMmoe, M. nanmwxoe) {Underground, Psychological
32Paralels (Dostoevsky, L. Andreev, F. Sologub, L. Shestov, A. Remizov, M. Pantiukhov)), 
1911 and Ivanov-Razumnik’s On the Meaning o f  Life. F. Sologub, L. Andreev, L. Shestov, 
1908. In English the following books appeared over the years: by James C. S. Wemham, 
Two Russian Thinkers: An Essay in Berdiaev and Shestov?A 1968; by Jose Maria Neto, The 
Christianization o f  Pyrrhonism: Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard and
27 Andrius Valevicius, Lev Shestov and his Times: Encounters with Brandes, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, 
Chekhov, Ibsen, Nietzsche and Husserl (New-York: Peter Lang, 1993).
28 See, for example, Victoria Rooney, ‘Shestov’s Religious Existentialism: A Critique’ (D. Phil. 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1990) or David Patterson, ‘Literary and Philosophical Expressions of 
Faith: Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Shestov’ (D. Phil. Thesis, University of Oregon, 1978).
29 Zakydalsky, p. 161.
30 L. Moreva, Lev Shestov (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo leningradskogo universiteta, 1991).
31 B. Griftsov, Tpu MbicmmejiR. B. Po3anoe, JJ. MepeotcKoecKUU, Jl. LUecmoe (Moscow: izd. V. M. 
Sablina, 1911).
32 A. Zakrzhevskii, Uodnonbe, ncuxonoemecKue napajuienu (JJoctocbckhh, Jl. AnnpeeB, O. 
Cojioryb, Jl. UlecTOB, A. PeMH30B, M. IlaHTioxoB) (Kiev, izd. zhumala ‘Iskusstvo’, 1911). The 
book was dedicated to Shestov.
33 Ivanov-Razumnik, O CMbicne ofcwnu (O. Cojioeyb, Jl. Andpeee, Jl. LUecmoe) (St Petersburg: tip. 
M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1908). [On the Meaning of Life. F, Sologub, L. Andreev, L. Shestov] 
(republished: Letchworth, England: Bradda Books Ltd, 1971)]. Further references will be to the 
latter.
34 James C. S. Wemham, Two Russian Thinkers: An Essay in Berdyaev and Shestov (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968).
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Shestov?5 1995; by Ramona Fotiade, Conceptions o f the Absurd: From Surrealism to the 
Existential Thought o f Chestov and Fondane?6 2001, as well as an edited volume (by
'*n . _
Fotiade) The Tragic Discourse: Shestov and Fondane1 s Existential Thought, 2006. The 
most recent book in Russian where Shestov’s name is mentioned in the title seems to be by 
Tatiana Blagova and Boris Emelianov, @wioco(peMbi JfocmoeecKoao, Tpu 
unmepnpemaifuu: Jl. UJecmoe, H. Eepdnee u E. Bbiutecjiaetfee ( ‘Philosophemas’ o f 
Dostoevskii, Three interpretations: L. Shestov, N. Berdiaev and B. Vysheslavtsev), 2003.
-JQ
The book by Natalie Baranova-Shestova The life o f Lev Shestov (in Russian, 1983, also 
translated into French in 1991-1993), remains the main source for the facts of Shestov's life 
and work. Fondane's Rencontres avec Leon Chestov mentioned above, 1982 (published 
posthumously) is another important source.
It is remarkable that the studies described above provide an investigation of Shestov's 
writings from philosophical, religious and generally intellectual points of view only. In 
contrast to this existing body of research on Lev Shestov, we have declared our main focus 
as literary. No substantial study on Shestov, known to us, provides a comprehensive 
analysis of him from a literary perspective. Those few works which concern his treatment 
of writers (mainly Russian classical writers) still adopt a predominantly philosophical or 
theological approach, even if they declare literary analysis amongst their objectives. Such 
is, for example, David Patterson's article of 1979 ‘The unity of existential philosophy and 
literature as revealed by Shestov's approach to Dostoevsky’ 40 based on his PhD thesis ‘The 
literary and philosophical expression of existential faith: a study of Kierkegaard, Tolstoi
35 Jose Maria Neto, The Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, 
Kierkegaard and Shestov (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
36 Ramona Fotiade, Conceptions of the Absurd: From Surrealism to the Existential Thought of 
Chestov and Fondane (Oxford: Legenda, 2001).
37 The Tragic Discourse: Shestov and Fondants Existential Thought, ed. R. Fotiade (Oxford: Peter 
Lang, 2006).
38 Tatiana Blagova and Boris Emelianov, &unoco<peMbi JJocmoeecKoeo, Tpu unmepnpemaifuu: Jl. 
UJecmoe, H. Eepdnee u E. Bbiiuecjiaeifee ( Philosophemas ’ o f Dostoevskii, Three interpretations:
L. Shestov, N. Berdiaev and B. Vysheslavtsev) (Ekaterinburg: Ural University Press, 2003).
39 Natalie Baranova-Shestova, JKwnb Jlbea LUecmoea (The life o f  Lev Shestov), in two volumes 
(Paris: La Presse Libre, 1983).
40 David Patterson, ‘The unity of existential philosophy and literature as revealed by Shestov's 
approach to Dostoevsky’, Studies in East European Thought, 19 (3) April (1979), 219-231.
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and Shestov’ (1978). Alternatively, such publications may offer a summary of the existing 
research under the umbrella of a broader, uniting goal. An example of this kind is a recent 
book by Edith W. Clowes, Fiction's Overcoat. Russian Literary Culture and the Question 
o f Philosophy 41 where Shestov gets a chapter devoted to him. Amongst those works which 
come closest to a literary point of view on Shestov we would like to distinguish the 
following: V. Erofeev's aforementioned article ‘“OcTaeTca oaho: npoH3BOJi” (OhjiocoiJhw 
oflHHonecTBa h jiHTepaTypHO-ocTeTHHecicoe Kpe/to JIbBa UlecTOBa)’, 1975, L. Kolobaeva’s 
comparative paper ‘“IIpaBo Ha cy6i>eKTHBHOCTb”. AjieicceH Pcmhsob h JIcb IIIecTOB’42 
(‘“Right for Subjectivity”. Aleksei Remizov i Lev Shestov’), 1994, as well as an article 
‘Dostoievskie chez Chestov’ 43 by Michel Aucouturier, 2001, (in French), and the chapter 
dedicated to Shestov in Blagova’s and Emelianov’s book above together with several 
sections in Fotiade’s edited volume. Yet, they remain fragmentary and restricted in their 
scope and focus, and do not offer a comprehensive analysis of the literary dimension of 
Shestov’s works. However, the articles by Erofeev and Aucouturier contain some very 
valuable insights into the nature of Shestov’s relationship with literature and into his 
method, which we use as a springboard for our own investigations offered in this thesis.
It is also noteworthy that some important landmarks in Shestov studies were laid by those 
who themselves were representatives of literature rather than philosophy, theology or other 
branch of scientific knowledge. Thus in 1973 the Polish-born poet Czeslaw Milosz wrote a 
brilliant piece ‘Shestov, or the purity of despair’, which we have already mentioned above, 
where he gave an artistically concise and deep overview of the whole phenomenon of this 
unusual thinker. A French poet, Yves Bonnefoy, wrote two highly original and inspiring 
articles on Shestov: ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la
41 Edith W. Clowes, Fiction's Overcoat. Russian Literary Culture and the Question of Philosophy 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).
42 L. Kolobaeva, ‘“llpaBO Ha cybteicTHBHOCTb” . AneK cen PeMH30B h  JleB LIIecTOB’, Bonpocbi 
numepamypu, 5 (1994), 44-76.
43 Michel Aucouturier, ‘Dostoievskie chez Chestov’ in Diagonales Dostoi'evskiennes, Melanges en 
L'Honneur de Jacques Catteau, ed. Marie-Aude Albert (Paris: Presses de LTJniversite de Paris- 
Sorbonne, 2002), 77-86.
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pensee de Chestov’44 and ‘L'obstination de Shestov’.45 We have also mentioned above 
some texts dedicated to Shestov by two other poets: Benjamin Fondane and David 
Gascoyne. In general, it is known that Shestov has always been held in higher regard by 
poets and writers than by philosophers. In this connection it is even more surprising that no 
significant research has been conducted on him from a specifically literary viewpoint.
It is precisely the intention of our thesis to bridge this unfortunate gap and to give the 
literary dimension of Shestov's legacy the attention it deserves by exploring its interplay 
with his philosophical ideas and the overall shaping of his existential thought. Our aim is to 
demonstrate the way in which his aesthetics interacts with his ethics and to show that it is 
the ultimate and inseparable merging of the two which yields the phenomenon of Shestov.
Our dissertation is organised into two main parts. Part I provides a conceptual explanation 
as to why a literary approach to Shestov is not only legitimate and fruitful, but also of such 
a crucial importance. It also explains what exactly this approach includes. This part starts 
with a reconstruction of Shestov's method of literary studies which we consider to be highly 
significant. In an interpretation of this method, which is provided in Chapter 1, lies one of 
our principal claims (which appears to be novel). We also show in this chapter the 
relevance of Shestov's biography to his works and discuss the specifics of his times with all 
their literary and philosophical implications for Shestov's work. Chapter 2 gives a brief 
outline of Shestov's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to his literary discourse. Although 
any purely philosophical analysis remains outside the scope of our research we nevertheless 
take not only a descriptive, but also a critical approach to our exposition of Shestov's ideas. 
In particular we demonstrate some of Shestov's conceptual misapprehensions which can be 
found on the mathematical borders of philosophy. We regard this analysis as a necessary 
diversion which highlights in particular Shestov's paradoxical personality and its 
implications for his works. It is also grounded semantically because Shestov had had some
44 Yves Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’ in Leon Chestov, un philosophe pas cotnme les autres?, Cahiers de l'emigration russe 3, 
(Paris: Institut d'etudes slaves, 1996).
45 Yves Bonnefoy, ‘L'obstination de Shestov’, preface to the French edition of Shestov’s Athens and 
Jerusalem (Paris: Flammarion, 1967; Aubier, 1993).
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mathematical background on one hand, and had striven to be involved in philosophy 
professionally, on the other. Finally in Chapter 3 we continue stating our main claims 
which provide a conceptual justification for a literary perspective on Shestov.
Part II consists of five major chapters containing our close readings of Shestov's works on 
classical Russian writers. In this part we substantiate our main claims declared in Part I 
through the case studies of these writers, using a combination of biographical, formalist and 
inter-textual approaches. This means that we examine closely separate texts by Shestov in 
their own right, but also study them in their entirety (in relation to each other) and analyse 
his work against the background of his biography. This particular combination was 
necessary to overcome a particular methodological problem which exists in Shestov studies 
and accounts for the discrepancy between Shestov's major influence on Western (especially 
French) philosophical thought on one hand and the relative obscurity in which he is held by 
the Western scholarly tradition. This is rooted, as was briefly mentioned above, in the 
difficulty of singling out the main thrust of Shestov's thought, which is often lost in his 
indirect and aphoristic mode of discourse, as well as in his personified approach which 
unites individuals with their existential problems.
All but one of the five chapters of Part II are situated in chronological order by the first 
appearance of texts dedicated to a particular writer, although on many occasions Shestov 
returned to the same writers in various works throughout his entire career. Thus in these 
chapters we explore Shestov's writings on Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Chekhov and 
Turgenev respectively. The only exception from chronology is the article on Pushkin which 
was written after the book on Tolstoy, 0u/ioco(pm u nponoeedb: dodpo e ynenuu epcKpa 
Toncmozo u Huifiue.46 However, ideologically it echoed the first book by Shestov written 
on Shakespeare and thus represented a digression into Shestov's early phase: dogmatic and 
idealistic. For that reason we have placed the chapter on Shestov and Pushkin before that on 
Shestov and Tolstoy, instead of keeping them in strict chronological order.
46 Lev Shestov, Qwococpw u nponoeedb: dodpo e ynenuu zpa$>a Toncmozo u Huifiue (Philosophy 
and Preaching: Good in the Teaching of Count Tolstoi and in Nietzsche) (St-Petersburg: 
Stasiulevich, 1900).
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It is hoped that this dissertation will shed some new light not only on Shestov's life and 
work, but also on the literary heritage of the Russian classics in question, as well as on the 
existentialist and irrationalist trend in the history of Russian thought.
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PARTI 
Conceptual justification for a literary approach to Shestov 
Chapter 1. Setting the problem: a reconstruction of Shestov’s method
1.1. The Author and His Lyrical Hero
It is of primary importance to our further investigations to understand what constituted 
Shestov's method of approaching the works of literature, above all of classical Russian 
literature, that he wrote about. The core of his method was invariably to replace the author 
by his literary heroes, to interpret through them the convictions and ideas of their creator 
and ultimately to draw conclusions about the writer, or more precisely about his system of 
beliefs. This is, as it were, the ‘outside’ of Shestov’s method, its ‘external’ description, or, 
in other words, its form. In this section we shall focus primarily on this form and see what 
conclusions can be derived, whereas in the next section we shall attempt to decode the 
underlying content.
Of course, such a conspicuous method was noted before by almost every scholar who ever 
studied Shestov from any perspective. To exemplify this we shall quote here some valuable 
and perceptive descriptions of this method.
The French scholar Michel Aucouturier wrote:
Shestov's critical method resembles [...] the Russian tradition of “real criticism” where a work of 
literature is only an excuse rather than an object of study [...] Moreover, the reality that interests 
Shestov is not the outside world, but the inner world of the writer. Shestov sees in a work of 
literature a personal confession of the author and the characters are simply representatives of 
the latter.1 He is not trying to explain a literary piece, but seeks in it a confirmation of what the 
writer has lived through -  as the only guarantee of the philosophical value of the work. For true 
philosophy in his eyes can grow only out of an existential revelation.2
1 The bold font is mine (O.T.).
2 Aucouturier, p. 79.
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The Russian researchers T. Blagova and B. Emelianov stated (following V. Erofeev) that 
arbitrariness dominated Shestov's method of interpreting writers (in their case study: 
Dostoevsky), at least in his early period, and supported their statement by referring to 
Shestov’s own claims that mistakes are possible in interpreting certain places and even 
whole novels and that critical intuition is not reliable either, so only one way out remains: 
arbitrariness.3 Interestingly, while Aucouturier traces the connection of Shestov's method 
with earlier currents of Russian literary criticism (introduced by Dobroliubov), Blagova and 
Emelianov connect it with a later -  postmodernist -  method introduced by the French 
phenomenologist Giles Deleuze.4 This, we note in parenthesis, explains in part what seems 
paradoxical to Aucouturier -  that a thinker like Shestov, who applies an old traditional 
method, should be labeled modernist. However, it must be said that Blagova and 
Emelianov perceive a certain evolution in Shestov's method (at least in his approach to 
Dostoevsky) to a more authentic, less subjective reading. Still, they distinguished the same 
thesis in Shestov's claims about Dostoevsky as Aucouturier did more generally -  that all 
the heroes are Dostoevskii himself, who is telling his own story.5
In the broader context of the later, purely philosophical works of Shestov, which are still 
marked by the same treatment of thinkers under his study as his early works, Levy-Bruhl 
famously accused Shestov of ‘hogging the covers’.6 That is, of ascribing to various thinkers 
his own convictions as a way of ‘interpreting’ their works, thus largely displaying the same 
arbitrariness that was mentioned above. Of course, other researchers have not failed to 
make this observation too. Aucouturier, as we already stated, speaks of a work of literature 
being for Shestov an excuse rather than an object of study. Blagova and Emelianov point 
out that ‘H lecT O B  c o 3 # a j i  T a x n e  H H T ep n p eT a m m , K O T optie  no3BOJiHJiH eM y “ B nH caT b”  
(K 0H T eK C T yajin3np0B aT b) .ZJocToeBCKoro b  c b o k ) n ap a tfH n v iy  “ (J)h jio c o (])h h  T p a r e ^ n n ” . [ . . .]  
E M y HyJKHLI TOJIbKO Te TeKCTbl, Ha KOTOpbie OH M05KCT “ HaJ103KHTb” CBOH to jio c ’ . In close 
connection with Shestov's tendentiousness in selecting texts for his analysis they note the
3 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 110.
4Ibid,p. 111.
5 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 46 (the bold font is mine. O.T.).
6 See, for example, Milosz, p. 102.
7 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 114.
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same subjectivity in his choice of characters to be interpreted. As the discussion in the next 
section will show all these opinions about the nature of Shestov's method are fundamentally 
correct and can be inscribed into the model that we shall provide there.
We regard Shestov's provocative and subjective method as very significant, and it is in 
examining it closely in the course of the thesis that we shall be able to evaluate his 
conclusions. Moreover, it is this method that gives rise to one of our principal claims which 
we shall now explain. This claim, while stemming from a widely noted method, sheds some 
additional light on its interpretation, thus extending previous research on Shestov.
Of course, a method of identifying the writer with his heroes applied blindly, randomly and 
unsystematically, would necessarily be faulty and misleading, and Shestov undoubtedly 
knew that. When discussing Taine’s reading of Shakespeare (as early as in 1898, i.e. in 
Shestov’s first book) Shestov agrees with the claim that although a poet is defined by his 
oeuvre, one has to have the skill of correctly and skillfully interpreting his writings, and a 
blind identification with the hero is usually wrong. In fact he goes as far as saying that 
‘caMbin HeyMejitiH npneM flpaMaTHHecicoro TBOpnecTBa - H3JiHBaTtca “ycTaMH”
o
,qeHCTByiomnx jihu. y  xoponmx nncaTejien hx repon roBOpjrr 3a ce6 a, a He 3a aBTopoB’. 
Later on Shestov did not go that far in his statements, for he did substantially ‘look for the 
writer’ in the heroes; yet, he was capable even then o f making a certain distinction between 
the two. Thus he wrote in f fo c m o e e c K u u  u H u ifiu e ... ‘...HecoMHeHHo, hto hh repon 
poMaHa, hh aBTOp He BepaT b cnacHTejitHocTt H/jen “jho6 bh k 6 jinacHeMy”. Ecjih yro/mo - 
jlfocToeBCKHH HfleT flajibine HBaHa KapaMa30Ba...’.9 In fact, Shestov’s analysis alone of 
Taine’s treatment of Shakespeare, where he criticises Taine for a too subjective and biased 
reading of the poet where Shakespeare is identified randomly (in Shestov’s view) with his 
heroes leaves no doubt that Shestov acknowledged that applying the method o f extracting 
as much information as possible about the writer through interpretation of his heroes should 
be treated with considerable care.
8 Lev Shestov, UleKcnup u ezo KpumuK Epandec in CoHuuenuH e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 
1996), I, p. 36.
9 Lev Shestov, ffocmoeecKuu u Hmpue: (pnnoccxftun mpazeduu in CoHunemm e deyx moMax 
(Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), I, p. 387.
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Indeed, unquestionably there is a great subtlety in the skill, largely subjective, of applying 
this method legitimately as part of proper literary analysis. However, it is virtually 
impossible to avoid such an interpretation. Still, there is a great difference between an 
interpretation of literary heroes so that they contribute to our understanding of the writer, 
and an actual identification of them with the author. What matters is how exactly the 
selection of ‘meaningful’ characters (carriers of the main ideas) is made and how exactly 
the interpretation is derived. It seems to us that it is precisely this grey area, which may not 
appear too significant at the first glance, that nevertheless conceals the crucial issues for 
understanding Shestov's approach and for analyzing his work as a whole. What we mean by 
this requires careful explanation.
The problem of the author and his hero is an old one and has been subject to serious 
analysis over many years. In particular, as William Mills Todd III writes, ‘npobjieMa MecTa 
aBTopa b jiHTepaTypHOM npoijecce h b TexcTe Ha pa3HBie Jia^ti o6cy5x#ajiacb 
aMepHKaHCKOH HOBOH KpHTHKOfi H (})paHIjy3CKHM nOCTCTpyKTypajlH3MOM ’. 10 Russian 
scholarship, including such influential figures as Mikhail Bakhtin, have also addressed this 
problem in various ways. However, what is most relevant to our perspective is a reference 
to modem Russian literature, more precisely -  that o f the late twentieth century. In his 
essay on Dostoevsky, ‘The Power of the Elements’, Joseph Brodsky says:
Every writing career starts as a personal quest for sainthood, for self-betterment. Sooner or later, 
and as a rule quite soon, a man discovers that his pen accomplishes a lot more than his soul. This 
discovery very often creates an unbearable schism within an individual and is, in part, responsible 
for the demonic reputation literature enjoys in certain witless quarters. Basically, it's just as well, for 
the seraphim's loss nearly always is the mortal's gain. Besides, either extreme, in itself, is quite 
boring, and in a work of a good writer we always hear a dialogue of the spheres with the gutter. If it 
doesn't destroy the man or his manuscript (as in the case of Gogol's Part II of Dead Souls), this 
schism is precisely what creates a writer, whose job therefore becomes making his pen catch up 
with his soul.11
10 William Mills Todd III, ‘Introduction’ in CoepeMennoe aMepuKanctcoe nytuKUHoeedenue. 
C6opnuK cmameu, ed. W.M. Todd III, transl. from English by M. B. Kuteeva, G. A. Krylova and 
others, (St Petersburg: gumanitamoe agenstvo ‘Akademicheskij proekt’, 1999), pp. 5-16 (p. 14).
11 Joseph Brodsky, ‘The Power of the Elements’, in Less Than One, Selected Essays 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 157-163 (p. 161).
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The contemporary writer Sergei Gandlevskii in his paper entitled ‘Olympic Game’ wrote 
about this schism in relation to Brodsky himself:
IIocjieflHHe flBecTH npH6jiH3HTejibHO jieT no3Tbi HanpaMyio BToprarcnrca b cboh npoH3Be,aeHHa Ha 
npaBax rjiaBHoro repoa. TBopnecTBO ynoAoSjiaeTca aBTonopTpeiy. PoMaHTH3M h npe/mojiaraeT 
Taxoe BMeniaTejiLCTBO xyzioacHHxa b coScTBeHHoe H3Aejme. B HHTarejibcxoM BOcnpmiTHH 
jiHpHHecKHH repoh h aBTop -  oaho. ... >KecTKoe TpedoBaHHe 5khtb xax nHineuib h nncaTb xax 
jKHBeuib HajiaraeT Ha aBTOpa o6a3aTe;ibCTBO codjiioAaTb noaBinxHoe paBHOBecne Me>x#y co6oh- 
npoTOTHnoM h codcTBeHHbiM 3aneHaTjieHHbiM o6pa30M.12
We find the same sentiments concerning the age o f Romanticism in B. M. Gasparov: 
‘oTHomeuHe k CBoen 5KH3HH Kax k nacTH xy/*05KecTBeHH0H mhcchk, nepexjiHHica MQTKjxy 
JIHTepaTypHbIM H 5KH3HeHHbIM “TBOpHeCTBOM” B BblCIIieH CTeneHH CBOHCTBeHHBI 
noBe e^HHK) poMaHTHxa’ . 13 This creates, using Gandlevsky's words, a dramatic relationship 
and a continuing struggle between the author and his hero. 14 Such a struggle acquires a 
particular intensity, especially in Russian literature with its distinctive anthropocentric 
character.
Indeed, Russian philosophical thought, according to Vasilii Zenkovsky,
G ojib u ie  B c e r o  3 a iu rra  m eM O ti o nenoeexe, o e r o  cyab6e h n y r a x  [...]. Ilpeagie B c e r o  sto 
CKa3biBaeTca b tom, H acxojibK O  Bcioziy AOMHHHpyeT Q jaace b oT B jieneH H bix npodaeMax) Mopanbucm 
ycmanoexa: 3A ecb  J ie m r r  o^hh H3 caM b ix  A encT B eH H bix h T B o p n ecx H x  hctokob p y c c x o r o  
(J)nnoco(J)CTBOBaHHa. Tot naH M opanH3M , x o T o p b ifi b cbohx (Jjrjioco^cxhx coH H H eH H ax Bbipa3HJi c 
HCKJIIOHHTeJlbHOH CHJIOH JleB  TOJICTOH, C H3BeCTHbIM npaBOM , C H3BeCTHbIMH OrpaHHHeHHHMH 
M oaceT SbiTb H aitaeH  nonra y  B c e x  pyccK H X  M bicjiH T ejien , a a a ce  y  T e x , y  KOTopbix HeT 
npoH 3BeAeH HH , npaM biM  o 6 p a 3 0 M  n o cB a m eH H b ix  B o n p o ca M  M opajiH .15
12 Sergei Gandlevskii, ‘OJiHMnHiicxaa Hrpa’ in Mocufp Epodcxuu: meopnecmeo, nmnocmb, cydbda, 
Hmoeu mpex xon(pepenifuu, ed. Iakov Gordin (St Petersburg: Zhumal Zvezda, 1998), p. 116-118 (p. 
116).
13 B. M. Gasparov, ‘IIoaTHKa IlyiiiKHHa b xoirrexcTe eBponeiicxoro h pyccxoro poMaHTH3Ma’ in 
CoepeMennoe aMepuxancxoe nyiuxunoeedenue. Cdopnux cmameii, ed. by W. M. Todd III, pp. 301- 
327 (p. 326).
14 Gandlevskii, p. 116.
15 Zen’kovskii, I, pp. 18-19.
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To a certain extent Bakhtin's words about Dostoevsky can be generalised to Russian 
literature as a whole: ‘oh 3HaeT oaho flBHHceHHe -  BOBHyTpt nejiOBeKa’ . 16
Literature in general is a self-reflective process. Probably when the process of reflection 
exceeds its authority and becomes an independent type of activity -  much more captivating 
than the event which gave rise to it -  literature begins. That is to say, an echo exceeds the 
sound which generated it. Apparently, it is in these efforts to trace simultaneously both the 
echo and the sound, that a split of consciousness, so characteristic for a writer, starts. As 
Akhmatova writes,
Yace 6e3yMHe KpbiJiOM 
.Hymn Haxpbuio nojiOBHHy,
H  noH T orHeHHbiM b h h o m ,
H  MBHHT B HepHyiO flOJIHHy.
H  n o m u ia  a ,  h to  eM y  
^ojDK H a a  ycT ynH T b n o S e /jy ,  
n p n c j iy u iH B a a c b  k  CBoeM y 
y>K e x a x  6 b i nyxcoM y 6 p e ,n y .17
This is a look at oneself from the side (as the last line particularly emphasises); a type of 
alienation which is constantly in danger of becoming unhealthy, of bordering insanity. 
However, it is precisely literature which constitutes the way to invest the destructive nature 
of self-reflection with a certain harmony. For having taken up a pen an author gets a unique
1 Ropportunity ‘HecbbiBiiieecfl BonjioTHTb’. His lyrical hero as it were shortens the distance 
between the desirable and the real. This is even more significant if  one takes into account 
that ‘fljw nooTa [...] tojikoboctb b TBopnecTBe noapa3yMeBaeT SecTOJiKOBocTb b 5kh3hh’, 19 
according to one of Fazil Iskander's characters. As Sergei Dovlatov said in his interview to 
the magazine ‘Slovo’: ‘JlHTepaTypHaa zjeaTejibHOCTB -  3to  cxopee Bcero nonbmca
16 Mikhail Bakhtin, Aemop u zepou. K (pu/ioco<pcKUM ocnoecm zyManumapubix nayx (St Petersburg: 
Azbuka, 2000), p. 243.
17 Anna Akhmatova, ‘PeKBHeM’ in Co6panue coHunenuu e 6 m o M a x  (Moscow: Ellis Lak, 1998), 
vol. 3, p. 27.
18 Aleksanrd Blok, ‘O, a xony 6e3yM HO x c H T b ...’ in Cmuxomeopenmi, no3Mbi, meamp; e 2 moMca 
(Leningrad: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1972), vol. n, p. 150.
19 Fazil' Iskander, ‘Host’ in Cwotcem cyu^ecmeoeamm (Moscow: Podkova, 1999), p. 98.
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npeoflojien, codcTBeHHbie KOMmieKCbi, H35KHTb hjih ocjiadnTb Tparn3M cymecTBOBaHHa’.20 
In his bitter letter to Igor' Efimov, Dovlatov says:
IIpaBbi Bbi h  b  t o m  nyHKTe, b  k o t o po m  npOHBHJiH HaHGoabinyio CTeneHb npoHHuaTejibHOCTH. Bbi 
nmueTe, h  3to  MoaceT 6biTb ropa3flo yMHee, neM Bbi flyMaeTe, h  HMeeT oTHomeHHe He TOJibKo ko 
MHe, h o  h  k  jiHTepaType Boobme, h Aaace bo  m h o h ix  cjiynaax oGbHCHneT 3Ty JiHTepaTypy, noTOMy 
h to  oneHb nacTo, name, neM KaaceTca, nHcaTejib CTapaeTca He pacxpbiTb, a cicpbiTb, a roBopio o 
Bameft 4>pa3e: “Bcio xoreHb Bbi Hcnojib30BanH jiHTepaiypy icaic rnnpMy, KaK cnoco6 Ka3aTbca”.21
Thus, as a natural continuation of an author's life his literature often replaces it in some 
sense, and having burst onto paper from the author's subconscious his lyrical hero 
determines as it were a vector of the author's aspirations.
Now, returning to Shestov, as we shall see, he was largely a product of the age of 
Romanticism which was still influential in European culture at the time. Extremely well 
and broadly educated, he was very sensitive to the dominant literary and philosophical 
currents of the epoch. Moreover, he himself became a representative of neo-Romanticism 
in Russian philosophical thought. Thus, we are facing a situation where, on the one hand, 
the romantic tradition itself suggests, as a rather natural phenomenon, a certain 
identification of a writer with his heroes. On the other hand the aforementioned schism 
between an author's life and literary creativity, the distance between ‘the pen and the soul’, 
the problem of ‘to be and to seem’ in some sense provides the antithesis to this 
identification.
In our opinion, what Shestov's method quite consistently accomplishes, is, in some sense, to 
resolve this conflict by exposing the schism between the author and his hero. In other 
words, by trying to read off the heroes the writer's own convictions and the main aspects of 
his life and sensibility, Shestov simply drags, as it were, the writer from behind the curtain 
of his literary characters. He attempts to bring the writer ‘into the open’ from the protective 
cover of his heroes; he finds and points to the writer's inner struggle, to all the aspects of his
20 Sergei Dovlatov, Codpanue npo3u e mpex moMax (St Petersburg: Limus-Press, 1993), III, p. 341.
21 Igor’ Efimov, SnucmonnpHhiu poMcm c CepzeeM JJoenamoebiM (Moscow: Zakharov, 2001), p. 
435.
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inner world that the writer is trying to overcome by means of writing or sometimes to 
conceal even from his own self. John Bayley sensed in Shestov this preoccupation when he 
wrote back in 1970 that ‘what interests him is the gap between what a great literary artist 
thought he was saying (intelligere), and what he was actually saying, with the Godlike 
confidence of a creator’.22
In short, our assertion is that Shestov exposes the writer's inner conflict, the undercurrents 
of his consciousness, by trying to invade the ‘forbidden’, carefully guarded, secret rift 
between ‘to seem’ and ‘to be’. Thus, in particular, Shestov's method transforms his literary 
and philosophical analysis into a form of suspense of sorts, into a captivating process of 
unmasking the writer, and consequently into a secondary literary work where Shestov's 
own literary hero becomes the writer himself. Blagova and Emelianov define the genre of 
Shestov's writings as philosophical essay-dramas where philosophers of different times and
O'Xschools act alongside one another. It may be illuminating to note in this connection that in 
his extreme youth Shestov tried to become a writer and a poet, but apparently 
unsuccessfully. Czeslaw Milosz suspects that Shestov's personal drama was in ‘lacking the 
talent to become a poet to approach the mystery of existence more directly than through 
mere concepts’.24
To summarise: one of our principal claims is that Shestov's widely criticized method, which 
consists of a seemingly arbitrary identification of an author with his heroes, is in fact an 
attempt (not necessarily recognised by Shestov himself) to expose the existing schism 
between ‘the pen’ and ‘the soul’, between the writer's ‘divine’ literary achievements and his 
real ‘earthly’ personality. It is our ambition in Part II to substantiate this claim by 
examining Shestov's critical writings on major Russian writers. We shall also engage in a 
consistent and coherent assessment of his method and subsequently of his conclusions.
22 John Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, The New York Review of Books, 14 (12) June 18, 1970, p. 
4.
23 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 37.
24 Milosz, p. 102.
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However, it is worth noting that while Shestov deems his conclusions ultimate and true, we 
point to their relativism, or rather we assert that the main value of his method is not in his 
conclusions as such, but in his daring attempt - novel in its intensity and concentration - of 
invading the very private, intimate area named ‘the writer versus his heroes’. By doing so 
he has not so much, as he invariably appeared to believe, ‘caught’ the writer and uncovered 
the true interpretation of his ideas, but highlighted the existence of the above schism 
between ‘pen’ and ‘soul’, of the literary problem of ‘to seem’ and ‘to be’.
This explains in particular why in his apparently arbitrary identification Shestov often 
rejects the ‘positive’ heroes as artificial and irrelevant (as being only a concession to public 
opinion and accepted norms) and interprets a writer via his ‘negative’ characters. However, 
the exposure of this schism is rather a by-product of Shestov's analysis. As we shall see, he 
always has his own agenda in his interpretation of writers. His selection of texts and 
characters, contrary to his own claims quoted above, are by no means arbitrary. His high 
subjectivity and tendentiousness, noted by Shestov scholars, have deep underlying causes 
which appear to be concealed in Shestov's biography. It is there that we shall seek a model 
for Shestov's interpretation of writers and their literary works. To this end, in the remaining 
two sections of this chapter we shall look attentively at Shestov's life and at his times with 
their dominant literary-philosophical currents that undoubtedly affected, if  not shaped, his 
views.
We shall then introduce, in the next chapter, an overview of Shestov's philosophical ideas 
without which it is impossible to understand his writings on Russian literature. 
Interestingly, there is a certain vicious circle concealed here, as Shestov drew and 
developed his philosophical ideas from this very literature, only to interpret that literature 
later on in such a way that it can be inscribed into his philosophy. In other words, Russian 
classical writers led him to his own original philosophical revelations, which he then 
‘rediscovered’ (or possibly re-invented) in their works.
As a result Shestov provided fresh and original interpretations of classical Russian writers; 
in his writings he introduced famous authors in a new light, as if without the veneer of
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traditional critical opinions. Like a skilful photographer, in order to reveal to the world 
what he deemed the true nature of his protagonists, he changed the angle of view, he 
rearranged their positions and adjusted the lighting accordingly. Having apparently 
portrayed them on his photograph, he at the same time created his very own image of them, 
which was sometimes unrecognisable to others. Moreover, or perhaps above all, from these 
unconventional images that he essentially created we can learn a great deal about Shestov 
himself.
1.2. Shestov's biography in relation to his model of interpreting a writer
In this section we shall trace the close connection between Lev Shestov's biography and the 
evolution of his ideas. We shall highlight some key aspects of his life which we deem a 
crucial contributory factor in the birth of Shestov's philosophy of tragedy. This will allow 
us to establish a system in Shestov's analysis of literary figures and consequently to provide 
a model for Shestov's interpretation of the writers under study. Thus our ambition here is 
not a mere exposition of Shestov's biography, but a critical reconstruction.
Before we start examining the facts of Shestov's life it is instructive to understand that 
Shestov's own approach to various thinkers that interested him was extremely personalised. 
As Milosz puts it, he was in ‘opposition to those who separate the propositions of a given 
man from his personal tragedy -  to those who, for instance, refuse to speak of 
Kierkegaard's sexual impotence or of Nietzsche's incurable disease’. In other words 
Shestov saw a causal connection between the existential experience of a thinker on the one 
hand and his philosophy on the other. Moreover, the personal life of an individual 
interested Shestov only in so far as it helped to uncover his inner world, his spiritual 
development. Sensational facts and cheap revelations were completely outside the scope of 
Shestov's interests. Thus he conducted his existential research into people's biographies at 
the highest moral level -  he simply viewed their lives as a spiritual journey, interlinked 
through their creative works with their systems of beliefs. That is why Michel Aucouturier 
quite rightly asserts that Shestov ‘is not trying to explain a literary piece, but seeks in it a 
confirmation of what the writer has lived through -  as the only guarantee of the
25 Milosz, p. 102.
24
philosophical value of the work. For true philosophy in his eyes can grow only out of an 
existential revelation’. Shestov himself liked to say that the really important things in 
people's biographies are not those exposed by researchers, but those hidden in small 
incidents, in certain crucial details which remain forever unknown. This belief Shestov 
carried through from his early idealistic phase to his mature period. ‘06cTOflTejn>Hbix 
6norpa(j)HH He 6i>iBaeT’, he wrote. ‘06biKHOBeHHO b >KH3HeonHcaHHJix HaM paccKa3biBaioT 
Bee, KpoMe Toro, hto Ba^ cHO 6luio 6bi y3HaTi>’. Therefore the only instructive pieces of 
evidence, he repeated, are writers' works supplied by the chronology, and your ov/n wit. In 
the same vein Boris de Schloezer wrote about Shestov that ‘what attracted him in a person 
was not those things that can be explained by some general causes, that can be reduced to 
the national or professional characteristics, but something particular, exceptional, 
inexplicable in the etymological sense of the term’. With the same approach in mind 
Schloezer suggested looking at Shestov himself. However, all things subjective grow out of 
an objective background which therefore cannot be ignored. Hence our ambition here is to 
consider both and distil one from the other.
Lev Shestov is the pen-name of Lev Isaakovich Shvartsman, a Russian Jew, bom in 1866 in 
Kiev to a big family of seven children. His father Isaak was a successful merchant- 
manufacturer of textiles who managed to develop a small shop into a large and famous 
business. The father was a Zionist and a religious scholar and believer, yet regarded as a 
free, even rebellious, spirit in the local Jewish religious community. Although his father's 
opinions on such issues of Judaism as marrying out were undoubtedly orthodox, he was 
nevertheless far from rigid in his overall attitudes and judgements. In fact he was even at 
one point under the threat of being expelled from the synagogue for his frivolous behaviour 
-  telling anecdotes, mocking religious fanatics and turning the synagogue into a club of 
sorts. At the same time he was a real connoisseur of ancient Hebrew and Jewish culture.
26 Aucouturier, p. 79.
27 Lev Shestov, Teopnecmeo w  nmezo in CoHmenuH e deyx moMcxx (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, p. 
186.
28 Schloezer, ‘Un Penseur Russe Leon Chestov’, p. 86.
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The figure of Isaak Shvartsman and the whole milieu in which their family life evolved 
provided an intellectual and cultural background for Shestov against which the shaping of 
his character took place. This background, it seems, was forever imprinted in Lev Shestov's 
personality as an inseparable mixture of earthly and heavenly, of the sober necessity to 
stand on your feet and a lofty aspiration of the soul. This rare blend of common sense and 
intense spiritual searching appears to us a striking feature of Shestov.
The Shvartsmans' household was generous and open to numerous visitors. Celebrated
Jewish scholars, writers, musicians and other cultural figures were their frequent guests. 
According to various memoirs Isaak Shvartsman was a witty and charismatic man. We can 
deduce from scattered pieces of indirect evidence that he was also an autocratic father. 
Indeed, he would not tolerate the disobedience of his oldest daughter Dora (by his first 
wife) who married a gentile, and cut off all connections with her. This was his attitude with 
respect to any of his children if they had any intentions of marrying out. He also behaved in 
a firm and uncompromising way when a disaster struck Shestov himself at the age of 12 -  a 
story that we shall discuss below. In other words, Isaak Shvartsman, in charge of his big 
family, behaved as a patriarch -  which was rather the norm at the time. Thus, in some 
sense, the independence of mind and rebellious tendencies of Shestov (who was the oldest 
of the sons) come as no surprise. His father's practical wisdom and intellectual wit must
also have served as suitable points of departure for the growing Lev.
Perhaps as a natural result of his upbringing Shestov throughout his life combined 
contradictory activities -  as it were the earthly and the heavenly, as we said above. Isaak 
Shvartsman never regarded Shestov's interest in philosophy and literary writings seriously 
and hoped that his son would follow in his footsteps and inherit the business. Shestov had 
indeed been involved in the family business almost throughout his entire life, even though 
he invariably viewed it as a burden and an obstacle to his vocation as a writer. Yet, he 
managed to combine his passionate philosophising with maintaining the family company. 
John Bayley writes that despite his irrationalist philosophy Shestov ‘remained himself a
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model of sanity and common sense’ -  the phenomenon that Bayley assigns to Shestov's
9 0‘remarkable and unique kind of cultural balance’.
It looks as if while growing up next to the best textiles in the country, he acquired a habit of 
being always well dressed, which again might have somewhat disguised the true image of 
his inner world. Interestingly Evgeniia Gertsyk mentions in her memoirs that he was
...TaicoH flejioBOH, KpemcHMH HoraMH c t o h ia h h  Ha 3eMJie. IIpHTpoHembCH k  ero pyicaBy -  
flobpoTHocTb t k b h h  HanoMHHT o ero dbiTOBbix KopHHX b  KHeBCKOM MaHy4)aKTypHOM Aene. Kor^a 
caAHTca k CTOJiy -  u ih p o k h m  x o 3 » h c k h m  acecTOM npHflBHHeT ce6e xjieb, Macjio, cbip... C h a h t , Tax 
c h a h t . Tax He noxoac Ha nTHHbH noBaAKH HHoro noaTa-tJjHjiocotJm: b o t -b o t  BcnopxHeT... Bo BceM 
ero objiHxe npocTOTa h  b t o  ace BpeMa MOHyMeHTanbHOCTb.30
Ironically perhaps, the way Shestov was turned out may have influenced Lev Tolstoy's 
misguided impression o f him after Shestov visited the famous Russian novelist in Yasnaia 
Poliana in March of 1 9 1 0 .  ‘C m c a b ih  napHKMaxep’, was the remark that Tolstoy made, and 
explained this comparison: ‘npHHUio b roAOBy, m o a h l ih  o h ,  HmxapHbiH -  h  b c h o m h h a c h  
napHKMaxep H3 M o c k b b i Ha cBaAtfie y AflAH-MyacHKa b AepeBHe. CaMbie nynuiHe MaHepti h  
AAHCte nnameT, OTnero h  npe3HpaeT Bcex’ .31
In reality Lev Shestov was very far from despising mankind. Every record about him that 
has survived to this day, sometimes by very different people, tells us of his extremely 
generous, helpful and pure personality that was invariably attractive to others. ‘B ero 
OTHOHieHHH K 6AH3KHM eMy AIOAAM HH TeHH n03bl HAH AHTepaTypHOrO yHHTeABCTBa (b Te 
roAti 3to  b AHKOBHHy) -  npocTo AodpoTa h AeAOBHTaA 3 a6 oTAHBocTb’ ,32 writes Gertsyk.
Amongst the examples she gives are assistance to free someone from unjust imprisonment, 
arranging a period of study abroad, finding an editor, sorting out family dramas and helping
29 Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, p. 2.
30 Evgeniia Gertsyk, 1Bochomuhcihm (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1973), p. 103. Cited in Baranova- 
Shestova, I, p. 94.
31 Maxim Gorkii, Lev Tolstoi (Letchworth: Bradda Books, 1966), pp. 58-59. Cited in Baranova- 
Shestova, I, p. 106.
32 Gertsyk, p. 110. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 94.
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people financially. ‘3 b o h o k .  Oh b nepeAHeH -  h Jinua AobpeiOT’, Gertsyk recollects. ‘H oth 
a io a h ,  nopofi cnopHBiHHe Apyr c ApyroM a o  ocTepBeHeHHA, Bee c x o a h j ih c b  Ha CHMnaraH k 
UlecTOBy, Ha KaKOH-TO ocobeHHOH fiepexcHOCTH k HeMy’,33 she points out referring to a 
circle o f friends which included Viacheslav Ivanov, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Gershenzon and 
others.
Sergei Bulgakov wrote about Shestov that it was impossible not to love him even if you 
were his firm ideological opponent:
IIIecTOBa Hejib3H 6 bino He JiiobHTb, Aaace co bc cm  He pa3AejiHH ero MHpoB033peHHa, h He yBaacaTb b 
HeM OTBa>KHoro HCKaTejia h c t h h m . JI. H . obnaAaA jih h h o h  onapoBaTenbHOCTbio HeoTpa3HMOH. 
Hejib3« 6 buio He paAOBaTbca eMy npH BCTpene, KaK s t o  a HaSjuoAaji Ha pa3Hbix AHuax, no 
MHp0B033peHHK> HHHerO o6 merO C HHM He HMeBUIHX. 3 t 0  06 'baCHaeTCfl, BepoaTHO, yAHBHTeAbHbIM 
AapoM cepAua, ero napyiomeH AobpoTOH h  OnaroBoneHHeM. O ho  cocTaBAAAO o c h o b h o h  t o h  ero
OTHOIIieHHA K AIOA^M, npH  OTCyTCTBHH AHHHOrO COpeBHOBBHHA (HTO peAKO BCTpeHaeTCH B HaUieM  
AHTepaTypHOM M H pe), HO 3TO COeAHHAAOCb C TBepAbIM CTOAHHeM 3a  CBOH AyXOBHbie AOCTHACeHHA. 
CTpaHHO 6bIAO AyM aTb, HTO nO A  3THM nOKpOBOM CKpblBaACA AyX, SecnpeCTaH H O  SopKDIAHHCa 3a  
B ep y . [ . . .]  ...Kax noK a3biB aeT  B binncK a H3 n n cb M a , KOTopoe o h  n p n c n a n  MHe neTOM 1 9 3 8  r.: 
“ H yacH bi BeAHHaHiiiHe ycH AH a A y x a , h to 6 m  ocB ob oA H T b ca  o t  K ouiM apa 6 e3 6 o x cH a  h  H eB ep n a , 
O B A aA eB inero H enoBenecTBO M ” .34
In this connection it is interesting to note that while Shestov's religiousity is obvious, his 
confessional choice still remains somewhat obscure to scholars. For instance, Milosz 
writes: ‘We know nothing about his confessional options and not much about the intensity
c
o f his personal faith’. This, in fact, is not entirely correct, as Shestov clearly treated both 
Old and New Testaments as the ultimate source o f  truth. Indeed, Vasilii Zenkovsky writes 
in a more affirmative fashion: ‘Mm He 3HaeM a o c t b t o h h o  coAepacaHHA ero BepoBaHHH, 
x o t a  He b yA eT  b o A b m o n  o h ih 6 k o h  CKa3aTB, h t o  o h  npHHHMaA h  B c t x h h  h  H o b b ih  3aB eT , 
b o  b c a k o m  cnynae, y Hero ecTb HeMano BMCKa3MBaHHH, roBopamnx 0  npHHATHH hm  
xpHCTHaHCKoro OTKpoBeHHA’. Judaism and Christianity were the dominant confessions
33 Gertsyk, p. 111-112. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 131.
34 Sergei Bulgakov, ‘HeKOTopbie nepTbi peAHrno3Horo MHpoB033peHHA JIbBa LUecTOBa’, 
CoepejvteHHbie 3anucKu, No 68, 1939, 305-323, p. 305, 319. Cited in German Lovtskii, ‘JleB 
IIIecTOB no m o h m  BocnoMHHaHHAM’, Grani (Frankfurt on Mein), no 45 (1.01.1960), pp. 78-98, and 
46 (1.04.1960), pp. 123-141 (p. 125).
35 Milosz, p. 118
36 Zenkovskii, II, p. 371
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that preoccupied Shestov most of his life, although he did not, indeed, indicate a clear and 
firm personal preference for either. He also kept an open mind about other religions and 
towards the end of his life became very interested in Hinduism. When he died there were 
two books by his bedside: The Bible and a book on Hinduism: The Vedanta system. What is 
clear, however, is that Shestov certainly was a deeply religious person, as his passionate 
philosophical writings demonstrate, even though his faith may not have had a definite 
confessional embodiment.
As far as his Jewish roots are concerned, it is somewhat surprising that in the Shvartsmans' 
home Shabbath was not kept, but their poor relation, who lived in, did hold this weekly 
celebration. This apparently made a lasting impression on the ten year-old Lev who
17
‘npnfieraji k Hen h  cjiymaji, h t o  OHa eMy HHTajia h  roBopHjia, jiio 6 h ji  ee npocTyio Bepy’, 
as Baranova-Shestova writes in her book. She mentions as well how Shestov was also 
impelled by an incidental encounter with the Russian Orthodox Church: ‘Pa3 o h  cjiyHaimo 
3ameji b  npaBocjiaBHyio uepKOBB. EMy Tax noHpaBHjiacb THinHHa, ropam ne jiaMna^xn, Bca 
oficTaHOBKa, h t o  o h  nmxajieji, h t o  o t o  He ero uepxoBb, r^e, eMy Ka3ajioct, 6 b u io  6 b i  Tax
-JO
xopomo m o j ih t b c h ’ . He compared unfavourably the simplicity and poverty of the 
synagogue with the festive religious ceremonies of Russian Orthodoxy. At the time he 
could have been easily converted, he confessed, if there had been some enthusiastic monk 
to attempt the conversion. It is interesting to mention in this connection that years later 
Shestov’s daughters by his Russian Orthodox wife were baptised with his consent.
On the subject of Shestov's attitude to Judaism an instructive account is given in 
Shteinberg's memoirs. From the words of Lev Shestov in his old age, quoted by Shteinberg, 
it follows that practising Judaic traditions met a definite rejection in Shestov as being a 
manifestation of a scholastic and hollow interpretation of the obligations of a religious 
faith. The very spirit of fastidiousness, of incredible precision and thorough diligence in 
Shestov's mind ran into contradiction with the nature of Truth:
37 Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 5
38 Unpublished part of Lovtskii’s memoirs. Cited in Baranova, I, p. 5.
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Bbi b o t  Bee renaejibSeprcKOH t o h h o c t h  AobHBaeTecb... BbiHHCJieHHe 6ecK0HeHH0 Manbix... 
KaTeropHnecKHH HMneparaB... HToObi pH3bi 6e3 e^HHoro mnmiiiiKa! [...] 3 t o  y Bac 
npHpoacfleHHbiH pHTyanH3M -  KomepHaa nnma: [ . . . ]  h to O m , He aaft Bor, He nonana b m h c h o h  cyn 
Kanjia MOJioKa... [...] 6y,m> Bbi m ohm  cm h o m  [...] h 6bi CTOJiKHyji Bac co CTe3H npaBeAHoft. Ho h t o  
roBopHTb! Tenepb yac, BepoaTHO, no3AHo, Aa a  h  caM yace He c o b c t h h k  caMOMy ce6e.39
In the same conversation they talked about Shestov's possible visit to Palestine and his 
hesitation as to whether to take up the invitation. Shteinberg, who had always been a 
practising Jew, was strongly in favour of this trip and generally advocated Judaic attitudes 
to any spiritual and practical matters. In a somewhat provocative way he even accused 
Shestov of being a Jew under a Hellenistic disguise, which caused a definite protest in the 
latter. In this regard a suggestion of Sidney Monas that ‘...Shestov was, in some not very 
orthodox sense, a Jew and a Christian’40 seems closer to the truth and is interlinked with 
our observations above on the nature of Shestov's beliefs. In fact, shortly before his death 
Shestov wrote in his letter to Sergei Bulgakov the following remarkable lines: ‘finx mchh 
npoTHBonojioacHocTH Me5KAy Bctxhm h Hobmm 3aBeTOM BcerAa Ka3ajiHCb mhhmmmh’.41
Yet, Monas also wrote that ‘it is tempting to see a connection between Shestov's work and 
the Jewish mystical tradition that must have been somewhere an intimate part of his 
background and milieu’42 and assigned Shestov in philosophical terms to Hassidism, or 
rather to its spirit -  claims which we will address in the next chapter when discussing 
Shestov's philosophy more closely. However, here we would like to say that while there are 
indeed some common features inherent in both -  Hassidism and Shestov's thought -  the 
origins of such proximity are hardly to be found in Shestov's cultural upbringing. In the 
light of the above evidence the conjectures of Monas regarding this point seem to be far­
fetched and largely speculative, even though atmospherically Shestov’s philosophising may 
indeed display some proximity to the spontaneity of Hassidic tradition. However, when 
viewed against the evidence from Shestov's life that we outlined above, Monas’s assertions
39 A. Z. Shteinberg, ‘JleB LUecTOB’ (Fragments of the chapter in Shteinberg’s book of memoirs 
Jlpy3bM m o u x  pmHux Jiem (1911-1928) (Paris: Sintaxis, 1991)) in Lev Shestov, CoHuueum e deyx 
moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), I , pp. 493-510 (pp. 505-506).
40 Sidney Monas, ‘New Introduction’ in Lev Shestov, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1969), pp. v-xxiv (p. xiv).
41 Shestov’s letter to Sergei Bulgakov of 26.10.1938. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 193.
42 Monas, p. viii.
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appear ungrounded, or at least disproportionately exaggerated. Shestov's deep affinity first 
and foremost to Russian literature with its strong underlying Christian orientation also 
testifies against them. More importantly, his remarkable unification of the two Testaments 
undermines his alleged bias towards Jewish mysticism. John Bayley's observation, quoted 
above, about Shestov's remarkable and unique cultural balance, in our opinion, portrays the 
situation much more adequately than Monas's suggestion which, by the way, he himself 
phrases so carefully, as if to avoid investing it with too much credibility.
Similarly, Czeslaw Milosz succumbs to the same temptation, it seems, implying that 
because ‘in Kiev Shestov absorbed Jewish religious literature, including legends and 
folklore, at an early age’,43 as opposed to the areligious upbringing of Simone Weil's (who 
was also Jewish by birth), their loyalties were split respectively between Jerusalem 
(Shestov) and Athens (Weil). To us, although Shestov's early exposure to his Jewish milieu 
is, of course, undeniable, we do not think that it automatically gives us the right to play up 
its role in Shestov's outlook on life. Schloezer's approach of essentially placing Shestov 
beyond, or rather above, narrow national and confessional boundaries,44 seems to us much 
more productive in this respect.
Indeed, Shestov grew up being both very sensitive and open to the outside world and the 
intellectual currents of the epoch. He was well-educated -  in gymnasiums in Kiev and 
Moscow and then in Moscow University. In Baranova-Shestova's book he is described as 
an extremely able youngster, full of inner spiritual strength and being in search of a noble 
cause to which to apply his potential. However, quite early in life he experienced an 
extraordinary upheaval. His great-nephew Igor Balakhovsky writes about it in his article on 
Shestov, tracing Shestov’s deep interest in the tragic to this frightening experience of his 
teens:
y»cacsi >k h3h h , jiHUib cpeflHecTaTHCTHHecKHe jyvi MHornx, AJia HeKOTopbix Bcerfla peajibHOCTb, 
TeM Sojiee y^cacHaa, hto  o h h , 3t h  “HeKOTopbie” , HCKjuoneHHe Ha obmeM 4>OHe, x o t b  6bi 
OTHOCHTejibHoro SjiaronojiyHHfl. Ha/jejieHHbiH hchbm m  h  npoHHuaTejibHbiM yMOM 12 jic th h h  Jlejia
43 Milosz, p. 114.
44 Schloezer, ‘ Un Penseur Russe Leon Chestov’, p. 86.
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LLlBapijMaH, SyA ym H H  JleB HcaKOBHH IIIecTO B, b nojiHOH M epe no3H aji 3 t h  y a ca cb i, x o r f la  e r o  
noxHTHJia H eH3BecTHaa r p y n n a , b h a h m o  a H a p x H H ecx o ro  H anpaB JieH na, H aflencb  nojiyH H Tb BbiKyn. 
O T eu , SoraT biH  k h c b c k h h  x y n e u ,  npoHBHji T B epflocT b , f leH er  He fla n  h  n e p e 3  TpH M ec a u a  pebeH O x  
BepHyjICH flOMOH, 5XHBOH H HeBpeflHMblH, HO CXOJIbXO nepOXHBIIIHH! TaKOBa 0(f)HHHaJIbHaa 
6Horpa(J)HB, a Heo(J)HUHajibHoe n p e f la m ie  flo 6 a B jia eT , h t o  B ee  s t o  He T ax  npocT O  -  ManbHHK M or  
HrpaTb b “ n o x n m e H H e ”  x a x  f lp y r a e  nrpaiO T  b x a 3 a xoB -p a36oH H H xoB . K a x , n o c j ie  3 T o r o , He H cxaTb  
b caM b ix  o6biH H bix, n oB ceflH eB H b ix  B e m a x  rp o 3 H b in  npH 3H ax nero-T O  H ecoxpyu iH M O  y a c a cH o ro ,  
n p a H y m e r o c a  n o  yrnaM  h  roT O B oro BbicxoHHTb b j h o 6 o h  m o m c h t? 45
Yet, this event was only a warning of fate, a rehearsal as it were for Shestov’s future entry 
into the realm of tragedy. The subsequent decade, however does not suggest any unusual 
changes in the evolution of Shestov’s psychology or of his intellectual predilections. Like 
many advanced young men of his generation Shestov was fond of Marxism and full of 
idealism. His study at Moscow University which started in 1884 with the course in 
mathematics subsequently changed into a study of law and eventually resulted in a 
dissertation in law which concerned the conditions of the Russian working class and the 
new Factory Legislation. This dissertation remained undefended because it was found too- 
left-wing. However, with the rise of Bolshevism Shestov's views changed completely and 
in 1920 he emigrated from Russia and settled in Paris. It is then that he wrote his only 
political book What is Russian Bolshevism?. Except for this single incident and for his 
student past, social and political issues remained almost completely outside the scope of 
Shestov’s interests as reflected in his books and articles, which he started to write in the 
mid-1890s -  while still in Russia. At the time they took the form of literary criticism, 
although they were increasingly and unstoppably turning into philosophical essays.
In 1897 Shestov married a Russian Orthodox woman Anna Berezovskaia, by whom he had 
two daughters -  Tatiana, bom in 1897 and Natalia, bom in 1900. However, since his wife 
was not Jewish Shestov kept his marriage secret from his parents in the fear that they would 
be devastated, especially the father with his orthodox views on Jewish marriage, given that 
he had already been mortally wounded once when his oldest daughter Dora had married
45 Igor’ Balakhovskii, ‘JJoxa3aTejibCTBO ot  abcypfla’, in Leon Chestov. Un philosophe pas comme 
les autres?, Cahiers de l’emigration russe 3 (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Slaves, 1996), pp. 41-70 (p. 
49).
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out. Interestingly, a year earlier -  in 1896 -  Shestov already had the intention of marrying a 
gentile (Nastia Malakhova-Mirovich), but it fell through due to his parents' violent 
opposition. However, Shestov did ultimately go against their will and only revealed the 
existence of his family to his mother after his father's death in 1914. However, again an 
alternative story, or rather a family legend, says that his mother knew all along, whereas his 
father genuinely did not and never found out.
It was therefore a difficult life full of forced separations in order to hide from Shestov’s 
parents the existence of his family. For some years he lived in Kiev while his wife and 
daughters stayed abroad. However, it was a stable long-distance relationship whereby 
Shestov, whenever possible, would go to see his family, supported them financially and 
was in regular correspondence with his wife. They were only able to re-unite more than a 
decade later, and after the turbulent years of the war and revolutions their life eventually 
settled in emigration. There Shestov was gradually recognised in French intellectual circles, 
taught as a professor of philosophy in the Russian extension of the Sorbonne and was a 
member of various European societies of cultural and philosophical orientation. He was 
personally acquainted with and held in high esteem by many celebrated Western 
intellectuals. During this period his philosophy significantly strengthened and developed 
without undergoing, arguably, any drastic turns. It is then, in emigration, especially after 
1922, that he wrote his most significant philosophical works. As Monas writes, ‘Camus 
owed him something, as did Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’,46 and Rayfield puts it even more 
strongly: ‘What would Sartre and Camus have written if Shestov had not existed?’.47 
Shestov died in Paris in 1938 having left behind numerous writings, most of which are 
translated into different languages. Nevertheless, in his very personal and passionate search 
for the ultimate truth Shestov remained largely alone and his voice was crying in the 
wilderness. He undoubtedly knew that (and even used the latter phrase as a subtitle for one 
of his books).
46 Monas, p. v.
47 P. D. Rayfield, ‘Introduction’ to Ivanov-Razumnik, On the Meaning of Life (Letchworth, 
England: Bradda Books Ltd, 1971), pp. v-viii (p. vi).
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These are the main facts of Shestov’s biography which, according to his own perception, 
shed, indeed, very little light onto the origins of his philosophy and the evolution of his 
ideas, including in particular the questions we are pursuing -  Shestov’s treatment of 
Russian literature. On the other hand, we did make a few omissions in the above exposition 
of the factual texture of Shestov’s life, and what we have so far suppressed may hold a key 
to our quest.
In addition to his two daughters Shestov also had a son, who was an illegitimate child by 
Aniuta Listopadova -  a maid in the wealthy Shestovs' household. This happened in about 
1892, long before Shestov married. Once again the woman was a gentile. Their son, Sergei 
Shestov, first lived with his mother in Moscow and then in the family of a Moscow 
journalist. He was killed young in the First World War. For Lev Shestov this was a major 
tragedy, as the father and the son were apparently very close. Sergei Shestov is mentioned 
in Pasternak’s prose OxpannaH zpaMoma,48 whereas there is no mention of the mother 
virtually anywhere.
In 1895 (when Sergei should have been roughly three) Shestov had a major mental and 
spiritual crisis which resulted in a nervous disease and his going abroad for treatment. 
Some sources suggest that it was caused by him having to take over the failing business 
from his father -  in an atmosphere where he felt totally suffocated. However, others hint at 
something much more personal and profound, but allegedly no-one knows for sure what 
exactly happened. M ore precisely, Baranova-Shestova writes: ‘HeKOTOptie H3 apy3eH 
IXIecTOBa, BepoaTHO, c ero cjiob  3Hajm o TparHuecKOM c o 6 l it h h , h  ynoMHHaHna o HeM 
BCTpeuaiOTca b  h x  pafioTax, h o  b  neM h m c h h o  3aKJiioHajiacb Tpareana, o h h , o h c b h ^ h o , He 
3HajiH’.49 This in a way is supported by Shestov’s own words from his ffneenuK Mbicneu 
about the m ost significant things in one's life: ‘o h h x  ace h h k t o , KpoMe Te6a, HHHero He 
3HaeT’.50 However, the memoirs o f  Shestov’s friends remain, in our view, rather
48 Boris Pasternak, OxpaHHcm epcmoma (Roma: Ed. Aquario, 1970), p.80. Cited in Baranova- 
Shestova, I, p. 21.
49 Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 22.
50 Lev Shestov, ‘^ hcbhhk Mbicjien’, KoHmuHenm, (8) 1976, pp. 235-252 (p. 252, entry of
11.06.1920).
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inconclusive with respect to the extent o f  their knowledge on the matter. For example, from 
the following recollections by Gertsyk, very carefully phrased, it is impossible to deduce 
unambiguously how much she actually knew: ‘3 t o t  TaxoH h h c t b ih  HejioBeK5, she writes 
referring to Shestov, ‘Hec Ha c o bc c t h  cjio5KHyio, He BnojiHe o6biHHyio OTBeTCTBeHHOCTB, o t  
KOTOpOH M03KeT 6bm> h  rayjiHCb ero njienn, h  rjiyboKHe MopmHHbi Tax paHO cocTapnjiH 
ero... 3 t o  6 bijio  BpeMa rjiySonaHuiero OTHaaHHJi JIbBa HcaaKOBnna, ero BHyTpeHHen 
KaTacTpo(j)bi\51 Moreover, when Gertsyk describes Shestov more than twenty years later, 
following the tragic death o f his son, she implicitly refers again to the previous mysterious 
tragedy o f 1895 by saying about his face that it was ‘Bee to  ace. He noTOMy jih , h t o  cxop6b 
yac npoBena pa3 HaBceraa Bee 6opo3flbi -  rjiy6ace Hejib3a, ropme Hejn>3H...\ Shestov's 
close friend A. M. Lazarev describes what happened in 1895 as ‘h c h t o  [ . . . ]  CTpauiHoe’, as
C *3
‘TaacKoe coSbrrae’, and his words are repeated by Zenkovsky and Baranova-Shestova. 
Shestov himself refers to this date in his ffneenuK Mbicneu written 25 years later by an 
allusion to Shakespeare: ‘pacnajiacb c bh 3b  BpeMeH’.54
Looking at the chronology and the circumstances it is not unreasonable to suppose that this 
deep crisis could have been connected to the fate of Sergei Shestov's mother: either she 
died, or she might even have committed suicide. However, while this was our initial 
conjecture which was still to be substantiated by getting, if at all existent, the appropriate 
archival evidence, we are now inclined to reject it in the light of the evidence from 
Shestov’s letter written to his friend Varvara Grigor’evna Malakhova-Mirovich in April 
1896. In this letter Shestov writes: ‘EbmaiOT rpycTHbie HacTpoeHHH -  h o  o h h  othocjttcb k  
TOMy npoKjMTOMy cjiynaio, KOTOpbiH Haaejian ct o jib k o  6qr b  Moeh 5k h 3h h ’ .55 For a pure 
and noble person, which Shestov undoubtedly was, such phrasing would be incompatible 
with a tragic fate of Anna Listopadova. It is therefore much more likely that the very
51 Gertsyk, pp. 102,106. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 22.
52 Ibid, pp. 112-113. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 148.
53 A. M. Lazarev [Adolphe Lazareff], ‘La Philosophic de Leon Chestov’ in Vie et connaissance 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), p. 11. Cited in Zenkovskii, II, p. 369 and in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 22. The 
phrase in the French edition reads ‘il lui est arrive quelque chose de plus terrible’.
54 Lev Shestov, ‘Journal de mes pensees’ (‘/fHeBHHK MbicneH’), transl. Blanche Bronstein-Vinaver, 
Le Beffroi, Revue Philosophique et litteraire, I, December 1986, pp. 9-30 (p. 30). Cited in 
Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 23.
55 The letter cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 24.
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situation with its awkwardness and burdening shame and responsibility was a cause for 
Shestov’s breakdown at the time. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of certain 
tragic incidents taking place as a consequence of this situation. In the entry from his 
JJneeHUK Mbicneu Shestov actually gives the time-frame for this dramatic happening in his 
life -  the beginning of September 1895. This, together with the above phrasing, refutes the 
above suggestions of some scholars that Shestov's crisis was simply due to the excessive 
stress induced by his obligatory involvement with his father's business. Instead the lines 
from his letter and his diary clearly point to some concrete event, some irreversible 
personal deed at which Shestov looks back with a mixture of annoyance and deep regret. 
The burden of business involvement could have served, in our opinion, as an aggravating 
circumstance, but no more than that.
I g o r  B a l a k h o v s k y  v i e w s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a  s i m i l a r  v e i n :  ‘O x o t h o  a o n y c x a i o ’ , h e  w r i t e s ,  ‘h t o  
ZUifl J I b B a  H c a K O B H H a  [ . . . ]  c o 3 H a H n e  t o t o ,  h t o  c b ih  b  r j i a 3 a x  oG m ecT B a  H e  6 b iJ i  e r o  c b ih o m ,  
h t o  o h  n o T O M y  T a x o H  “ B e e t  H3f le p r a H H b iH ” , h t o  e M y  “ B 0 3 a y x  M e p a io T  T a x  5xajio6H O  h  
C K y n o ”  (T iO T H e B )  6 b u i o  H e 3 a 3 X H B a io m e H  p a H o n ’ .56 I t  i s  t h i s  c r i s i s ,  B a l a k h o v s k y  t h i n k s ,  t h a t  
o p e n e d  S h e s t o v ' s  e y e s  t o  t h e  ‘ c T p a u m y i o  6 e 3 f l H y ,  o x p y a c a i o m y i o  B c e x  H a c ,  6 e 3 a H y ,  
3 a r j ia H y B  b K O T O p y io , n e j iO B e x  c T a H O B H T c a  (J)hjioco(})Om H e  “ o t  y z n iB j ie H H fl” , x a x  c H H T a n  
A p H C T O T e jib , a  “ o t  O T H a a H H a ’” .57 H o w e v e r ,  B a l a k h o v s k y  a l s o  t h i n k s  t h a t  S h e s t o v  w a s  b y  
n a t u r e  p r e d i s p o s e d  t o  a  t r a g i c  o u t l o o k  o n  l i f e :
B p a n H  x o p o r n o  3H aioT, h t o  jiio ^ h  BnaaaiO T b a e n p e c c m o  He noTOM y, h t o  a n a  3 T o ro  ecT b  B H eim w a  
npHHHHa, a  noTOM y, h t o  TaxoBO  h x  B H yrpeH H ee, o n a o r e H H o e  y c T p o n cT B o . H  ecjiH  IIIecTO B TpaTHT 
CTOJTbKO CHJI, HK>6bI CMblBBB TOJICTblH rpHM, nOKa3bIBaTb, HTO (|)HJ10C0(1)RH MHOrHX BeJIHXHX JlIOfleH 
3 t o  4>Hjioco(J)Ha OTHanHBH, t o  TOJibxo noTOM y, h t o  o h  caM  npHHa/UTe>KHT x  3 t o h  t k q  n o p o a e  h  a a x ce  
xax-TO  r o p a n T c a  3 t h m . 58
The above suggestion of Balakhovsky lays the ground for modelling Shestov’s 
interpretation of the literary figures he wrote about. Indeed, Shestov's own attitude to 
human life and thought was certainly first and foremost existential. His approach is perhaps
56 Balakhovskii, p. 50.
57 Ibid, p . 5 0 .
58 Balakhovskii, p. 50.
36
best exemplified by the importance he attributed to a single tragic event in an individual’s 
life which served as a life-changing experience. On this issue we would side with 
Balakhovsky and definitely argue against John Bayley's unsubstantiated assertion that 
Shestov himself ‘underwent no tormenting spiritual pilgrimages like those of Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky’ and ‘had no pretensions to anguish’.59 On the contrary, putting together 
Shestov's close attention to existential details with his own personal crisis leads us to 
presume that the reason for such a biased approach to other biographies is precisely because 
he himself underwent such a tragic transformation of convictions. This, indeed, provides a 
natural explanation as to why he was inclined to view everyone's biography and inner 
world in the same light -  as being transformed by a catastrophe -  no matter whether visible 
and tangible to others or only to the person him self. It is in these existential details that he 
must have seen the keys to unlocking the life and personality of the writer.
An especially explicit example is Shestov's interpretation of the origins of Plato's 
philosophy. He asserts:
H c t o h h h k o m  e r o  [IlaaT O H a] T B opnecT B a h b ju h o t c b  He T o a b x o  H a en  C o x p a T a , H a c a e a n e ,  
n o jiy n e H H o e  o t  paH brne H ero  m c h b iu h x , h  cob cT B eH H oe a ap oB aH H e, h o  He b  M eH biuen , a  M oaceT  
6biT b, b  b o jib u ie ft  e m e  M epe Te o c o b b ie  nepeacH BaH H a, KOTOpbie n p o b y a n a H  h  a o B e a n  b  h S m  a o  
T a x o r o  x p aH H ero  H anpaaceH H a e r o  MeTa(J)H3HHecxyK> n o T p eb H o cT b . K a ico e  3 t o  nep eacH B aH n e?  Bee 
b e 3  KOJiebaHHa M o ry r  co ra a cH O  oTBeTHTb Ha s t o t  B o n p o c :  CMepTb C o x p a T a . [ . . . ]  H ecoM H eH H O , 
h t o  CMepTb C o x p a T a  n o T p a c a a  H ecabixaH H O  a y u iy  M o a o a o r o  IlnaT O H a h  3acT aB H aa e r o  c  h o b o h , 
apyrH M  HenOHaTHOH H CTpaHHOH CRJIOH CTBBHTb 4>HaOCO(f>CKHe BOnpOCbl.60
In the same way Shestov talks about Nietzsche's tragic experience, reconstructing the 
thoughts of the latter. Nietzsche, Shestov writes, should have naturally said to himself:
. . .o a H H  T a a c ea b iH  y a a p  c y a b b b i ,  n p o cT O H , o p a n H a p H b iH , r a y n b in  c a y n a n ,  H e c a a c T b e , x o T o p o e  
M o r a o  b b i npHKJiioHHTbCH c o  b c jik h m , c BeaHKHM  h  c M aabiM  c e r o  M H pa -  h  a  B a p y r  y b e a c a a io c b ,  
h t o  t o t  3ro H 3 M , K O T o p o ro  a  H H K o ra a  b  c e b e  H e n o a o 3 p e B a a ,  cBOHCTBeH MHe T a x  a c e , x a x  h  
obbixH O BeH H W M  CM epTHbiM . He 3H3HHT a n ,  h t o  h  B e e  a p y r u e  y H H T ea a  n p H T B o p a iO T c a , h t o  h  o h h , 
x o r a a  B e m a io T  o b  h c t h h c , a o b p e ,  a io b B H , M H a o c e p a n H  -  T o a b x o  n rp a iO T  T o p a ce cT B e H H y ro  p o a b ,  -  
x t o  a o b p o c o B e c T H O  h  b  H eB eaeH H H , x a x  x o r a a -T O  a ,  a  x t o , M oaceT  b b m > , H e a o b p o c o B e c T H O  h
59 Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, p. 1.
60 Lev Shestov, Jlexijuu no ucmopuu epenecKou (frujiococpuu (Moscow-Paris: Russkii Put' -  YMCA- 
Press, 2001), p. 130.
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C03HaTeJIbH0? He 3HaHHT JIM, HTO Bee BeJlHKHe H CBHTbie J1IOAM, eCJIH 6bl MX nOCTaBHTb Ha MOe 
MecTO, Tax 7Ke  Mano m o t jih  yrem H Tbca c b o h m h  HCTHHaMH, x a x  h  a? H  h t o , x o m a  o h m  roBopHjiH o  
jh o 6 b h , caMono^cepTBOBaHHH, caMooTpeneHHH, n o #  b c c m h  h x  KpacHBbiMH 4>pa3aMH, x a x  3Mea b  
UBeTax, cxpbiB anca t o t  ace npoxiiHTbiH 3roH3M, xoTopbiH si Tax HeoxcHAaHHO OTxpwji b  c e 6 e  h  c 
xoTopbiM h Tax 6e3yM H0 h  Tax H anpacH o 6op iocb ?"  3 T a  Mbicub, eme HeacHaa, MoaceT 6biTb, aaace  
He Mbicub, a h h c t h h x t , onpeAejiHJia c o 6 o k > xapaxT ep  SjiHxcaHiiiHx HcxaHHH Hnmne.61
Numerous examples of this kind are scattered throughout Shestov's works. They testify in 
favour of the above assertions that he attributed a vital significance to a turning point in a 
biography, to a sudden rupture in someone's life, to a tragedy - whether it had a concrete 
and immediate embodiment or was of a hidden and slow-acting nature. Moreover, he was 
convinced, it seems, of the invariable existence of such a rupture and viewed it almost as 
his personal mission to uncover it.
Along these lines Shestov's first book Shakespeare and his critic Brandes serves as a very 
important point of departure, since it demonstrates how his philosophy originated from 
idealism and dogmatism, only to take later an irreversible turn in the completely opposite 
direction. Looking at Shestov's treatment of Shakespeare over time we can see very clearly 
the evolution of his own convictions -  from believing in the sense and meaning of 
existence to entering an eternal struggle against cruel, senseless and indifferent necessity. 
Between these opposite beliefs the rupture in Shestov’s own life took place, and the 
philosophy of tragedy was bom. Shakespeare and his critic Brandes was, by a precise 
formulation of Ivanov-Razumnik, the last (and therefore especially passionate) expression 
of faith before the ultimate faithlessness: ‘nepea oxoHnaTejibHbiM HeBepneM ocofieHHo 
ropana fibreaeT nocjiemnui Bcnbimxa Bepbi’62 are Ivanov-Razumnik’s precise words. By 
faith he means here not a religious faith, of course, but a collection of idealistic beliefs. 
Shestov himself describes it in the following words: ‘il Toiyja eme ctohji Ha Tonxe 3peHHH 
Mopajm, xoTopyio BCxopocTH ocTaBHji. Ho yjxe h  T o iy ja  3Ta Tomca 3peHHfl aomjia JXo 
Taxoro Haxajia, h to  m o jx h o  6 bijio  npeflBH/jeTb, h to  paMbi HannHaiOT TpecxaTbca’.63
61 Lev Shestov, ffocmoeecKuu u Huijiue: <ftwioco<pux mpaeeduu in ConuHenwi e deyx moMax 
(Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), I, p. 424.
62 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 201.
63 Benjamin Fondane, Rencontres avec Leon Chestov (Paris: Plasma, 1982), p. 85.
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The breaking point lies between this first book of Shestov and his subsequent books, 
marking a total re-evaluation of all his values. In his first book Shestov justified life with all 
its horrors; he saw in Shakespeare the great power of life-assertiveness despite the tragedy 
that the world order is steeped in. In his later writings Shestov exclaimed, on the contrary, 
that Shakespeare does not give a single satisfactory answer to ‘the accursed questions’ of 
existence: ‘y IIIexcnHpa [...] Tax MHoro CTpaniHbix BonpocoB h h h  oflHoro
yzjOBJieTBopHTejiLHoro OTBeTa’.64 Ivanov-Razumnik spells out the obvious truth that 
Shestov used Shakespeare only as a cover behind which to hide his own self. He writes,
Korvja IIIeKcnHp nucan CBoero TaMjieTa, roBopHT JleB IIIecTOB ... t o  a jib  Hero “Ilajia cB»3b BpeMeH 
[ . . .]  3 t o  3HanHT - npeacHaa, 6ecco3HaTejibHaa, flajomaacfl HaM BceM AapOM Bepa b 
uejiecoo6pa3HOCTb h  ocMbicjieHHOCTb HejiOBenecxoH 5KH3HH pyuiHjiacb. HyacHO ceftnac ace, 
H eM edneuH o  H airra HOByio Bepy - HHane 5KH3Hb obpamaeTca b HenpepbiBHyio, HeBbmocHMyio 
nbiTKy. Ho xax s t o  CAejiaTb? T^e H airra  Bepy? H ecTb j ih  Taxaa Bepa Ha 3eMJie? ... OrBeT He 
TOJibxo He npuaeT ceiiHac, h o  He npnaeT h  nepe3 MHorae roabi, a UlexcnHp [...] 6y.neT ncHTb c 
co3HaHHeM, h t o  Hero Bee norwSjio, h  h t o  Bee OTBeTbi, xorna-jra6o AaBaBumecfl Ha 
raMJieTOBCKHH Bonpoc - SbuiH jiHnib nycTbiMH cjioBaMH”.65
‘3^ecb Bcio^y nnmeTca “IIIexcnHp”, a npoH3HOCHTca “JleB IIIecTOB’” , Ivanov-Razumnik 
summarises, and adds that ‘jiio^ m Haniero pocTa Bcer^a yaofiHO CTaTb uojx 3amnTy Taxoro 
BejinxaHa, xax IIIexcnHp’.66
Ivanov-Razumnik was one of the first to observe this rift separating the old Shestov from 
new Shestov. He uncovered this pattern of Shestov hiding behind great writers and 
projecting his own inner evolution onto theirs. This outstanding phenomenon did not go
(\7unnoticed by other researchers, and we already mentioned above the words of Levy-Bruhl 
who accused Shestov of ‘hogging the covers’. In the same manner, as our dissertation will 
in particular demonstrate, Shestov traced the same profound transformation of convictions 
as his own - from idealism and positivism to scepticism and irrationalism - in all major 
Russian writers. Shestov's apparent existential pattern in his attitude to various thinkers, his
64 Lev Shestov, Ano(peo3 decnoueeHHOcmu in Cohumhiir e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, 
pp. 117-118.
65 Ivanov-Razumnik, pp. 197-198.
66 Ibid, p. 198.
67 See Section 1.1.
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belief in achieving a revelation only through inner catastrophe was also spotted by his only 
disciple, a French poet of Romanian-Jewish origin, Benjamin Fondane. Fondane writes in 
his memoirs:
I wrote to him saying how difficult it is to follow in his footsteps because, using his own words, in 
order to do that one has to live through one's own inner trauma, spiritual disaster ...I added: who 
would want to wish upon himself such a disaster only for the sake of one's love for the truth? Who 
would agree to become his disciple? A few days later I received an invitation from Shestov's 
daughter Tatiana to visit them. There were quite a lot of people there. Shestov grabbed hold of me. 
“I am used”, he said, “to people writing to me about my talent, about my penetrating understanding 
of Dostoevsky, about my style... And now, probably for the first time, someone has become 
interested in the question per se”.68
Thus, Shestov believed that tragedy is the sole route to philosophy and ultimate truth, that 
only through tragic personal experience can one's eyes be opened to see the true meaning of 
life and death. Undoubtedly his own life-changing experience of 1895 prepared the grounds 
for constructing a philosophy of tragedy. However, the final spark which set alight his 
emerging ideas and transformed his own tragic experience into his philosophy of tragedy 
came when Shestov discovered for himself the Bible and the writings of great thinkers, and 
was completely overwhelmed by them. ‘Shakespeare had shaken me in such a way that I 
lost my sleep’,69 Shestov told Fondane decades later. He also confessed that when he 
started reading Nietzsche he felt that in his books the world was turning upside down. ‘I 
can’t even describe the impression he made on me,’70 -  Shestov said to Fondane. Similar 
sentiments were evoked in him by Dostoevsky, whom Shestov forever regarded as his main 
teacher.
It is interesting to note that in his treatment of writers, when Shestov invariably uncovers 
the rift between the writer's pen and his soul, as we mentioned in the previous section, he 
essentially launches a certain attack on the author in an attempt to expose the inner crisis 
(the breaking point) of the latter. The corollary of our assertions above is that this attack by 
Shestov is, in fact, always directed at Shestov himself.
68 Fondane, pp. 42-43.
69 Ibid, p. 85.
70 Ibid, p. 85.
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Thus, for example, as we shall see in more detail in the chapter on Chekhov, when accusing 
the writer of his unhealthy interest in ‘overstressed’ people, Shestov in fact is fighting with 
his own image in the mirror, or rather beyond the looking-glass, in that domain of tragedy
71into which (in his own words) ‘mo/m H/jyr jimm> noHeBOJie’.
A related conjecture was expressed by Boris de Schloezer in his introduction to Shestov's 
book L'hommepris aupiege: Pouchkine, Tolstoi, Tchekhov. There he considers exactly this 
extreme interest of both thinkers in the overstressed person and regards it as a continuation 
of their own personal crises, a turning point in their ideologies which clearly took place in 
the case of both Chekhov and Shestov. ‘In fact there is nothing in common between the 
naive idealism and moralism of Shestov's Pushkin and his passionate interrogations 
addressed to Tolstoi’, - Schloezer writes; ‘A natural question arises which cannot be 
ignored’, - he says later, - ‘how precise is Shestov's interpretation of Chekhov, isn't this
77portrait in fact a self-portrait?’.
We can now formulate the following conclusion from our considerations above. Although 
Shestov in the course of his life underwent a certain evolution in his ideas and perception of 
the world, which we shall touch upon in this dissertation in connection with every writer 
under study, the main turning point of his biography and his thought can be dated to 1895 
when his personal tragedy took place. The mysterious crisis which happened to Shestov 
then caused an inner catastrophe which completely overturned his outlook on life -  from 
idealism and positivism he made a leap to the opposite camp of adogmatism, scepticism 
and irrationalism. He preserved these attitudes until the end despite evolutionary variations 
that his philosophy underwent. His main ideas related to the struggle against the restrictive 
power of mind and necessity as well as speculative philosophy in general, which are even 
referred to by some as ‘idees fixes’, stayed essentially unchanged.
71 Lev Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huipue: <pwioco<pm mpazeduu in Cohumhwi e deyx moMax 
(Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), I, p. 327.
72 Boris de Schloezer, ‘Preface’ in Leon Chestov, L ’homme pris au piege: Pouchkine, Tolstoi] 
Tchekhov (Paris: Plon, 1966), pp. 7-12 (pp. 11-12).
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This deep personal crisis coincided with Shestov having discovered for himself some 
fundamental achievements of human thought through the Bible and through such writers as 
Shakespeare, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and other classics. The re-evaluation of all 
values that ensued formed him as a philosopher of tragedy passionately obsessed with the 
tragic fate of the individual in the face of indifferent nature and soulless eternity. It shaped 
his attitude towards all the thinkers that interested him as existential and personified. This 
means that he trusted only the personal, existential experience of a thinker as holding the 
key to his writings and being the only true route to his spiritual discoveries. He was 
invariably seeking in all of these writers a breaking point, an inner disaster similar to his 
own which would have caused in them, as in his case, the total transformation of their 
convictions. Shestov was convinced that every human ultimately runs into a dead end of 
tragedy and consequently undergoes a catharsis which gives him, as it were, a second birth. 
Moreover, he believed that the only way to the Truth lies through a tragic experience and 
therefore those whose works he perceived as revelations, in whose works at least a glimpse 
at the Truth could be witnessed, must have gone through such an overwhelming trauma 
resulting in the total transformation of their convictions.
Thus Shestov largely imposed his own model on the writers under study and projected his 
own portrait onto theirs. As a result of this projection he often fought against his own 
image and launched a certain attack on these writers which was ultimately an attack 
directed at Shestov himself. The by-product of this process of submitting these thinkers to 
the closest scrutiny and most ‘passionate interrogations’, using Schloezer's words above, 
was his attempt to filter their true personality through their artistic aspirations, to separate 
their ‘pen’ from their ‘soul’ and to uncover not only their discoveries -  the results of their 
search - but also, if not first and foremost, the existential road leading to them.
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1.3. At the turn of a century -  the specifics of the time and its impact on shaping 
Shestov’s thought
In this section we shall look more closely at the temporal landscape of Shestov's life, for his 
philosophical convictions as well as their literary expression should inevitably be viewed in 
the context of his time. In this respect the initial period in Shestov's biography is of most 
importance, as it is then that his views were taking shape. Therefore of most interest to us is 
the fin  de siecle era, although we shall provide a broader background by undertaking some 
brief excursions back and forth on the temporal axis.
Any human society has a tendency to attribute some mystical significance to artificial 
temporal markers. Thus the end of every century is marked by certain typical social moods 
which include a brooding nostalgia for the departing age as well as new hopes and 
expectations mixed with anxiety and uncertainty about what the future holds. This in turn 
nourishes those mystical and apocalyptic tendencies which otherwise remain dormant. 
However, the end of the nineteenth century was also marked by some qualitative difference 
which is best described in the following lines of Joseph Brodsky taken from his foreword to 
an anthology of nineteenth-century Russian poetry. These lines serve as an excellent 
preface to a more systematic overview of the epoch that we intend to provide here, for they 
make the reader feel, as it were, the emotional texture of the time.
‘What we call the nineteenth century’, Brodsky writes,
marks what appears to be the last period in the history of our species when its scale of reality was 
quantitatively human. Numerically at least, an individual's interplay with his likes was not any 
different from that in, say, antiquity. It was the last century of seeing, not glimpsing; of 
responsibility, not the incoherence of guilt. Similarly, no matter how homicidal one might have felt, 
one still lacked the means to commit what would pass today as mass murder. Relations with space 
were based on the pace of one's own step; and whenever one travelled, one did so in a charabanc 
driven by the same number of horses as a Roman chariot; i.e., by four or, at best, six. The invention 
of the engine, whose efficacy is measured in so many horsepower (i.e., in such scores of these 
animals that there is no way to assemble and harness them for the purposes of coherent motion), 
chipped a lot from the reality of space and soiled what remained with abstractions hitherto confined 
to the works of one's imagination tackling either the life of sentiments or that of time.
That was the real, not the calendar, end of the nineteenth century. That is, its poets, up to then, 
could be more easily understood by their Latin counterparts than by ourselves. The acceleration of 
pace (subject more of enjoyment than of manly regret) has set us clearly apart, if only due to its
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curtailing effects on any form of commitment or concentration. For a man travelling at bullet or 
supersonic speed to his destination, it is difficult to comprehend wounded honour, the grid of class 
barriers, someone's brooding over a ruined estate, the contemplation of a single tree, or ambivalence 
at prayer. Yet such was the stuff of the nineteenth century's poetry, concerned with the movements 
of the individual soul, whose evolutions turned out to foreshadow all the laws of thermo- and 
aerodynamics.
To put it differently: an age ago, much less stood between man and his thoughts about himself than 
today.73
In this atmosphere of human beings contemplating their predicament, as reflected in 
classical Russian literature with its distinctive anthropocentric nature, Lev Shestov grew up. 
The psychological flavour of this literature rooted in early nineteenth-century Russian 
poetry, with its intellectual passion and emotional intensity, made a lasting impact on the 
young Shestov and undoubtedly contributed to the existential turn of his thought.
He was bom in a rather turbulent period of Russian history when serfdom had only been 
abolished five years before -  significantly later than in the rest of Europe -  and reforms 
introduced were so tragically incomplete that instead of bringing long-awaited political 
relief they only aggravated the explosive situation in Russian society. Terrorist 
organisations, whose aim was to overthrow the monarchy and to facilitate a revolution in 
the country, grew and spread at high speed. Moreover, they were rapidly gaining support 
amongst very broad strata of the population. The country was boiling over in a state of 
political instability, fear and rising anger and dissatisfaction with the regime. The response 
of the latter was to tighten the autocracy, which was becoming increasingly helpless, and to 
establish an infrastructure of secret police agents. Thus the social climate in the country 
grew more and more unhealthy.
This social turbulence naturally found its way into literature. In this state of restricted 
freedom, so characteristic of Russia, literature played a crucial role in society. More 
precisely, amongst the educated classes (that is to say, all those who were able to read),
73 Joseph Brodsky, ‘Foreword’ to An Age Ago, A Selection of Nineteeth-Century Russian Poetry, 
selected and translated by Alan Myers (New-York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1988), pp. xi-xix (pp. xii- 
xiv).
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great writers had the status of prophets. However, the gap between the vast peasantry and 
quickly growing proletariat on one hand, and the nobility and emerging stratum of 
raznochintsy on the other, remained huge and disturbing. Therefore the problems of social 
justice together with associated deeper questions, which are usually referred to as eternal, 
were burning particularly brightly in Russian society.
This was a time of intense spiritual searching and intellectual hesitation. Traditional 
movements of Slavophiles and Westerners, which originated at the beginning of the 
century, had evolved by the end of it to produce a broader spectrum of ideas. The rise of 
nihilistic attitudes was widespread and ultimately interlinked with the rapid loss of religious 
faith. Russian secularism drew strength from Hegelian idealism and positivism which grew 
extremely popular. The ideas of scientific progress took strong hold of Russian 
intellectuals, and materialism in the form of Darwinism and Marxism became the dominant 
philosophical trend.
A movement of legal Marxists, led by Petr Struve, promoted an evolutionary path of 
development for Russia -  as opposed to the militant revolutionary Marxism which later 
gave rise to Bolshevism. However, legal Marxists eventually became disillusioned with this 
ideology and gradually moved back to Russian Orthodoxy. It was a time when neo­
romanticism prevailed in Russian society in the atmosphere of decadent and apocalyptic 
moods which reflected in particular a fin  de siecle search for a new aesthetics and new 
religious consciousness. The result of this search was the renaissance of Russian literature 
and philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century, known as the Silver Age. It was 
then brought to an end by the Bolshevik regime.
Against this background of continuous social questing, especially in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the theme of ‘the little person’ -  one of the main strands in Russian 
literature -  gained particular momentum. Indeed, this issue has always lain at the heart of 
Russian life and preoccupied its intellectual elite -  to find the ways and means of liberating 
the masses enslaved by ignorance and poverty. This theme engaged poets such as Nekrasov
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and his generation, and critics such as Belinsky and Dobroliubov. It permeated literary 
works from Gogol’s Overcoat to Dostoevsky’s Poor Folk and The Insulted and Injured.
The young Lev Shestov was clearly influenced by the same sentiments and strongly 
affected by all the spiritual and social questions that he found in the works of Russian and 
world classics. This is particularly evident in his early literary experiments. In his 
unfinished and untitled story with a young unsuccessful writer Mirovich as the main hero, 
Shestov wrote the following revealing lines:
B i ia to m  h  rnecTOM K jiacce  M h p o b h h  y a ce  x o p o r n o  03H axoM H nca c  cym ecTBOBaBiiiHM H  b P o c c h h  
“ HanpaBJieHHAMH” , h  nepBbiM  6e3ycn oB H b iM  T p eb o B a m ieM  k o  B ca x o M y , npeTeH AO BaBiiieM y Ha e r o  
yBaaceH H e n e n o B e x y , 6biJia n p H H aA neam ocT b  k  n o cn eA H eM y  H anpaB neH H io, CTpeMJieHHe 
npoA O Ji^aT b eme n p n  riym K H H e H anaT oe A e n o  p y c c x o H  HHTennHreHUHH. O h  3H an O H erH H a, 
lleH o p H H a , B a 3 a p o B a , H eam aH O B a, x a x  nocA eA O B aT ejibH bix HOCHTeneii p y c c x o i i  HAeH, h  T p eboB an  
o t  coB peM eH H H xoB  cTpeM neH H a x  B bipaG oT xe h o b o h  HAeH, x o T o p a a  6bU ia 6b l AJ1» HHX TeM 3Xe, HeM 
HAen 2 0 - 4 0 - 6 0  h  7 0  t o a o b  G m ah a a a  nepeH H cneH H b ix  B b im e npeACTaBH Tejien AH TepaTypH bix  
T n n o B ... Bee pa3M bm ineH H a e r o  CBOAmiHCb b x o H u e  x o h u o b  x  on p eA eA eH H io  coB peM eH H oro  
p y c c x o r o  HHTeAAHreHTa. H A ea n n cT b i c o p o x o B b ix  t o a o b ,  peanHCTbi-inecTHAecaTHHXH h m c a h  c B o e  
AeAO h  CAenanH e r o . . .  H t o  T e n e p b  HaM HyacHO AeAaTb? O h  He M or h h  b n ep B b ie  roA bi i o h o c t h ,  h h ,  
x a x  BbWCHHAOCb BnOCAeACTBHH, H B 3peA b ie  TOAbl, OTBeTHTb Ha 3TOT B o n p o c , HO OH TAySoXO 6bUl 
y 6eacA eH  b t o m , h t o  o t b c t  Ha s t o t  B o n p o c  ecT b h  AOAaceH 6 b m > , h t o  c o  BpeM eHeM  o h  e r o  y3H aeT . 
O h  H H cxoA b xo He coM H eB an ca , h t o  a io a a m  e r o  BpeMeHH HyacHO cxa3aT b  HOBoe c a o b o  h  HanaTb  
HOBoe AeAO. H eo S x o A H M o  noACHHTaTb ocT aB A eH H oe npeA xaM H  HacAeACTBO, h  T orA a B ee  c t b h c t  
acHbiM . P o c c h h ,  h c c o m h c h h o ,  npeACTOHT B e n n x a a  6 y A y m n o c T b . O H a ocym ecT B H T  T e B eA H xne  
3aAaHH, nepeA x o t o p w m h  o x a 3 a n a c b  6eccH A bH a 3an a A H a a  E B p o n a  -  r o c y a a p c T B a  h  H apoA ti 
x o T o p o fi nou iA H  S b icT p o  n o  a o a c h o h , B e A y m eii x  rnSeA H  A o p o r e .. .  O h  y a ce  T orA a c  ropAOH  
paAOCTbio x o a h a  B3aA h  BnepeA n o  xoM H aTe, A exA aM H pya H 3BecTHbie c t h x h  n y m x H H a :
YBKDxy Ab, o  Apy3ba! H apoA  HeyrHeTeHHbiH 
H  pabcTBO, n a A in e e  n o  mahhio u a p a ,
H HaA OTenecTBOM cbo6oai>i npocBemeHHOH 
B 30HAeT ah HaxoHeu npexpacHaa 3apa?
3 t o  neT B epocT H iiiH e, roBapH BaA o h ,  6 m a o  nepBbiM  npH3biBOM reH H aA bH oro n o 3 T a  x  p y c c x o i i  
HHTeAAHreHUHH. H  OHa y c n e A a  OTXAHXHyrbca Ha 3 t h  B eA H xne CAOBa. O H a 6 o a p o  p a 6 o T a eT , x a x  
p a b o T a n a  c  B c a h h c x h m  b o  rAaBe HaA caM O o6pa30BaH H eM  h  HaA BbiacHeHHeM  n p eA C T o a m eii 3AA<ihh. 
C x o A b x o  nop aboT aA H  a io a h  6 0 - x  t o a o b  HaA a c a o m  ocB oSoacA eH H a xp ecT baH . T A e e m e ,  
B o c x n m a A c a  o h ,  6biBaAO, b ynoeH H H , M oaceTe y x a 3 a T b  b w  HaM axT  CTOAb b c a h x o h  
rocyA ap cT B eH H oii M yApocTH , x a x  o cB o b o a m eH H e xpecT b aH . O h G n a r o ro B e n  nepeA A a ex ca H A p o M  II 
h  e r o  coTpyAHHxaM H b b c a h x h x  pe(J)opM ax...74
74 Unpublished (and untitled) story by Lev Shestov. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 12-13.
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We deliberately quoted a long extract as it testifies to the profound idealistic orientation of 
the young Shestov and his deep affinity with and knowledge of Russian cultural life. It is 
also evident from the above lines that in his extreme youth Shestov quite possibly laboured 
under some naive monarchist delusions and his political views at the time could have been, 
as we would now say, centrist -  for progress and liberation by moderate evolutionary 
means. However, we do not know the intended continuation of this story and therefore 
cannot be sure how much the author's ideas can be identified with those of his hero. 
Baranova-Shestova describes this period in Shestov's life as follows: ‘TanaHTJiHBbm 
lOHOina, nojiHtm AyxoBHBix cun, ncicaji npHjioKeHna cb o h x  He3aypaAHBix 
cnocofiHOCTen’.75 In another story of Shestov - In the wrong place - of the same period and 
with the same protagonist Mirovich, only this time written in the first person, he wrote
. . . b  H eK p a c o B e  a  b m c o k o  h t h a  n io b o B b  k  bnnacH eM y, n io b o B b  k  npocT O M y HapoAy. E r o  no33HA  
caHKUHOHHpoBajia b m o h x  r j ia 3 a x  e m e  t o t  y r o n o K  npaB A bi, o  k o to p o m  Mano r o B o p m iH  A p y r n e  
noaT bi. B o a  no33HA npeflC T aB juuiacb  MHe T o r^ a  ano(J)eo30M  npaB A bi, TOHHee A o b p a ...  A  B c er ^ a  
AyM aji, h t o  >KH3Hb ecT b He h t o  H H oe, x a x  n o cT o a H H o e cTpeM jieH H e 3 T o ro  “A o b p a ” k  n o b e A e  Hazt 
3jiom  h  h t o  HOCHTeAH HAeH A o b p a  nocTOAHHo yBeAHHHBaiOTCH b cB oeM  HHCAe h  n o b e A a  HX eCTb 
TOAbKO B o n p o c  BpeM eHH.76
Thus Shestov was passionately, even if naively, preoccupied by the destiny of Russia as 
well as general questions of good and evil from his early years.
When he reached the age of entering university, his political views, as in the case of many 
advanced young people of his generation, had already become extremely left-wing. For 
precisely this reason his law dissertation was turned down by the censors. However, these 
political views were short-lived in him. No sooner was the century over than Shestov wrote 
to his wife from St Petersburg the following rather sceptical and ironic lines about the legal 
Marxists and their leader:
75 Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14.
76 Unpublished story by Lev Shestov ‘He Tyaa nonan’. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14.
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...BCTpeTHJi [...]  C rp yB e, T oro caM oro, KOTopwii 3aBeAyeT 3 k o h o m h h 6 c k h m  MaTepHajiH3MOM h  
HBjiaeT c o 6 o h  Ma3HHH77 MapKCHCTOB. BeAb o h  3,aeci> b KOHuepTax BbiCTynaeT: noeT  apHH H3 
nOJIHTHHeCKOH 3KOHOMHH. H  nOCJie KOHUepTOB MapKCHCTKH oSpblBaiOT eMy (J)aJIAbI, HTOObI HMeTb 
KycoK ciopTyKa Ha naMATb... CaM AJiHHHbiH, t o i i j h h ,  SjieAHbiH. 3a HeHMeHHeM A p yroro  cpaBHeHHA 
b HeM HaxoA^T c x o a c t b o  c  XpwcTOM. Pa3Be nocjre 40 a h c h  HCKyuieHHH b nycT bm e X p n cT o c  6bui 
tb k h m ! T ojib x o  a He n o n a ra io , h t o 6 m  CTpyBe 3Han HCKymeHHA. O h  yace o t  npnpoA bi JioxMaTbiH h 
t o l h h h ,  a  a  e m e  o t  M a p x c a ...78
Even less enthusiasm was evoked in Shestov by the Bolsheviks. They tried to take Shestov 
under their wing and to turn him into an advocate of their policies, but to no avail -  Shestov 
was never compromised by them. Moreover, when he left Soviet Russia he wrote a 
devastating critique of Russian Bolshevism. The times of the revolution and civil war were 
deeply disturbing for Shestov. It is then that he wrote in his ‘Diary of Thoughts’ (‘^ hcbhhk 
MbiCAen’), ‘HincorAa TaK ynopHo, HanpaaceHHo He p a 6 o T a A a  m l ic a b , KaK b  3t h  yxcacHbie, 
KpoBaBbie a h h . H HmcorAa -  TaK fiecnnoAHo’.79
Yet he was a bad prophet and did not notice the danger beyond Bolshevism. That is to say, 
he overlooked the rise of fascism in Europe. In 1927 he wrote in a letter to Gertsyk:
M h c  [ .. .]  KaaceTca, h t o  HHnero oco6eHHO 3HaHHTeAbHoro He nponcxoA H T. PaboTaioT MHoro, oneHb  
MHoro, h o  boA buie 3aHATbi npaKTHKofi, 3anH3biBaiOT paHbi, ycTpaHBaiOTca HaHOBO. H  b 3 to m  oneHb  
npeycneBaiO T. [ ...]  J L o a h  x o a ^ t  cbiTbie, oAeTbie, obyT bie -  TeaTpbi, k h h o ,  Ka4)e nepenojm eH b i. JleT  
nep e3  naTb o  BOHHe, no^canyH, h  c o b c c m  3a6yA yT.80
Gertsyk remarks how faulty these prophecies of Shestov actually were, because ‘act nepe3
o 1
naTb y BAacTH CTan (J)amH3M, h  b o h h u  n p n  A B ep a x ’ . She notes in her memoirs that
R9‘3opKHH Ha BHyTpeHHHe c o 6 b i t h a  AyuiH -  BeTpa BpeMeHH JleB HcaaKOBHH He C A b i m a A ’ . 
Shestov did of course eventually see the horrific turn that events were taking and was 
extremely aggravated by it. In a way he was lucky to die in 1938 -  just in time to avoid 
witnessing the true horrors of Nazism, and in particular the death of his only disciple 
Benjamin Fondane in gas chambers at Birkenau.
77 As Baranova-Shestova comments, Mazzini was an Italian singer who at the time was often 
referred to in press as ‘the king of tenors’ (see Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 41)
78 Shestov’s letter of March 1899 to his wife. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 41.
79 Shestov, ‘JJhcbhhk Mbicnen’, p. 235 (entry of 17.10.1919).
80 Gertsyk, p. 116. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 345.
81 Ibid, p. 116. Cited in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 102.
82 Ibid, p. 161. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 131.
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At the time of his Diary o f Thoughts {JfmeuuK Mbicneu) he was already in his fifties, but 
was yet to write -  in emigration -  his most significant philosophical works. It was then that 
his writings were taking a distinct turn from literature to philosophy. However, in many 
ways he remained forever faithful to the world of literature which led him to philosophy. 
Indeed, in his youth he wrote a manifesto of sorts about the crucial role of literature in 
Russian society -  in his story In the wrong place he wrote of the hero Mirovich already 
mentioned above:
IIocTOHHHoe HTeHne HauiHx jryH iim x nncaT ejieH  npH Beno e r o  k TOMy ybexcAeHHio, hto Bcaicoe 
BejiHKoe odm ecTBeH H oe a e jio  npeflBapHTejibHo o6cy>K^aeTCH b jiH T eparype h hto 3Ta nocjieA H aa  
HBjiaeTCH HHHUHaTopoM BCHKoro hoboto  odiuecTBeH H oro abhxcchha. O h  bhacji, hto AHTepaTypa 
Harnero BpeMeHH He Morjia BbipaSoTaTb hchwx h  onpeaejieH H bix 3aaan . O h ac^aji T oro  
cnacTJiHBoro BpeMeHH, Kor^a “ HaKaHyHe” nepeiiA eT , npoftAeT h  “HacTynHT, HaKOHeu, HacToamHH  
AeHb” . B  to m , hto 3tot  AeHb HacTynHT, oh He coM HeBajica. HyacHO TOJibKo a p >okho, 3HeprHHH0, 
6e3aBeTH0 OTAaTbca BeAHKOMy A ejiy cjiyxceHHA odm ecT B y, T.e. Kaic HyacHO TeopeTHnecKH -  b 
JiH T eparype -  BbipadaTbreaTb nporpaM M y AeaTeAbHOCTH. IloaTOMy acao  n o x a  cboahtca  k 
AHTepaTypHOH padoT e. B chkhh neAOBeK, nyBCTByioiuHH b c e d e  “A ym y acHBy” , AOAaceH ocTaBHTb b 
CTopoH e Bee HHTepecbi h  npeAaTbca HCKAiOHHTeAbHO odmecTBeHHOMy A eJiy...83
Yet, Shestov, as it were, broadened typically Russian themes, took them a step further or a 
step up -  to the level of mankind as such. Thus he transformed the traditional Russian 
attention to the little person into a no less intense attention to a genetically tragic person, 
lost in the dead-ends of existence. This compassion for tragic human fate determined the 
existential direction of Shestov's philosophy.
He was ultimately a romantic. It sounds paradoxical, for as soon as he matured, he parted 
for good with any kind of idealism which he deemed deceptive and ultimately destructive. 
Yet, he was an idealist in his youth and loved French Romanticism (another powerful 
influence of the epoch), especially Alfred Musset, Baudelaire and Verlaine. ‘Above all 
there is music, and the rest is literature’, - he liked to repeat in French before he discovered 
the ‘greatest music’, using Plato's terminology, - philosophy.84 The reason he preserved that 
affinity to Romanticism is because in his philosophical views, as the next chapter will
83 Unpublished story by Lev Shestov ‘He Tyaa nonaA’. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 13.
84 See Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 15.
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demonstrate, he was an extremist. Such spiritual extremism is in itself a symptom of a 
romantic, even if not a conventional one.
In the cultural blend that formed Shestov's sensibility Russian literature together with 
Shakespeare, Kant, Nietzsche and the Bible eventually came to dominate other influences 
and gave Shestov, it seems, a certain spiritual inoculation against any failure of taste by 
creating a unique cultural balance, using the words of John Bayley again. It is, perhaps, this 
balance that kept Shestov safe from any parochial corporate involvement, whether social, 
political or philosophical, and helped him to develop a unique world of his own.
Some fundamental works which contributed to this balance can be seen from his letter to a 
close friend where he gives advice on a reading list as well as on general attitudes.
Xopomo 6buio 6bi BaM JJarrre nponecTb, Doro, JbOMa cbiHa h pyccicnx TojiCToro, JJocToeBcicoro, 
IlHceMCKoro, Torojia, TypreHeBa, EejiHHCKoro, JJobpojiioboBa. H 3areM -  HCTopmo. IIojie3HO -  
HCTOpHK) JIHTepaTypbl, HCKyCCTBa H obmeCTBeHHbIX flBHHCeHHH. [ . . .]  ...He SoHTeCb 6 e 3flHbI 
npeMyApocTH. OHa He Tax CTpauiHa. [...] He pobeiiTe. [...] . . .h He B3AyMaHTe noflHHHHTbca 
bjihbhhk) Toro xpyra, KOTopbift BCTpeTHTbca BaM b napH^ce. [...] nobeAHT Bac jiHiiib Bam 
CObCTBeHHblH CTpax.85
Shestov's general recommendations which profess a firm belief in one's own strength and 
abilities, independence of spirit and not bending to the authority of famous names constitute 
an interesting and instructive feature of this letter.
Bayley finds a manifestation of Shestov's cultural balance in his remarkable sanity and 
common sense, and attributes its origin to Shestov’s multiple identity as a Jew, a Russian
os
and a European. In a similar vein Louis Shein essentially describes Shestov as
on
psychologically Russian, but thematically European. He sees Shestov as a product of 
Russian culture in some respects, but in others not fitting at all into the milieu of which he 
was a product.
85 Shestov’s letter to V. G. Malakhieva-Mirovich o f April 1896. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 
24-25.
86 Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, p. 1.
87 Shein, p. 12.
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We wish to add to the above that the specifics not only of space -  whether Russian or 
generally European, -  but also of the time played, in our view, an important role in 
producing the phenomenon of Shestov with the remarkable cultural balance that he indeed 
had. Because, returning to Brodsky’s words again, it was an age when nothing stood 
between man and his thoughts about himself.
While the time itself provided a rich blend of intellectual influences (or in many cases, if 
you like, anti-influences) which shaped Shestov in his youth, he ultimately made his very 
personal choices and re-emerged from the usual youthful idealism, although - as one would 
expect - a nihilist, but not a conventional one. For the nihilism of those years was 
intimately connected to the rise of secularism. In contrast, Shestov's nihilism consisted of, 
as it were, negating the existing nihilism, in fighting secularism at its roots. His first non- 
idealistic book (which was his second book chronologically) already proclaimed the urgent 
need to search for God.
Any epoch with all its dominant currents requires not only its heroes, so to speak, but also 
anti-heroes - those who will go against the conventional wisdom of the time to produce 
something qualitatively new. Resisting the forthcoming age of faithlessness with the reign 
of scientific knowledge at its head, Shestov was profoundly anti-modem and yet he 
forestalled or even originated certain trends which ultimately formed the texture of 
modernity -  existentialism, surrealism and postmodernism with its psychoanalytical 
orientation.
Unlike the majority of his friends and compatriots Shestov did not stop in awe of 
Tiutchev's lines:
Y mom  P occhk) He noHjm>,
ApiIIHHOM ofimHM He H3MepHTb.
y  Heft ocobeHHaa CTaTb.
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B  POCCHK) M05KH0 TOJIbKO B epH T b.
He did not fall into the opposite extreme either -  of Chaadaev's total disillusionment with 
Russia, bordering on rejection, when in his First Philosophical Letter Chaadaev said that 
‘MbI 3KHJ1H H npOflOJDKaeM 5KHTb JIHIIIb TOIX), HT06m nOCJiy)KHTb KaKHM-TO Ba5KHBIM 
ypOKOM fljia  OT^ajieHHMx noicojieHHH, KOTopbie cyM eioT  e r o  nom iT b; H bm e me  m m, b o
OQ
bchkom  cjiynae, cocTaBJiaeM npobeji b  HpaBCTBeHHOM MHponopjmice’. For Shestov a blind 
faith in the country that Tiutchev promoted was replaced by a blind faith in the omnipotent 
God for whom he constantly searched.
He was bom, it seems, happily cosmopolitan (and in that manifestly European) and, as the 
underlying material for his philosophy, was ultimately interested in what we would now 
call comparative cultural studies -  literary and philosophical. This national impartiality of 
Shestov had little to do with his Jewishness, although it is tempting to say that he could 
never feel fully Russian and was ultimately without a motherland. It is, however, not true -  
as we argued in the previous section Shestov's confessional choice was ambivalent, while 
his deep affinity to Russian literature was unquestionable. The extracts from his youthful 
stories given above are deeply symbolic in this respect as they show with a remarkable 
power how young Shestov, through the mouth of his hero, was swearing an oath to the 
undying ‘task of the Russian intelligentsia’. Moreover, although frequently spending time 
abroad, Shestov never intended to leave Russia for good, and in 1914 he finally moved with 
his family to Moscow in the hope of settling there forever. If it had not been for the tragedy 
of the Bolshevik revolution, he would surely have stayed.
It is instructive to compare Shestov's allegiance to the Russian cause on the one hand and 
his perfect understanding of Russia's historical position and its confused attitude to Western
88 Fedor Tiutchev, ‘Y m o m  P o c c h io  H e nomrrb...’ in CmnxomeopeHun, ed. K. Pigarev (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1945), p. 261.
89 P. Ia. Chaadaev, ‘1829-1831, Lettres sur la philosophie de l’histoire. Lettre Premiere’ in 
CoHUHenm u nucbMa 77. 77. Vaadaeea, ed. M. Gershenzon (reprint of the edition: Moscow 1913- 
1914) (Oxford: Mouette Press, 1972), p. 85.
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values on the other. In his book on Turgenev -  in a passage which later became part of The 
Apotheosis o f Groundlessness -  Shestov wrote with brilliant irony:
K yjibT ypH O C T b -  H aoneflC T B eH H biH  f la p ,  h  c p a 3 y  npH BH Tb e e  c e 6e  n o n r a  H H K orfla  H e y f la e T c a . [ . . . ]  
M b i [ . . . ]  b  K o p o T K o e  BpeM H orpoM H biM H  fl03aM H  n p o rjiO T H Jin  t o ,  h t o  e B p o n e in j b i  npH H H M anH  b  
T e n e H n e  c t o j i c t h h .  [ . . . ]  C t o h j i o  p y ccK O M y  H e j io B e x y  x o t b  H eM H o ro  n o flb iu ia T b  B 0 3 f ly x o M  E B p o n w ,  
h  y  H e r o  H aH H H ana KpyacHTbCH r o j io B a . O h  HCTOJiKOBbiBaji n o -C B o e M y , KaK h  n o n a r a n o c b  flH K a p io , 
B e e , h t o  e M y  n p n x o f lH j io c b  BH fleTb h  c j ib im a T b  06 y c n e x a x  3anaflH O H  x y j ib T y p b i. [ . . . ]  H  n eM  
H ecSbiT O H H eH  6buiH  e r o  r p e 3 b i ,  TeM  o x o r a e e  o h  npH H H M an h x  3a flencT B H T ejibH O C T b. R a x  
p a 3 0 H a p o B a iic a  3anaflH H K  T e p u e H  b E B p o n e ,  x o r f l a  e M y  n p H u n io c b  M H o ro  JieT  n o f lp n f l  npo>xH T b 3a 
r p a H H u e iii  H  B e flb  o h ,  H ecM O T pn H a b c io  ocT p O T y  C B o e r o  y M a , H H e x o J ib x o  H e n o f l0 3 p e B a n ,  h t o  
E B p o n a  M eH ee  B c e r o  n oB H H H a b  e r o  p a3on ap O B aH H H . E B p o n a  flaB H biM -flaB H O  3 a 6 b u ia  o  n y f le c a x :  
OHa f la n b u ie  H fle a n o B  H e u u ia ;  3 t o  y H a c  b  P o c c h h  a o  c h x  n o p  n p o flO jn x a iO T  cM eu iH B aT b  n y f l e c a  c  
H fleajiaM H . [ . . . ]  B e f lb  H a o b o p o T :  h m c h h o  o t t o t o ,  h t o  b  E B p o n e  n e p e c T a n n  B epH T b b  n y f l e c a  h  
n o H a jiH , h t o  b c h  H ejio B en ecK a H  3 a f la n a  c b o a h t c h  k  y c T p o e H H io  H a 3eM Jie , TaM  H an ajiH  H 3 o 6 p eT a T b  
H fle a jib i h  H f le n.90
This demonstrates the breadth of Shestov's intellectual vision as well as the fact that his 
Russian patriotism was indeed profound, because ironic criticism is a much more authentic 
feature of true love than blind adoration. This healthy attitude is akin to that of the best 
Russian cultural figures who, being exposed to Western values, were not afraid of issuing 
the most offensive ironic remarks about their country. Amongst them there were Pushkin 
with his famous ‘HepT floraflaji mchh pOflHTtca b P o cch h  c flymoio h  c TajiaHTOM!’91 and 
Blok's Skythians (Cku^ u ): ‘/Ja, ckh(J)i»i - mbi! a, a3HaTbi - mm, C pacicocMMH h acaflHMMH 
onaMH!’.92 In this poem Blok expressed with piercing perceptiveness the ambivalence and 
torment of Russia's attitude to the West and to its own place in history, but unlike Shestov's 
ironic tone, Blok's poetic voice is tragic:
P o c c h h  -  C(J)h h k c ! Jlnxyn h  c K o p b n ,  
H  06 flHBaflCb nepH O H  KpOBblO,
OHa TJlHflHT, TJlHflHT, TJlHflHT B T ebfl 
H  C HeHaBHCTbK), H C JIK>60BbK>!93
90 Lev Shestov, Ano<peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu in CoHUHenm e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, 
p p .  29-30.
91 A. S. Pushkin, from the letter to his wife of 18.05.1836 in A. S. Pushkin, Codpanue c o h u m h u u  e  
10 moMax (Moscow: ‘TEPPA’-‘TERRA’, 1997), vol. 10, p. 272.
92 A. Blok, ‘CKH(J)bi’ in Cmuxomeopenm, nosMbi, meamp, vol. II, p. 196.
93 Ibid, p . 197.
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Although bom a Jew under the Russian autocracy, Shestov nevertheless had the benefit of 
an all-round education and was exposed to all the contemporary cultural trends as well as 
the vast philosophical and literary heritage of preceding generations. His cultural openness, 
sensitivity and inquisitive mind contributed to his main distinguishing feature of becoming 
profoundly international. He approached Russian literature with the extreme passion of 
Russian psychological irrationalism and at the same time with the shrewd European 
utilitarian attention to ideas as such. In his comparative cultural analysis not only did he 
take burning questions from the hands of Russian writers as well as from the thinkers of all 
times and peoples, but he also transposed them across and beyond narrow national 
boundaries -  to a superior plane of existential problems intrinsic to man per se.
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Chapter 2. Shestov’s philosophical credo as part of his literary discourse
Although the study of Shestov as a philosopher per se lies outside the scope of this thesis, 
his philosophy is central to his whole life and creative heritage and therefore cannot be 
avoided in our explorations. However, what this study will try to avoid is a technical and 
narrowly specialised exposition of his philosophical views and their analysis which 
constitutes the main body of existing Shestov studies. On the contrary, it will attempt to 
present his philosophy as viewed first and foremost from a literary rather than a 
philosophical standpoint and only in so far as it is necessary for the study of him from a 
literary perspective.
The only exception to this approach will be given in section 2.3, where we shall expose 
from a purely scientific (more precisely -  mathematical) point of view some technical 
errors in Shestov’s reasoning (especially relevant given that he did have a mathematical 
background). Such a treatment appears to be entirely novel, as hitherto either philosophers 
in their polemics with Shestov have provided a critique of his philosophical discourse and 
techniques, or artists have commented on his writings from their perspective. The approach 
of natural science has never been applied to the foundations of Shestov's thought.1
2.1 Faith and reason. Systematic critique of speculative philosophy.
Before starting a discussion of Shestov’s philosophical ideas it is first necessary to point out 
the profound distinction between his very definition of what constitutes philosophy and that 
of more conventional philosophers.
It is crucial to understand that Shestov, like Kierkegaard whom he discovered rather late in 
life, saw the source of philosophy not in curiosity or astonishment, but in despair. Shestov's 
view on what philosophy as such is about is aptly summarised by Louis Shein as follows: 
‘the task of philosophy consists in escaping from the power of rational thinking and in
1 A brief discussion on this topic, by a professor emeritus of mathematics, appeared recently, while 
the current dissertation was being written. See, Ricardo Nirenberg, ‘2x2=5’ in The Tragic 
Discourse. Shestov’s and Fondane’s Existential Thought, ed. R. Fotiade (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 
pp. 47-54.
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finding in oneself the audacity (only despair gives man such audacity) to seek the truth in 
that which all have become accustomed to consider as paradoxical and absurd’;2 philosophy 
is ‘what is most important’3 and the result of ‘magnanimous despair’4 rather than 
speculation and reasoning. Moreover, instead of clarifying world phenomena and 
unravelling their inner logic and driving force, a true philosophy in Shestov's eyes should 
on the contrary demonstrate to man that even those things in the universe that seem 
perfectly obvious are in fact completely enigmatic and mysterious. Philosophers must, 
Shestov wrote, ‘ocBoboxyjaTbca h  apyrnx ocsoOoKflaTb o t  Bjiacra nomrran, cBoeii 
onpe,zjejieHHOCTi>K) y6nBaiomHX Taimy. Be#b h c t o k h , Hanajia, xopHH 6 b it h h  - He b  t o m , 
h t o  o6HapyxceHo, a b  t o m , h t o  CKptrro: Deus est Deus absconditus (Bor ecTb cxpbiTbiH 
Bor)’.5
Clearly, this extreme view contradicts conventional teachings. It is perhaps best 
exemplified by a much more traditional (in the West especially) -  and very lucidly 
expressed -  perception given by Bertrand Russell in the introduction to his History o f  
Western Philosophy:
Philosophy [...] is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology it consists 
of speculations on matters to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like 
science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of 
revelation. All definite knowledge [...] belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite 
knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is No Man's Land, exposed 
to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy [...] The conceptions of life and the 
world which we call 'philosophical' are a product of two factors: one, inherited religious and ethical 
conceptions; the other, the sort of investigation which may be called 'scientific' [...] Individual 
philosophers have differed widely in regard to the proportions in which these two factors entered 
into their systems, but it is the presence of both, in some degree, that characterises philosophy.6
On this scale Shestov certainly takes an extreme stand, for his sort of philosophical 
investigation is primarily by revelation rather than speculation. At least so he himself
2 Shein, p. 13.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Lev Shestov, A<puubi u HepyccmuM (Moscow: Folio, 2001), p. 371.
6 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social 
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1961), p. 13.
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asserts. In fact, Shestov openly says that philosophy is not a science, but an art. 
‘0njioco< i)H fl c jiorH K on He AOJim ia HMeTt HHHero o6mero’, he proclaims, ‘<J)HJioco(j)mi 
e c T b  HCKyccTBo, CTpeM ^m eeca n p o p B a T tca  c k b o 3 b  JionroecK yK ) n e n t  yM03aKJHOHeHHH h  
BBiH ocanjee nejiOBeica b  6 e36p excH oe M ope (J)aHTa3HH, (J>aHTacTHHecKoro, r /ie  Bee 
OAHHaKOBO b o 3 m o > k h o  h  hcbo3M O H C ho’ .7 Perhaps for that reason almost every scholar who 
has attempted to analyse Shestov's works has pointed out the difficulty of a systematic 
study of him. The main objection is that Shestov is deliberately asystematic -  instead of 
constructing a philosophical system of his own he fights against virtually all existing 
systems. His style is notably literary, which, despite rendering him one of the most readable 
philosophers, obstructs understanding by being enriched with multiple aphorisms and 
sophisticated irony. His personified approach to the thinkers he was interested in only 
complicates matters further, because it mixes together the authors' existential experience 
and their ideas. Still, the biggest objection of all put forward by Shestov scholars is his idee 
fixe -  the power of a single idea that came to dominate all his works. As Czeslaw Milosz 
wrote, ‘Shestov hammers at one theme again and again, and after a while we leam that it 
will emerge inevitably in every essay; we also know that when the theme emerges, his 
voice will change in tone and sustain with its usual sarcasm the inevitable conclusion. His 
voice when he enters an argument is that of a priest angry at the sight of holy vessels being 
desecrated’.8 This main idea lies in juxtaposing Athens and Jerusalem: reason and faith.
Shestov was a rebel and laid his very own path in philosophy. He did not have the benefit 
of a philosophical university education and took pride in it, for it saved him, he claimed to 
Fondane, from the narrow-mindedness of a doctrinal academic approach. ‘It is only because 
I did not study philosophy at university that I preserved freedom of spirit’,9 Shestov said. 
Thus he was able to start from scratch and reinvent the wheel. And the wheel he reinvented 
was not at all like a conventional one.
7 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoH6enHocmu, II, p. 28.
8 Milosz, p. 102.
9 Fondane, p. 88.
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According to Shestov's own words one of his first teachers in philosophy was Shakespeare. 
Reading Shakespearean tragedies was for Shestov an overwhelming experience, and when 
later he discovered a book by George Brandes with a critical study of Shakespeare he was 
infuriated by its cold rational approach which exposed, in Shestov's eyes, the author's total 
indifference to the agony of the human predicament. Brandes wrote about Shakespeare, 
Shestov thought, being virtually unaffected by his deeply disturbing tragedies. ‘His reading
t
was superficial, it skimmed on the surface of things’,10 Shestov said to Fondane, and added 
metaphorically, as was already quoted in the previous chapter,11 that Shakespeare, clearly, 
did not disturb Brandes’s sleep. Shestov's indignation found its form of expression in his 
first book Shakespeare and his critic Brandes with the epigraph taken from Nietszche: ‘I 
hate all idle readers’.
This book was the first and only book by Shestov written from an idealistic and dogmatic 
standpoint. Yet, it is important to linger over it because without understanding Shestov's 
point of departure one cannot appreciate either the transformation of his philosophical 
convictions, or his ultimate conclusions. Another important reason is that despite the 
apparent abyss (noted by most Shestov scholars) between this book and subsequent ones 
the grains of Shestov's thought in its eventual form can already be found there. 
Interestingly, this observation is shared by A. Valevicus who says in his monograph on 
Shestov: ‘Even though the style, tone and content are completely different from anything 
else which he was to later write, in many ways the entire Shestov in all his audacity is 
already in evidence and, retrospectively, we can distinguish certain themes which were to 
become leitmotifs in all his future works’.12
In his first book Shestov displayed his belief in the general good (what we would now call 
an abstract humanism) and in the rationally justifiable design of the universe which has 
purpose and meaning. Despite the genre of literary criticism this was a clear beginning of 
Shestov's philosophical search, for in this book he showed his deep concern with the
10 Fondane, p. 85.
11 See Section 1.2.
12 Valevicius, p. 11
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fundamental questions of human existence. ‘IIIecTOB’, writes Ivanov-Razumnik, ‘[...] c
yacacoM  ocTaHOBHJica n e p e ^  (J ju h to m o m  CjiynaR, ob eccM b icjiH B aiom ero  H ejiO BenecK yio
>kh3hi>. [ . . . ]  Ujejibie ro,zjbi HCKaji o h  OTBeTa Ha 3 t o t  MyHHBiHHH e r o  B o n p o c  o
6eccM bicjieH H ocTH  5KH3HH, o  cjiynaiiH ocT H  e e ’, R a z u m n ik  c o n t in u e s . ‘EM y K a3ajiocb
CHanajia, h t o  3 t o t  B o n p o c  m o > k h o  pem HTb b  CTopoHy npH3HaHHa CMbicna ) k h 3 h h ,
HH3Bep>KeHHa npH 3panH oro C jiy n a a  h  3aMeHbi e r o  “pa3yMHOH Heo6xo,miMOCTbK)” : TaKOH
1 ^OTBeT Hamen o h  b  TBopnecTBe IIIeKcnupa’. Indeed, Shestov asserts, inspired by the 
writings of Shakespeare:
TaM, r,ne ^jifl Hac xaoc, cjiynan, SeccMbicjieHHaa 6ops6a  MepTBOH, paBHO,oymHOH, ho becKOHeHHO 
MoryneH chjibi c acHBbiM, nyBCTByiomHM, ho HeMomHbiM nejiOBeKOM (T.e. TaM, r^e jjjih Hac oSjiacTb 
Hejienoro TparH3Ma), -  TaM no3T bh^ht ocMbicjieHHbift npouecc ayxoBHoro pa3BHma. IIoa  
BHflHMblMH BCeM JIIOAflM MyKBMH OH OTKpblBaeT HeBH£HMyK> HHKOMy 3aflaHy 3KH3HH,14
In fact, by assigning an idealistic value and meaning to life with all its tragedies Shestov at 
the time was essentially advocating the Kantian point of view of total predetermination 
being an a priori law of nature. He denied the accidental nature of life and tragedy by 
investing them with a deep moral meaning. ‘lileKcnup B03BemaeT b c j ih k h h  3axoH 
ocMbicjieHHOCTH HBjieHHH HpaBCTBeHHoro MHpa’, Shestov wrote; ‘cnynaa HeT, ecjin 
Tpare^HH Jlnpa He OKa3ajiacb cjiynaeM’.15 Everything has sense which we often fail to see, 
which we simply cannot yet explain -  this is Shestov's basic stance in his first book. 
According to Razumnik there is a dichotomy in the question about the meaning of life: 
either there is no meaning and our life is accidental, or there is no accident and so there is 
meaning to life. ‘IIIecTOB’, Razumnik asserts, ‘Hanaji co BToporo OTBeTa h  npHuien k  
nepBOMy’.16
Indeed, already then, when searching passionately for meaning in life to the extent of 
advocating tragedy, Shestov in fact was trying to overcome his own growing scepticism 
with respect to this idealistic system of beliefs. As we quoted in Chapter 1 Shestov told
13 Ivanov-Razumnik, pp. 168-170.
14 Shestov, UleKcnup u ezo KpumuK Epandec, p. 177.
15 Ibid, p. 183.
16 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 171.
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Fondane that in his first book he was speaking from a moral perspective which he 
abandoned shortly after; but even then, this perspective was pushed to such limits that it 
was fairly obvious that the frame was going to crack soon enough. Shestov had thus taken 
the usual path of Belinsky, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and so many others -  as he himself came 
to demonstrate in his later writings -  who also started with idealism, which ultimately 
developed into complete disillusionment, leading them to seek different answers.
However, although Shestov's first book was his final, desperate and ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt at self-persuasion about the sense and meaning of existence, what is remarkable 
about it, and already then clearly manifested, is his original approach to philosophical 
problems -  an approach which we would call psychological and distinctly anthropocentric. 
Along the lines of the well-established traditions of Russian literature Shestov placed a 
human being in the centre of his investigations since he was preoccupied by the enigma of 
human life, the nature of suffering, tragedy and injustice. Shestov's insights were achieved 
first and foremost through the psychological analysis of the literary heroes that he 
conducted. Thus, for example, Shestov traces the tragedy of Hamlet to his distorted 
psychology: his one-sided inner composition which manifests itself in his reflective and 
contemplative nature at the expense of his under-developed psychological make-up (the 
failure to engage actively in reality), of his withdrawal from real life. Similarly, Shestov 
draws a psychological profile of Brutus from Julius Cesar, exposing him as a representative
1 7of ethical individualism (in Ivanov-Razumnik’s classification), of the unity between 
living and thinking, of feelings equipped with reasoning.
Moreover, Shestov already then begins to interlink the personal search of the writer (in this 
case Shakespeare) with the spiritual quest and psychological evolution of his heroes. This 
tendency will only strengthen as Shestov matures as a writer and moves to his purely 
philosophical works. In the Introduction to the first of such works -  The Apotheosis o f 
Groundlessness -  where his clear philosophical orientation is finally refined, he treats 
philosophers first of all as human beings rather than bearers of certain philosophical ideas. 
In the same light Shestov views the philosophical outcome of their contemplation -  as a
17 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 181.
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re su lt  of th e ir  e x is te n t ia l e x p e r ie n c e  m o r e  th an  (o r  at le a s t  e q u a lly  a s )  th e  r e su lt  of th e ir  
ab stract p h ilo s o p h ic a l  sp e c u la t io n s . ‘M H e 3aMeTjrr’ , h e  w r ite s , ‘h t o  K or^a B036y^cflaiOTca 
(})HJioco(J)CKHe B o n p o c t i,  BCflKHe jm pH H ecK ne OTCTynjiemw HecBoeBpeM eHHbi. [ . . . ]  3 t o  
6 b u io  6 b i  cnpaBe^JiHBO, e c j in  6b i <J)HJioco(j)bi [...] c o c t o h j i h  H3 o ^ h h x  H^eft, a He H3 HepBOB 
h  M ycK yjioB... [ . . . ]  O h j io c o 4 >  3HaeT ycT anocT b, KOTopaa KaxoH yroAHO KOHeij 
npe^noH H TaeT npoflOJDKHTejibHOMy cKHTaHmo’. 18
It is worth noting in this connection that Shestov was elected to the Moscow Society of 
Psychology as early as 1915 while still in Russia. He was, of course, a contemporary of 
Freud and undoubtedly found the ground-breaking teaching of the latter interesting. 
Notably, Shestov himself never applied Freudian techniques in his psychological analysis 
of literary characters and their creators, yet some scholars talk about Shestov's approach as 
laying the foundations for psychoanalysis in literary scholarship. For instance, Blagova and 
Emelianov assert, ‘Mbi nonaraeM B03M0>KHbiM paccMaTpHBaTb IlIecTOBa kqk npe^Teny 
ncHxoaHajiHTHHecKH opneHTHpoBaHHoro jiHTepaTypoBe/jeHHA, c^ejiaB, npaB^a, 
Heo6xo,zmMbie oroBopKH’.19 Thus the authors speak of Shestov's interest in the personal 
tragedy of the writers under his study, but emphasise the extreme respectfulness that 
Shestov showed towards them. In Part II we shall have the opportunity to view Shestov's 
approach in the context of formal psychoanalytical theory when dealing with Shestov's 
treatment of individual writers. Moreover, in Chapter 7, on Chekhov, a comparison will be 
drawn between Shestov's and Freud's approach to existence. In this context Shestov's 
friendship with Dr Max Eitingon -  Freud's first formal student -  will be discussed. In 
emigration Shestov became good friends with Eitingon -  a distinguished psychoanalyst 
who trained Fania -  Shestov's sister -  in psychoanalysis. *[...] c 3 h t h h t o h o m  m b i  fiojibine 
fieceayeM o caMbix ofinjux Bonpocax ncHxoaHanH3a -  h  Oedipus-Komplexus b  Hainnx 
pa3roBOpax yxoflHT Ha nocnezumH njiaH’,20 Shestov wrote to Fania in 1922 about one of his 
many encounters with Eitingon. Interestingly, Fania eventually became an extremely 
successful psychoanalyst and in Palestine (Israel), where she spent many years (from 1939
18 Shestov, Ano$eo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, pp. 12-13.
19 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 118.
20 Shestov’s letter to Fania Lovtskii of 10 Nov. 1922, cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 243.
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until 1956), was one of the most active members of the Psychoanalytical Society of Israel 
and created a strong school of students.21
With his distinctly psychological approach to literature and through the latter to philosophy 
Shestov seems to have broken new ground. Later, especially with the rise of 
psychoanalysis, such a method of literary study was no longer a novelty, although it was 
largely rooted in applying Freudian theories. In a way an echo of a more Shestovian 
approach can be seen in the popular book Accentuated Personalities by Karl Leonhard 
where the characters of world classical literature are used to display and examine human 
psychological abnormalities and innate patterns. However, in that book this approach is a 
thing in itself, whereas Shestov applied it to a much more profound and ambitious task with 
far-reaching consequences -  that of contemplating major philosophical problems.
In fact, as will also be demonstrated in Part II, Shestov can be considered as a precursor not 
only of the psychoanalytical trend in literary science, but also of the ‘narrative psychology’ 
approach. The latter is a modem concept which emerged in the framework of post­
modernism and came to occupy an important place within contemporary psychology, 
dealing predominantly with narratives of the Self. As Anna Bull writes, ‘narrative research 
is considered especially important when the object of analysis is personal experience and 
personal identity’.22 This is particularly relevant in the case of Shestov’s approach to 
literature and its authors, and helps to map Shestov’s place within a broader framework of 
existentialism. Indeed, the distinctly Shestovian phenomenon of placing the main emphasis 
on existential experience, manifested already in his first book, laid the foundations for later 
labelling his entire philosophy existential.
Apart from the clear existential orientation there is another remarkable feature of Shestov's 
book on Shakespeare which also displays the continuity of his thought and is, in fact,
21 See more on it in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 301.
22 A. Cento Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war”: an analysis of the self­
narratives of neofascist protagonists’ in Imagining Terrorism: The rhetoric and representation of 
political violence in Italy, 1969-2006, eds. P. Antonello and A. O'Leary (London and Leeds: 
Legenda).
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closely related to its existential dimension. In our view this feature lies in the fact that 
despite the obvious idealism of Shakespeare and his critic Brandes -  an idealism which 
Shestov later completely abandoned -  it nevertheless contains the origins of what grew to 
become his main idee fixe. Indeed, in this book he raised the question of science 
encroaching upon the domain of art and attempting to lay hold of the issues which describe 
the inner life of man:
HejioBCK HayKH, yneHbiH, n o  CBoeMy BoenHTaHHio, n o  c b o k m  npHBbinicaM, no BceMy c io ia a y  CBoen 
flyuiH  Bbimeji H3 t h u ih  CBoero KaSnHeTa h  n o j io m u i c b o io  p y x y  Ha >KH3Hb. 3 t o ,  HecoMHeHHO, 
BejTHHanniHH (J)aKT H3 HOBeniiieH HCTopnH. H a y x a  h  ee ABHraTejiH y>xe He x o t h t  TOJibKO cuyxcHTb 
5XH3HH, nOAHHHaa eH BHeiHHHH MHp -  OHH HIIiyT nepeKpOHTb 5KH3Hb C006pa3H 0 TOMy HAeaJiy, 
KOTopbiH o h h  HauuiH TaM, b 3 to m  BHeruHeM MHpe, r,ae M H ororo, h t o  ecTb b H auien HejiOBenecKOH 
h ch 3 h h , -  HeT, h o  m e  uapHT 6e3MJiTe5KHbiH n o x o fi poB H oro cymecTBOBaHHa. TaM u ejin  HeT, TaM 
CMbicjia HeT, TaM HeT nyBCTBa BOCTOpra, TaM HeT x on oA a  OTnaaHHa -  B cero  3Toro h  He HyacHO. Bee 
3 t o  cjie^ yeT  BbipBaTb H3 rpy^H H ejioBexa, h to G b i B03BbiCHTb e r o  “ a o  npHpoAfci” . HejTOBexy H ayxn  
3 t o  6b u io  n p o m e  B cero. O h  o ir o r o  h  CTan yneHbiM, h t o  MeHbiue B cero  3Haji h  ueHHJi Te h m c h h o  
HejiOBenecKHe nyBCTBa, KOTopbix “ b n p n p oA e” -  cxojibKO h h  h iu h  -  HHKoraa He H aiutem b.23
Thus already at that time Shestov started the juxtaposition of science and art which, if we 
look at it this way, later became the juxtaposition between reason and faith. However, the 
evolution of the former into the latter was gradual. Moreover, taking a literary approach we 
would assert that the central conflict of Shestov's philosophy -  that between faith and 
reason -  has at its roots, as the underlying cause, the conflict between art and science. 
According to Shestov those are the two opposites which are impossible to reconcile, and 
which Western philosophy nevertheless has forever tried to reconcile -  on the plane of faith 
and reason -  in a rather futile fashion.
‘Bee XlX-oe cToneTHe npeACTaBJiaeTCH JI. UiecTOBy 3anojiHeHHbiM 6opb6on 
npoTecTyiomnx hhahbhAy3jihctob xyAO>KHHKOB -  BaiipOHa, Miocce, TeiiHe -  c 
TOpacecTByiomHMH cboio nobeAy mbicjihtcjiamh b po^e TaHa’,24 wrote Ivanov-Razumnik. 
He then generalized this observation to the statement which captures the core of the 
existential outlook: that the subjective is forever juxtaposed by Shestov to the objective:
23 Shestov, UleKcnup u eso x p u m u K  Spondee, p. 11.
24 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 199.
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9S‘o6i>eKTHBHoe, o6meo6a3aTejii>Hoe npoTHBonocTaBJiaeTCfl cy6T>eKTHBHOMy\ Indeed, right 
from the start Shestov focused on the idea that there are things in the phenomenon of a 
human being which do not lend themselves to scientific analysis -  precisely because they 
are so individual, private and subjective that they escape generalization and hence lie 
outside the domain of science. However, science in its steady advance and with a 
depressing self-assurance claims omnipotence in the human world -  if not today, then 
tomorrow and therefore the very foundations of such science have to be questioned, 
Shestov says. The objective is trying to oppress the subjective, and human reason instead of 
standing up for every living soul, on the contrary validates this oppression. Therefore, 
Shestov concluded, human knowledge and reason must have something deeply wrong at 
their very roots. By what right does Hellenistic philosophy, hand in hand with its direct heir 
-  modem European thought, -  Shestov asks, regard man as no more than another link in the 
evolutionary chain, as if sealing his tragic destiny with rationalist approval? Necessity 
celebrated by reason Shestov met with a definite indignation and rebellion. He therefore did 
no less than to provide a fundamental critique of the whole history of Western philosophy.
The most illuminating expression of the quintessence and roots of Shestov's rebellious 
thought is given by Czeslaw Milosz in the following beautiful lines:
What does a creature that calls itself “I” want for itself? It wants to be. Quite a demand! Early in life 
it begins to discover, however, that its demand is perhaps excessive. Objects behave in their own 
impassive manner and show a lack of concern for the central importance of “I” [...] The “I” is 
invaded by Necessity from the inside as well, but always feels it as an alien force. Nevertheless the 
“I” must accept the inevitable order of the world. The wisdom of centuries consists precisely in 
advising acquiescence and resignation. [...] Shestov simply refuses to play this game of chess, 
however, and overturns the table with a kick. For why should the “I” accept “wisdom”, which 
obviously violates its most intense desire? Why respect “the immutable laws”? Whence comes the 
certainty that what is presumably impossible is really impossible? And is a philosophy preoccupied 
with man in general of any use to a certain man who lives only once in space and time? Isn't there 
something horrible in Spinoza's advice to philosophers “Not to laugh, not to weep, not to hate, but 
to understand”? On the contrary, says Shestov, a man should shout, scream, laugh, jeer, protest. In 
the Bible, Job wailed and screamed to the indignation of his wise friends.26
25 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 199.
26 Milosz, pp. 103-104.
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S h e s to v  c h o s e  a  d is t in c t ly  a n ti-ra tio n a l a p p ro a ch  b y  r e fu s in g  to  su rren d er to  th is  etern a l 
n e c e s s i t y  w h ic h  s e e m s  to  r e ig n  u n d iv id e d ly  in  th e  u n iv e r se  an d  w h ic h  c a m e  to  b e  
w o r sh ip p e d  b y  ‘s e c u la r ’ p h ilo s o p h y , b y  m e n  o f  R e a so n . S h e s to v , in  co n tra st  to  th e  la tter, in  
a  v e r y  a rtis tic , ir ra tio n a lis t  rath er th an  s c ie n t i f ic  w a y , ju x ta p o s e d  te m p o r a l, b u t p a s s io n a te  
e x is te n c e  to  s o u lle s s  o b je c t iv e  re a lity , an d  cen tr ed  h is  p h ilo s o p h y  arou n d  m a n 's  su ffe r in g .
Having started with advocating tragedy in the name of some higher truth Shestov soon ran 
into a dead end and realised that the answers provided by the idealistic outlook are by no 
means satisfactory. His personal discovery o f Nietzsche had a shattering impact on him and 
sealed his realisation o f how illusory are the consolations offered to a suffering individual 
by the general good and morality. Shestov's further steps along this route soon led him to 
another existential discovery that ‘caMOH xapaKTepHOH j x j u l  nejioBeica HepToii HBjiaeTca
on6ofl3Ht npaBflbi’. S h e s to v  se n se d  th e  h u g e  e x te n t  to  w h ic h  m a n  is  p rep a red  to  g o  in  o rd er  
to  s h ie ld  h im s e l f  fro m  th e  h orrors o f  re a lity , in  ord er  to  cr ea te  fo r  h im s e l f  a w o u ld -b e  
sta b le , se c u r e  an d  c o m fo r ta b le  e n v ir o n m e n t. B y  c o m fo r t  w e  m e a n  h e r e  sp ir itu a l, m en ta l  
c o m fo r t  w h ic h  is  n o t  to  b e  c o n fu s e d  w ith  a  b a n a l m a te r ia lis t  o n e . T h is  c o m fo r t  h a s  b e e n  
c o n v e n ie n t ly  o f fe r e d  to  m a n  b y  h is  ra t io n a lis t  a p p r o a ch  to  th e  w o r ld , or, in  sh o rt, b y  r e a so n .
‘HaM noK a^ceTca’, h e  w r ite s , that ‘h c t h h l i  -  h  n ep B b ie  h  n o cjie^ H n e - paHO h jih  no3^HO  
6 y a y r  HaMH flofibrrbi h  HaMH nocTH rH yrbi c  Taicon ace h c h o c tm o  h  OTneTjiHBOCTbio, c  
KaxoH mm n o cra r jiH  y3Ke M H oroe m h o h ccctb o  cpe^H H x h c t h h .  H t o  TeojiorHnecKHH h  
MeTa<J)H3HHecKHH n ep n o flb i h c t o p h h  ocT ajin cb  flajieico 3a  HaMH h  mm hchbcm n o j x  3HaxoM  
nojiom rrejibH O H  HayKH, e e  yue ijapcTBOBaHHio HeT h  He fiyzjeT K o m ja !’ .28 H o w e v e r ,  S h e s to v  
e x c la im s , w e  are s t i l l  l iv in g  ‘oKpyxceHHbie 6ecKOHeHHbiM m h o^ ccctb om  TaHH. [ . . . ]  T o , h t o  
MbI CHHTaeM HCTHHOH, HTO MbI ^oSblBaeM  HaiHHM MbllUJieHUeM, OKa3bIBaeTCB B KaKOM-TO 
CMMCJie HeCOH3MepHMbIM He TOJTbKO C BHeiHHHM MHpOM, B KOTOpblH HaC OKyHyJIH C
90po c^/teHHB, ho  h  c h h uihm h  coficTBeHHbiMH BHyTpeHHHMH nepexcHBaHH^MH’. And despite 
the enormous advances of natural sciences, Shestov states, ‘“TyMaH” nepB03flaHH0H TaHHbi
27 Lev Shestov, Havana u Komfbi. npe/iHCJiOBHe in CovmeHUH e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 
1996), II, p. 181.
28 Lev Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea (Moscow: Folio, 2001), p. 184.
29 Lev Shestov, A<puvbi u Hepycaniw (Moscow: Folio, 2001), p. 26.
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He pacceajica. CKopee, eme 6ojiee crycrancA’. For Shestov mysteries are everywhere, 
even in things that seem perfectly straightforward; but the human mind tends to shriek 
away from them. However, there comes a time in everybody's life when we encounter 
tragedy, death, solitude and despair. This is the moment of truth according to Shestov, 
because only then a human being is free from all bonds and duties, and thus can think in a 
most uninhibited and penetrating way.
icorfla  H ejioB eicy rpo3H T HeM HHyeMaa r a b e j ib ,  K or^ a  n p eA  h h m  pacjcpbiB aeT ca n p o n a c T b , K or^a  
yxpflHT nocjieflHHfl H a^O K^a, c H ero  BHe3anHO cHHMaiOTca B ee e r o  T arocT H bie o6a3aH H O C TH  b 
OTHomeHHH k  jh o a ^ m ,  H ejioB enecT B y, k  b y a y m e iv iy , uHBHjiH3auHH, n p o r p e c c y  h  t .  a . ,  h  B3aMeH  
B c e r o  3 T o ro  npeA bH BJiaeTca ynp om eH H b iH  B o n p o c  06 e r o  o a h h o k o h ,  h h h t o h c h o h ,  He3aMeTHOH
JIHHHOCTH, 31
Shestov says. It is then that man really starts seeking ultimate answers to the burning 
questions of existence, it is then that true philosophy is bom. Thus, according to Shestov, 
true philosophy is the philosophy of tragedy. Everything else is just an attempt to go the 
opposite way -  to escape from reality, to calm, stupefy and comfort the human spirit -  in 
other words, to lull it to sleep rather than to awaken it to the intense and painful search for 
tme answers. This was the case with Shestov's passionate philosophising and that is why 
Berdiaev observed that ‘Shestov was philosophising with all his being’ (‘(jmjioco^CTBpBaji 
BceM c b o h m  cymecTBOM’) and philosophy was for him ‘a matter of life and death’ ( ‘AejiOM  
5KH3HH h  CMepTH’).32 In a similar vein, although decades later, David Gascoyne described 
Shestov's activity as ‘actual spiritual activity’33 consisting of an ‘undivided truth-seeking’.34
We note that, interestingly, this lonely and intense quest for the truth and the way of 
extracting it -  by revelation rather than speculation -  always attracted artists, perhaps 
because it is in itself reminiscent of the process of artistic creativity, and in our view this is 
no coincidence. This comparison will become clear in the next chapter where we shall
30 Shestov, Acpuubi u HepycanuM (Moscow: Folio, 2001), p. 27.
31 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huifiue, pp. 396-397.
32 Nikolai Berdiaev, ‘OcHOBHaa naea (J )h jio c o 4 )h h  JIbBa IIIecTOBa’ in Lev Shestov, YM03penue u 
omKpoeenue (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1964), pp. 5-9 (p. 5).
33 Gascoyne, p. 128.
34 Ibid, p. 131.
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focus more closely on Shestov's proximity to art. Here, however, we shall restrict ourselves 
to a quotation from Boris de Schloezer which illuminates this point further, even if in a 
rather aphoristic way:
Anyone who absorbs Shestov's ideas, acknowledges the force of his criticism, and tries to follow 
him, will find himself alone, as Shestov himself is alone since he broke with the common world. 
...In spite of our almost-certainty that the revolt will come to nothing, [...] many of us find 
something extraordinarily attractive in Shestov's thought: once we have known its influence, we can 
never go back on it even though we may part company with Shestov. [...] Though still enslaved by 
reality, one is no longer a consenting slave. [...] Because the hope of salvation, the hope of a miracle 
is alive in one's heart.35
Now, if we trace the mental path of Shestov through his works taken in chronological 
order, we can see that having started with juxtaposing artists and thinkers in his first book, 
Shestov went on to juxtapose philosophy and preaching in his second book: Good in the 
Teaching o f Tolstoy and Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching, and the tragic and the 
ordinary in the third: Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: The Philosophy o f Tragedy. The profound 
rift between Shestov's first book and the subsequent ones marked a drastic turn in his 
convictions. This turn was celebrated by Shestov in his fourth book which could have 
served as his ideological manifesto if not for the paradox that in it he consciously declared 
the renunciation of all ‘sensible’, ‘rational’ ideologies. Hence the title: The Apotheosis o f  
Groundlessness.
Bernard Martin noted that this book
already adumbrates a number of the chief characteristics of existentialist thought. It contains not 
only a vigorous attack on the speculative metaphysics of the neo-Kantian and Hegelian idealist 
variety that dominated European academic philosophy at the time but also a radical challenge to the 
pretensions of scientific positivism and its basic assumptions, namely, the principle of unalterable 
regularity in the sequence of natural phenomena and the idea of causal necessity that is supposed to 
govern them. Shestov further denied the value of autonomous ethics and passionately insisted on 
the need for subjectivity and inwardness in the search for truth.36
35 Boris de Schloezer, ‘Leon Chestov’, The Adelphi, 5 (3) December (1932), 157-162 (p. 160).
36 Bernard Martin, ‘The life and thought of Lev Shestov’, Introduction to Lev Shestov, Athens and 
Jerusalem, trans. Bernard Martin, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), pp. 11- 44 (p. 19).
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These, in fact, firmly remained the principal features of Shestov's thought. The two books 
which followed {Beginnings and Ends and Great Vigils) only continued and furthered his 
outlook.
Thus Shestov's failure to convince himself in a habitually shared way that morality and 
good can overcome Chance in human life as well as all the horrors of existence ended his 
initial idealistic perception of the world and landed him in total disillusionment. Already 
then amid the nihilistic phase that naturally ensued, Shestov recognised the need for a 
positive stance. He ended his second book -  the one which marked his rebirth as a thinker -  
with an essentially religious message: ‘Hymio HCKaTb Toro, h to  eume cocipaaaHHH, eume 
ao6pa. HyxcHo ncicaTb Bora’.37 However, it is only in his next book -  on Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche -  that his new philosophy was taking a definite shape. It was then further formed 
and perfected in The Apotheosis o f Groundlessness where Shestov largely parted with the 
genre of literary criticism and chose a purely philosophical orientation. From then on his 
thought was gradually refining itself by entering the same struggle against reason over and 
over again; and the counter-balance to reason -  outweighing and overcoming it -  Shestov 
found in faith (which he labelled a second dimension of thought) -  an unquestioning faith 
in the omnipotent God. This principal motif of setting reason and faith (Athens and 
Jerusalem) against one another only to argue the superiority of the latter over the former 
provides the basis for virtually all the major works of Shestov written in emigration: Sola 
Fide, Potestas Clavium, On Job's Scales, Kierkegaard and Existential Philosophy and 
finally his fundamental (and last) work: Athens and Jerusalem. In it Shestov summarised 
the life-long achievements of his thought. In particular he wrote: ‘MyzipocTb HejiOBenecKaa 
ecTb 6e3yMHe npea Tocno^oM, h  MyapeHinHH h 3 jh o a c h  6bui, xax 3t o  corjiacHO npo3penH 
c toJib HenoxojKne apyr Ha ^pyra Hmime h  KnpKerapA, BejiHHanniHM rpeniHHKOM. Bee,
38
hto He ot Bepbi, ecTb r p e x ’ .
Thus Shestov's main concepts included faith, reason, truth and freedom as well as tragedy 
and death. His principal aim was to liberate mankind from universal necessity and bring it
37 Shestov, Tojicmoii u Hutitue, p. 316.
38 Shestov, AcpuHbi u Hepycamm, p. 25.
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to the state of infinite possibility. To this end he called upon human beings to awaken from 
the hypnosis of self-evident truths, from the enchantments and promises induced by Reason 
which the Hellenistic and later the whole of Western philosophy embraced. His struggle 
was to overcome reason, to fight against the restricted nature of the human Mind. The 
alternative that he suggested was faith -  another dimension of thought which originates in 
the Scriptures and is achieved by revelation. Therefore Shestov's philosophy is normally 
branded irrationalist. Moreover, unlike other representatives of irrationalism in Russian 
philosophy, such as Skovoroda, Khomiakov, Golubinsky and others, Shestov produced the 
most shrewd criticism of the sources of rationalism (‘npoHmjaTejibHbiii aHajiH3 ocHOBHbix 
npe^nocbuioK pauHOHajiH3Ma’), in the words of Vasilii Zenkovsky, and experienced and 
communicated with an extraordinary force the supernatural origins of faith (cHHo6biTne 
Bepbi’).39
In the sections that follow we shall discuss in more detail first of all Shestov's attempts to 
overcome the power of Mind and secondly the theological aspect of his thought, which 
according to some scholars like Zenkovsky, is central to Shestov's philosophy. In fact 
Zenkovsky goes as far as to suggest that Shestov's thought is decisively theocentric, rather 
than anthropocentric.40 In our view the roots of what Zenkovsky perceives as Shestov's 
theocentrism -  his preoccupation with the Deity and the origins of faith -  lie precisely in 
Shestov's anthropocentrism, in his concentration on the tragic human predicament and in 
his attempts to liberate man by finding the true God from whom man became separated by 
knowledge. Thus at best Shestov's philosophy is a combination of theocentric and 
anthropocentric approaches.
Zenkovsky also asserts that Shestov's philosophy cannot be squeezed into the narrow frame 
of existentialism, for his fundamental themes spread far beyond the latter.41 However, from 
our perspective -  when we interpret Shestov's main conflict of faith and reason as 
originating from that between art and science (the individual and the general) and associate
39 Zenkovskii, II, p. 376.
40 Ibid, p. 366.
41 Zenkovskii, II, p. 366.
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his ‘method by revelation’ with the generally artistic (where the subjective is set against the 
objective) -  his thought certainly falls under the label of existentialism. In Shestov's mature 
stage it evolves into biblical existentialism, and it is the latter that the concluding section of 
this chapter deals with.
2.2. The struggle against the Mind by means of the mind. Overcoming the self-evident.
We have already explained that for Shestov a fundamental task of philosophy was to 
demonstrate the existence of mystery in the seemingly obvious, instead of -  on the contrary 
-  clarifying and explaining that which seems mysterious. The latter function -  of killing 
mystery -  Shestov assigned to science in a rather derogatory fashion. It is interesting to 
compare this stance of Shestov with the following statement by the distinguished Russian 
literary scholar Iurii Lotman:
H a y ic a  H an H H aeT ca  c T o r o ,  h t o  m m , B rjiH A W fiaacb b  npH B M H H oe h ,  K a 3 a n o c b  6 m , noH U TH oe, 
HeOJKHAaHHO OTKpblBaeM  B HeM CTpaHHOe H H eo6bflC H H M O e. B 03H H K aeT  BOnpOC, OTBeTOM Ha 
KOTOpblH H n p H 3 B aH a  HBHTbea T a  HJIH H H aa KOHUenUHB. HcXOAHbIM  nyHKTOM H3yneHHH CTHXa 
HBJiaeTCH co 3H aH H e n a p a A O K c a jib H O c ra  no33H H  x a x  TaKOBOH. E c j i h  6 b i  cym ecT B O B aH H e no33H H  He 
6m jio  S e c c n o p H o  ycTaHOBjieH HM M  (J)aKTOM, m o ^ k h o  6 m jio  6 m  c  AOCTaTOHHoii C T en eH b io  
y6eAHTejibHOCTH n o K a 3 aT b , h t o  e e  H e m o jk c t  6 b iT b .42
Thus both agree, in a rather unusual way to some, that the enigma of existence is locked in 
that which appears clear and straightforward. However, what for Shestov is the task of 
philosophy -  a certain wake-up call for humanity to abandon the framework of standard 
reasoning -  for Lotman is a call for and the origin of scientific inquiry. Philosophy, 
according to Shestov, should alert us to mystery and lead us ultimately beyond rational 
speculation - to revelation, to the beginning of faith. According to Lotman, this mystery is a 
challenge to be taken on by science -  the commonly shared view against which Shestov 
struggled all his life. Yet Lotman's words about poetry could have been repeated by 
Shestov, only he would have generalised them to the phenomena of life and death in their 
entirety. In the last section we quoted Shestov’s statement that we live surrounded by an
42 Iurii Lotman, O nosmax u no33uu (Aucuim no3mmecKOBO mencma, cmambu, uccnedoemm, 
3aMemKu) (St Petersburg: Iskusstvo-SPB, 1996), p. 45.
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endless multitude o f mysteries. ‘Ho KaK h h  3araA0HHbi OKpy^aiomne 6brrae TaftHbi’, he 
continues, ‘caMoe 3araAOHHoe h  TpeBomioe, h t o  TaHHa Boo6me cymecTByeT, h t o  mbi KaK 
6bi oKOHHaTenbHo h  HaBcer^a OTpe3aHbi o t  h c t o k o b  h  Hanaji h ch 3h h ’.43 From this 
perspective Shestov inadvertently equated poetry and existence in that both are o f a 
paradoxical nature, and this may actually carry a deep meaning and be more than 
accidental. Indeed, for him both were paradoxical, mysterious and beautiful, and the roots 
of both were forever concealed from us as humans. We will argue in the next chapter that 
Shestov's whole approach to the universe v/as o f a poetic nature. It is precisely in 
paradoxical concepts that Shestov suggested that the truth should be sought, and the way to 
this search was supposed to be irrational.
‘HHKorfla pa3yM He b cnnax 6bui onpe^ejiHTb 3Jio h  Ao6po h jih  jx30kq o t a c j ih t b  3Jio o t  
Aobpa x o t h  6bi npH6jiH3HTejibHo; HanpoTHB, Bcer^a acajixo h  no3opHo cMenraBaji; Hayxa 
)Ke AaBana pa3peinemi5i KyjianHbie’.44 These words o f Stavrogin addressed to Shatov in 
Dostoevsky's The Possessed Shestov cherished as revealing the helpless nature o f the 
human Mind. He believed that it is Dostoevsky, not Kant, who has provided the real 
critique of pure reason, and enthusiastically shared this fundamental stance of Dostoevsky. 
He also claimed that this novel demonstrates ‘b o  h t o  npeBpamaeTca HejiOBenecKaa xareHb, 
OTopBaHHaa 3HamieM o t  ee TBopua’.45
In this section we propose to navigate through Shestov's complex relationship with Mind 
and disentangle his attitudes in their evolution, separating the wheat from the chaff.
In short, Shestov's attempts were directed at exposing the inability of Mind to resolve the 
questions that matter most to mankind. He undertook to demonstrate the crucial limitations 
of reason and, moreover, the poison of its power and the harm of its self-assurance. Shestov
43 Shestov, A<pUHbi u HepycanuM, p. 26.
44 Fedor Dostoevskii, Eecbi in IIojiHoe codpanue conuHenuu e 30 moMax (Leningrad: Nauka, 1982), 
vol. 10, p. 199. Cited in Lev Shestov, O ”nepepootcdenuu ydeotcdeHuii” y  flocmoeecKoeo in 
YM03peHue u omKpoeenue (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1964), p. 193.
45 Shestov, O “nepepoofcdemiu ydejtcdenuu " y JJocmoeecKoeo, p. 194.
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emphasised how deceptive our perception of the universe really is and how easily we fall 
prey to the dictates o f knowledge:
K o jm y H , BeflbM a, ;u >hboji -  s t o  TOJibKO H en ro  HOBoe, ho  noH ATH oe, He n p o T H B o p e n a m e e  
OHeBH^HOCTH. BepTAIAaACA ACe  3CMAA, HenOABH^CHOe COJIHUe, (J)HKTHBHOe H e 6 o  H T. n. -  B ee 3TO 
B e^b B e p x  SeccM bicjiH U bi a a a  p e d e m c a . H  TeM He M eH ee s t o  -  HCTHHa, o h  3H aeT 3t o  H aB epH oe h  c 
3t o h  H enpaB A onoA odH O H  h c t h h o h  oh  achbct u e j ib ie  roA bi. P a3B e T aicoe H a cn jin e  HaA ac tc k h m  
yMOM M oaceT He H3ypoAOBaTb e r o  no3H aBaTeAbH bie c n o c o d H O c r a ?  P a3B e B ep a  b  c m m c a  
deccM bicA H U bi He CTaHOBHTca e r o  B T op oh  npnpoA O H ?46
As we explained earlier, Shestov started by juxtaposing creative writers and scholarly 
thinkers, in short -  art and science. From these two sources he derived related concepts 
which can be all generalized as the rational on one hand and the irrational on the other, but, 
interestingly, they were from his point of view always in contradiction with each other. For 
Shestov at the roots of his juxtaposition there lay a deep ancient conflict and throughout his 
entire writing career he never supposed that these concepts could exist in parallel, let alone 
coexist in some sort o f fruitful, even symbiotic, collaboration. From Shestov's perspective it 
was always ‘either, or’. He wrote about this yet again in his final work Athens and 
Jerusalem: “‘A(J>HHbi h  HepycaAHM”, “peAHrno3Hasi (JjhaococJjha”  - BbipaaceHHA, nouTH 
paBH03HanamHe h  noxpbmaiomHe Apyr Apyra h , BMecTe c TeM, paBHO 3araAOHHbie h  
pa3ApaxcaiomHe cBoefi BHyrpeHHeH npoTHBopeHHBOCTbio coBpeMeHHyio m b ic a b . He 
npaBHAbHee a h  nocTaBHTb AHAeMMy: A<J)HHbi a h 6 o  HepycaAHM, peAHTHA a h 6 o 
(Jjh ao co iJjh a? ’ .47 For Shestov,
PeAHrH03Haa 4 )h a o co (J )h a  He ecTb pa3bicKaHHe npeABeuHo cymecTByiomero, HeH3MeHHoro CTpoa h  
nopHAKa dbiTHA, He ecTb orAHAxa (Besinnung), He ecTb Toxce nocTHxceHHe pa3AHHna Memory 
AodpoM h  3 a o m , odMaHHO cyAAmee ycnoKoeHHe H3MyneHHOMy HeAOBenecTBy. PeAHrH03Haa 
4 > h a o co 4 )h a  ecTb poACAaiomeecA b 6e3MepHbix HanpAxceHHAx, nepe3 OTBpaT o t  3HaHHA, uepe3 Bepy, 
npeoAOAeHHe AoxcHoro CTpaxa npeA  h h h c m  He orpaHHHeHHoft b o a c h  TBopua, ctpaxa, BHyiueHHoro 
HcxycHTeAeM HarneMy npaoTuy h  nepeAaHHoro HaM BceM. [...] HHane roBopa, 0Ha ecTb BeAHKaa h  
nocAeAHAA 6opb6a 3a nepB03AaHHyio CBo6oAy h  cxpbrroe b CBodoAe doxcecTBeHHoe “Aodpo 3eAo”, 
pacuenHBuieecA nocAe naaeHHA Ha Harne HeMomHoe Aodpo h  Harne BceyHHHToxcaiomee 3 a o .48
46 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huifuie, p. 438.
47 Shestov, AcpUHbi u HepycanuM, p. 7.
48 Ibid, p 24.
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Thus, Shestov’s fundamental stance, which was mentioned earlier, is that ‘Bee, hto He ot 
Bepti, ecTb rpex’. Hence the strict juxtaposition o f faith and reason. ‘Ham pa3yM, noBTopio, 
onopoHHJi b Hamnx rnaaax Bepy’, Shestov crucially insists; ‘oh “pacno3Haji” b Hen 
He3aKOHHoe npHT«3aHHe HenoBexa ho^hhhhtb cbohm acejiaHHHM HCTHHy h othuji y Hac 
flparoijeHHeHiHHH ,nap He6a, ^ep5KaBHoe npaBo ynacTBOBaTb b TBopnecicoM fiat (aa fiyzteT), 
BTOJiKOBaB h pacnjnomHB Harne MbiuuieHHe b njiocxocTH OKaMeHeBmero est (ecTb)’.49
This intolerance attributed by Shestov to both domains -  the rational and the irrational -  
with respect to each other also reveals, in our view, some deep underlying intellectual 
extremism of Shestov -  or, if you like, some fundamental naivete of his outlook. For it is 
ultimately rooted in his struggle against the scientific approach which demonstrates, in fact, 
that he misconstrued the concept of science as such. Indeed, in his interest first and 
foremost in the individual, subjective and particular he denied science its very nature of 
generalisation. In his ‘^ hcbhhk Mbicjiefi’ Shestov wrote
Pa3Be mo>kho noKJiOHHTbca 3aKOHaM? Be/ib 3aKOHbi MepTBbi —  nejiOBeK >xe npeacae h nocjie Bcero 
acHBoe cymecTBO. H, ecjiw kto KOMy xnaHjrrbCH /jojoxeH, to  He nejiOBex 3aKOHaM, a 3aKOHbi 
nejioBeKy. Oho Tax h ecTb OTnacTH. B obmecTBeHHOH 3KH3HH 3axoHbi co3/iaK)TCH jxjin HenoBexa, 
a aace cy66oTa, xax cxa3aH0 b nncaHHH, rjin  HenoBexa. Ho Hayxa 3Toro He npH3HaeT. Pfaean 
yneHoro HenoBexa —  cbccth Bee xanecTBeHHbie pa3JiHHHB k xoJMHecTBeHHbiM. [...] H ecjiH 6bi, 
HaxoHeu, Hayxe yaanocb H36aBHTbca o t  Bcex octbtkob, KOTopbie ao chx nop He BMemajiHCb b 
(J)opMyjibi, OHa 6bi npa3AHOBana cboio oxoHnaTejibHyio nobeay. [...] Kax caynHjiocb, hto Hayxa 
C0 3Aajia ce6e Taxon naean? Orxyaa ee BenHaa h HenpHMHpHMaa Bpaacaa xo BceMy 
oayuieBJieHHOMy?50
In our view, this basic misconception of the tasks, methods and nature of science played a 
substantial role in determining the way Shestov's philosophy evolved.
If initially art and science, as we mentioned above, were for Shestov simply embodiments 
of two opposite domains, then subsequently the exact content of both of them underwent a 
gradual evolution. Largely due to the above misconception, already in Shestov's second and 
third books (on Tolstoy, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky) what was concealed under the name of
49 Ibid.
50 Shestov, ‘/jHeBHHx M bicjieft’ (entry of 22.11.19), pp. 248-249.
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science acquired a different meaning: it involved all rational empirical knowledge which 
took hold of humanity. Everything which constituted human understanding of the universe, 
including the laws of nature and the rules they imposed on human behaviour, was classified 
by Shestov as suffocating self-evident truths bordering on vulgarity and having a philistine 
nature. In other words human reason became synonymous with what Dostoevsky's term of 
BceMCTBO (translated by Andrius Valevicius as ‘omnitude’) represents (common truths 
stretching down to low, down-to-earth aspirations shared by the mediocre majority). This 
identification is, of course, unjustifiable and, at the very least, surprising. However, Shestov 
is not concerned about providing justification. He is primarily occupied with giving 
evidence for the prosecution of Mind, as Balakhovsky rightly observes in his article.51 
Balakhovsky also makes the very interesting observation that once we add to Shestov's use 
of Mind the adjective ‘standard’, everything suddenly starts making sense. Indeed, what 
Shestov really means seems to be the standard, conventional ways of thinking which are 
indeed characteristic of that mediocre majority that he, like Dostoevsky, refers to as 
BceMCTBO. At the time it was this way of thinking or rather this outlook on life that Shestov 
really attacked, while assigning its vices to the human mind per se. However, this utilitarian 
way of thinking is, in fact, diametrically opposed to the creative flight and daring of 
scientific thought. Yet, over time the image of the enemy in Shestov's philosophy becomes 
refined and from a rather wild blend of science and rationalistic, philistine convictions there 
emerges pure Reason.
Interestingly, Shestov with his affinity for polarisation is not seduced by the rather 
Nietzschean path that opens up at this point -  the juxtaposition to this implicitly mediocre 
majority called bccmctbo o f  some creative minority who, by contrast, are interested in the 
eternal questions, a spiritual search, and so on. Shestov, while accepting in principle this 
division between people does not mind the existence o f  the ‘standard’ majority, does not 
denigrate their values and does not necessarily acknowledge, let alone celebrate, the 
superiority o f the implicitly sophisticated minority. ‘He HyxcHO [...] , hto6bi cymecTBOBano 
yfiexc^eirae, hto ciioco6hoctb hckjhohhtcjibho OT^aBaTBCfl bbicuihm BonpocaM Hayxn h
51 Balakhovskii, p. 43.
52 Ibid, p.46.
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HCKyccTBa BbiroflHO OTjiHHaeT nejiOBeKa’,53 he writes in his Tolstoy and Nietzsche. 
Assessing mankind in this way and inducing inequality of this kind does not interest him. It 
is not in social boundaries that his interest lies. He is preoccupied by the boundaries within 
the human psyche as such, by the limitations of reason, by the life of the soul which is 
generally called spirituality. He has his own -  very different -  agenda and his incentive 
seems pure and noble. He truly wants to liberate humanity from its burdensome rationalistic 
chains, and ideas of the superiority of some over others are completely alien to Shestov. In 
this he differs substantially from Nietzsche whom he infinitely respected as a very profound 
thinker.
Once the root o f  all evil was traced by Shestov to the human mind as such, he began a 
relentless search through the whole intellectual history o f  mankind to find more and more 
evidence against the gloomy and restrictive pow er o f reason and to disavow the adherents 
o f the rational school as well as to find his own associates -  those who, like Shestov, 
rebelled against the self-evident. Thus this crusade, although conducted in a very 
persuasive, coherent and eloquent way, is difficult to regard as a fair analysis. It is more a 
one-way street for Shestov, a case for the prosecution only, where he strives w ith ultimate 
audacity towards the answer that awaits him all along, while he claims to be genuinely 
searching for truth. Indeed, he him self undoubtedly perceived his lonely struggle as an 
infinite and terrifying search for the ultimate answers, especially difficult given that 
Shestov essentially fought against the achievements o f  W estern civilization o f  which he 
was him self a product. Zenkovsky wrote: ‘nocne TOpacecTBeHHbix “noxopoH”
paijHOHanH3Ma b o^hoh KHHre, oh CHOBa B03BpamaeTca b cne^yiomeH KHHre k kphthkc 
pauHOHajiH3Ma, KaK 6bi oacHBinero 3a 3to BpeMa. Ho Bee 3to ofibacHJieTCJi tcm, hto 
pa3pyniHB b cede o/jhh “cjioh” paiiHOHaiiHCTHHecKHx nojioaceHHH, IIIecTOB HaTbiKaeTca b 
ce6e ace Ha hobbih, fiojiee rjiyfioKHH cjioh to to  ace paijHOHajiH3Ma’.54
Curiously, Zenkovsky essentially repeated Shestov's misconception of science, as he said: 
‘IIIecTOB nyBCTBOBaji bck) npaB/iy Otkpobchhji, h ero He nyrajin MejiKHe 3aBoeBaHHa
53 Shestov, Toncmou u Huijiue, p. 299.
54 Zen’kovskii, II, p. 367.
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KpHTHijH3Ma b  OTHoineHHH CBameHHoro IlHcaHHB, KaK He HMnoHHpoBajiH eMy Bee TaK 
Ha3BiBaeMtie “3aBoeBaHHa” coBpeMeHHOH HayKH’. 55 Zenkovsky wrote with joyful 
enthusiasm about Shestov’s struggle against rationalism and stressed that one o f  Shestov's 
achievements was in disclosing that ‘“aBTOHOMHa pa3yMa” (“TpaHcneH^eHTanH3M”) 
Hen36e>KH0 npeBpamaeTCB b  THpaHHio pa3yMa’.56 He clearly embraced the fact that 
Shestov's philosophical foundations lay in religious consciousness and mystical ethics and 
that Shestov managed to shoot in passing ‘mctko  h  yzjauHo no caMbiM, Ka3ajiocb 6bi, 
6eccnopHbiM, ho  “uyaoBHmHo-HejienbiM” yTBepayjeHHaM coBpeMeHHoro 3HaHHa’.57 The 
question thus arises, which we pose in passing: was it not the case that everybody interested 
in philosophy in general and Shestov's philosophy in particular who did not actually come 
from a scientific background was persuaded by Shestov's elaboration and inclined to share 
his conclusions? It might have been precisely that unfamiliarity with and unawareness o f 
scientific methods and goals which might have allowed one to follow Shestov on his path 
o f anti-scientism.
Shestov's rather unscrupulous treatment of the concept of mind demonstrates that to prove 
his extraordinary point he engages in those very blind generalizations of which he himself 
violently accuses science. Indeed, he groups together under the label of Mind things which 
are totally unrelated to each other, such as philistine ideology and scientific inquiry. On the 
whole he himself uses the only means available to man in any intellectual dispute -  logical 
arguments, that is to say that very Mind against which his attacks are directed. This is 
obviously the most fundamental contradiction in his entire philosophy, which was pointed 
out to him multiple times. However, he never seemed to take this seriously and essentially 
avoided any polemics. In particular, he famously replied to Berdiaev: ‘H to  npaB^a, to 
npaBfla. noHMan. T ojibko 3aueM jiobhtb  Gbuio? H pa3Be TaK khhth  wraiOT? no  
npOHTeHHH KHHTH HyHCHO 3a6bITb He TOJIbKO BCe CJIOBa, HO H Bee MbICJIH aBTOpa, H TOJIbKO
CO
noMHHTb e r o  j ih i jo ’. B e r d ia e v , h o w e v e r ,  m a d e  th e  v e r y  p o in te d  o b se r v a tio n  th a t S h e s to v  
‘f io p o jic a  npoTHB THpaHHH pa3yM a, npoTHB BJiacTH no3HaHHa, H3THaBmero uejiOBeKa H3
55 Zen’kovskii, II, p. 377.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Lev Shestov, IJoxeana znynocmu in C o H U H en m  e deyx m o M a x  (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, p. 238.
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p a a ,  H a  T e p p H T o p H H  c a M o r o  n o 3 H a m m ,  n p n S e r a a  k  o p y z j H H M  c a M o r o  p a 3 y M a \  59 Bernard 
Martin noted this paradoxical strategy of defeating mind by means of the mind: ‘His 
polemics against scientific knowledge and reason, as even the most superficial reading of 
his work reveals, are themselves peculiarly lucid and rational’. 60 Milosz commented: 
‘Paradoxically he waged his war as an anti-rationalist using rational argument as his 
weapon’.61
There was clearly something idiosyncratic in the outright war against reason that Shestov 
waged single-handed and which became his mission in life. He knew that and did not 
expect any understanding or serious following. The following words that Shestov said to A. 
Z. Shteinberg in a conversation about the origin of his pen-name, clearly had a broader 
implication for the reception of his thought in general: ‘nocne Moeft CMepTH nycTb roBopaT 
h  numyr, KOMy h t o  yroflHo. Ho h h  3a h t o  He xony npocjn>rn> cyMacmezuiiHM npn 
3k h 3h h ’ .62 Shestov believed that humanity would eventually -  possibly in the very distant 
future -  discover for itself what became his personal truths. Meanwhile, however, the Job’s 
scales on which individual human grief outweighs the sand of the seas ‘xaacyTca 
$HJioco(J)aM XX-ro c t o j ic t h h  BepxoM HejienocTH’,63 he wrote in his correspondence.
Thus over time Shestov's attacks against science became (rather illogically) directed against 
any standard reasoning and eventually grew to encompass any rational form of perception. 
When ultimately he pronounced Mind (or Reason) as the main enemy, his juxtaposition 
between art and science was transformed into that between speculation and revelation -  or 
between Reason and Faith (Athens and Jerusalem).
The evolution of the domain of art into that of faith was also gradual and signified 
Shestov's transition from a purely nihilistic stance to a positive one which eventually 
became dominant and, arguably, the most valuable aspect of his whole philosophy.
59 Berdiaev, ‘ O cH O B H aa n a e a  (j)HJioco(j)HH JltBa L U ecT O B a’ , p. 8 .
60 Martin, p. 37.
61 Milosz, p. 118.
62 Aaron Shteinberg, JJpy3bR m o u x  pannux Jiem (1911-1928) (Paris: Sintaksis, 1991), p. 258.
63 From Shestov’s letter of 19.10.1926 to Max Eitingon. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 357.
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Notably, it was also inseparable from his struggle against mind -  as in the siphon 
phenomenon: the more he went away from the rational the closer he approached the 
irrational. Indeed, Shestov traced the origins of the unbearable poison which penetrated 
human life (and rendered it finite and tragic) to original sin -  i.e. to acquiring knowledge 
and thus losing the primordial freedom and happiness granted to humans by God. Thus he 
searched for the Truth in the Bible and assigned the primary significance to the story of the 
Fall. As Milosz writes, ‘Shestov doesn’t hesitate to speak of man before he tasted from the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil as possessing omniscience and absolute freedom. What, 
then, was the Fall? A choice of an inferior faculty with its passion for a distinguo and for 
general ideas, with pairs of opposites: good, evil; true, untrue; possible, impossible. Man 
renounced faith in order to gain knowledge. Shestov names his enemy: Reason. He even 
says the fruits of the forbidden tree could just as well be called synthetic judgments a 
priori \ 64 The last section of this chapter will look more closely at Shestov's treatment of 
faith and at the biblical aspects of his philosophy.
Faith for Shestov grew out of the ‘irrational remainder’ -  all the inexplicable aspirations of 
the soul. Right from the start everything subjective, poetic and spiritual Shestov ascribed to 
the domain of art and artists. These encompassed the creative and rebellious aspects of life 
which intrinsically refused to submit to objective necessity. And since Shestov passionately 
searched for a way of overcoming the stone wall of the impossible, at the foot of which, he 
thought, human reason bowed its head, he eventually arrived at the only other alternative -  
religious faith.
The opening paragraph of Athens and Jerusalem, which we quoted in parts above, delivers 
the most alarming truth which hits the heart of the matter: that the main mystery -  that 
about the sources and beginnings of life -  is unattainable for humans.
H3 Bcero, neMy mbi hb jih cm ch  cBuzjeTejiflMH Ha 3eMJie, s t o  h b h o  caMoe Hejienoe h  6eccMbicjieHHoe, 
caMoe cTpauiHoe, noHTH npoTHBoecTecTBeHHoe, HeoTpa3HMO HaBOflamee Ha Mbicjib, h t o  j ih 6 o  b 
caMOM MHpo3AaHHH He Bee SjiaronojiyHHO, j ih 6 o  Haum noaxoflbi k  h c t h h c  h  npe;u>flB.naeMbie k  Heft 
TpeboBaHHA nopaaceHbi b caMOM xopHe xaKHM-TO nopoKOM. Kax 6w Mbi h h  onpeaejranH HCTHHy,
64 Milosz, p. 107.
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Mbi HHKOiyja He MoaceM oTpenbca o t  aeicapTOBCKHx clare et distincte (acHOCTb h  OTneTJiHBOCTb). A 
TyT BeHHaa TaHHa, BeHHaa HenpoHHijaeMOCTb, cjio bho  eme coTBopeHHa MHpa k to-t o  pa3 
HaBcerAa peniHJi 3aKpbiTb jnociyn HejioBeicy k TOMy, h to  a jib  Hero HyacHee h  BaacHee Bcero.65
These words of Shestov, put together with an earlier quote -  ‘t o ,  [ . . . ]  h t o  m b i AofibiBaeM 
HauniM MbiiwienueM , OKa3BmaeTca [...] Hecon3MepHMBiM [...] c b h c i i ih h m  m h p o m , b  
KOTopbiH Hac OKyHyjiH c poaqjeHHa’,66 point to his firm conviction that the very nature of 
the human mind, par excellence, is flawed, unreliable and incapable of giving final answers 
to the most important questions of existence. In a certain sense, being ‘forever separated 
from the sources and beginnings of life’ captures all the tragedy of the human predicament 
and seals off the intrinsic incapability for humans of going beyond the designated area, as it 
were given from above, of what is possible to attain by knowledge and what is not. The 
scope of questions which lie outside human reach people cannot, by definition, be 
conclusive about. They are therefore faced with a very personal choice of dealing with 
these sort of questions. Some turn away from them altogether, others believe in some 
superior power in the Universe -  whether called God, or Nature, or some supernatural force 
(this is only a matter of terminology) or do not believe. The latter, like the former, may 
have their own model of Creation, of life and death, but the point remains that these sorts of 
questions are beyond answering, because any conjecture ultimately runs into a mystery 
which is impossible to prove or refute, which is, par excellence, beyond human power. For 
this reason religious faith, as well as faithlessness, do not lend themselves to proper 
disputes based on any logical arguments. As in matters of personal preference, polemics are 
really out of place here. In other words, there are phenomena in our universe which 
constitute the material for scientific inquiry and can be studied and in principle be 
‘understood’; but there are also questions, the answers to which may indeed be forever 
remote from man, that is to say there are not (and in principle cannot be) any means at 
man's disposal for answering them. They represent the domain of faith.
Thus reason, organised into science, has its own domain where it can operate and extract 
objective knowledge about the universe. On the other hand there is a domain of the
65 Shestov, Afpunbi u HepycanuM, p. 26.
66 Ibid.
79
subjective, individual and private which cannot be generalised and therefore lies outside the 
scope of scientific inquiry. It is responsible for the irrational, it lends itself exclusively to 
faith and can only be addressed by art and not by science.
In our opinion -  and this is one of our principal claims -  Shestov's main role and 
significance was that he pointed out the existence of the boundary between the kingdom of 
reason and that of faith; he protected as it were the domain of art, or the subjective, from 
the encroachments of science, or the objective. If his attempts to disavow Mind as such 
seem absurd, they suddenly gain full sense when viewed as attempts to point to the 
limitations of the latter and to draw the line around questions which do not, in principle, 
lend themselves to rational explanations. His main philosophical achievements lie on the 
plane of the Divine where he exposed the total inadequacy of the application of reason to 
questions of religious faith and thus provided a critique of theology.
Thus Shestov, in our opinion, can be viewed as a regulator of the boundaries between 
Athens and Jerusalem, using his own terminology. It is in this sense, we think, that one 
should interpret the words of the poet Viacheslav Ivanov addressed to Shestov on his 
seventieth birthday. ‘E c j ih  c t p o h t b  KyjibTypy c BaMH Hejn>3*i, t o  Henb3fl c t p o h t b  ee h  6 e3 
Bac, 6 e3 Barnero ronoca, npe^ocTeperaiomero o t  OMepTBemia h  o t  ayxoBHoii 
rop#ocTH’, wrote Ivanov; ‘Bbi noxoxcn Ha BopoHa c MepTBOH h  x c h b o h  b o / j o h ’ . These 
words, in our opinion, can be taken as an epigraph to the whole creative heritage of 
Shestov, as the summary of the ultimate value of his philosophy.
In the light of the above, various purely philosophical (in the technical sense of the word) 
arguments concerning Shestov's philosophy appear misplaced. Indeed, any discussion on 
matters which are beyond any rational proof are by definition vacuous. For example, along 
these lines, Galtseva's analysis of Shestov's philosophical claims which is described in the 
article by Taras Zakydalsky and enthusiastically supported by the latter, seems flawed to 
us. Galtseva essentially claims that if God can undo the past then human achievements, not
67 Letter of 10 Febr. 1936. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 146.
68 Ibid.
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just failures, will be nullified. In Zakydalsky’s account, ‘if salvation consists in undoing the 
past, then not only the horrors of the past but also the moral victories, by which at least 
some individuals overcame tragedy and gave meaning to their lives, will be revoked. This 
salvation is even more oppressive to the individual than the self-renunciation proposed by 
the rationalist tradition’ .69 However, since the action, as it were, takes place in the domain 
of the irrational then anything is possible and no rational argument really applies. Therefore 
Shestov could answer this criticism, say, in the following way: God is the omnipotent one 
for whom all things are possible, therefore when mending the past He will leave human 
achievements untouched, but only repair the damage done. Such examples could be 
continued endlessly, but one is enough, in our view, to show the demagogical nature of 
such polemics altogether.
There is, however, something else to add to our discussion above. The conflict between 
subjective and objective, art and science, reason and faith, if and when it exists, manifests,
70if you like, ‘the tragic split between ethics and aesthetics’ that mankind once underwent. 
At least at the level of mind and soul, of rational and irrational beginnings in a human 
being, no antagonism is necessary -  on the contrary, harmony is desirable and, in fact, 
possible, as some of the best examples that mankind has produced show. Equally on the 
plane of art and science it could be argued that these two domains are harmoniously and 
inseparably united in the phenomenon of genius. Truly great scientists as well as artists 
always exemplify how scientific and artistic perceptions of the universe co-exist in 
symbiosis, which can be labelled as ultimate creativity in general. However, interestingly, 
the words of Fazil Iskander, a contemporary Russian writer, can be interpreted as pointing 
to some fundamental truth concealed in the main aspirations of Shestov's philosophy: 
‘LJejiB HejioBenecTBa — xoponiHH HejioBex. H flpyroii ijejin HeT h 6 tm> He mojkct. [...] Ym
71 ■ ii
6 e3 HpaBCTBeHHOCTH Hepa3yMeH, ho HpaBCTBeHHocTt pa3yMHa h 6 e3 yMa’. Thus, in a 
sense (albeit a rather figurative sense) he establishes a certain superiority o f soul over mind, 
or the subjective and irrational over the objective and rational, o f faith over reason or
69 Rephrase of Gal’tseva, p. 113 in Zakydalskii, p. 159.
70 The quote is from Fazil’ Iskander’s novella ‘Hoot’, published in CioDtcem cyufecmeoeanm 
(Moscow: Podkova, 1999), where this issue is discussed (pp. 143-144).
71 Fazil’ Iskander, ‘noHeMHory o m h o tc)m ’, HoeuuMup, No 10,2000, p. 122.
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Jerusalem over Athens. This very much reflects the claim about the truth of which Shestov 
tried to persuade humanity throughout his life.
2.3. The iron laws of Necessity. 2x2=5 and other ‘errors’.
Years after Shestov's death various scholars maintained that the time for his ideas had not 
yet come. ‘JleB IIIecTOB -  o t o  6yzjymee, h  b onem* M ajioii cTeneHH -  HacToamee’, wrote
one of the editors of the journal Grani, N. B. Tarasova, in her letter to Shestov's daughter
10Natalie, in 1960. It was her response to being sent an article by German Lovtsky ‘JleB 
IIIecTOB no m ohm  BOcnoMHHaHHaM ’. ‘Kor,zja r-H JIob ijk h h  ynoMHHaeT o HenoHHMaHHH 
coBpeMeHHHKOB, t o  3 t o  Bnojme 3aK0H0MepH0. CjinmKOM Bam oTeij mamyji Bnepea’,73 
Tarasova concluded. Marc Yolis from Buenos Aires, who translated Shestov's works for 
the local Jewish philosophical journal Davke and organised the placement of Shestov's 
manuscripts in the Jewish Scientific Institute o f Buenos Aires, called Shestov a deep 
thinker ‘k KOTopoMy Mbicjnmmn Mnp BepHeTca nepe3 enje CTOJieTna’.74 Yolis maintained 
that Shestov's writings ‘6yayT cnyxcHTb nyreBOflHon 3Be3AOH b Henpoxo^HMbix aeGpjix 
TanHCTBa ObiTHfl’.75 He believed that assessing Shestov's contribution is a matter for future 
generations -  ‘k  TpyzjaM ero j i o k h t  BenHbin nyTb, KOTOpbin He 3apacTeT TpaBOH 
3a6biTba’.76
Shestov himself believed that his ideas indeed belonged to the future when they would 
finally be appreciated and their truth confirmed. As was mentioned, he did not expect 
twentieth century thought to understand them, let alone to share them. The way he 
envisaged a suitable place for his ideas was that they would turn out to be part of some 
major all-encompassing teaching (or, rather, a revelation) which is still to dawn over 
mankind, akin to the way in which Newton's physics inscribed itself into Einstein's.
72 The letter (of 18.05.60) is cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 222.
73 Ibid.
74 From Yolis’s letter to Natalia Baranova-Shestova of 20.12.55. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 
237.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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However, in the case of Newton's and Einstein's theories, as in other examples of this kind, 
such as, say, Euclidian and Lobachevsky's geometries, the former fits into the latter as its 
limiting case. In a similar way we can say that our planet is a plane rather than an ellipsoid 
if we are looking at a sufficiently small area of it. This simply means that in the case of 
such a small sample it is indeed best approximated by the area of a plane than a sphere. 
This does not run into contradiction with the fact that the whole planet is elliptic. Thus, 
when speeds in Einstein's physics approach a relatively low boundary Newton's physics 
applies. However, a different model results from and is determined by a different set of 
axioms. Whether such a model can exist in some reality is another question.
Shestov was aware of the existence of axioms that describe our universe or rather our 
current model of it. It is precisely those fundamental postulates and their corollaries that 
Shestov seemed to rebel against, because for him they were both only the representation 
and validation of the stone wall of necessity -  the wall which stands in the way of human 
freedom.
Thus Shestov's rebellion, somewhat like that of Don Quixote, was directed against the 
eternal and indifferent force that seems to govern the Universe, or in other words against 
the laws of nature. He could not tolerate the fact that man is forever trapped, helpless in the 
power of that force, while the latter is a law in itself. The power of reason and the 
autonomous ethics which comes as a result only endorse that force and impose restrictions 
on humankind which soulless necessity seems free from (or rather it is indifferent to their 
existence). Thus, for example, says Shestov, the human being is not permitted to kill, but 
thunder is: TpoMy -  m o )k h o  y6 nBaTb, a HenoBeicy -  Hem»3Ji. 3acyxe m o j k h o  oSpeicaTb Ha 
rojioa orpOMHMH xpah , a nejiOBeica m b i  Ha3MBaeM 6e36oDtCHbiM, ecnH o h  He no^acT xjie6 a 
ronoflHOMy! / J o j d k h o  j ih  6 b i t b  Taxoe npoTHBOpemie? ’77 Shestov exclaims. In general, man 
is completely exposed to these blind forces of nature and the fundamental injustice of this 
slavery is something he refused to accept. A way forward that Shestov saw was, as has been 
pointed out before, in the sphere of the irrational, in the domain of faith.
77 Shestov, fi,o6po eynenuu ap.Toncmozo u Huipue, pp. 307-308.
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He cherished Dostoevsky's Underground Man who also refused to accept that necessity 
despite all the obvious omnipotence of it. ‘Kaicaji KaMeHHaa CTeHa? Hy, pa3yMeeTca,
3aKOHLi npnpo^bi, Bbreozjbi ecTecTBeHHbix HayK, MaTeMaTHKa . Yuk kslk AOKaacyT Te6e, 
HanpHMep, h to  o t  o6e3taHbi npOH3omeji, TaK yac h Henero MOpmHTtca, npHHHMan KaK 
ecTb. [ . . .  ] Henero ^ejiaTb-TO, noTOMy ^Baacabi jspa. -  MaTeMaTHKa’ ,78
However, in our opinion, if Shestov attempted to fight against Reason by means of reason 
(in the absence of any other means available to man) he should have, at least, known the 
enemy better. His fundamental misconception of science which was discussed in the 
previous section landed him in the middle of the enemy's side of the battlefield where he 
could not really feel competent. In other words, not only did he appeal to formal logic in 
order to fight against it, but his appeal was also flawed. This section will expose some of 
Shestov's logical errors which confirm his lack of familiarity with the natural sciences, 
especially mathematics, despite the fact that Shestov did have some mathematical 
background. Indeed, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, he originally enrolled to read 
mathematics at Moscow university. Subsequently he transferred to the Faculty of Law, but 
within the latter he specialised in economics which again belongs more to the domain of the 
sciences than to the humanities. Nevertheless his treatment of logical concepts appears 
somewhat weak. Or, speaking more precisely, he falls victim to the same misconceptions as 
any non-specialist would (and most of his fellow philosophers indeed have been rather 
foreign to the domain of precise science). The difference is, however, that they did not 
attack the latter; they conducted their battles on a different plane, whereas Shestov targeted 
science quite consciously. Hence the demands on him in this respect should be higher, and 
he certainly falls short of fulfilling them.
As follows from the quotation given above, Shestov, expecting his philosophy to belong to 
the future, believed that it would turn out to be embedded, in some sense, in a broader -  
comprehensive -  theory, be a limiting case of it. Yet, since the domain he operated within 
was really that of the arts rather than the sciences, no logical constructions were appropriate
78 F. M. Dostoevsky, 3anucKu to nodnojibR in IJojinoe codpanue commenuu e 30 moMax, vol. 5, p. 
105.
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for it. Moreover, he himself defied and denied any theories per se. In general to struggle 
against logic by its own means is not a fair struggle and is rather reminiscent of a cat trying 
to catch its own tail. Therefore Shestov's arguments can only be taken figuratively, not 
literally; and his whole philosophy, in order to free itself from contradictions, to stop being 
an oxymoron, should be viewed as indeed belonging to art, not to science (and should 
therefore be read appropriately). To confirm that this is indeed the case is the purpose of 
the exposure of some basic faults in Shestov's mathematical education, if not logical errors 
per se, that we are undertaking in this section.
In the first case it is necessary to explain one straightforward mistake that Shestov makes 
when issuing his accusations against science in general and reason in particular. It is 
important to understand that essentially Shestov took the design of the universe as a 
personal insult, or rather what had become of this design since it was violated by original 
sin, by acquiring knowledge. In a way he regarded the existing laws of nature that govern 
the universe as his personal enemies with Reason being their faithful servant. They simply 
represented a stone wall of necessity which repelled him. Shestov listed these laws, called 
them by names which for him became common names. One of these, for example, which 
we shall discuss below, was a generalised label for any mathematical ‘self-evident’ truth: 
that ‘2 times 2 is four’. Another rule, hateful in its unshakability, was for Shestov that ‘a 
whole is always larger than any of its parts’. Translated into precise mathematical language 
this statement would read: ‘a set is always larger than any of its proper subsets’ where a 
proper subset is that which is neither the whole set nor the empty set. It seems natural to an 
outsider to mathematics, like Shestov, while it is actually false.
A counter-example which refutes this statement can be constructed as follows. As a set a 
segment of a straight line is taken. Let us label its end points as A and B and refer to the 
segment as AB. We can then take a subset of it, for instance a segment (of any length 
smaller than AB) symmetric with respect to the midpoint of AB. Let us call its endpoints C 
and D and refer to this shorter segment as CD. Now we clearly have the set up situation 
described in the statement above: we have indeed a set -  AB -  and its subset -  CD. For 
visual reasons let us now raise CD above AB, as shown on Diagram 1 below.
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Diagram 1
V - * — f
I---------- !----- 1---- !-----------1
A B
Let us now join together points A and C as well as points B and D, and continue the two 
lines until they meet. The point of their intersection we shall call V. Thus we have drawn a 
triangle AVB with a segment CD contained inside it, as our diagram 2 shows. This 
construction will help us to establish that in this case the set AB and its subset CD consist 
of an equal number of points and therefore the subset is not strictly smaller than the set. To 
verify this we shall use a method similar to that when we need to establish that the number 
of guests in a room is the same as the number of chairs -  we simply sit them down and see 
that no spare chairs or spare (i.e. standing) people remain. In our geometric case we shall 
‘sit down’ every point from CD on every point from AB, as it were. More precisely, we 
associate with every point from CD a point from AB in the following way: take an arbitrary 
point X of CD and join together V and X, and then continue the line until you get to the 
intersection with AB. This point at the intersection (let us call it Y) will be the one 
associated with X. Now, from this geometric construction it is clear that two different 
points of CD will have two different points of AB associated with them, because the rays 
that start at V and go through a pair of points on CD will take them even further apart, as it 
were, when they come to AB. On the other hand, any point Y from AB will have a point X 
from CD with which it is associated. To find this point X simply reverse the procedure and 
join together Y and V -  the intersection of this segment with CD will give us the required 
X (see Diagram 2).
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Diagram 2
V
Thus we have associated with every point of the subset CD a point of the whole set AB in 
such a way that different points are associated with different points and no points of AB 
remain uninvolved. This means that we have found a one-to-one correspondence between 
the points of the set and its subset. Therefore they have the same number of points in them 
and to say that the subset CD is strictly smaller than the whole set AB is wrong. This 
proves that the general statement which Shestov believed to be a universal truth -  that a 
whole is always larger than its parts -  is also false.
Thus, as this example only confirms in a particular case, Shestov's vision of Reason was 
essentially blurred. Because of this shortsightedness the strict borderline that he drew 
between reason and faith with his uncompromising allegiance to the latter did not define the 
two camps well enough, as he perceived and portrayed them. In this binary oversimplified 
division Shestov overlooked, for instance, the fact that what he regarded as the opposite 
camp may, in fact, have had his allies in it. Similarly he himself tirelessly exposed the 
adherents of reason within the camp of Faith -  all those who tried to explain the 
inexplicable, to reconcile the two. While Shestov could disregard the latter as traitors to the 
true faith, scientists could hardly be classified by him as traitors to reason and secret 
knights of faith. He was simply unaware of the complicated divisions within science and 
hence within reason. Moreover, it seems as if, once he was convinced that reason was the 
root of all evil, he did not want to give it any benefit of the doubt. Thus this somewhat 
crude division -  Athens versus Jerusalem -  did not reflect the true disposition of forces.
This point can be clarified by a particular example which concerns the law of contradiction. 
One of Shestov’s main objections to speculative philosophy was concealed in this law
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which is sometimes called the law of the excluded middle. It states that any coherent 
statement is either true or false and no middle way exists. Shestov knew that the assurance 
of speculative philosophy and science that what is pronounced impossible is really not 
possible is due to this hateful law of contradiction which for him constituted the main part 
of that stone wall that he strove against. However, what he apparently did not know is that 
everything is not that simple and that mathematics -  for Shestov an almost derogatory term 
-  like Mind itself is constantly developing and has a dynamics of its own. He would 
probably have been most surprised to learn that the beginning of the twentieth century -  
very much his lifetime -  was marked by an emerging school of thought among 
mathematicians who cast doubt upon this hitherto unshakable law. They were called 
‘intuitionalists’ and their claim was essentially that of Shestov -  how do we know that what 
is not true is necessarily false? (in Shestov's language: whence comes the certainty that the 
impossible is not really possible?). Intuitionalists rejected a proof by contradiction. That is 
to say, if  in order to prove that a statement A is true one proves instead that the negation of 
A is false, it does not yet mean to them that A is indeed true. They only accepted the direct 
proof -  for example, if one talks of the existence of a certain mathematical object one has to 
construct it rather than to prove that the assumption that this object does not exist leads to a 
contradiction.
In the light of the above examples the words of a leading contemporary Russian 
philosopher, A. V. Akhutin, seem particularly relevant. According to the latter the depths of 
Greek philosophy reveal that
T peB oam aa rpaHHua, O T/jenaiom aa OKOHnaTejibHoe 3HaHne o t  GecxoH eHH oro He3HaHHa, npoxo/jH T  
He M eaoty s j ij ih h c k h m  Pa3yMOM h  G h G jich ck o h  B e p o fi, a  b caMOM cep ;m e  3Toro Pa3yMa. Ha 3 t o h -  
t o  rpaHHue -  b cpeflOTOHHH t o h  MH(j)OJiorH3HpoBaHHOH MeTa4>H3HKH, KOTOpyio, c o G c t b c h h o ,  H 
HMeeT b BH/jy IIIecTOB, roB opa o  qapcTBe Pa3yM a, -  h  poac^aeT ca 4>HJioco(])Ha. [...]  O h j io c o 4 )hh  
noflBOAHT Mbicjib k  H exoeM y Hunmo m m cjih  h  Gbrraa, rfle e m e  HeT T oro, h t o  e m e  TOJibKO Mootcem 
6bimb. ®HJ10C0(j)Ha HMeeT AejIO He  C BeHHblMH HCTHHaMH, a C TeM, KCIK OUU 603M0DtCHbl, -  c
donyiijeniiHMu BeHHoro Gbrraa. IIIecTOB h  caM n o p o io  6 j ih 3 k o  noAxo/jHT k TaxoM y noHHMaHmo 
“ B Toporo H3M epeHHa MbiuuieHHa” , h o  b ch  3Ta HanpaaceHHaa napaaoKcanbHOCTb 4)Hjioco(J)CKoro
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MBiuijieHna HeMeAJieHHO yrpaHHBaeTca, Kor/ja pacna^aeTca Ha ppa. BnojiHe 0AH03HaHHbix nojiioca -  
pa3yMa h  Bepbi.79
This split within reason itself, as well as the complicated nature of the evolution of the 
latter, essentially escape Shestov's attention. In the same way with his contempt towards the 
unshakable ‘axioms’ as a reflection of necessity Shestov could not begin to imagine, it 
seems, that some of them might actually be dropped without changing the system that they 
determine. This fact was proved in the 1930s by Godel in the language of formal logic and 
then developed further by his students.
Under the label of axioms Shestov apparently implied any ‘self-evident truth’ and an 
allegorical symbol of those for him was a simple consequence of the Piano axioms of 
arithmetic which describe the natural numbers. This consequence, which was already 
mentioned above, states that two times two is four. As early as in his first book Shestov 
already attacked this symbolic trademark of reason by pointing out the absence of causal 
connection between the laws of nature (or, as he puts it, the categorical imperative) and the 
laws of morality. Moliere's Don Juan, says Shestov, ‘BepnT t o jib k o  b  t o , h t o  .zmaambi flBa -  
neTbipe, a /ma^K/jbi neTbipe -  b o c c m l . M oTciojja y Hero HHKaK He b b i x o ^ h t , h t o  He Hymio 
jiraTb’.80 In his book Great Vigils Shestov adds to his struggle against this hateful 
arithmetical truth an interesting hypothetical twist borrowed from Mill: ‘ecjin 6 bi Ka>K£Lm 
pa3, Kor/ja HaM npHxo^HTca 6paTb ^B a^bi no asa npe^MeTa, Kaicoe-HHOym. 6 o)KecTBO 
noflcoBbmajio 6 bi eme o ^ h h  npe^MeT, t o  m l i  6 b ijih  6 b i y6 e»meHbi, h t o  Asa^mbi flBa - He 
neTbipe, a mrn>’.81 This again shows a simple lack of understanding on Shestov’s part of the 
ways in which science works. He does not suspect that this new reality would not shake the 
foundations of the natural sciences. Indeed, the reaction of science to this phenomenon, if it 
ever occurred, would be quite predictable. If this creature inserted a fifth object every single 
time, then indeed the conclusion would ensue that two times two is indeed five, and this 
would become a new law, a new necessity, against which Shestov himself would naturally
79 A. V. Akhutin, ‘A h t h h h o c t b  b <J)h jioco(])h h  JIbBa LLIecTOBa’-  an introduction to Lev Shestov, 
Jlevmuu no ucmopuu epenecKou (pwioco<fiuu (Moscow-Paris: Russky Put’-YMCA-Press, 2001), 
pp.5-19 (p. 13 and pp. 17-18).
80 Shestov, UJeKcnup u eeo Kpumm Spondee, p. 186.
81 Shestov, Bejimue Kanynbi, p. 286.
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soon rebel. However, if this creature did its trick only once in a while then scientists would 
start investigating the nature of this phenomenon, any pattern in the circumstances of its 
occurrence, and so on.
Interestingly, even the formal theory of arithmetic has turned out complicated enough to be 
knowable (regretfully, Shestov could not have known this). This is a consequence of 
Godel’s theorem mentioned above. In fact, Godel’s achievements amount to something of 
great significance v/hich is directly relevant to Shestov’s quest (and moreover -  something 
that would have been deeply consoling for Shestov). Indeed, for a long time science was 
hoping that our universe could be described by a finite set of postulates. That is to say, that 
a finite number of equations (the derivation of which was considered to be only a question 
of time) could then predict the behaviour of natural phenomena, when supplied with the 
relevant initial data. However, Godel put an end to such hopes, for he proved that any 
system which is sufficiently non-trivial is essentially unknowable.
To be knowable in this context means that a certain set of axioms and rules for 
manipulating them describes the system fully, i.e. any statement about this system can be 
deduced from the axioms, using the rules. According to Godel, however, there always 
exists a statement that can be added to the axioms determining the given system without 
changing anything. This simply means that there is always a statement such that neither it 
itself, nor its negation can be deduced from the given set of axioms using the given rules. 
Thus the system is unknowable -  and this is true of any system which is not completely 
trivial. On the other hand, even such a relatively straightforward theory as the formal theory 
of arithmetic is already an example of such a non-trivial system! Furthermore, the systems 
in the centre of scientific investigations are already incredibly simplified (in order to be 
made into an object of study possible to handle by the means available to human beings) 
and represent only a crude approximation to the real life systems. But if even such 
simplified (deliberately idealised) constructions are unknowable, then (one can ask 
rhetorically) what can be said about such immensely complicated systems as the human 
psyche, emotions and behaviour patterns? This information, if  it was available to Shestov 
(and for that matter to Dostoevsky) would have completely eliminated their fears as to the
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potential prospects of explaining the cosmos of human relationships by means of natural 
science.
Still, whether with or without Godel’s theorem in hand, any polemics with Shestov in this 
respect would most probably be pointless, because in a way Shestov's dispute with science 
is reminiscent of the story by Vasilii Shukshin entitled ‘Cpe3an’ (‘Got you!’). It depicts an 
academic on vacation who comes to visit his home village. A local man with a chip on his 
shoulder, challenged by the implied intelligence of the visitor, decides to take him on in an 
intellectual battle. The story masterfully describes this battle in which no proper 
communication is possible, let alone a real understanding, for the two protagonists talk in 
different languages despite the fact that both are Russian speakers. Interestingly, the local 
witnesses of this dispute as well as the initiator of this duel himself remain totally 
convinced of the defeat of the educated visitor (hence the title of the story). In the same 
way, it seems, Shestov takes on science, from time to time exclaiming ‘Got you!’.
In this vein one can view Shestov's letter to his friend A. M. Lazarev written in response to 
the latter’s complaint that he does not understand Shestov's writings:
noium, m o5kh o  IlH(j)aropoBy TeopeMy, MeH/jejieeBCKyio nepnoAHHecKyio cncTeMy, Teopmo 
GHHiirreHHa h  Aaace jnoboe (J)Hjioco(|)CKoe nocTpoeHHe. H6o lyr 3aaaHa c bo a h tc h  k  TOMy, h to6  
HeH3BecTHoe npHBecTH k H3BecTHOMy. Ho [...] Koraa HeH3BecTHoe xoneT OTCTOHTb c bo k> 
He3aBHCHMOCTb h  He aaeTca b  ruieH H3BecTHOMy -  Tor^a Beab h  3aaana MemieTCH. “noHHMaHHe” 
0Ka3biBaeTca HeHyacHbiM, noHaTb HeH3BecTHoe Torvja paBHocHjibHO TOMy, HTobbi noTepaTb ero. il 
nojiaraio, h to  ^aace beccnopHbie HaynHbie obbacHeHHa b  KOHue k o h u o b  He npHBoaaT Bce-TaKH k 
noHHMaHHio. CnHTaeTca, h to  m m  “noHHMaeM” Bo^y, Korvja roBopHM, h to  BO^ a ecTb coe/niHeHHe 
flByx ra30B, B3aTbix b  H3BecTHbix KOJiHHecTBax. Ho pa3Be, b  cymHocra, s t o  ecTb “noHHMaHHe”?
B o / j a ,  K ax  6 b u ia ,  T a x  h  o c T a n a c b  H e n o H a T H o io . [...] rjiyxoh M oaceT  o t j t h h h o  n ocT H H b  T e o p H io
82
3ByKOBbIX BOJ1H, HO OH HHKOrAa He y3H aeT , HTO T a x o e  3ByK.
Further in this letter Shestov explains that any substance which we try to incorporate into a 
causal chain is in fact breaking away from it. Thus, he concludes, Lazarev does not 
understand his -  Shestov's -  writings exactly because he tries -  wrongly -  to place them too 
into the chain of causal connections.
82 The letter (of 22 Sept. 1927) is cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 349-350.
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Clearly, these views of Shestov do not withstand any rational arguments, but equally they 
are not intended for any rational dispute. If you like, in them Shestov insists on his 
fundamentally irrational stance, on his rebellion and his role as the enfant terrible of 
philosophy, as Czeslaw Milosz puts it. Therefore, as we said above, his whole philosophy 
should be viewed from an artistic, rather than scientific perspective which, in particular, 
reinforces once again our literary approach to Shestov. The corpus of other conceptual 
justifications for this approach will be presented in the next chapter, but the principal 
reason should now be becoming clear, as a result of the above exposition. The lyricism of 
Shestov's perception of the world is undeniable and the main value of his position, as far as 
any speculative, if not specifically scientific approach to him is concerned, lies at the point 
where his otherwise peculiar anti-scientism turns into a sensitive and passionate defence of 
art and humanism as well as a refusal to submit to the common world with its suffocating 
necessity.
2.4. From nihilism to existentialism. Biblical truths. The problem of the Fall
Although the foundations for the religious orientation of Shestov's philosophy were laid 
even in his early writings, the religious phase as such took a while to prevail. More 
precisely it was only the second half of Shestov's writing career that can be referred to as 
biblical existentialism and for which he cleared the grounds during his first -  nihilistic -  
phase. As Bernard Martin notices, ‘his rebellion against rationalism and scientism was only 
[...] a preliminary step. It was a clearing of the way for his bold and fervent affirmation, in 
the mature and final phase of his life, of the truth of the biblical message’ .84 This mature 
phase started when Shestov was in his late forties.
Indeed, although his works, as should become clear from our earlier explanations, are 
marked by evident continuity and his initial phase of ‘literary criticism’ already contains 
much of what characterises his philosophy as a whole, his first explicitly religious book
83 Czeslaw Milosz, ‘Eopb6a c ynymbeM’ in Hocu<p Epodcmm: mpydu u dnu, ed. Lev Losev and 
Petr Vail’ (Moscow: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1998), pp. 237-247 (p.245).
84 Martin, p. 13.
92
was Sola Fide on which Shestov worked in 1913-1914. Natalia Baranova-Shestova writes 
that ‘IIIecTOB Bbibpaji 3arjiaBneM khhiti H3peneHHe “Sola Fide”, BepoflTHO, noTOMy, hto
Of
oho apKO xapaKTepH3yeT 6 opb6 y Mojio^oro JIiOTepa 3a Bepy’. She emphasises the 
remarkable soul kinship which Shestov felt for Luther during the period of the latter’s 
youth because Luther's spiritual struggle was so close to Shestov's own. This book, 
Baranova-Shestova suggests, can be regarded in a way as Shestov's spiritual 
autobiography.86 Parts of it were later included into On Job's Scales and Potestas Clavium 
where Shestov's religious philosophy was gaining its full momentum. Kierkegaard and 
Existential Philosophy was to follow with the final culmination in Shestov's fundamental 
work Athens and Jerusalem. Sola Fide itself was only published posthumously as was 
Speculation and Revelation which deals with the religious philosophy of Vladimir Solov’ev 
and various other thinkers.
There is still no agreement on what is central for Shestov's philosophy -  God or man. As 
we already mentioned in section 2.1, Vasilii Zenkovsky argued that Shestov is in substance 
a religious thinker and his philosophy is first and foremost theocentric; hence, according to 
Zenkovsky, labelling it anthropocentric (as for example Viktor Erofeev basically does in 
his study, insisting that the aspect of Salvationism in Shestov’s philosophy is primary, 
while his religious search is secondary) 87 is wrong. We think that both trends of thought are 
of undeniable value. Definitely Shestov sought the Supreme Being, or the Truth, but on the 
other hand Shestov's principal concern was with the tragic destiny of man, man's lack of 
freedom which the latter was to regain only through Faith. Thus Shestov's philosophy 
evolved around both the divine and the earthly and, moreover, inseparably interlinked the 
two. Indeed, his central theme was that of the relationship between the individual, private 
and separate on one hand and the universal, general and unified on the other. His 
fundamental juxtaposition of Athens and Jerusalem can, in fact, be traced to the common 
source of thought stemming from contemplation on mortality by the ancient Greeks on one 
hand and the Jews on the other. Indeed, in his lectures on the history of Greek philosophy
85 Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 125.
86 See Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 125-126.
87 See Erofeev, for example: pp. 157, 162, 172 and especially 178.
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Shestov himself points to the proximity between the perception of the private and the 
general by Anaximander and by the Old Testament:
AHaKCHM anap CHHTaeT, hto B ee  OT/jejibHbie B e u m  Kamm-mo He3aKOHHbiM cnocodoM eupecmucb U3 
ue6bimnR k  dbimuio. ... Hh OT^ejibHbie jiioah, hh acHBOTHbie, hh pacT eH H a, hh Aaace  
H eoA ym eB JieH H bie npe^M eT bi He b n p a B e  6biJiH BbixoAHTb H3 jioH a  cahhoh, bchhoh cymHOCTH b 
3tom MHpe. He B np aB e 6mjih -  h Bce-TaKH, n p eH e G p er u m  H3HanajibHbiM 3aKOHOM, KaKOH-TO 
xH T pocT bio  Bce-TaKH BbipBanHCb Ha ceem u 3a omo uecym HaK03auue.ss
Their punishment, Shestov says, is their fmiteness, in the case o f humans and living beings 
-  their mortality. This is their expiation for the original sin: ‘JI HapoHHO ynoTpeGnji c jio b o  
“nepBopoflHbiH rpex”, h 6 o  a j m  Bcaxoro, a AyMaio, a c h o , HacxoJibKO m l ic jib  AHaxcHMaHApa 
6jiH3Ka no cymecTBy cBoeMy t o h  HAee, KOTopaa 3aKjnoHeHa b  6 h 6 j ic h c k o m  cKa3aHnn o 
rpexonaAeHHH nepBoro HejiOBexa’.89 Man who disobeyed God, wanting to get out of the 
bosom on which he was destined to live, was punished by exile and mortality. Shestov 
emphasises that no borrowing whatsoever was possible between ancient Greeks and Jews, 
and thus both nations, stunned by the horror of death, posed the same question and gave the 
same answer.90
This is consistent with Shestov's understanding, borrowed from Plato, that the theme of 
death is central for philosophy as such. He repeatedly discussed this idea -  most notably in 
his fundamental work Athens and Jerusalem  written in the genre o f religious philosophy, 
where Shestov quotes from Plato’s Phaedo  that ‘a c jio  (JmjioccxjjiiH [...] e c T b  [ . . . ]  
ynpa3KHeHne b  CMepra’ and ‘Bee h c t h h h o  OTAaBaBinneca (J)h j io c o (])h h  Hunero Apyroro He 
AenajiH - TOJibKO roTO BH jiH C b k  CMepra h  yMHpaHHio’.91 In line with this conviction Shestov 
made one of his central claims that we already mentioned -  that true philosophy is bom out 
of despair. Further on this route he emphasised that ‘pe3KO OTrpaHHHHBaTb 3aAann
094)HJioco(j)HH o t  3aAan pejinrnH HeT h h  HaAobHOCTH, h h  b o 3 m o a c h o c t h ’ . To exemplify the 
true closeness between philosophy and religion he compared the first commandment:
88 Shestov, JleKijuu no ucmopuu epenecxou (pnnoco(puu, p. 66.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, pp. 66-67.
91 Lev Shestov, A(punbi u Hepycam m , p. 54.
92 Shestov, JleKifuu no ucmopuu epenecKOu (pwiococfruu, p. 55.
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‘bo3jiio6h T o c n o f la  Bora CBoero BceM cep /m eM  cbohm h ^ y in o n ’ w ith , as h e  p u t it, th e  first  
p h ilo s o p h ic a l c o m m a n d m e n t:  ‘yM eh OTopBaTbca o t  cbohx n p e x o ^ a m n x  BpeM eH Htix  
HHTepecoB h bo3jtio6h B een  f ly m o n  h bccm tbohm  cepflijeM  to ,  h to  Bbim e T e6a , to ,  h to  usm 
to 6 o h , -  B eH H yio HcTHH y’ .
As was already mentioned in Section 2.2, one of Shestov's main and distinctive 
achievements is a total and thorough exposure of the intrinsic inadequacy o f theological 
science. Shestov persistently argued that reason has no place and no power in the domain of 
the divine. In other words, since faith, by its very nature, does not submit to rational 
explanations, such explanations are a  p r i o r i  doomed to falsehood. Thus, according to 
Shestov, theology is imposture o f sorts. He accuses it o f an attempt to ‘paint over the cracks 
in existence’ (‘3aMa3aTb [...] menu 6brraa’).94 Thus Shestov wrote that ‘Becb c m b ic j i  
“Teonoro-nojiHTHHecKoro TpaKTaTa” b  t o m ,  h t o 6 b i  BbiMecTH H3 Hamero ayxoBHoro 
baraaca 3aHeceHHbie b  Hero H3 IlHcaHHa h  h h h c m  He onpaBflaHHbie m b i c j i h ’ .95
As Milosz puts it,
According to Shestov, Hellenistic civilization could accept neither the God of the Old Testament 
nor Christ of the New Testament. It had to adapt the scandalous particularity of a personal God to 
its general ideas, shaped as they were through speculation. [...] The gnosis, when it absorbed 
Christian elements, was nothing more than an attempt to trim the Scriptures of their 
“capriciousness”, of their anti-generality equated with untruth. The heresy of Marcion in the 
beginning of the second century, inspired by the gnosis, altogether rejects the Jehovah of the Old 
Testament as an evil demiurge because his incomprehensible behavior seems offensive to an 
enlightened mind. But similar Hellenization of the Scriptures continued throughout the Middle 
Ages. Where the Scholastics affirmed that God created the universe by making use of some 
preexisting laws of Nature (two and two make four, the principle of contradiction, and so on, as 
eternal principles) they in fact put Necessity (universal laws) above the God of Genesis. They paved 
the way for the modem attitude that calls religion before the tribunal of Reason. The modem mind, 
Shestov affirms, is completely under the spell of formulas found in their most perfect form in two 
representative thinkers: Spinoza and Hegel. The latter said: “In philosophy religion receives its 
justification. Thinking is the absolute judge before whom the content of religion must justify and 
explain itself’.96
93 Shestov, JleKifuu no ucmopuu zpenecKoii pw iocopuu, p. 67.
94 Shestov, IJaMnmu eenuxozo (punocopa. SdMynd ryccepjib in yM03penue u omKpoeenue, p. 304.
95 Shestov, Apuubi u Mepyccuiim, p. 15.
96 Milosz, p. 107.
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For Shestov, on the contrary, if  all were explicable man would not need God. Thus, as 
Zenkovsky writes, Shestov ‘c Hpe3BbiuaHHOH HacTOHHHBocTBio Bee BpeMfl BtmBHraeT 
m b ic j ib , h t o  paii|HOHajiii3auHH Bepbi, KOTopyio Tax HCKajiH b  Cpe^HHe Bexa (“credo ut 
intelligam”), (jmicraHecKH BBiJiHJiacB b  omeepotceHue Bepbi h  3aMeHy ee dorocjiOBHeM’. 
Zenkovsky sees Shestov's utmost significance in his acute struggle against the system o f 
secularism which constituted a fundamental problem in the development o f Russian 
thought. ‘TBopnecTBO IIJecTOBa’, Zenkovsky asserts, ‘xax 6 b i 3aBepmaeT b c i o  
Hanpa^ceHHyio 6opb6y pyccxon m b ic j ih  c  ceKyjiapn3MOM. B UlecTOBe m b i a o x o j j h m  # o  
BBicmen t o h k h  b  3 t o m  o c h o b h o m  /jb h ^ k c h h h  pyccxoH m b ic j ih  -  h  3,a;ecB 3aKJHOHaeTCH Bee
Q O
HeoueHHMoe 3HaneHHe ero b  h c t o p h h  pyccxoH < J )h jio co 4 ) h h \  Intimately interrelated with 
Shestov's crusade against secularism is his perpetual inner struggle against the system of 
rationalism, even more significant in the light of his own rationalistic cultural roots. 
Interestingly, Zenkovsky suggests that it is because of the very personal nature of Shestov's 
struggle against rationalism that his philosophy acquires the features of existentialism. He 
points out that Shestov revived the topic, first introduced to Russia by the Slavophiles, of 
the untruth of rationalism and of its poisons; yet, Shestov understands rationalism in a 
much deeper and more subtle way than the Slavophiles did and provides an on-going 
thorough critique of it which ultimately turns into a fundamental critique of Western 
philosophy as such."
However, Zenkovsky notably concludes that Shestov's irrationalism is secondary to his 
creativity, whereas his religious world is primary. He sees the kernel of Shestov's thought 
in his extraordinarily strong and deep perception of the supernatural origins of faith.100 
Indeed, instead of rationalistic constructions of the Graeco-Roman civilisation Shestov 
develops a religious philosophy entirely based on faith and revelation.
In other words, looking from a literary (existential) perspective, we can say that having 
started with the eternal questions of existence seen through the moral implications of world
97 Zenkovskii, II, p. 370.
98 Ibid, p. 367.
99 See Ibid, pp. 366-368.
100 Ibid, pp. 376-378.
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literature, Shestov rejected reason as an instrument for solving those questions in favour of 
the irrational concept of faith which he declared (most notably in his Athens and Jerusalem) 
‘the second dimension of thought’ (‘BTOpoe H3Mepeirae MtmmeHHa’). The search for God 
proclaimed in the first book of his mature period (Tolstoy and Nietzsche, if  we do not count 
his actual first book -  on Shakespeare -  written before the revaluation of all values) 
acquired new depth in the course of his writing career. Having faced the ‘accursed’ 
questions of the human predicament Shestov tried to search for his own answers and, 
following Nietzsche, questioned the validity of human morality and ended up attacking 
autonomous ethics. Along the same lines he followed Dostoevsky in the attempt to see if 
good has any force and power to save humanity, and moreover, if  there is any salvation for 
the fallen. Spuming the social dimension of these questions, Shestov chose to view them 
from a religious angle and his search for the omnipotent God of the Bible rather than the 
sham, decorative god of the philosophers led him to the domain of Biblical existentialism. 
As Blagova and Emelianov point out in their study, 101 Shestov offered an entirely new 
possibility of interpreting Dostoevsky's world view by suggesting that Dostoevsky 
juxtaposed the Bible to Western scientific achievements (we note here that this is precisely 
what Shestov did himself, claiming to have taken this approach from Dostoevsky). 
According to Shestov, Dostoevsky through Raskolnikov tried to find an interpretation of 
the Scriptures which does not reject the prayers of a fallen man. Shestov saw in Dostoevsky 
and shared enthusiastically his attempt to move from ‘religion within the limits of reason’ 
back to the ‘truth of revelation about the “living God’” : ‘O t  “pejinrnH b  npe^enax pa3yMa”
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[ . . . ]  o h  pBeTCfl ofiparao k  HCTHHe oTKpoBeHHB o 5KHB0M Bore’. It is also in Dostoevsky 
that Shestov found his very own revolt against the indifferent laws of nature. He especially 
treasured Dostoevsky's words from The Idiot where the reference is to Holbein's painting of 
the dead Christ:
npnpoAa MepemHTca npn B3rjume Ha 3Ty KapTHHy b BHAe Kaicoro-To orpoMHoro, 
HeyMOJiHMoro h HeMoro 3Bepa, hjih BepHee, ropa3AO BepHee cKa3aTb, xotb h CTpaHHo, - b BHAe 
KaKOH-HHbyab rpoMaAHOH MaiiiHHbi HOBeHinero ycTponcTBa, KOTOpaa 6eccMbicjieHH0 3axBamna, 
pa3Apo6HJia h norjiOTHJia b ce6a, rjiyxo h becnyBCTBeHHO, BejiHKoe h SecueHHoe cymecTBO - 
Taxoe cymecTBO, KOTopoe oaho ctohao Been npHpoAw h Bcex 3aK0H0B ee, Been 3eMAH, KOTOpaa h
101 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 94.
102 Shestov, O 'nepepoDtcdenuuy6eotcdeHUu’yJJocmoeecKoeo in yM03peuue u omKpoeenue, p. 185.
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c o 3A aB ajiacb-T o, M oaceT 6bm > , eAHHCTBeHHO a a a  OAHoro TOJibKO noBB Aem iH  3 T o ro  cy m ecT B a !  
KapTHHOH 3TOK) KaK 6yATO HMeHHO Bbipa>KaeTCa 3TO nOHATHe O TeMHOH, HarAOH H 
6eCCMbICAeHHO-BeHHOH CHAe, KOTOpOH B ee  IIOAHHHeHO.103
Shestov draws fundamental philosophical conclusions from these sentiments of Dostoevsky 
which amount to Shestov's all-pervasive theme of the stone wall of necessity, oppressing 
every living being. It is this theme that lies at the core of his whole philosophy and which 
initiated his revolt and, as it were, his rebellion to defend the private against the general, the 
living and temporary against the soulless and eternal. It is this theme that sent him on the 
stormy search for solutions to such an unbearable human predicament and where he 
eventually found gnosis at the roots of the problem and faced the insoluble confrontation 
between the latter on one hand and faith on the other.
The more Shestov was getting convinced that reason is incompatible with faith to the point 
of killing it, the more he was waging a war on reason and ultimately traced to the roots of 
its poisonous power to the Biblical original sin. It is in Dostoevskii's Dream o f a Ridiculous 
Man, where the narrator in his dream visits a happy humanity on an unknown planet, that 
Shestov saw the story of the Fall with far reaching philosophical implications. In fact, 
Shestov's interpretation of this story can serve as the point of departure for his whole 
religious philosophy. As Milosz writes,
for Shestov the story of the Garden of Eden, because of its unfathomable depth and complexity, 
spoke for the superhuman origin of the whole Scripture. Explanations of the Fall advanced by both 
theologians and the popular imagination seemed childish to him when compared with chapters 2 
and 3 of Genesis. Dostoevsky's intuition enabled him, Shestov felt, to guess at a metaphysical state 
of man before the Fall, not just to visualize a happy Rousseauistic society.104
Milosz's explanations, which were partially cited before, summarise the turn of Shestov's 
thought: ‘Shestov doesn't hesitate to speak of man before he tasted from the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil as possessing omniscience and absolute freedom. What, then, 
was the Fall? A choice of an inferior faculty with its passion for a distinguo and for general 
ideas, with pairs of opposites: good, evil; true, untrue; possible, impossible. Man renounced
103 F. Dostoevskii, Hduom  in Ffojmoe co 6panue cohum huu e 30  moMax, vol. 8, p. 339.
104 Milosz, p. 106.
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faith in order to gain knowledge’. 105 Thus in his attempts to trace the roots of the tragic 
human predicament Shestov found at those roots the fruits of the tree of knowledge. It is 
interesting to note in this connection that, as Blagova and Emelianov suggest, Dostoevsky's 
interpretation of original sin in his story of a Ridiculous Man is actually different from the 
one Shestov derived. Indeed, the writer saw the source of the Fall in lies, they claim, while 
Shestov saw it in knowledge. However, as Milosz writes, Shestov ‘reminds us with relish 
that Saint Augustine hated the Stoics as much as Dostoevsky hated the liberals; both the 
Stoics and the liberals recommended a morality of self-sufficing Reason’ .106 Thus having 
rejected speculative philosophy with its formulae that ‘the good is God’ and ‘Love is God’ 
Shestov insisted that the abstract and general should not be put before the living and 
particular, that ‘God is Love’ is the only acceptable way round, and unquestioning faith is 
the only answer to human hopes and strivings.
In this connection it seems valuable to consider Sidney Monas's suggestion mentioned in 
the previous chapter of seeing a relation between Shestov's ideas and the Jewish mystical 
tradition, and to view Shestov's philosophy in the context of Hassidism ‘with its primary 
emphasis on the unique and mystical experience’ .107 While it is not entirely clear whether 
Hassidism lay at the source of Shestov's ideas and influenced him in the shaping of his 
philosophy as he grew up (see section 1.2  for our arguments in this respect), we 
nevertheless acknowledge a certain undeniable proximity between the spirit of Hassidic 
thought and Shestov's ideas.
The Hassidim, as Monas summarises, put the main emphasis on personal experience and 
viewed Holy Writ as a symbolic text to be experienced by revelation rather than interpreted 
by logic and reason. They placed paradox and mystery above rationalistic constructions. 
Monas describes them as ‘dionysiac’ and draws a parallel between the Hassidim and the 
early Christians. In the same way, he claims, ‘Shestov believed in the unique, the 
overwhelming, the ineffable insight’ and regarded as ‘at best provisional, “preparatory”
105 Milosz, p. 106.
106 Ibid, p. 107.
107 Monas, p. viii.
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[...] what lends itself to abstraction or to precision of formulation’. Shestov was also fond
of paradox and contradictions as the only promising sources from which the truth may
108emerge.
In our view, this evident proximity between the way of experiencing the Universe and 
searching for the truth between Shestov and the Hassidism in fact captures precisely the 
existential approach to the world. Indeed, one of the central convictions of the Hassidism is 
an acknowledgement of the fact that anybody is capable of grasping the mystery of 
existence and the divine at their own level, by the movement of their own soul, intuitively 
and instantaneously. Actually, the Hassidim have a fable which captures this belief. In it a 
boy-shepherd whistles on listening to wise men discussing the mystery of God in a 
synagogue, and, the fable says, his whistling contains more faith and divine understanding 
than all their wisdom put together. Interestingly, the significance and unquestionable moral 
authority of a rabbi acquired later within the Hassidic movement, would have inevitably 
met a strong protest in Shestov, since it seems to undermine intrinsically the idea of an 
intense personal quest which can neither be shared with nor facilitated by others.
Thus, if you like, amongst the three forms of cognition: analytical, synthetic and by means 
of revelation it is the latter that both Shestov's and the Hassidic approach fit into. On the 
other hand it is this very approach -  through intuition and revelation that poetry (as the 
pinnacle of literature and art in general) adopts and is characterised by. This is to say that 
the parallel between Shestov and the Hassidim that Monas pointed to is in fact a 
manifestation of a more general phenomenon which both exemplify (and thus they need not 
necessarily be interrelated by a causal connection). From this point of view the assertion 
that Shestov's approach to the world which ultimately shaped his philosophy was adopted 
from his literary culture and experience carries no less weight than Monas's suggestion that 
it is the Hassidic movement that might have played a crucial role in forming Shestov's ideas 
from his childhood. This is probably as much as can be reasonably speculated about the 
actual sources of Shestov's ideas, and further on we shall focus instead on the implications
108 See Monas, p. ix.
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of our assertion about the literary nature of Shestov’s thought. Thus in the next chapter our 
aim is to advance and justify our literary perspective on Shestov.
As a prelude to that we wish to conclude our present discussion by emphasising the 
remarkable route of Shestov's thought in the sense of its apparent total unconcern with the 
topical burning questions of his day, whether of a social or a generally historical nature. It 
is especially notable given how turbulent those years were and what major political 
upheavals Shestov's native Russia underwent by which his own destiny was also (and 
crucially) affected. Semen Frank wrote in this connection: ‘I don't know of any 
contemporary writer, with the exception of course of Tolstoy, who in his interests and 
searching, would be so independent of the spirit of the times, who, in vacuous expanses 
filled only with his own ideas, thinks so much outside the atmosphere of every new trend, 
as Lev Shestov does’ . 109
Indeed, Shestov followed his own, very original path, was never seduced by the winds of 
fashion and remained thematically and philosophically distant from the majority of his 
contemporaries. When reading Shestov it is often impossible to establish the actual time 
frame of his works and to deduce the actual historical period of his life, for the only 
chronological markers are concealed in the names of past philosophers, and contemporary 
socio-political questions are very rarely discussed. In this respect Shestov can be compared 
to the Russian writer Alexander Grin (a pen-name of Alexander Stepanovich Grinevsky, 
1880-1932) whose romantic novels written amidst the brutal reality of the Russian civil war 
of 1919 are set in some picturesque foreign land within a non-identifiable time scale. In the 
case of Grin a plausible conjecture is his escapism, a desire to leave behind the unbearable 
suffering of his country, himself included, and to become transposed to an imaginary 
universe. Such instances are not uncommon -  for example, contemporary Israeli literature 
certainly has a similar trend of temporal writing in the vein of the European tradition of 
being preoccupied largely by the private life of an individual. It is, however, hard to avoid 
the impression, when reading it, that authors are simply (and quite consciously) fleeing 
from the tiresome and oppressive situation of a permanent war. The effect is, interestingly,
109 Semen Frank, Slovo, (3) 10 Dec, 1908. Cited in Valevicius, p. 2.
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dual (if not opposite to the expected one) because the actual Israeli reality, which is being 
suppressed in such writings, distinctly looms from behind their lines. In other words, its 
very absence gains a voice of its own which overwhelms the narrative.
In the case of Shestov, however, we think that this suggestion of simple escapism is not 
correct and the above similarity is external only. In our view, he was genuinely preoccupied 
first and foremost with the timeless human questions common to all mankind and saw his 
vocation in trying to solve them within philosophical discourse. His path did not lead him 
away from suffering into the hiding place of the romantic imagination or to problems of a 
qualitatively different order of magnitude. In his own eyes he was getting to the bottom of 
that very suffering, desperately trying to find a cure. In his opinion the Apocalypse of wars 
and revolutions that the world and most of all his native Russia were witnessing at the 
beginning of the twentieth century was a direct result of the erroneous foundations of the 
human world and he allegorically quoted Shakespeare that ‘something is rotten in the state 
of Denmark’. 110 Thus he viewed the tragic history contemporary to him as the tip of a 
global iceberg of the destiny of mankind and wanted to trace the metaphysical roots of it.
In the turbulent year of 1919 (which Shestov’s family spent in Kiev to where they fled from 
Moscow when life there was becoming increasingly unbearable) he wrote in his diary the 
entry (which was already cited in the previous chapter, in section 1.3): ‘Hmcorfla Tax 
y n o p H o ,  H anpiD K eH H O  h  H en p ep B iB H O  H e p a b o T a j ia  m b ic j ib , x a x  b  3 t h  y ^ c a cH B ie , x p o B a B B ie  
£hh. H HHKoraa — max 6ecruiodHo\ux He felt a due concern about Russia’s destiny and 
shared his country's torment with everyone else. He once even made a diversion from his 
usual writings and displayed his reaction to the phenomenon of Bolshevism openly and 
directly by creating the book What is Russian Bolshevism? (Hmo maKoe pyccxuu 
6oJibweeu3M?), perhaps as a belated attempt to issue a warning to the rest of the world. Its 
publication was undertaken by Shestov's friend E. G. Lundberg, but the book turned out to 
be so hostile to the Bolshevik regime that Lundberg, who only read the book when it was 
already in print, ordered nearly all the copies to be destroyed before seeing the light of
110 Quotation is from Hamlet, Act I, Scene IV.
111 Shestov, ‘/jHeBHHK m b ic jic h ’, p . 235 (entry of 17 Oct. 1919).
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day. 112 In 1934 Shestov published another article on the burning issues of the day rather 
than philosophical matters as such. This article was entitled ‘The Menacing Barbarians of 
Today’ and concerned the rise of Nazism. It appeared in the journal Aryan Path in August 
1934.
In other words, Shestov never turned away from the present, he was simply sent on a long 
and torturous journey through human history and thought by this very present with its 
horrific happenings. As in a children's hide-and-seek game, he must have felt that looking 
together with a crowd is much less productive than setting off on your own quest, however 
bitter and lonely it may be. And in the process of this journey Shestov inevitably took a 
‘view from above’ on human history and placed modernity in a broader historical and 
philosophical context. In his letter to Schloezer of September 1938 he wrote:
K o H e H H o ,  H e j i b 3 H H e  n y B C T B O B a T b  y a c a c o B ,  A a a c e  H e  to jii> k o  T e x ,  K O T o p w e ,  m o jk c t  6 b m > ,  H a M  
n p e f lC T O B T , H O  H T e x ,  K O T O p b ie  B b lH O C flT  H B b lH O C H JIH  B p a 3 H b IX  C T p a H a X  H yX C H e H CTO J ib  6 jIH 3 K H e  
H a M  j i iq a h . He T O J ib x o  T e n e p b ,  h o  h  b o x z j a n e H H b i e  B p e M e H a .  n o M H H T e  r u i a n  H e p e M H H ?  H r p o M b i  
A n o K a n H n c H c a ?  Ho 3 a r a a o H H b iM  o 6 p a 3 0 M h  n p o p o K H  h  a n o c T O J i b i  C K B0 3 b  y a c a c b i  b b i r a a  
n p o 3 p e B a n H  h t o - t o  H H o e .  [ . . . ]  T o h h o  o h h  n p e A H y B C T B O B a n H , h t o  x o u i M a p  “ A e n c T B H T e j ib H O C T H ”  T a x  
a c e  H c n e 3 H e T , x a x  x o u i M a p  c h o b h a c h h j i .  [ . . . ]  P a 3 B e  B e e  3t h  C r a n H H b i ,  M y c c o j i H H H ,  T H T J ie p b i  
B e H H b i?  H p a 3 B e  h x  “ n o b e A b i ”  H e  n p H 3 p a H H b i?  HeM 6 o j i b u i e  o h h  T o p a c e c T B y iO T ,  T e M  6 o j i e e  h b h o  
o b H a p y x c H B a e T C H  (b  h h o h  n e p c n e K T H B e )  h x  H H H T o m i o c T b . 113
Thus his general concern was broader than a direct preoccupation with modernity and lay at 
a metaphysical level -  which is the same level as that of great works of art which, 
regardless of their actual themes, invariably reach through to the global and eternal. It is 
precisely Shestov's proximity to art that the next chapter deals with.
112 For more details of this story see Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 189.
113 Letter to Boris de Schloezer of 11 Sept. 1938. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, pp.187-188.
Chapter 3. Existential perspective and proximity to art. The literary roots 
of Shestov’s ideas.
In this chapter we provide a conceptual justification for taking a literary approach to 
Shestov's works and explain why such an approach is not only legitimate and productive, 
but also crucially important for the study of this thinker.
3.1 The philosophy of tragedy as a philosophy of art. The role of aesthetics in 
Shestov's philosophical search.
One of Shestov's fundamental claims was that philosophy is an art rather than a science. 
This statement in the case of Shestov's own philosophy, as will be seen in this section, is to 
a large extent true and, in our opinion, has profound implications for the way in which his 
thought should be interpreted.
This section will demonstrate and examine the intrinsic proximity between art in general 
(and especially literature) and Shestov's philosophy of tragedy. In particular an attempt will 
be made to untangle Shestov's complicated relationship with aesthetics.
Andrius Valevicius points out in his book that Shestov was often regarded by his 
contemporaries as ‘boVshoi original’ (a man of great originality) . 1 Indeed, his insights into 
every thinker he ever studied were invariably different from the existing perspectives. The 
next part of the thesis will highlight numerous examples of such original interpretations 
provided by Shestov. One of the most recurrent amongst them is that of Nietzsche who 
made an overwhelming impression on Shestov and greatly influenced his writing style as 
well as his ideas. Shestov's view of Friedrich Nietzsche, as we shall see, significantly 
diverges from the common perception of the German philosopher summarised, for instance, 
in Bernard Russell's book. Russell describes Nietzsche's ethics as follows: ‘Victors in war, 
and their descendants, are usually biologically superior to the vanquished. It is therefore
1 Valevicius, p. 2.
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desirable that they should hold all the power, and should manage affairs exclusively in their 
own interests’.2 Russell sees Nietzsche essentially as suffering from an inferiority complex 
and trying to soothe ‘his wounded vanity’ by praising cruelty. ‘I dislike Nietzsche because 
he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men 
whom he most admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die’, 
Russell writes. As the ultimate argument against Nietzsche's philosophy Russell appeals to 
the emotions rather than to facts: ‘Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it the motive 
power to all that I desire as regards the world’.4 Thus, the conventional interpretation of 
Nietzsche's thought ascribes to him a perception of the world which is essentially fascist. 
However, it fnay be an open question to what extent this interpretation would meet 
Nietzsche's own approval.5 On the other hand, it is indeed sufficiently easy to see why 
fascists chose precisely Nietzsche, with his ultimate escape from the horrors of reality to his 
advocacy of the Superman, as an ideologist of their philosophy. In other words the nature 
of his teaching fits comfortably with fascist aspirations.
In an analogous way, we assert, the nature of Shestov's philosophy reflects the perception 
of the universe provided by Art, or, if you like, it is a philosophy of artists. This in 
particular explains why Shestov, while remaining an isolated and relatively obscure figure, 
is held in such high esteem first and foremost by writers and poets rather than philosophers 
per se. Indeed, there is a number of singular characteristics of Shestov's philosophy that 
prove its artistic origin as well as its artistic nature, and justify his own identification of 
philosophy with art.
As we explained earlier, Shestov believed that true philosophy originates in despair. More 
precisely, philosophical contemplation is ‘the result of a magnanimous despair’. This belief
2 Russell, p. 734.
3 Ibid, p. 736.
4 Ibid, p. 738.
5 T h e  fo l lo w in g  w o rd s  o f  N ie tz s c h e  are w e ll  k n ow n : ‘I h a v e  to  p u t a fe n c e  aroun d  m y  w o rd s  an d  m y  
te a c h in g  to  sa v e  th e m  fro m  b e in g  in v a d ed  b y  p ig s ’ . V ik to r  E r o fe e v  w h e n  g iv in g  th is  q u o ta tio n  in  
c o n n e c t io n  w ith  S h e s to v  ( in  h is  artic le  ‘O cTaeTca o a h o :  npoH 3BO Ji...’)  a sk s  a  v e r y  appropriate  
q u estion : ‘He ym epbH O  jth  b CBoefi o c h o b c  t o  yneH H e, KOTopoe Hy^cAaeTca b orp aA e?’ (E r o fe e v , p. 
174).
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is most probably due, in particular, to Shestov's own personal experience which allowed 
him to take a glimpse into the realm o f tragedy, and what opened up in front o f  him in that 
abyss completely overwhelmed him. The image o f the individual whose despair reaches 
unbearable bounds, when ‘nejioBeK npoflOJixcaeT h c h t b  nocne Toro, Kor^a o h  coBepuieHHO 
yrpaTHji cnoco6HocTb SpaTB o t  >kh3 h h  t o ,  b  neM m b i npHBBiiuiH b h z j c t b  ee cymnocTB h  
c m b ic j t ’6 became the central focus o f Shestov's attention. ‘MbicjiHTejiBHBie cnocobHocra b  
TaKHX cjiynaax bojiBmen nacTBio yroHnaioTCfl, oOocTpaioTCJi, BBipacTaiOT £0
n
KOJioccajiBHBix pa3MepoB’, Shestov writes about such a person; ‘nyTB t o j i b k o  naxHyjio Ha 
Hero x o j i o ^ o m  T p a r e ^ H H  —  o h  b c c b  npeo6pa3Hjicfl’.8
Shestov personally went through a profound transformation o f convictions and from then 
on this breaking point leading to the total re-evaluation o f all values that he had learned 
from Nietzsche captivated his imagination. For Shestov such magnanimous despair became 
the point o f departure for his philosophical quest. Thus, what for many is the aim and end 
o f their reflections -  tracing the human predicament to its ultimate breaking point -  for 
Shestov served as the beginning o f his philosophical journey. He wanted to explore that 
metaphysical state when all hopes are lost, when, for a ‘hopeless person’, ‘cTaBnme 
He/jocTynHBiMH eMy m c h t b i  m o j io z j o c t h  HammaioT Ka3aTBca eMy jd k h b b im h ,  
o6MaHHHBBIMH, npOTHBOeCTeCTBCHHBIMH. C HCHaBHCTBIO H 03KeCT0HeHHCM OH BBIpBIBaeT 
H3 ce6a Bee, b o  h t o  Kor,zja-TO Bepnn, h t o  Kor^a-To j h o 6 h j i ’ .9 Moreover, Shestov wanted to 
find rescue, a way out -  first o f all, apparently, in his personal case: and thus, viewing one's 
life path as a labyrinth o f doomed human attempts to find the way out became Shestov's 
principal concern, defining his main focus as distinctly existential.
On the other hand, any tragic experience, as Shestov knew himself, separates one 
irreversibly from the common world. A tragic person ‘HaHHHaeT HHane zjyMaTB, HHane 
HyBCTBOBaTB, HHane acenaTB’.10 It is in this ‘domain o f  tragedy’, in this new country where
6 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 mmeao, pp. 187-188.
7 Ibid, p. 188.
8 Ibid.
9 Shestov, flocm oeecKuu uHuipue, p. 327.
10 Ibid.
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o n e  c a n n o t, par excellence, h a v e  a n y  c o m p a n io n s  an d  is  in  to ta l s o li tu d e  that S h e s to v 's  
p h ilo s o p h y  o f  tr a g e d y  starts. In th e  fa c e  o f  s c e p t ic is m  an d  p e s s im is m  ‘uejiOBeK [ . . . ]  
B n ep B tie  b )kh3hh  ncm>rn>iBaeT to C T panm oe o /m H on ecT B o, H3 KOToporo e r o  He b cn jia x  
BbmecTH hh  ooto  caM oe npe/jaH H oe h m o fia m e e  c e p a i je ’ . 11
If we now compare Shestov's preoccupation with the existential tragedy of an individual 
soul with the main preoccupation of literary creativity as seen through classical world 
literature, we discover their close resemblance. Indeed, the central focus of any serious 
work of literature is the inner experience of an individual, the evolution of his or her soul 
which ultimately amounts to the intrinsic tragedy of the human predicament. In other 
words, like art itself Shestov's thought is fully concentrated on the tragic fate of the 
individual. Or, putting it more broadly, Shestov's pioneering existential perspective in 
philosophy comes closest to a generally artistic perspective.
Furthermore, the sources o f  art, and notably o f  literature, also lie predominantly in despair 
and in a sudden, but inescapable realisation by an individual o f  his total existential solitude. 
The quotation from Dovlatov given earlier (in Chapter 1) testifies to that: ‘JlHTepaTypHaa 
flejrrejitHOCTb -  oto CKopee Bcero nonbiTKa npeoaojieTb cobcTBeHHbie KOMnjiexcbi, h35khtb 
hjih ocjiaGHTb TparH3M cymecTBOBaHHfl’. In Brodskii’s works we find a poetic expression 
o f  the same idea; poetic activity becomes a means o f resisting existential solitude in the 
face o f  soulless eternity (prompted, i f  you like, by this very eternity):
X ojio/j MeHa BoenHTaji h bjiokhji n ep o  
B najibHbi, hto6  hx  corpeTb b ropcTH.12
Thus, not surprisingly, this state of extreme loneliness from which, according to Shestov, 
the philosophy of tragedy also originates has infinite artistic descriptions.
11 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huifuie, p. 369.
12 Joseph Brodskii, ‘CeBep KpouiHT MeTanji, ho ma^urr CTemio’ in OopMa epeMenu. 
CmuxomeopeHm, scce, nbecbi in two volumes (Minsk: Eridan, 1992), I, p. 311.
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CnaCTJIHB TOJIBKO TOT, KTO He nOHJUI, HTO OH OAHH,
Kan ahtji, 3a6jiy,aHBUieeca b jrecy 13
are poetic lines o f  the contemporary Russian poet Tatiana Voltskaia. E.M. Remarque in his 
famous novel Three friends looks at this sense o f isolation from the perspective o f a love 
relationship which, while breaking all conceivable barriers between people, is still 
incapable o f  freeing one from the feeling o f ultimate loneliness because o f the 
overwhelming temporality o f  existence which love paradoxically intensifies: ‘06jia^aHHe 
caMO no ce6e y>xe yrpaTa. HnKonja HHHero Hejn>3fl yaepjKaTb, HHKor^a! HnKor^a Hejib3fl 
pa30MKHyn> jm raiom yio  ijenb BpeMeHH, HHKorAa GecnoKOHCTBO He npeBpamanocb b 
noKon, noHCKH -  b THmnHy, HHKorAa He npeicpamajiocb na^eHHe. [...] HMKor^a hhh to  He 
ocTaeTca, hh “a” , hh “tb i”, h yum MeHbme Bcero “Mbi” ’.14
‘He Hcxajia jih OHa b cymHOCTH toto ace, hto h a ? ’, the main protagonist asks about a 
woman who is trying it on with him, introducing by his question the same considerations of 
existential solitude and the attempt to overcome it through human closeness, ‘CnyTHHKa, 
hto6bi 3a6biTb oflHHonecTBO 3KH3HH, TOBapnmu, hto6bi Kax-To npeoAOAeTb 
GeccMbicjieHHOCTb Gbitim? ’15
B r o d s k y  p u ts  th e s e  th o u g h ts  a b o u t th e  u lt im a te  h u m a n  s o li tu d e  in  th e  fra m e w o r k  o f  
r e lig io u s  fa ith  in  h is  ‘P a3roB op  c  He6o>KHTeneM’, w h e r e  h e  w rite s:
Ho fla^ ce Mbicjib o -  KaK ero! -  GeccMepTbH 
EcTb Mbicjib 06  oAHHonecTBe, moh Apyr.16
Furthermore, it is not just common roots and a common perspective on the world that 
literature -  within art in general -  shares with Shestov's philosophy of tragedy. Another
13 Tatiana Vol’tskaia, ‘YMHpaji iohmm, AOTarHBaa ao ccahh...’ in IfuKada (St Petersburg: Feniks, 
2002) p. 119.
14 E.M. Remarque, Tpu moeapuufa in Ha 3anadnoM (pponme 6e3 nepeMen.Bosepatqemie. Tpu 
moeapuu^a (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1959), p. 619.
15 Ibid, p. 620.
16 Brodskii, ‘Pa3roBop c HeSoHorrejieM’ in QopMa epeMenu. Cmuxomeopenmi, scce, nbecbi, I, p. 
223.
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evident parallel of key significance is between the very nature of Shestov's philosophy on 
the one hand and that of art on the other.
One of the most striking features demonstrating the proximity between the two is Shestov's 
spiritual extremism, his readiness to defend fiercely the private, individual and finite in the 
face o f the blind impartiality of the general, unified, eternal and necessary. He uses the 
scales of Job -  one o f his favourite Biblical characters -  to cry out that human suffering 
outweighs the sand of the seas. In other words, Shestov as it were stands up for individual 
existence -  as does art, which in a certain sense always defends the formula that the private 
is ‘greater’ than the general. ‘ E c j i h  HCKyccTBO neMy-TO h  yHHT [...] t o  h m c h h o  HacraocTH
17HejiOBenecKoro cymecTBOBamia’, asserts Brodsky in his Nobel lecture and adds that it is 
this privateness and individuality that is a charm against tautology, the repetition of 
someone else's life and submission to heralds of historical necessity.
In this connection it is worth pointing out that in his alliance with the private against the 
general Shestov is sometimes interpreted as a defender of solipsism. For instance, Viktor 
Erofeev in his brilliant article on Shestov points out that the ineradicable tragedy of human 
existence deepens not only despair, but also human egoism. The re-evaluation of values 
entailed by tragedy, he asserts, breaks the equilibrium between the world and the 
individual. To exemplify this claim Erofeev gives a quotation from Dostoevsky which 
Shestov particularly treasured: ‘CBeTy j i h  npOBajiHTtca, h j i h  b o t  MHe naio He mm>?
152cxa^cy, h t o  CBeTy npoBajiHTbca, a h t o 6  M H e  nan Bcer^a mrn>\ However, Berdiaev in his 
article on Shestov gives a very different interpretation of this quotation and its significance 
for Shestov:
B a a cH ee  B c e r o  ycTaHOBHTb, h t o  T y r  p e n b  HfleT He 06 obbweH H O M  “ 3roH 3M e” , K or^ a H eaoB eK  c b o h  
H H Tepecbi npe/jnoH H T aeT  nyacHM HHTepecaM . O HeT, obbi/jeH H biH  “ 3roH 3M ” B CTpenaeTca Ha 
Ka>KflOM rn a ry  h  He 3aKJHOHaeT b c e b e  h h k b k o h  T pare/jH H , a a a c e  nacTO 3acT paxoB b iB aeT ca  o t  H e e . ... 
T y r  B o n p o c  o “ n a e ” -  4>hjioco<J)Ckhh, o t h h c c k h h  h  pejiH rH 03H biii, 3 t o  “ npoKJWTbiH B o n p o c ” ,
17 B rodsk ii, ‘HobejieBCKaa JleKuna’ in  0opMa epeMenu. Cmuxomeopenwi, 3cce, ribecbi, II, p. 451.
18 F.M. Dostoevskii, 3anucKu m nodnojibn in IJojinoe co6panue conunenuu e 30 moMax (Leningrad: 
Nauka, 1982), vol. 5, p. 174.
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npoBaji b ncwseMHoe qapcTBO. [...] 3 to  npoSjieMa HHAHBuayajibHocTH, ocHOBHaa npoSjieMa 
HejiOBenecKOH h ch 3 h h , xopeHb Bcex pejmrHH, npo6jieMa Teo^HqeH, Rax ee nacTO Ha3bmaK)T.19
In this particular case we fully side with Berdiaev's perspective in recognising this issue of 
individuality as the main problem for Shestov, the philosopher. It is also, we repeat, this 
very problem that occupies a central place in art.
In the same vein it is Shestov's intense and tragic irrationalism that takes him really close to 
poetry, to a poetic perception of the world. Boris de Schloezer writes:
Shestov's philosophy is the child of indignation. In Shestov's thought we see the reaction of a soul 
profoundly shocked by reality. Not the familiar indignation of morality, pointing the eternal contrast 
between what is and what ought to be, and usually leading to the construction of an ideal world; but 
the revolt of a living creature who will uphold to the last the human desires, hopes and aspirations, 
who will not be reconciled to the grievous horrors imposed on us by reality, and who claims to lay 
hold of “the things which are not in our power”.20
Thus Shestov quite consciously does not subscribe to the existing world order and 
contemptuously repudiates the illusory consolations of logic and mind. The same view is 
notably characteristic of poetry, only at a rather subconscious level. And it is no surprise 
that a poet by definition is always in solitude, not only because the very nature of creativity 
is strictly individual, but also because poetry breaks the existing causal connections:
Ilo3Ta .aaJieKO 3aBOAHT penb.
[...]  n y rb  KOMeT -  I Io3tob n yrb .
Pa3BeaHHbie 3BeHba 
IIpHHHHHOCTH -  BOT CBB3b e r o !21
These are the words of Tsvetaeva from her ‘Poets’. Further in the same poem she 
elaborates:
19 Berdiaev, ‘TpareAHB h odbmeHHOCTb’ in Lev Shesttov, ConmeHUH e deyx m o M a x  (Tomsk: 
Vodolei, 1996), I, pp. 465-491 (p. 476).
20 Boris de Schloezer, ‘Leon Chestov’, p. 157.71 Marina Tsvetaeva, ‘IIoaTbi’ in Codpmue coHUHenuu e 7 moMax (Moscow: Ellis Lak, 1994), vol. 
2, p. 184.
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O h  t o t , kto  cM euiH B aeT  KapTbi,
06M aH W B eT  B ee  h  cn eT ,
O h  t o t , kto  cn p a u iH B a eT  c  napT bi,
K t o  KaHTa HarojiOBy 6 b eT  [...]
[ . . .]  aoKfl, a  He c o r p e B a a .
P b b , a  He B 3pam H B aa -  B3pbiB h b 3jtom -  
T boh  CTe3a, rpH B acT aa KpHBaa,
He n p eA y ra ^ a H a  K ajierw apeM !22
It is in Tsvetaeva's works, in our view, that the connection between the world of poetry and 
the ideas of Shestov can be traced most explicitly, because there is a striking proximity 
between Shestov's rejection of the iron laws of existence and Tsvetaeva's famous lines from 
her ‘C t h x h  k  Hexmi’:
Ha T b o h  6e3yM H biH  MHp 
OTBeT OflHH -  OTKa3 23
Speaking more broadly, we should say that if Tsvetaeva in a certain sense can be regarded 
as a poetic alter ego of the philosopher Shestov,24 poets in general are -  not surprisingly -  
particularly attracted by this almost naive rebellion of his. For the remarkable 
insubordination of Shestov's thought, his frenzy and passion have the same root as the 
poetic intensity of emotions, or more precisely an intense way of expressing them.
The last observation is of key significance for our question about Shestov's proximity to art, 
since it exposes an inevitable link between the ethical side of Shestov's kinship to art and 
the aesthetic one. Indeed, a way of expressing ideas belongs to the domain of aesthetics 
while the ideas themselves are rather an ethical phenomenon. The aesthetic aspect plays a 
vital role in understanding Shestov's philosophical thought -  because in art it dominates, in 
a certain sense, over ethics -  in the sense in which form dominates over content. Or at least
22 Tsvetaeva, ‘no3Tbi’, vol. 2, p. 184.
23 Tsvetaeva, ‘C t h x h  k  Hexnu’ in Co6panue c o h u m h u u  e 7 moMax, vol. 2, p. 360.
24 This line of research on the proximity between Shestov’s and Tsvetaeva’s creative worlds had to 
remain largely outside the scope of this thesis. I have summarised some of the results of this study 
in my conference paper ‘Across the World Order: Lev Shestov, Marina Tsvetaeva and Venedikt 
Erofeev’, delivered at the BASEES conference in Cambridge, 2003.
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art presumes an inseparable blend of ethics and aesthetics, with the latter having the upper 
hand.
In Shestov's case this relationship between ethics and aesthetics is much more complex, 
which reflects the fact that despite the poetic origin of his thought and his attribution of 
philosophy to art, Shestov himself was much more of a philosophical thinker than an artist. 
Moreover, in our view there was a certain continuing conflict between the two within him, 
as will subsequently be demonstrated. We think that it is this conflict that is responsible for 
a certain paradox in which Shestov's philosophy is steeped: while being of an artistic, even 
poetic, origin it often shows a certain deafness to aesthetics.
In fact, the words that Donald Rayfield wrote in 1971 about Ivanov-Razumnik can, in our 
opinion, be applied with a certain accuracy to Shestov too: ‘He squeezes his writers like 
lemons for an attitude to life and throws away the fruit. He does not care to distinguish 
good and bad writing; he barely touches on his subjects' handling of the word, their 
aesthetic traditions or the purpose of art. For him, literature is only a more striking form of 
philosophical tract’. John Bayley, indeed, wrote in 1970 that ‘great literature for Shestov 
is [...] a waxwork museum of ideas’ and that ‘as a critic Shestov wastes no time on style or 
form or literary device’.26 Although the above claims seemingly imply a total neglect of the 
aesthetic aspect of literary works, for Shestov an important correction is due: it is only an 
apparent neglect. In Shestov's case, we think, it is more likely that he ignored aesthetics 
only superficially, only on the surface of things, while at a deeper level he was enslaved by 
it just as an artist would have been. This is because to presume otherwise leads us to an 
unsolvable contradiction with all the undeniable artistic aspects of Shestov's creativity, 
which will be discussed further below. However, the existence of this deeper level which is 
very carefully concealed, even from Shestov himself, still remains to be disclosed.
25 P. D. Rayfield, Introduction to Ivanov-Razumnik, On the Meaning of Life (Letchworth, England: 
Bradda Books, 1971), p. vi.
26 Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, p. 6.
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Returning to the descriptions above borrowed from Rayfield and Bayley, perhaps a more 
precise, even if metaphorical, image of Shestov's treatment of aesthetics, which can serve 
as central for our purposes, is the following one: his perception of the aesthetic aspect of a 
literary piece is akin to watching a poet reading out a beautiful poem, but with the sound 
switched off. This is to say that Shestov witnesses all the apparent passion and 
temperament of this performance and is inflamed by them, but by them alone. He cannot 
appreciate the beauty of the text, but he can feel compassionate, as it were, to the pathos of 
it.
This metaphor, in fact, is not entirely precise, because it neglects the fact that Shestov 
approached literature first of all from a philosophical point of view and so he did listen to 
the text very carefully, even if with the sole purpose of extracting its ideas. Therefore a 
more accurate image would be if we suppose that he can hear the sound, but the poetry is 
read in a language foreign to him and he is supplied with a literal translation only. Thus he 
is still denied the appreciation of its poetic beauty, although he can follow all the 
philosophical ideas concealed in the text.
This degree of aesthetic deafness is best exemplified by Shestov's reading of Chekhov 
which will be explored in Chapter 7 of Part II. The main idea is that Shestov always 
remained first and foremost a philosopher and in the eternal struggle between the 
philosopher and the artist in him it is the philosopher who would ultimately win. That is to 
say that content (or ideas) mattered more to him than aesthetic form (understood in a broad 
sense), to the point of overshadowing it.
In this connection it is extremely interesting to recall Milosz's conjecture that Shestov's 
personal drama was ‘lacking the talent to become a poet, to approach the mystery of 
existence more directly than through mere concepts’.27
Nevertheless Milosz essentially follows the same pattern that was suggested above -  of 
placing Shestov truly close to the world of art and notably of poetry. He draws an explicit
27 Milosz, p. 102.
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parallel between Lev Shestov and Joseph Brodsky, calling both ‘3amHTHHKH CBHineHHoro 
b  BeK 6 e 3 B e p H a ’ . The next section will return to Milosz's analysis when discussing the role 
of literature in shaping Shestov's thought.
Another distinct characteristic of Shestov which displays his proximity to art is his 
tendency towards the edge, facilitated, or even predetermined, by his, as it were, religious 
temperament. Just as a sportsman searches for the boundaries of human abilities Shestov 
seeks the limits of moral, inner strength (especially if one understands the world as a huge
9 8existential laboratory where, using Brodsky's words, ‘uejiOBeK ecTb HcntrraTejib 6 o jih ’) . 
In doing so Shestov never trusts external appearances and submits every thinker to a 
passionate interrogation, ‘nocjie^moio HCTHHy HyxcHO HCKaTL b  nopaaceHHJix, b
9 0
Hey/janax’, as Shestov wrote in his essay on Henrik Ibsen.
This tendency of Shestov persists in connection with every other thinker who became an 
object of his study. Part II will examine Shestov's highly subjective hermeneutic method in 
his treatment of various Russian writers. Such a method by its very subjectivity suggests 
another parallel with art, whose methods are also highly subjective due to its very nature.
It is also interesting to note here that the origin of artistic inspiration is often associated 
with a special, rather abnormal state of mind, to attain which an artist can submit himself to
1 A
all sorts of potential self-destruction. ‘HeHopManbHOCTb oneBH^Ha’, said Osip 
Mandelshtam about the behaviour of a poet in search of inspiration. In the same vein Victor 
Erofeev (as Andrius Valevicius points out in his book) describes Shestov's philosophy as an
illness in which philosophical searching is made easier by ‘a forty degree temperature,
*11
epileptic fits or something of the sort’.
28 Joseph Brodskii, ‘Pa3roBop c HeSoacHTejieM’ in QopMa epeMenu. Cmuxomeopenm, scce, rtbecbi, 
I, p. 220.
29 Lev Shestov, Tlodedbi u nopaotcemiH in Conunenun e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, pp. 
394-395.
30 Osip Mandel'shtam, ‘O coSece/mmce’ in U ly M  e p e M e n u ;  e o c n o M u n a n m , c m a m b u  u  o n e p n u  (St 
Petersburg: Azbuka, 1999), p. 168.
31 Valevicius, p. 46 (reference made to Erofeev, p. 177).
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Yet, an apparent discrepancy in Shestov’s proximity to art which is concealed in his 
treatment of aesthetics is still to be disentangled. The fact remains that despite his youthful 
dream of becoming a writer, the mature Shestov would always be angered by any attempts 
to be called such and remained indifferent to praise of his literary style. He warned his only 
disciple Benjamin Fondane, a French poet of Romanian origin, to steer away from any kind 
of literature when writing a philosophical paper: ‘you'll have to grab eloquence and break
' i 'y
its neck’. Thus, it would seem that he aimed to concentrate fully on the content and to 
avoid any literariness, any excesses of form; Shestov’s preference in his works was 
apparently above all ethical, despite the artistic nature of his philosophy. Yet, we maintain, 
there are evident contradictions, into which we run as soon as we trust Shestov's claims 
about his essential neglect of aesthetics and our own conclusions regarding his treatment of 
writers like Chekhov.
The first of these is Shestov's extraordinary literary style, which will be discussed in detail 
in the last section of this chapter. Notably, it reconciles Shestov's ethics and aesthetics by 
merging them together and gives another proof of the importance of aesthetics for Shestov 
despite the reduced role that he attributed to it. Interestingly, even Ivanov-Razumnik, who, 
according to Rayfield, disregarded the aesthetic aspect of literary works, could not help 
noting about Shestov that ‘npn HTeHun KHHr JI. IIIecTOBa uyBCTBO ocTeTHuecKOH 
yaoB JieT B op eH H O C T H  noH T H  Bcer^a c o n p o B 0 5 K # a e T  pafioTy m b ic j ih , a o t o  m o e c h o  cKa3an> He 
o MHornx H3 coBpeMeHHBix nHcaTejien’. Notably, Ivanov-Razumnik called Shestov's 
works philosophical and artistic simultaneously.
Sometimes Shestov himself would drop an almost accidental remark that would suddenly 
give away his true attitude to the importance of aesthetics. One of these remarks we already 
quoted in Section 2.2. Shestov made it in his paper ‘In praise of stupidity’ written in 
response to Berdiaev's criticism of Shestov's logical contradictions. This remark, in our 
view, rather reinforces our metaphorical image above of Shestov's treatment of aesthetics.
32 Fondane, p. 146. For a fuller quotation (with a reference to Verlaine whose phrase Shestov is 
using here), see p. 481, footnote 175.
33 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 165.
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‘H t o  ripaBaa, t o  npaB^a. IIoHMaji. T o j i b k o  3aneM j i o b h t b  6 b u i o ?  M pa3Be TaK k h h t h  
HHTaiOT? no npOHTeHHH KHHTH HyXCHO 3a6BITB He TOJIBKO BCe CJIOBa, HO H BCe MBICJIH 
aBTopa, h  t o j i b k o  noMHHTB ero j i h i j o ’ .34 This is simply yet another artistic pas  on Shestov's 
part -  to emphasise the role o f  the general lasting impression, o f the aftertaste, as it were, o f  
a book and its creator. One too many, it seems, for someone who persistently plays down 
the aesthetic dimension. Especially given that what we have hitherto witnessed already 
exposes the artistic roots o f  Shestov's philosophical writings.
To reiterate: both art and the philosophy of tragedy have common origins -  in existential 
solitude and despair; they both possess a distinct existential focus and use an equally 
subjective, hermeneutic method; both allegedly spring from an abnormal state of mind, a 
sort of spiritual ecstasy necessary to achieve their goals; by the same token, the artistic 
roots of Shestov’s writings lie in his spiritual extremism in rebelling against the world order 
and standing up for individual existence -  for the ‘private’ against the ‘general’; finally, 
they include Shestov's brilliant literary style and his entry into philosophy through literature 
(the topic of the next section).
Moreover, as John Bayley implies in his article on Shestov, his striving for unquestioning 
religious faith is akin to art in that the function of the latter is also ‘to affirm that here “all 
things are possible’” .35 ‘Its function’, - Bayley continues, - ‘is as vital as that of faith itself, 
is indeed the most graphic possible affirmation of it. Artists, or else they would be silent, 
believe like the Knights of the Faith in what they are doing’.
Interestingly, such a merging of artistic values with religious philosophy that we see in 
Shestov can be found in Russian literature, and the most striking example is Dostoevsky -  
Shestov's main teacher, as Shestov liked to repeat. This idea will be elaborated in the 
analysis of Shestov's interpretation of Dostoevsky given in Chapter 6 of Part II.
34 Lev Shestov, IJoxecuia enynocmu in CommeHW e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, p. 238.
35 Bayley, ‘Idealism and Its Critic’, p. 6.
36 Ibid.
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In the light of the above we can conclude that Shestov’s philosophy which he himself 
regarded as art rather than science shares with the former its main sources and 
preoccupations, tasks and goals, methods and vision. Consistent with that, Shestov's 
preference for ethics over aesthetics does not withstand closer examination. Thus, as 
discussed above, the evident and profound proximity between an artistic (notably literary, if 
not purely poetic) perception of the world and Shestov's philosophical perception reveals 
the utmost significance of a literary approach to him without which our understanding of 
Shestov will remain dramatically incomplete. Moreover, for Shestov other approaches to 
the eternal questions of existence, such as, for example, an epistemological or sociological 
approach, could not exceed in importance his central -  existential and metaphysical -  
approach which was manifestly personal and intense. Such an approach indeed comes 
closest to a literary one and therefore taking a literary perspective on Shestov is both 
natural and vital.
In taking such a perspective it seems particularly important and revealing to focus on the 
actual role that literature itself played in Shestov's philosophical quest. This role turns out 
to be so substantial that it deserves separate consideration, which will be given in the next 
section.
3.2 Literary space in lieu of reality.
In her book Fiction's Overcoat. Russian Literary Culture and the Question o f  Philosophy 
Edith W. Clowes argues that just as, in Dostoevskii's words, all Russian writers came out 
from Gogol's ‘Overcoat’, Russian philosophy emerged from under the overcoat of Russian 
literature. It arose ‘in conversation with narrative fiction, radical journalism, and 
speculative theology, developing a distinct cultural discourse with its own claim to 
authority and truth’.37 Historically, in Russia with its invariably oppressive and 
authoritarian style of political regime, literature came to play a very special role. A writer 
or a poet was always a ‘master of human thought’ (BjiacTHTejib jxyu), not merely a free 
spirit engaged in an artistic activity of his own. As Evgenii Evtushenko stated, ‘nooT b
37 Clowes, from the book cover review.
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“X  8Pocchh -  fiojibine, neM no3T5. Thus, Russian literature has always served as a locus for 
spiritual search and as such, in its engagement with the fundamental existential questions, it 
has intrinsically encompassed philosophy. Therefore we can talk about Russian literature 
being manifestly philosophical. In the same way Russian philosophy has a distinct literary 
flavour (which facilitates the widespread Western misapprehension about the virtual non­
existence of Russian philosophy altogether). As Zenkovsky writes, Russia has always 
passionately responded to Western influence to the point and at the cost of delaying the 
development of Russia's own specific route. However, ‘moiiu> 5Ke ee coficTBeHHoro remra 
BnepBbie npoaBHJiact b c(J>epe jiHTepaTypBi. [...] 3a jiHTepaTypoft nocjie^OBajm apyrne
IQ
(JjopMbi ncKyccTBa [...] CKopo h (j)Hjioco(j)H;i b Pocchh yace Hamna cboh n yra ’.
It appears that the fact of literature and philosophy in Russia being much more intimately 
interrelated than in the Western tradition played a substantial role in Shestov's spiritual 
development. As Edith W. Clowes puts it: ‘Philosophers in Russia, including Shestov, 
often built their philosophies from the insights of novelists, dramatists, and poets’.40 It 
seems to us that in Shestov's case this attitude is not only most profoundly marked, but also 
a much stronger statement is true: Shestov did not just build on the insights of writers, he 
actually used the literary space as a foundation for his philosophical constructions.
The quotation from Milosz given in the previous section, where he draws a parallel 
between Shestov and Brodsky in calling both ‘defenders of the Sacred in the age of 
faithlessness’ (3amnTHHKH CBanjeHHoro b Bex 6e3Bepna) in a certain sense reinforces this 
perception of Shestov as coming directly from a literary perspective on the Universe. 
Because ‘Sacred’ here has to be understood broadly: not only as Divine in the religious and 
clerical sense, but as encompassing culture and primarily literature. For it was precisely 
literature which served for Shestov as a gateway to philosophy (and is one of the crucial 
characteristics which accounts for his proximity to art). Indeed, Shestov invariably regarded 
literary characters as bearers of the writer's ideas and at the end of the day saw the source of
38 The title of Evgenii Evtushenko’s book (Minsk, Belarus’: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1973).
39 Zen’kovskii, I, p. 15.
40 Clowes, p. 134.
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Truth in the Bible -  the book of books. This doorway to philosophy directly from literature, 
if not unique, is at least non-standard in the sense that it is a literary space that is treated by 
Shestov as a space of real life, as a source of philosophical wisdom. And in this we see an 
exact parallel with artists and especially writers, who are able to put their literary 
experience above real life experience.
Brodsky often repeated this, claiming that his generation was probably the last to choose 
culture as the main value. Equally Tsvetaeva wrote that for her life by itself would mean 
nothing if it did not have its literary expression41 (or, in other words, an echo was more 
important for her than the sound which generated it). And since, as Brodsky puts it, ‘b 
H C K y c c T B e  f l o c T i D K H M a  -  Gjiaro^apa c b o h c tb b m  c a M o r o  M a T e p n a j i a  -  T a  C T e n e m >  j m p n 3 M a ,  
( j ) H 3 H H e c K o r o  3 K B H B a j i e H T a  K O T o p o M y  b p e a j i t H O M  M u p e  H e  c y m e c T B y e T .  T o h h o  tb k h m  tkq 
o 6 p a 3 0 M  H e  O K a 3 b m a e T c a  b p e a j i t H O M  M H p e  h  3 K B H B a j i e H T a  T p a r n n e c K O M y  b H c x y c c T B e ,  
K O T O p o e  -  T p a r n n e c K o e  -  c y T b  o b o p o T H a a  c T o p o H a  j i n p H 3 M a  -  h j ih  c j i e ^ y i o m a a  3 a  h h m  
C T y n e H b ’ , 4 2  Tsvetaeva was able to find in poetry a different world where intensity and 
freedom are boundless, where all things are possible -  which brings us back to the title of 
Shestov's book.
This extraordinary degree of the lyrical and the tragic, attainable only in art, may be 
responsible for Shestov's ideological or philosophical extremism which he may have drawn 
directly from literature as a reflection of the ‘supernatural’ intensity of the latter. The high 
tautness of a literary piece where aesthetic demands require an extreme economy of 
expression leaving no space for anything secondary, unlike in real life, must have had a 
certain implicit appeal to Shestov with his desire to go straight to the heart of the matter, to 
leave out everything unimportant and get to the truth. In other words, both literary material 
itself, being a highly saturated and intensified form of documented human experience, and 
literature as the most effective means of delivering ideas fitted in best with Shestov's inner 
demands in his search for philosophical truth.
41 From a letter of 30 Dec. 1925 to A. Teskova. Cited in Tsvetaeva. A Pictorial Biography. 
IJeemaeea. 0omo-6uoepa(pm, ed. Ellendea Proffer (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1980), p. 31.
42 Iosif Brodskii, ‘IIo3T h  npo3a’ in ConuHenm Hocufpa EpodcKoeo (St Petersburg: Pushkinskii 
Fond, 1999), vol. V, p.133.
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The effect of this confusion or substitution, as it were, of life by literature, is akin to the 
generalised phenomenon most frequently exemplified by Pushkin's Tatiana (used as an 
archetype, as she herself is a literary character): literature has a crucial impact on Tatiana’s 
life and largely determines her destiny by dominating her inner world and creating an idea 
of the universe which is hardly compatible with existing reality. In other words, literature 
results in her distorted conception of life, disproportionately based on literary experience 
rather than real life experience and direct empirical evidence. We find a similar 
phenomenon in Shestov: his philosophical judgement is biased in that it is based 
predominantly on the literary universe and originates from it. Similarly to Plato's famous 
description of a cave and its prisoners as an illustration of the relative and illusory nature of 
the human concept of truth and perception of the world, Shestov's own treatment of 
literature is often characterised by the same optical deficiency in that he uses literary reality 
as a final source of truth about the world rather than a subtle and multi-layered reflection of 
the latter.
In fact, this phenomenon of essentially confusing between life and literature, and in a 
certain sense asserting the primacy of the latter over the former, is deeply inherent in 
Russian cultural tradition. Thus a Dutch scholar Keis Verheil describes the Dutch national 
idea as embodied (even if  in a slightly exaggerated fashion) in the belief that ‘Korfla 
HejiOBeK roBopuT, peajibHOCTb nepecTaeT HMeTb MecTo’.43 In contrast, Verheil states, the 
main idea of Russian culture is that ‘xor^a uejiOBeic m o j ih h t ,  peajibHOCTb nepecTaeT HMeTb 
MecTo’.44 Along the same lines, Tsvetaeva’s claim above that her life gains meaning only 
through finding its literary expression, is highly resonant (even if  in a ‘passive’ rather than 
‘active’ sense) with what Richard Peace describes as Belinsky’s philosophical credo -  ‘I 
am portrayed therefore I am’.45 Peace traces this frame of mind indirectly to Karamzin’s 
Poor Liza (1792) in which through “‘fictionalisation o f life” the fiction took on all the
43 Keis Verheil, ‘TmiiHHa y AxMaTOBofi’ in AxMamoecKue nmenim. IJapcmeenHoe cnoeo (Moscow: 
Nasledie. Institut mirovoi literatury im. A. M. Gor’kogo RAN, 1992), pp. 14-20 (p. 14).
44 Ibid.
45 R. A. Peace, Russian Literature and the Fictionalisation of Life (Hull: The University of Hull, 
1976), p. 1.
120
substance and solidity of life itself.46 Literature, Peace asserts further, is a magic mirror 
which not only reflects life (in a variety of ways), but also projects back. ‘A distorted 
image’, which literature mirrors, Peace writes, ‘often becomes more powerful than the 
object itself47 -  which brings us back again to Tsvetaeva’s situation above, and not 
surprisingly: for ultimately in Russian literature and Russian reality ‘art has more power
A O
o v e r  l i f e  th an  l i f e  h a s  o v e r  art’ .
E r o fe e v  a c c u s e s  S h e s to v  o f  e s s e n t ia l ly  n e g le c t in g  l i f e  as su c h  in  h is  p h ilo s o p h ic a l  
c o n s id e r a tio n s  c o n c e n tr a te d  e n t ir e ly  o n  th e  tra g ic . ‘C d o n tin o H  c h j io h  h  c ip a cT B io  
BCKptmaa cymHOCTb JKH3HeHHoro T para3M a’, E r o fe e v  w r ite s , ‘IIIecTOB, oflH aico, He 
COOTHOCHT e r o  C 3aKOHaMH “3KHBOH 5KH3HH” H 3a6bIBaeT O BaHCHOM MOMeHTe: h t o 6 b i  
“ cnacT H ” n ejioB eica, H eoSxo^H M o nom iT b e r o  b o  B een  ijejiocTH ocTH , HHane b m c c t o  
“cnaceH H fl” eM y yroTOBaHa K aT acT po^a’.49 B la g o v a  an d  E m e lia n o v  w r ite  th at S h e s to v  
‘fo r g e ts ’ D o s t o e v s k ii 's  p h ilo s o p h ic a l  c o n c e p t  o f  ‘l iv in g  l i f e ’ an d  th e r e fo r e  its  m e a n in g  and  
s ig n if ic a n c e  r e m a in  n e g le c te d  in  h is  in te rp re ta tio n  an d  th u s  s lip  in to  o b l iv io n  fro m  th e  
a c t iv e  cu ltu ra l m e m o r y . ‘3a6b m aH n e b flaHHOM cjiy n a e  flecTpyKTHBHo’, th e y  a ssert. 
‘KoHTeKCT (])HJIOCO(j)eMbI “ )KHBaa )KH3Hb” , CMblCJI 3aJIOXCeHHbIX B Heil nOHaTHH H CHMBOJIOB 
ocT ajm cb  HeaKTyajiH3HpoBaHHbiMH, a  3HanHT, x o t h  6b i Ha BpeMa h  oTHacTH no^BeprjiHCb  
yracaH H io b KyjibTypHOH n a m T H ’,50 th e y  w r o te , u s in g  th e  litera ry  o b s e r v a t io n s  o f  th e  
m o d e m  sc h o la r  D ia n e  T h o m s o n  o n  th e  fa d in g  o f  v a r io u s  d e g r e e s  o f  cu ltu ra l m e m o r y .51
The most marked manifestation of Shestov's substitution of literature for real life is 
comprised in Shestov's treatment of various writers. As Erofeev points out ‘IIIecTOBy 
rjiy6oKO n y x q j  na(J)oc /mcTaHijHH no o t h o h ic h h io  k  paccMaTpHBaeMOMy h m  nncaTejiio, hto  
b  c b o k ) onepe^b CBH3aHO c h 3b c c t h o h  AorMaTHHHOCTbio ero aflomaTHHecKOH
46 Peace, Russian Literature and the Fictionalisation of Life, p. 2.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, p. 16.
49 Erofeev, p. 188.
50 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 115.
51 See Diane Oening Thomson, The Brothers Karamazov and The Poetics of Memory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). Cited in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 115.
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<J)hjioco(J)hh’. Instead of this pathos of distance (na(j)OC flHCTaHHHH), Erofeev claims, it is 
‘arbitrariness’ ( ‘npoH3BOJi’) which is inherent in Shestov, as the latter himself openly 
admits. Therefore, Erofeev concludes, the question of reconstructing a genuinely true image 
of a writer simply does not make sense for Shestov, it is irrelevant for him, because in
co
Shestov’s own words ‘^ ocTOBepHOCTt Hmcaicoro OTHOuierara k hcthhc He HMeeT*. Thus, 
Erofeev says, these images of writers under Shestov's pen ‘HanojiHajiHct cmbicjiom jihihb 
KaK BpeMeHHbie onopHbie nyHKTbi Ha mecTOBCKOM nyra k “cnaceHHio”, KaK Bexn ero 
3bojiioijhh’.54 Nevertheless, as Erofeev also admits, Shestov's declaration of ‘arbitrariness’ 
as his choice o f methodology is largely there for shock value. However, it is only partly so. 
As was already explained in Chapter 1, unmasking writers is indeed Shestov's main 
preoccupation, but his hermeneutic method and his achievements represent a subject for 
separate analysis that will be provided in Part II in the case studies o f different writers.
Having said that, it is worth pursuing a little further Shestov's tendency to be too free with 
his writers in order to see if it has any deeper underlying basis in Shestov's universe. Yves 
Bonnefoy's essay on Shestov may hold the key to an attempt to trace the roots of Shestov's 
‘arbitrariness’ manifested in his treatment of writers and their literary creations. It is likely 
that this ‘arbitrariness’ (if one is to take it seriously enough) is cognate with freedom in the 
sense that Shestov, as a critic and philosopher, but ultimately a reader, is free to interpret, 
just as a writer is free to create. The concept of freedom is one of the central concepts for 
Shestov, and Bonnefoy in his essay focuses on it and asks whether Shestov was seeking in 
literature this boundless self-willed divine freedom of the writer which exceeds even the 
freedom of the Creator.55 However, Bonnefoy essentially answers this question negatively, 
for a writer's freedom is not an imposition of self-will. And, interestingly, -  we note -  it is 
precisely the aesthetic feeling of the writer that makes him stay faithful to the tragic truth of 
life, that does not allow Shakespeare, for example, to rewrite the horrible ending and make 
Cordelia live.
52 Erofeev, p. 171.
53 Ibid, pp. 171-172. The quotation from Shestov is taken from Ha eecax Hoea, p. 29.
54 Ibid, p. 172.
55 Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’, pp. 15-16.
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In other words, it is the aesthetic feeling, we think, that makes the writer not exceed God in 
this freedom of creation, but only to approximate Him. Only mediocre writers, like Nahum 
Tate, says Bonnefoy, wrote happy endings. Thus, we conclude, such a demand of boundless 
freedom, at least when directed to a writer, is an example of a certain aesthetic failure. 
Shestov directed it to God, expecting from the latter's omnipotence the ability not only to 
construct the future, but also to mend the past. Was it simply an act of insanity on Shestov's 
part? No, says Bonnefoy, because, unlike Shestov, the insane, trapped in their psychosis, 
are incapable of, or rather indifferent to, love and compassion.56
A different perspective will emerge from our further engagement with Erofeev's views on 
the subject. He sees in Shestov's tendency to treat writers rather freely a conflict with the 
very demands o f the cultural tradition, leading the philosopher to a certain cultural nihilism 
when he rejoices whenever ‘rojioc jk h b o h  npnpoflbi 6epeT Bepx Ha# HaHOCHbiMH 
KyjiBTypHMMH npHBBiHKaMH ’.57 For Erofeev this squares up with Shestov's sceptical 
attitude to the ‘value in itself of literature. ‘CaMH no ce6e ycjiOBHOCTH H3amHon 
cjiOBecHOCTH, cnjieTeHHbie b 3aMbicjiOBaTbiH y3op, Moryr 6bm> KpacHBbiMH, flaace 
BejlHKOJienHblMH, HO OHH He HMeiOT HHKaKOrO OTHOmeHHa K peaJlbHOH fleHCTBHTCJIbHOCTH 
h  HecnocodHbi cojjeHCTBOBaTb ee niy6HHHOMy ocMbicjieHHio’.58 This is Erofeev's summary 
of Shestov's attitude which leads the former to call the latter a critic of aestheticism. It is 
from this stance that Shestov's article on Viacheslav Ivanov is written, Erofeev observes. In 
order to achieve this unreal perfect beauty ideas should be separated from reality and stop 
feeding on its juices, Shestov claims in this article, explaining that this is precisely what 
Ivanov is doing in his writings.
In our opinion, this exposes an inner contradiction of Shestov's philosophy -  in that it itself 
originates more from literature than from reality. In other words, the accusation directed 
against Ivanov can be with the same force applied to Shestov himself. This seems to be a
56 Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’, p. 14.
57 Shestov, Teopyecmeo U3 Hunezo, p. 197. Cited in Erofeev, p. 172.
58 Erofeev, p. 170.
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recurring phenomenon in Shestov -  as we shall see from the examples in Part II, he often 
fights with his own image in the mirror.
To aestheticism, in Erofeev's view, Shestov juxtaposes writers like Chekhov who did feed 
on real life juices and arrived at despair and hopelessness. Yet, in our opinion, it is exactly 
the aesthetic aspect that Shestov misses in writers like Chekhov (as we have pointed out in 
the previous section), thus invalidating this very juxtaposition. Erofeev, however, views 
this phenomenon differently, finding a contradiction of another kind: it is precisely because 
such writers draw on real life that they show resistance to Shestov's attempts to assist them 
in exposing their tendencies. Thus Shestov's activity, Erofeev says, imperceptibly 
transforms itself into unmasking writers and accusing them of treachery, cowardice and of 
covering up tragedy altogether.59
Erofeev's conclusion is quite drastic and as such surprising. He asserts that Shestov's fatal 
step was the idea o f an individual breaking away from others, of immersing himself into 
solitude in order to seek salvation and truth. As a result, Erofeev claims, Shestov's 
philosophy of tragedy alienates him from the real problems of culture and ultimately leads 
him to a direct confrontation with the latter. ‘UlecTOB e^HHofiopcTByeT c KyjitTypon KaK c 
noMexoft Ha nyra k hcthhhbim npoaBjieHHJiM HejiOBeuecKoro Ayxa, He co3HaBaa Toro, h t o
  u  ? 6 0
HMeHHO KyjitTypa jrejraeTca BbipaaceHHeM 3Toro jxy x a  b o  Been ero  npOTHBopenHBOCTH , 
E ro feev  w rites.
To us such a conclusion appears far too extreme (and we do not even exclude the 
possibility that such a formulation was Erofeev's compromise in giving in to the demands 
of Soviet censorship which viewed Shestov as an enemy, ‘bourgeois’ philosopher). Yet, 
Erofeev may be right in some restricted sense in that logically Shestov may have run into a 
formal conflict with culture (this conflict becomes especially visible in Shestov’s treatment 
of Chekhov and thus will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, which is dedicated to
59 Erofeev, p. 171.
60 Ibid, p. 187.
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the writer). And to us, one of the central problems that this conflict exposes is the problem 
of communicability reminiscent of Tiutchev's ‘ m m c j i b  H 3 p e n e H H a j i  e c T b  j i o ^ c b ’ . 61
Indeed, Shestov's struggle against rationalism and its poisons was doomed from the start in 
that it had no other means of being conducted and communicated except for the means of 
rational discourse (especially given that he wrote philosophical prose, not poetry). This can 
explain his assertions made in Sola Fide that the truth is incommunicable. And here we 
agree with Erofeev that as a result Shestov severely limits the value of his own 
philosophical activity. Thus, in a way, he was condemned to be trapped in a vicious circle. 
Yet, he knew or rather passionately felt his destination, and therefore he was in a certain 
sense serving the completeness of his beliefs by essentially neglecting everything that 
would not fit -  an accusation he directed at his opponents like Hegel, Leibnitz or Kant who 
tried to rationalise the Scriptures by stripping all the miraculous elements from them. In a 
way it is akin to a real life phenomenon (for instance, inspirational lying) which has some 
literary flavour: when for the sake of the completeness of an artistic image some 
inconvenient details simply get brushed away. This is of course extremely anti-scientific -  
to neglect the truth for the sake of the demands of artistic beauty. However, Shestov, in his 
disdain of science, would not have had any difficulty in this case, even though his slogan 
always was to attain the truth whatever the cost. On the other hand, at least at times he
h i m s e l f  w a s  c a p a b l e  o f  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  t h a t  ‘ n o c j i e f l H H X  h c t h h  [ . . . ]  H e  6 b i j i o ,  H e T  h
62HHKOiTta He G y z j e T .  H c t h h  c t o j i b k o ,  c k o j i b k o  mo^eH Ha CBeTe’.
He craved the truth to be what he deemed it to be -  in faith, in opposing reason to such an 
extreme extent, and in turn his extremism essentially predetermined the rather predictable 
metamorphosis of his adogmatic thinking into dogmatism (which Erofeev does not fail to 
point out, as we saw in reference 52 given above).
Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that in the end for Shestov, as for the 
Jesuits, in a way, the end justified the means, or rather the means changed the aim -  it was
61 Tiutchev, ‘Silentium!’ in Cmuxomeopenm, p. 69.
62 Shestov, Ano<$eo3 decnoweHHOcmu, p. 129.
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no longer The Truth he was seeking, but to persuade mankind of his long-cherished 
conclusions, achieved through suffering. In a remarkable poem by a contemporary German 
poet, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, there is a parody on any extreme revolutionaries (notably 
of the socialist kind): if only people did not exist we would have constructed a perfect 
world. Unfortunately, people always get in the way and spoil everything. In this sense 
Erofeev has a point that ‘living life’ which could not be squeezed into any paradigms and 
would get in the way of Shestov's philosophical constructions prevented him from 
ultimately creating a coherent system. As soon as one leaves the world of art which is 
capable of preserving living life's palpitating image, life is lost in dry constructions. In a 
sense this was Shestov's own claim (that speculative philosophy cannot adequately capture 
life with all its irrational enigmas), and yet he himself fell into the same trap, for his means 
and especially forms of communication were not artistic and in the end he tried himself to 
rationalise the irrational in which he so passionately believed and always stood up for. Thus 
we have the paradox that literature does not forgive an escape into the non-literary even if 
this is accomplished with the noble purpose of communicating its achievements. But 
literature’s achievements (artistic-philosophical revelations, that is) can only be 
successfully communicated through its own means and that is the fundamental 
metaphysical secret. Thus Dostoevsky could get his philosophy across -  straight into 
human hearts, but Shestov intrinsically could not -  what came across was a somewhat 
distorted reflection of his entangled feelings and beliefs, a continuing struggle of 
contradictions, a cat trying to catch its own tail. This is an image which is harmonious and 
makes full sense in art, but not outside it.
As M ilosz says when comparing Shestov to Brodsky, ‘B 6opi>6e npoTUB Hco6xoahmocth 
npocTpaHCTBa h BpeMeHH IlIecTOBy MeHbine noBe3Jio, nocKOJibxy oh 6bia Bcero-HaBcero 
<j)Hjioco(j). EpoACKHH yxBaTbmaeT -  yjiHijy, apxHTeKTypHyio aeTajib, aTMOC(J)epy MecTa -  h 
H3BjieicaeT hx H3 noTOKa BpeMeHH, H3 npocipaHCTBa, hto6bi coxpaHHTb HaBceraa b 
KpHCTajibHbix MeTpax’.64 Important in this connection may be the fact that, as Milosz also
63 In Russia this poem is known thanks to the song performed by the distinguished singer of poetry 
Elena Kamburova (translation by L. Ginzburg, music by V. Dashkevich, ‘E c jih  6 H e j i io a h ! ’) .
64 Milosz, EopbSa c ydywbeM, p. 246.
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asserts, Shestov was not mixing genres, he did not write poetic prose, but there is still, we 
find, a blend, conceived at the very roots of Shestov's thought, of things fundamentally 
alien to one another. Perhaps in his claim that philosophy is not a science, but an art, he 
himself actually expressed the nature of this blend -  of philosophy (in its speculative form, 
as inherited from antiquity) and art in the general sense. Thus Shestov himself was in a 
certain sense a product of this union of things that he deemed impossible to unite -  art and 
science, faith and reason, soul and mind -  and yet he tried to persuade us, as well as 
himself, that they could not possibly ever be united.
Still, this only demonstrates that Shestov's very conflicts and paradoxes were strongly 
rooted in cultural problems. In our opinion, Erofeev's claim that Shestov ultimately 
struggled against culture is a definite oversimplification of his ideas. If there is any truth in 
it, it is a rather formal truth, rather than that concealed in the spirit of Shestov's philosophy. 
This is because Shestov, who was inflamed originally by literature with its romantic spirit 
as well as its full concentration on the human predicament, never really left its boundaries 
and was forever engaged in a conversation with its chief representatives. He parted with 
idealism and positivism, but preserved the idealistic cast of mind in the sense of his 
passionate faith in the light at the end of the tunnel, in an omnipotent God, in ultimate 
freedom, and most of all in the human being.
On the one hand, it seems a somewhat vulgarised interpretation of Shestov to believe that in 
his exaltation of nature over speculation and reason he actually prefers instinct to cultural 
baggage. For instance, when Shestov interprets Dostoevskii's ‘Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ 
as a vision of Eden in the Golden Age, it is not culture in the form of acquired knowledge 
and values that he rejects, and it is not the voice of wild and unrestrained nature that he 
embraces. It is the absolute metaphysical freedom of the uninhibited, innocent human spirit 
at the stage preceding the discovery of good and evil. However, on the other hand, 
Erofeev’s claims do seem to have certain foundations that merit a close examination, which 
will be provided in Chapter 7.
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As for Shestov's ‘solipsism’, it should be viewed, in our opinion, only as a necessary 
prerequisite for achieving artistic or philosophical revelation (which in his case equate to 
each other); as a means of placing the main emphasis on individuality, on ‘uncommonness 
of visage’ -  which is both the purpose and the source of art and, for that matter, of culture.
Whatever Shestov did, he did from within the very depths of culture, remaining inside its 
fundamental framework and, moreover, displaying a perfect cultural balance, to use the 
words of John Bayley again. Essentially using literature as his main point of departure he 
remained forever its devoted and selfless servant, passionately defending cultural 
boundaries from the encroachment of scientific method and any other form of 
rationalisation and automatisation. His single and lonely struggle against soulless necessity 
for the sake of a temporal individual doomed to a tragic fate is a noble crusade of Don 
Quixote against the windmills, and as such is as admirable as it is moving. He did 
invariably run into extremes and contradictions, he overwhelmingly misconstrued the 
concept of science in his accusations against mind and reason, but such was the nature of 
his fight -  it was incompatible with any calm and equilibrium just as life itself is. Any less 
extremism would apparently have been insufficient to sustain the inner fire. ‘He loved only 
those who, like Pascal, “cherchent en gemissant” -  who “seek while moaning’” ,65 as 
Milosz pointed out. Moreover, Shestov's extraordinary revolt against the self-evident is 
essentially directed against all types of cliche which for an artist are equal to an artistic 
death, an end. And this gives another meaning to his struggle against death when translated 
to the plane of art, as if reinforcing Shestov's intrinsic connection to the latter. As Berdiaev 
wrote, tragedy starts when an individual destiny becomes separated from the destiny of the 
whole world, which, due to death, always turns out to be the case for everybody.66 
However, life itself is full of dying: of hopes, of feelings, of strength; death is concealed in 
any ‘end’. In this sense Shestov's struggle against the self-evident can be viewed in a more 
general context as that against diverse occurrences of death in the stream of life.
65 Milosz, p. 105.
66 Berdiaev, Tpaaedun u o d b id eH H O c m b ,  p. 475.
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To our mind, true insight into Shestov’s relationship with culture, which also summarises 
our elaboration above, was given by Viacheslav Ivanov (and already quoted in Section 2.2) 
where the latter asserted Shestov’s vital, yet ambivalent (even contradictory), cultural role. 
He compared Shestov with a raven from the Russian fairy-tales who holds the water of life 
and death. And this image is extremely important to our study and can be regarded as 
central to the whole thesis. For it highlights the very special cultural role -  in the dimension 
of art -  that Shestov played, as it were guarding the human soul against the oppression of 
mind with its cliches. On one hand he was awakening people to remember ‘o b b ic iiik x  
i t e j ia x  Gl it h h , o  CBoeM H ejioB enecK O M  a o c t o h h c t b c ’ ,67 to find their unique individuality 
and their very own spiritual route. Yet, on the other hand, he was, at the same time, by 
denying them reason, encouraging and deepening the tragic split between mind and soul, or 
if you like between ethics and aesthetics. Thus he highlighted the fundamental cultural 
conflict of contemporary mankind, which will be discussed further in Part II.
Therefore separating Shestov from culture, let alone juxtaposing him to it, is in our view 
counter-productive. Moreover, as we pointed out before, it is the representatives of culture 
in its most direct and intense form -  artists, such as writers and poets -  who valued Shestov 
most highly. As Boris de Schloezer put it:
Anyone who absorbs Shestov's ideas, acknowledges the force of his criticism, and tries to follow 
him, will find himself alone, as Shestov himself is alone since he broke with the common world. 
...In spite of our almost-certainty that the revolt will come to nothing, ...many of us find something 
extraordinarily attractive in Shestov's thought: once we have known its influence, we can never go 
back on it even though we may part company with Shestov. ...Though still enslaved by reality, one 
is no longer a consenting slave. ...Because the hope of salvation, the hope of a miracle is alive in 
one's heart.68
This essentially can be regarded as Schloezer's response to Erofeev's claims about the 
implications of Shestov's solipsism and separatism. It does not lead against or away from 
culture, but instead it immerses us into its full stream, Schloezer implies.
67 A. P. Chekhov, Rcma c codanxou in IJojmoe codpanue coHunenuu u nuceM e 30 moMax 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1974-1982), vol. 10, p. 134.
68 Schloezer, ‘Leon Chestov’, p. 162.
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Yves Bonnefoy invests Shestov's thought with even more cultural significance: ‘This 
enigma can be explained by returning to its origin: he is a witness of the hope that there is a 
sense and value to existence. A thought which is certainly more difficult to keep alive and 
active than the belief in a simple miracle’.69 We find similar remarks and recollections from 
a substantial number of writers, and especially poets.
‘OflHa)K£i>i... k HaM npnexaji noaT  M h h c k h h ’ , quotes Baranova-Shestova in her book from 
memoirs by I. Korvin-Khorvatsky:
“>I BaM npHBe3 hchto 3aMeHaTejibHoe”, -  cica3aji M hhckhh [...] “sto KHHra JIbBa UlecTOBa, 
4)Hjioco4>a, OTpnuaiomero 4)hjioco(J)hio. [...] UlecTOB HHHero He C03flaeT! Oh c GojibiiiHM 
MyacecTBOM h, Hy^ KHO CKa3aTb, c SojibiiiHM TanaHTOM HanaAaeT Ha be^Hbix (Jjhjioco^ ob... IllecTOB 
He jiyKaBHT, oh npeaejibHO HCKpeHeH h caM-TO BJia/jeeT cjiobom b coBepmeHCTBe h oGjiaflaeT 
pa3yMOM o6oK>AO-OTTOHeHHbiM! y  IlIecTOBa BcerAa (j)eepBepK Mbicjieii, ho oh nojib3yeTca 
pa3yMOM, hto6 w nobopoTb pa3yM!” [...] Bee CTajiH obcyacAaTb c a3apTOM KHHry UlecTOBa... Ho 
bojibuie Bcex cjiymaji, KaK 3aBopo>KeHHbiH, Bopa nacTepHaK. O h MHe menHyji, pacuiHpaa cboh 
npeKpacHbie rjia3a: Te6e He noHBTb 3Toro! A a Becb Apoacy!70
Marina Tsvetaeva, whose intrinsic closeness to Shestov has already been touched upon 
earlier, called Shestov in a private letter addressed to him, as her ‘caMaa 6ojn>maa 
HejiOBenecKaa h ch h o c tb  b  IlapHace’.71 Yves Bonnefoy and David Gascoyne, representing 
French and English poetic traditions respectively, have both found, judging by their 
writings on Shestov, that very something ‘extraordinarily attractive about Shestov's 
thought’ to which Schloezer was referring in the quotation above. Shestov's only true 
disciple was again a poet: Benjamin Fondane. We have already extensively quoted Milosz - 
another poet of statue so obviously attracted by Shestov's thought -  who drew a direct 
parallel between him and Joseph Brodsky. The latter too held Shestov in high regard even 
though the evidence for this is somewhat scarce. But when it does exist it is rather 
attractive. For example: CKa3aji’ , Octavio Paz recalls about his first conversation with
Joseph Brodsky, which took place in the USA soon after the young exiled Russian poet
69 Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’, p. 17.
70 I. Korvin-Khorvatskii, Tojiybofl ;u>im’, Russkoe voskresenie, 23 July 1960, Paris. Cited in 
Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 69-70.
71 ‘9 n n ceM  M. IfBeTaeBOH  k  JIbBy lllecTOBy’, BecmnuKpyccKozo xpucmuancKOZo deujfeenwt, 129 
(3) 1979, Paris-New York-Moscow, pp. 124-130 (p. 125).
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came to settle there, ‘b h3bccthoh ereneHH bbi noBTopaeTe mlicjih pyccKoro (})Hjioco(J)a 
JIbBa IUecTOBa’. To which Brodsky exclaimed: ‘Bbi 3HaeTe UlecTOBa? 3 to 3aMenaTejibHO, 
noTOMy hto b 3toh npoKJMTOH CTpaHe He c KeM noroBopHTb o IUecTOBe’.72
These endearments from the literary world only reflect the fact which we have been trying 
to illuminate in this section -  that Shestov's philosophy originated from literary roots and 
became fully fledged in symbiosis with literature (despite the conflict of literature and 
philosophy, of irrational revelation and rational speculation, of excesses and paradoxes that 
were inevitable on Shestov's chosen route, p a r  excellence infested with contradictions). 
However, he himself viewed his vocation as the ‘great and last struggle’, in the words of 
Plotinus,73 which is necessary for the soul to undergo in order to break away from the 
chains of the common world and to achieve the ultimate revelation of truth. It is interesting 
that this struggle for Shestov meant much more than serving culture as such. Yet, he did 
accept that the route of this struggle might be intimately connected to the way of invisibly 
sustaining culture (just as the mythological Atlas supports the sky), as expressed in the 
following lines from one of Shestov's private letters which seems to us the most appropriate 
way to close the discussions above:
Kyjibrypa Bemb ueHHaa h Hyamaa. Hjioxo 6 biao 6 bi, ecjiH 6  3to 3HaHHJio, hto to , H3-3a nero a 
bopoaca h bopoTbca npoaoaacaio, HMeeT cmmcji h 3HaneHne TOJibKO ana Kyjibiypbi. Kohchho 
bo3mo5kho, OTHOCHTejibHO MeHa jiHHHO, h Taxoe npeanoaoaceHHe. T.e. MoaceT 6 biTb, hto a He 
aeaaio HacToamero aeaa. Ho ecjiH roBopHTb He 0 6 0  MHe oaHOM, a Boobme 0 6 0  BcaxoM nejiOBeice, 
kto (icaic CKaaceiw FLjiothh, KOToporo Bbi Ha3biBaeTe) 3Han h npHHHMaji 
“aynjv peyiaiOCT Kai ea x a x o a a ”74 -  BejiHKyio h nocaeaHyio 6 opb6 y, -  to  Tyr Moamo h aojdkho 
paccHHTbreaTb Ha HHoe. npHMep -  JfocToeBCKHH. Hanncaa “3anHCKH H3 noanoaba” -  h He ToabKO 
apyrne, caM noHTH hto o t  hhx OTpexca -  ho npom.no aBa aecaTKa aeT, b nyacon CTpaHe nponea 
(aa eme b aypnoM 4>paHHy3CKOM nepeBoae) hx 6e3aoMHbin CTpaHHHK - ycabiuian, npnHaa b ceba h 
paccKa3aa o hhx. >1 ayMaio, MHoro 6 biao tbkhx npHMepoB. TopHT HeyracHMaa aaMnaaxa kcm-to
72 Interview with Oktavio Paz conducted by Michael Ignatiev in Hocu<p EpodcKuu: mpydu u duu, 
ed. Lev Losev and Petr Vail’ (Moscow: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1998), pp. 256-258 (p.257).
73 ‘Benmcaa h nocaeaHaa 6 opb6 a oacHaaeT ayum’ -  from Plotinus (Enneads. I, 6 , 7) -  is an 
epigraph to the fourth part (‘O BTopoM H3MepeHHH MbimaeHHa’) o f  Shestov’s A(punbi u H e p y c a n u M .  
See also the next reference.
74 ‘Beamcaa h nocaeaHaa 6opb6a’, a quotation from Plotinus, was often given by Shestov in his 
writings to mean the highest effort of the soul which is necessary to free oneself from the laws of 
empirical reality and to come close to God. Shestov's idea of struggle against ‘the self-evident’ as 
well as the concept of ‘the second dimension of thought’ are often connected in Shestov with this 
phrase of Plotinus.
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K or^a-T o 3aHOKeHHaji, ropH T h  He racH eT  -  A o6poBO JibH bie CTpaHHHKH He3aMeTHO j u i n  A p y r n x  
noAJiH BaioT b H ee Macjra.
. . .  J \a y K Q  T e, K OTopwe paboT aiO T  a jih  K y jib iy p b i, AenaiO T o n eH b  u eH H oe h  H yacH oe A e n o . A rjiaB H oe, 
no-M oeM y: HHKorAa He orjiHAbmaTbCH Ha3aA h  He noACHHTbreaTb, h t o  Tbi cA en a ji. B b i cn p o cH T e:  
OTKyAa h B3HJ1, h t o  “ rn a B H o e” . O T B en y  B aM  H e c r a o :  He 3H aio , OTKyAa. M o a ceT  He y  OAHoro 
C oK paT a, a n y  A p y r n x  J iioA en  ecT b c b o h  a c m o h h ,  KOTopbie hm  noACK a3biBaioT, h t o  rA aB H oe h  h t o  
He rjiaB H oe. T a x  h j ih  H H ane, a  HHKorAa c e 6 a  He cn p a u iH B a n , h t o  b m h a c t  H3 m o h x  nncaH H H  h  
HCKaHHH. O T T oro b npexcH H e BpeM eH a, K orA a He 6 b in o  B H eiiiH en Hy^cAbi h  m o jk h o  6 b in o  A aace He 
TO ponH Tbca “ npoA aB aT b pyK onH C b” , a  6biJi T an paBHOAym eH k  cyA b6aM  c b o h x  k h h t .  T e n e p b ,  
KOHeHHO, oScTOHTejibCTBa H3MeHHAHCb -  npHxoAHTCH HHTepecoBaTbCH “y c n e x o M ” . H o  
“ BAOxHOBeHHe”  h  T e n e p b , cu a B a  E o r y ,  He Hy^cHO npoA aB aT b -  a , CTano 6brrb , m o a ch o  e r o  He 
oueH H BaTb. A CTano 6biT b, m ohcho n o - n p e m ie M y  H 3o6peT aT b MH(J)HHecKHe “ B ecb i H o B a ” , Ha 
K OTopbix CKopSb n ejiO B enecK aa n ep eB eu iH B aeT  n e c o x  M o p cxoH . H , e c n n  He n p n  » c h 3 h h , t o  n o c n e  
C M epra o h h  HenoHHTHbiM aJih H ac o 6 p a 3 0 M , M o ry r  OKa3aTbca H y^cHee B c e r o  Ha C B eT e.. ,75
3.3 Analysis of the evolution of Shestov’s literary style.
A study of Shestov from a literary perspective would be incomplete without a separate 
analysis of his literary style. This section will trace the evolution of the latter and see how it 
has reflected the changes in Shestov's world outlook.
The poet D. S. Mirsky described Shestov's literary style in the following admiring words, as 
‘the tidiest, the most elegant, the most concentrated -  in short, the most classical prose -  in
K\the whole of modem Russian literature’. Such high praise looks even more stunning in the 
context of the Silver Age, being a true renaissance of Russian culture which gave rise to a 
rich variety of new literary talents. Another important feature to be reckoned with here is 
the background against which Mirsky would have made his assertion -  still fresh in 
people's minds was the period which had just seen the whole immortal pleiad of Russian 
classical writers -  from Pushkin to Chekhov and beyond. Yet, Mirsky's superlative 
judgment appears to differ from that of others only in scale. In other words, his high 
estimate is only quantitatively disputable, whereas qualitatively the literary gift of Shestov 
seems undeniable to virtually any writer or scholar who has ever written about him. In 
particular, Czeslaw Milosz favourably compares Shestov's style to that of his contemporary 
Russian fellow philosophers, asserting that they essentially do not withstand the
75 From Shestov’s unpublished letter to B. de Schloezer of 1 Dec. 1927 -  an excerpt from my (with 
R. Fotiade, eds) book Unpublished correspondence between Lev Shestov and Boris de Schloezer (a 
fully annotated edition), Russkii Put’ -  YMCA-Press, Moscow-Paris, forthcoming in 2008.
76 D. S. Mirsky, History o f Russian Literature, (New-York: 1964), p. 426.
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comparison: ‘Let us concede that his severe, unomamented style makes Soloviov sound by 
contrast verbose if not wooly, and Berdiaev, frequently rhetorical. But Shestov also argues
7 7
well’. This account is particularly important given the peculiarity of Russian philosophy 
that we have already explained, of being to a large extent a product (or, if you like, a by­
product) of Russian literature. For, in a way, an impressive literary style would have thus 
been a prerequisite of Russian philosophical writings, and in this context Milosz's 
evaluative comparison is particularly revealing. In the same vein even figures who did not 
pay particular attention to the aesthetic value of intellectual writings, like Ivanov- 
Razumnik, could not help noticing the high literary merit of Shestov's works, as we 
mentioned in the previous section. While Shestov's thought, being challenging and 
provocative, forever evoked disputes, his literary powers remained essentially beyond 
criticism, to the point that, for instance, the literary critic Aikhenvald claimed that Shestov
70
was wasting his significant literary talent on his philosophical writings.
Indeed, Shestov's style is most lucid, concise, and free from any doctrinal cliches. On the 
other hand, as Milosz writes: ‘The social function of language is ... both to protect and to 
reveal’.79 And in Shestov's case this uninhibited and energetic style of writing, full of irony 
and aphorisms, perhaps was simply a very effective means to carry forward his subversive 
ideas. Indeed, Shestov's obsessive and passionate extremism, his rebellious nature in his 
search for the Ultimate Truth, his trust in faith and suffering rather than Mind and reason 
made him one of the most daring writers of his time. However, the highly-charged content 
of Shestov's thoughts demanded an adequate form of expression and, fortunately for him, 
Shestov was able to satisfy this abstract aesthetic demand. On the other hand, a person 
capable of such aesthetically talented writing cannot be free from aesthetics: this is a 
contradiction in terms. Instead, we would assert that in Shestov's creative style we see a 
manifestation of how his ethics merges with his aesthetics. ‘Few writers of any time could 
match his daring, even insolence, in raising the naughty child's questions which have 
always had the power to throw philosophers into a panic. For that reason such questions
77 Milosz, pp. 110-111.
78 See Iuri Aikhenval’d’s review in PyccKue BedoMOcmu, (63) March 7, 1905, p. 3. Cited in 
Clowes, p. 131.
79 Milosz, p. 103
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have been wrapped in highly professional technical terms and, once placed in a syntactic
OA
cocoon, neutralized’, says Milosz. Shestov was not afraid, he had the audacity to 
challenge the obvious, indisputable, set in stone. He was able to destroy by very simple and 
clear words that syntactic cocoon, to expose the heart of the matter, to demand the true 
answer rather than a sophisticated, but in fact just hollow pretence. As Milosz stated, ‘He 
simply did not care whether what he was saying about Plato or Spinoza was against the 
rules of the game—that is, indecent. It was precisely because of this freedom that his 
thought was a gift to people who found themselves in desperate situations and knew that
o 1
syntactic cocoons were of no use any more’.
The most frequent characterisations of Shestov's style remark on its humour, full of 
sarcasm and reserve, as well as on its vigorous energy and high saturation with aphorisms. 
These more superficial features of Shestov's style are interrelated with the deeper 
peculiarities of his discourse: the underlying freedom and independence of Shestov’s 
thought as a consequence of his neglect of any type of authority including his own. Thus 
John Bayley describes Shestov's style as ‘humorous, sceptical, unexcited’, but nevertheless 
full of ‘great energy’ and asserts that Shestov ‘is often extremely funny at the expense not 
only of other philosophical attitudes but also of his own: there are few recent sages with 
less self-importance’.82 These words resonate with those of Milosz who notices that 
Shestov ‘always develops a logical argument in well-balanced sentences which, especially 
in their original Russian, captivate the reader with their scornful vigour’. Milosz remarks 
on the high register that Shestov's language would invariably ascend to when defending his 
fundamental philosophical stance: ‘His voice when he enters an argument is that of a priest 
angry at the sight of holy vessels being desecrated’.
The variety of these striking features is summed up in the frequent opinions of Shestov's 
extreme readability: ‘Shestov is almost the only Russian polemicist who is a joy to read
80 Milosz, p. 103.
81 Ibid.
82 Bayley, ‘Idealism and its Critic’, p. 5.
83 Milosz, p. 102.
84 Ibid.
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even in translation’,85 states Bayley. Milosz takes this statement even further by saying that
o/r
‘Shestov is probably one of the most readable philosophic essayists of the century’.
On the other hand the first literary exercises of the young Shestov were far from perfection 
both in style and originality of thought. In this respect they can serve as a very instructive 
point of departure to be compared with the sophisticated level reached by Shestov in his 
later writings. At the same time the evolution of Shestov's style in its fully-fledged form in 
conjunction with the development of his philosophy is another revealing line of study to be 
pursued below.
If w e  lo o k  a g a in  at th e  p a s s a g e s  c ite d  in  S e c t io n  1.3 as e x a m p le s  o f  S h e s to v 's  e a r ly  litera ry  
e x e r c is e s ,  w e  c a n  s e e  an  a ttem p t (w h e th e r  c o n s c io u s  o r  s u b c o n s c io u s )  to  im p e r so n a te  w h a t  
a p p r o x im a te s  m o s t  c lo s e ly  to  T u r g e n e v 's  ty p e  o f  w r it in g  s ty le ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  term s o f  th e  
r o le  p la y e d  b y  th e  narrator. In d e ed , a c c o r d in g  to  B a k h tin 's  c h a r a c te r isa tio n  o f  T u r g e n e v 's  
ty p e  o f  n a rra tiv e  w h e n  it p r e se n ts  d ir e c t  s p e e c h , it  is  m a rk ed  b y  ‘npaMbiM aBTopcKHM 
cjiobom, HenocpeacTBeHHO BbipaxcaiomHM e r o  hhtchijhh. [...] Bbo,zui paccKa3HHKa’, 
B a k h tin  c o n t in u e s , ‘T yp reH eB  b 6ojibiiiHHCTBe cjiyu aeB  BOBce He CTHJiH3yeT Hy^cofi
on f
HH/uiBHayajibHOH h counajibHOH M aH epti paccKa3biBaHHfl’. In th e  e x a m p le s  that B a k h tin  
g iv e s  h e  c la im s  th at th e  narrator's ty p e  o f  d is c o u r s e  c o in c id e s  w ith  th e  ty p e  that T u r g e n e v  
w o u ld  h a v e  u s e d  h im s e l f  i f  h e  h a d  b e e n  t e l l in g  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  s to ry . ‘3 /jec b  HeT ycTaHOBKH 
Ha cou n ajitH O  uy>KOH CKa30BBiH to h , Ha coijnajibH O  u y^cyio  M aH epy BHfleTb h nepe^aB aT b  
BHfleHHoe’,88 B a k h tin  sa y s . He a ls o  d e n ie s  th is  ty p e  o f  n arra tion  a n y  o r ie n ta t io n  to w a r d s  an  
in d iv id u a lly  ty p ic a l m a n n er . ‘TypreHeBCKHH cx a 3  nojiHOBecHO HHTeHUHOHaneH, h b hcm -  
o^hh tojioc, H enocpeacTBeH H O  BbipaacaiomHH aBTopcKHe hhtchijhh’, 89 B a k h tin  a sse r ts , 
an d  ch a r a c te r ise s  th is  c o m p o s it io n a l d e v ic e  as s im p le . T h e  s a m e  te c h n iq u e  is  a ls o  d e sc r ib e d  
b y  B. M. E ik h e n b a u m , w h o  e x p o s e s  th e  p u r e ly  c o n d it io n a l fo rm  th a t th e  author's  
in tr o d u c tio n  o f  a  n arrator m a y  ta k e , as in  th e  c a s e  o f  T u r g e n e v . ‘B TaKHX c j iy n a a x ’,
85 Bayley, ‘Idealism and its Critic’, p. 5.
86 Milosz, p. 102.
87 Mikhail Bakhtin, IJpod/ieMbi meopnecmea flocmoeecKOZO (Moscow: Alkonost, 1994), p. 83.
88 Bakhtin, p. 83.
89 Ibid.
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Eikhenbaum explains, ‘paccica3HHK ocTaeTca TeM jke aBTopoM, a BCTynHTejitHaa 
MOTHBHpoBKa HrpaeT pojiL npocTon HHTpoayKi^Hn’.90 In the excerpt from Shestov's early 
story ‘He Tyna nonaji’ this tendency is self-evident:
O neH b paHO, R o m a  a 6bui b neTBepTOM m ia cce  rHMHa3HH, t .  e . 13 jieT o t  p ojiy , BKopeHHjiocb b o  
MHe y d e^ a eH H e, h t o  He nncaTb a He M ory h  h t o  a HenpeMeHHO CTaHy xopouiH M  nHcaTejieM... 
O c h o b h o h  B3rjia^ Ha jiH T epaiyp y y  Mepw ycTaHOBHJica yace b t o  BpeMH, h  h c b h t o ,  HeH3MeHH0 
cjieflOBan c b o h m  a c t c k h m  BepoBaHHflM, HecMOTpa Ha bck> cypoBOCTb npomieHHOH m h o io  ... 
5KH3HeHHOH uiKOJibi. K o ra a  MHe 6b u io  13 JieT, h y^ce m h o t o  n p o n eji. He roB opa yace o nyuiK H H e, 
JlepMOHTOBe, T o ro jie  h  /ip y r n x  Harnux KJiaccHKax, a HHTaji T or^a yace KHOCTpaHHbix nHcaTejiefi -  
IIIeKcnH pa, TeTe h  Aaace MeHee KpynHbix -  A y a p d a x a , LLInHjibrareHa h  t .  n. H 3 pyccKH x  
nH caTejiefi ocodeHHO nojnoG m i a b t o  BpeMa H eK pacoB a. T.e. j i io S h j i a h  nyuiK HH a, h  
JlepMOHTOBa, h 6 o  a KaKHM-TO nyAOM H36erHyji roenoACTBOBaBinero b t o  BpeMa, Aaace c p e a w  
rHMHa3HCTOB, OTpHijaHHH nyuiK HH a, a o jd k h o  6biTb noTOMy, h t o  y c n e ji n p ea y ;e  nojiiodHTb 3 t h x  
n n caT ejien , neM no3HaKOMHTbca c  OTpHnaTejibHbiM HanpaBjieHHeM c b o h x  
TOBapnmeH...91
Thus we can see quite clearly that Shestov's early literary experiments represented 
stylistically his obvious orientation towards what Bakhtin calls a ‘single-voiced word’ 
(‘oAHorojiocoe c jio b o ’) .  Like Turgenev, who according to Bakhtin did not like and was 
incapable of refracting his intentions in the other's discourse, Shestov too apparently could
09 , , ,not handle the use of a ‘two-voiced word’ (‘AByrojiocoe c jio b o ’) . This resulted in both 
Turgenev and after him Shestov choosing a narrator from their own social class. Such is 
indeed the narrator Mirovich from Shestov's early stories who was a pupil of a gymnasium. 
In the words of Baranova-Shestova, all the heroes of Shestov's stories of the time (there are 
ten drafts preserved in his archive) were these ‘beAHbie TajiaHTJiHBbie lOHonm-HAeajiHCTbi,
03 t
MeHTaiomne o t o m , h t o 6 bi “cKa3aTb HOBoe cjio bo  h HanaTb HOBoe a c jio ’” . This last 
remark captures the proximity in spirit between Shestov's early writings and the works of 
Chemyshevsky with his naive dream of better social structures, fulfilled ideals and 
improved morals, with the only difference that Chemyshevsky was oriented towards 
advanced Western Europe while Shestov at the time was closer to the Slavophiles' ideas of 
Russia’s special destiny. Ironically, even Chemyshevsky's fundamental question ‘Hto
90 B. M. Eikhenbaum, JIumepamypa (Leningrad: Priboi, 1927), p. 217. Cited in Bakhtin, p. 84, 
footnote.
91 From Shestov’s unpublished story ‘He Tyzia nonan’. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14.
92 On the types of discourse and their classification see p. 92 of Bakhtin.
93 Baranova-Shestova, I, pp. 11-12.
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aejiaTb?’ (the title of his most famous book) is present in Shestov's narrative. However, 
arguably, the vitality and sophistication of literature per se are virtually absent from these 
writings of both Chemyshevsky and the young Shestov. If we look again at the following 
extract (given in Section 1.3) from Shestov's early story, its imitative, yet enthusiastic tone 
and idealistic content seem to be balancing on the edge of self-parody:
O h  3Han O H erH H a, IleH op H H a, E a 3 a p o B a , H eayraH O B a, xaic nocjieflO B aT ejibH bix HOCHTejieft p y c c x o H  
H A en, h  T p eb o B a ji o t  coBpeMeHHHKOB CTpeMjieHHa k  BbipaboT K e h o b o h  H A en, KOTopaa 6 b u ia  6b i jv m  
h h x  TeM a ce, neM  HAew 20-40-60 h  70 t o a o b  6 m a h  a j m  nepeHHCJieHHbix Bbirne npeACTaBHTejieft 
jiH T epaT ypH bix T H noB ... Bee pa3M biiiineH H a e r o  CBOAHAHCb b KOHue k o h u o b  k  o n p e A e A e r o n o  
coB p eM eH H oro  p y c c x o r o  H HTejuinreHTa. PfaeajiHCTbi copoK O B bix t o a o b ,  peajiHCTbi- 
uiecTHAecaTHHKH HMejiH c B o e  A ejio  h  cflejia jiH  e r o . . .  H t o  T e n e p b  HaM HyjKHO AC A aTb? (bold font 
is mine. O.T.) O h  He M or h h  b n ep B b ie  roA bi i o h o c t h ,  h h ,  x a x  B bw cH H jiocb BnocAeACTBHH, h  b 
3peA b ie  roA bi, oTBeTHTb Ha s t o t  B o n p o c , h o  o h  r jiy O o x o  6 b m  ySe^cA eH  b t o m , h t o  o t b c t  Ha s t o t  
B o n p o c  ecT b h  A oiw ceH  6biTb, h t o  c o  BpeM eHeM  o h  e r o  y3H aeT . O h  h h c k o a b k o  He co M H eB a n ca , h t o  
jh o a a m  e r o  BpeMeHH HyacHO cxa3aT b  HOBoe c a o b o  h  HanaTb HOBoe a c a o .  H c o 6 x o a h m o  noACHHTaTb 
ocT aB A eH H oe npeA xaM H  HacAeACTBO, h  T orA a B ee  c t b h c t  a ch b im . P o c c h h ,  HecoMHeHHO, npeACTOHT 
BeAHKaa 6yAym HOCTb. O H a ocym ecT B H T  Te BeAHKHe 3aaaH H , n e p e A  KOTopbiMH O K a3anacb  
O eccH AbH a 3an a A H a a  E B p o n a  -  ro cy A a p cT B a  h  H apoA bi K OTopofi nou iA H  6biCTpo n o  a o a c h o h ,  
B e A y m eh  k  rn 6eA H  A o p o r e .. .94
Thus the impression one gets reading Shestov's literary experiments of the time and 
Chemyshevskii's socially subversive oeuvres (which in literary terms were extremely poor) 
are very similar. Therefore it is not surprising that, as Shestov writes himself in his 
autobiography, his attempts at writing fiction were doomed to failure: ‘Ilpo6oBan a nncaTb 
noBecTH h  paccKa3bi -  HaimcaA HeMaAO, h o  3 t h  paGoTbi He Hanum AOCTyna k  ny6nHKe. H a 
caM h  Te HeMHorae Apy3ba, KOToptiM a noKa3aA 3 t h  onbiTbi, ocyAHAH h x ’ .95
We have lingered so extensively over Shestov's early writings because their monological 
discourse partly survived into his mature style, after he had divested himself of virtually all 
other elements of these youthful literary experiments. The apparent ‘monologism’ of the 
fully-fledged Shestov is noted, for example, by Bakhtin,96 who ascribes Shestov to the 
genre of philosophical monologue in his reading of Dostoevsky (a topic for more detailed 
analysis in Part II). However, it could be argued that the discourse of the mature Shestov is
94 Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14.
95 Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 11.
96 See Bakhtin, p. 11.
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more complex than purely monological and contains within it diverse discursive elements 
that can be described as other than strictly ‘single-voiced’. The features of this complex 
discourse will be examined below.
First, however, it is interesting to note that Shestov's revolutionary social tendencies 
(starting from Slavophile and monarchic sympathies in his extreme youth and then 
changing to the opposite extreme of socialism during his university years) quite quickly 
came to an end with the emergence of scientific Marxism. ‘I've been a revolutionary since 
the age of eight, much to my father’s despair. I haven’t ceased to be a revolutionary until
0*7much later, when “scientific” socialism, Marxism, emerged’, were Shestov's own words 
reported by Fondane.
Indeed, Shestov quite quickly broke free from imitative and socially oriented writing and 
manifested himself as a fresh and original voice focused entirely on the existential and 
rebelling against scientific discourse with its proclamation of ‘self-evident truths’. Blagova 
and Emelianov in their analysis of Shestov's interpretations of Dostoevsky define (quite
A O
correctly in our view) his discourse as that of philosophical essays. It is reasonable to 
suppose that Shestov's initial striving to write fiction (whether prosaic or poetic) which fell 
short of realisation (and according to Milosz may have become Shestov's hidden personal 
drama) eventually found its way into his original narrative where he merged literature with 
philosophy more profoundly than any other Russian thinker (and hence his literary style 
merits study even more than that of others). On the other hand this life-path fitted precisely 
into the very spirit of the times in Russia, for as Edith Clowes explains ‘Russian 
philosophical modernity has inhabited the edge between mystical, associative, “poetic” 
thinking and representative, categorizing “scientific” thinking’.99 Clowes asserts that ‘in 
the flowering of Russian philosophy around 1900, and beyond into the twentieth century, 
this conflict led to [...] a rich, compelling scepticism about all absolute categories of truth, 
logic, essential being, knowledge, and identity that both religious and scientific types of
97 Fondane, p. 116.
98 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 37.
99 Clowes, p. 13.
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discourse often have imposed on a complex world’.100 In Russian philosophy at the time 
‘these categories become a matter of interpretation and negotiation’ with an extensive use 
of ‘the logic of poetic tropes and asystematic genres’.101 In this interplay of opposite 
approaches Shestov, with his conviction that philosophy is art rather than science, clearly 
took an extreme stand.
Yet, in finding his very own literary style it appears that the main ground-breaking 
syntactic and semantic influence on Shestov was that of Nietzsche, as has already been 
mentioned in earlier chapters. In general, Nietzsche's influence was of the utmost 
significance in Russia and affected not only Shestov, but representatives of virtually all 
intellectual groups. Many scholars note the close proximity of Shestov's discourse with that 
of the German thinker. For example, Valevicius, in his attempt to examine the deeper 
influences of Nietzsche on Shestov, comments first on the obvious external similarities of 
both thinkers such as literary style, the form of self-expression as well as Shestov's direct
109use of Nietzschean terminology at times. Writing in aphorisms is a clear parallel between 
Shestov and Nietzsche which is most explicitly manifested in Shestov's Apotheosis o f  
Groundlessness. Interestingly, Bernard Martin sees in this book Shestov's proximity in style 
to Kierkegaard rather than Nietzsche, even though Shestov at the time was not at all 
familiar with Kierkegaard's writings. Martin writes:
Shestov here revealed himself as a keen satirist and polemicist, a master of the ironic style and of 
the indirect mode of discourse that characterizes much of Kierkegaard's writing. Though at this time 
Shestov had not even heard of Kierkegaard or of what a few years later came to be called Existenz- 
philosophie, it is interesting to note that The Apotheosis of Groundlessness already adumbrates a 
number of the chief characteristics of existentialist thought.103
On the other hand, Blagova and Emelianov in their study develop a productive and 
suggestive line of Nietzschean influence on Shestov. They trace the beginning of Shestov's 
genre of philosophical essay-plays to his second book -  that on Tolstoy and Nietzsche -  
which preceded his aforementioned Apotheosis o f Groundlessness (his fourth book). The
100 Clowes, p. 13.
101 Ibid, pp. 13-14.
102 Valevicius, p. 67.
103 Martin, p. 19.
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researchers presume that after having lived through his own personal crisis around 1895 
Shestov turned to this genre as the most suitable for contemplating his own experience. 
Already in his second book, they explain, he ‘3aHMCTByeT y Humne h  na(])oc k p h t h k h  
TpazmUHOHHOH (J)HJ10Co 4)H H, H TCXHHKy CIjeHHHeCKHX npneMOB (j)HJIOCO(j)CKHX apaM5.104 It
is appropriate to note here that Nietzsche's presence is already evident in Shestov's first 
book where he starts actively mentioning the German philosopher. Yet, the weight of 
Nietzsche's presence there in comparison to that in Shestov's following books is such that 
one is inclined to agree with Valevicius in that ‘the effect that Nietzsche had on Shestov 
was a “delayed reaction’” .105 Edith Clowes, in pointing out Nietzsche's profound influence 
on Shestov, especially on his aphoristic style, also lists their differences. Amongst them is 
Shestov's implicit decision to aim his writings at a broader readership as well as the absence 
of any intentions to teach anybody anything. Clowes stresses that Shestov's anarchism and 
nihilism operate strictly within the philosophical field and deal exclusively with the inner, 
spiritual sphere.106
While Blagova and Emelianov insist on the chronological consistency of Shestov's genre 
which they define as the philosophical essay-play, Clowes prefers to distinguish two 
periods in the development of Shestov's work. ‘His philosophizing emerges from two 
forms’, she writes, ‘the literary essay and later the aphoristic fragment. With the form of the 
critical essay Shestov acknowledges the horizon of expectations of educated readers, only 
to lead them toward philosophical discourse’.107 She claims that having started with the
10Rcritical essay Shestov's style then disintegrates into aphoristic fragments. ‘He chooses the 
aphoristic form as a challenge to systematic philosophy’, Clowes asserts; ‘having realized 
that logical consistency and a devotion to the Big Idea came at the cost of freedom of 
thought, Shestov decides to abandon the critical essay’.109 To us this conclusion appears too 
extreme, since the only consistent example of purely aphoristic writing was Shestov's rather
104 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 42.
105 Valevicius, p. 73.
106 See Clowes, p. 144, footnote 15.
107 Clowes, p. 136.
108 Ibid, p. 137.
109 Ibid, p. 138.
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provocative, yet significant book Apotheosis o f Groundlessness which had the effect of an 
exploded bomb and evoked a lot of criticism. This book signified Shestov's explicit turn 
from literature to philosophy, yet his genre of a literary-philosophical essay survived 
through to his later works. Thus we agree with Blagova and Emelianov's terminology in 
their defining Shestov's works as philosophical essay-plays. Moreover, their view that 
Shestov borrowed this genre from Nietzsche in more than its superficial form seems very 
convincing.
Indeed, Blagova and Emelianov comment on the unique form which Nietzsche created for 
his own writings. They quote the contemporary scholar Podoroga who observes that 
Nietzsche's aphorisms represent complete mises en scenes where ‘Bee TeKCTOBoe 
npocTpaHCTBo 3axBaneHO othmh HeoacHflaHHO HBjunomHMHca cneHoo6pa3aMH’.110 
Importantly, Blagova and Emelianov emphasise that according to Nietzsche the genre most 
suitable for a dethronement of the actor-like essence of philosophy is the tragicomedy of 
masks.111 The same key observation in connection to Shestov is made by Valevicius who 
asserts that Shestov borrowed from Nietzsche this method of ‘unmasking’ writers because 
he learned from Nietzsche's example that ‘author's words may only be written to mask his
119inner experiences and have little to do with what he really believes’.
In this connection, as Sydney Monas points out, Shestov in his literary essays ‘was
interested in the experience behind the one the writer writes about’, it is the ‘relationship
11^between thought and the experience from which it emerged’ that was Shestov's focus. 
‘Because his primary concern was for the quality and texture of experience, and only 
secondarily and usually ironically for the idea that can or cannot be abstracted from it, he 
violated literature less than most critics or philosophers’,114 Monas wrote. A vital role in 
this phenomenon should be attributed to Shestov's use of language which is indeed akin to
110 V. Podoroga, MemacpmuKa jianduiatpma (Moscow, 1993), p. 213. Cited in Blagova and 
Emelianov, p. 42.
111 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 42.
112 Valevicius, p. 74.
113 Monas, p. vii.
114 Ibid. The concluding part of this comment (that Shestov violated literature least) appears quite 
disputable, as our considerations of Part II should demonstrate.
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that o f Nietzsche in the sense described by Shestov himself as early as in his first book as 
‘nopa3HTejibHa5i <j)HJioco(])CKafl jmpHica’115 of rare intensity. Shestov's intention is to 
awaken the reader by the new type of philosophising. Thus Shestov himself claims in Great 
Vigils’. ‘0HJIOCO(j)Hfl /JOJDKHa 5KHTB CapKa3MaMH, HaCMeimcaMH, TpeBOrOH, 6opi»6oH, 
HefloyMeHHBMH, oTuaaHHeM, b c j ih k h m h  Ha e^ z^taMH h  pa3pemaTb ce6e co3epijaHHe h  
noKofi t o j ib k o  BpeMH o t  BpeMeHH, j\Jia nepeflbiimaT.116 Indeed, Shestov's philosophical 
language is full o f irony and sarcasm as well as contradictions, paradoxes and oxymoron. 
Clowes describes this style as ‘self-consciously figurative’ and observes that Tike many 
other Russian philosophers appropriating poetic tropes for the purposes o f speculative 
thought, he modulates his voice in contrast to the enlightenment tradition o f philosophy and
117empirical science’. Indeed, since Shestov rebels against the established forms of 
speculative philosophy his language quite naturally lives up to this revolt and overturns the 
existing scientific discourses traditionally used for philosophising. Clowes stresses the 
particular significance of Shestov's ‘use of chronotope, those images of time and space in 
which philosophizing is embedded’.118 An interesting observation that she makes when 
talking about Shestov's associative poetic discourse is that he is ‘the first Russian 
philosopher to see this preference in language style -  and, by implication, style of thought -  
as part of a national consciousness’.119 While Europeans started to believe in establishing 
life on earth, Russians, who were introduced to the achievements of Western civilisation 
too rapidly and suddenly, still continued to believe in miracles. ‘Shestov sees this gap 
between Russia and Europe in a way that [...] anticipates the predominance of magical and 
poetic language to the increasingly authoritative modem scientific language of definition by
1 90differentiation ’, Clowes writes.
Yet, Shestov always felt very acutely that the final truth is uncommunicable. It is achieved 
only in extreme solitude and is lost in communication. This fundamental inner
115 Shestov, lUeKcnup u eeo rpumux Epandec, p. 115.
116 Shestov, BenuKue Kanynbi, p. 296.
117 Clowes, p. 139.
118 Ibid, p. 139.
1,9 Ibid, p. 147.
120 Ibid, pp. 147-148.
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contradiction represented a key problem for his philosophical writings and reached its 
climax in Shestov's most peculiar book Sola Fide which remained unpublished up until 
1966. As Erofeev suggests, Shestov must have realised himself all the contradictions and 
inconsistencies of his reasoning in an attempt to defeat reason in this signature work and 
decided to leave it solely for himself. Shestov ‘Tax HHKoryja h  He pa3peuiHji c jio >k h o h  
npo6jieMbi K0MMyHHKa6ejibH0CTH, oflHaico Bnocjie^cTBHH o h  cTpeMHjica He o6ocTpjm> ee b
191
t o h  CTeneHH, b  k h k o h  3 t o  c^ejiaHO b  Sola F ide\ Erofeev observes.
However, in our opinion Shestov's style in its fully-fledged form, that is to say starting from 
his very first book on Shakespeare and Brandes, displays a strong continuity of form. This 
form evolves and becomes perfected as Shestov turns increasingly to purely philosophical 
writings from literary ones. Yet, its fundamental characteristics described above stay 
largely unchanged and it is never difficult to find points of great stylistic similarity between 
his chronologically distant writings. What is transferred to Shestov's mature style from his 
early literary experiments is only their monological element. His new discourse is 
increasingly characterised also by the essayistic genre with the dominant passionate voice
1 99of the ‘staging director’ Shestov (as Blagova and Emelianov label him). Indeed, he 
organises the thinkers he writes about in his intense polemical fashion into collisions of 
ideas while being himself engaged in unmasking them in order to reveal their true 
existential and philosophical identities. We disagree with Valevicius that the ‘heated, 
polemical tone of Shakespeare and Brandes is absent from the next several books that were 
to follow’.123 In our view, what Bernard Martin calls ‘the style of the prophet, not the 
theologian or religious apologist’124 is increasingly inherent in virtually all Shestov's books. 
While the book on Shakespeare is indeed based on different values and defends a 
fundamentally different philosophical stance, its language is already recognisably 
Shestovian. As the following example shows, precisely because of the uniformity of the 
unmistakably Shestovian sarcastic and passionately involved style it is possible to find 
passages which stylistically could have occurred on two consecutive pages of the same
121 Erofeev, p. 181.
122 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 43.
123 Valevicius, p. 24.
124 Martin, p. 43.
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book, while in reality they are taken from two different works by Shestov, one of which is, 
in fact, his work on Shakespeare:
H o  SojibuiHHCTBO m o /je n  o T H e c j io c t  o n eH b  paB H O fly iim o k  HOBbiM naeflM . H h  KocTBHaa y jib ib n a  
B o u b T e p a , h h  coM HeHHa T e ir n e , h h  6 y p n  E a iip o H a  He xacanH C b h x . P fa e n  n p H H ecjin  hm  n o x a  Jinu ib  
HeKOTopbie y a o b c T B a , pa3p eu iH B  CHHTb c  c e 6 a  M a cx y  jiH u eM ep n a , KOTOpoii n p e a g je  np H xoaH Jiocb  
npHKpbiBaTb ManeHbKHe aarreHCKHe p a a o c T H .125
Boaee T o r o , He HyacHO aaxce, HTobbi cymecTBOBajio ybeacaeHHe, h t o  enocodHOCTb HCKjiioHHTejibHO 
OTaaBaTbca b w c u ih m  BonpocaM HayKH h  HCKyccTBa BbiroaHO OTJiHHaeT neaoBeica. 3 t h m  
npeapaccyaKOM, k  coacaaeHHio, CToab ace pacnpocTpaHeHHbiM, cxojibKO h  aoacHbiM, co3aaeTca 
MHoacecTBO aioaen, npoTHB cBoero aceaaHHa npeaaioiaHxca HeHyacHbiM hm  3aHaraaM, HHTaiomnx 
CKyHHbix aJia h h x  (J)hjioco4)ob h  noaTOB h  paccyac^aiomnx o npeaMeTax, ao KOTopbix hm  h ct aeaa. 
O hH  3THM OTaaiOT aaHb obmeCTBeHHOMy MHeHHK), CTO Jib B03H0CameMy HHCTO “ayXOBHbie” 
HHTepecbi. Ho neHHOCTb s t o h  aaHH aanexo He oaHHaxoBa am i njiaTamnx h  cobHpaiomnx ee.126
The frequent occurrence of this phenomenon of such close stylistic proximity allows us to 
affirm that while ideologically and from the point of view of his Weltanschauung Shestov's 
first book is to a large extent different from the following ones, stylistically they are all a 
smooth continuation of one another and represent a sequence of writings that are 
systematically becoming perfected.
For a more scrupulous analysis of Shestov's style it is quite important to establish the type 
of discourse that he predominantly used in his writings. On the surface it appears that 
Shestov's discourse as an author is despotic -  the view expressed by Blagova and
1 97Emelianov in their study. ‘Oh 3a^aeT Bonpocti, ho He yKaQT Hecorjiacna HHTaTejw’, they 
assert. Indeed, as in his youthful experiments, his mature discourse may easily seem 
unambiguously ‘single-voiced’ and distinctly monological.
Indeed, there are obvious reasons for this point of view. However, in our opinion the 
situation is more complex. More precisely, we distinguish the evident presence of another -  
‘two-voiced’ -  discourse in Shestov's narrative. To explain our position we need to look
125 Shestov, UJeKcnup u ezo Kpumun Epandec, p. 15.
126 Shesto\,flo6po eynenuu apcufta Toncmozo u Huijiue, p. 299.
127 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 118.
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more closely into Bakhtin's classification of stylistically different types of discourse 
provided in his study of Dostoevsky. Bakhtin offers three types:
I. a ‘straight’ discourse directly oriented to its object as an expression of the last semantic 
instance of the speaking subject [IIpHMoe, Henocpe^CTBeHHo HanpaBjieHHoe Ha cboh 
npe^MeT cjiobo, Kan BbipaaceHHe nocjie^Heh cmbicjioboh hhctuhuhh roBopamero],
II. a d is c o u r s e  o f  th e  o b je c t  ( o f  th e  p o rtra y ed  p e r s o n )  [O b b e K r a o e  cjiobo (cjiobo 
H3o6pa5KeHHoro J in iia )].
III. a discourse oriented towards the other's word (a tw o-voiced word) [Cjiobo c 
ycTaHOBKOH Ha ny>Koe cjiobo (^Byrojiocoe cjiobo)].
The third sub-type of the latter type is, by Bakhtin, an ‘active type (a reflected word of the 
other)’ [Akthbhbih ran  (oTpaaceHHoe nyacoe cjiobo)]. It may include
a) hidden inner polemics [cKptrran BHyipeHHjra nojieMHKa];
b) polem ically coloured autobiography and confession [nojieMHnecKH OKpameHHaa 
aBTo6Horpa(j>Hfl h ncnoBeflb];
c) any discourse which takes into account the other's discourse [Bcaicoe cjiobo c onumKOH 
Ha nyacoe cjiobo];
d) a replica of dialogue [penjiHKa anajiora];
e) hidden dialogue [cKpbiTbiii ^najior].
‘tfyjKoe cjiobo B03^eHCTByeT H3BHe’, Bakhtin explains; ‘B03MoacHbi pa3Hoo6pa3HeiimHe 
(jjopMbi B3aHMooraomeHHH c  uy^cHM cjiobom h pa3JiHHHbie cTeneHH ero #e(j)opMHpyiomero
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bjihhhhji’. ‘3 tot yneT OTcyTCTByiomero coSeceaHHKa mojkct 6 bitb 6ojiee hjih MeHee 
HHTeHCHBeH’, Bakhtin writes with respect to Dostoevsky's early genre o f  epistolary novel 
(such as, for example, Poor Folk) which he labels particularly congenial ‘fljin OTpa^ceHHoro
1 99uyacoro cjioBa’. In Dostoevsky, Bakhtin asserts, this phenomenon takes on an extremely 
intense character.
B CBoeM nepBOM npoH3Be,aeHHH ^ o c t o c b c k h h  Bbipa6aTbreaeT CTOJib xapaicrepHbiH ana Bcero ero 
TBopnecTBa peneBOH c th j ib ,  onpe/iejifleMbiH HanpaaceHHbiM npeflBOCXHmeHHeM nyacoro cjioBa. 
3HaneHHe 3Toro c th jm  b ero nocjiejiyiomeM TBopnecTBe rpoMajjHo: BaacHeniiiHe
HcnoBeAajibHbie caMOBbicKa3biBaHna repoeB npoHHKHyrbi HanpajKeHHeniiiHM OTHomeHneM k  
npe^BocxHiuaeMOMy nyacoMy cjioBy o h h x ,  h jo k o h  peaxuHH Ha h x  c jio b o  o  ce6e. He to j ib k o  t o h  h  
CTHjib, h o  h  BHyrpeHHHH CMbicjiOBaa CTpyicrypa 3 t h x  BbicKa3bmaHHH onpeAeJiaiOTca
npe^BocxHiueHHeM ny>Koro cjioBa.130
Bakhtin gives a very convincing reconstruction of Makar Devushkin's monologue into a 
dialogue between him and the other (the absent interlocutor), whose anticipated reaction 
largely determines Devushkin's narrative.
Now we are ready to present our hypothesis concerning Shestov's type of discourse. In the 
same vein as described above by Bakhtin, we claim, Shestov in his mature writings as well 
as using a ‘straight’ discourse (type I) rendering it distinctly authoritarian, also uses type III 
in its last sub-type: ‘bcbkoc cjiobo c onumicoH Ha uy>Koe cjiobo’; an inner polemic with 
which is constantly taking place, predetermining the narration. However, this ‘other’ is 
Shestov himself and the heated inner polemics are his polemics with his own deepest 
feelings and convictions which he is constantly trying to overcome. It is the Western 
rationalist tradition that is native to Shestov through his whole upbringing and which he 
forever attempts to destroy within his own psyche that lies at the core of his conflict with 
himself. Thus, like Bakhtin's reconstruction of Devushkin's monologue as a dialogue, we 
can rewrite Shestov's narrative as his polemic with that side of his own self that forever 
resists being persuaded by Shestov's irrationalist arguments.
128 Bakhtin, p. 92.
129 Ibid, p. 98.
130 Ibid, p. 99.
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For example, we can extend the following monologue from the introduction to On Job's
111
Scales represented below by Shestov's lines, to a dialogue by introducing Shestov's 
‘other self (the voice of reason) in the following way:
Shestov: M3 m>iHe JKHBymnx hhkto flaace h He nofl03peBaeT, hto npaBjjHBBiH CnHH03a 
BOBce He Gbiji Tax npaB/niB, xax sto npHHHTo jiyMaTB. Oh roBopnji, h nacTO roBopHJi, 
coBceM He to, hto #yMaji.
The Other: Ho npaB^a xoth 6bi, hto oh He cHHTan cboio (J)hjioco$ hk) jiynmeH? Mjih 
ayMaeTe, oh jiyxaBHJi?
Shestov: HenpaBjja, hto <J)HJioco(j)HK) cboio oh CHHTaji He Jiynmen, a tojibko hcthhhoh.
The Other: Ho no KpaiiHeH Mepe jjojdkho Gbitb npaB^oH, hto, co3^aBaa ee, oh He njiaxaji, 
He CMeajiCH, He npoxjiHHaji, a tojibko npncjiyrnHBajiCB k TOMy, hto eMy roBopnji pa3yM? 
Mjih 3TOMy B bi TO)Ke He BepHTe?
Shestov: HenpaB^a TO>Ke, hto, C03^aBaa ee, oh He njiaxaji, He CMeajica, He npoiciHHaji, a 
tojibko npHCJiyinHBajiCH k TOMy, hto eMy roBopnji pa3yM, t . e. tot ko BceMy 
6e3pa3JIHHHBIH - nOTOMy HTO He 2KHBOH - CyntBH, KOTOpBIH np0B03TJiaCHJI, HTO CyMMa yTJIOB 
b TpeyrojiBHHKe paBHaeTca aayM npaMBiM.
The Other: Ho noneMy r jjojraeH Bum BepHTB? Kaxne y Bac, co6ctbchho, ocHOBaHHn?
Shestov: Ecjih He BepHTe MHe - npoHTHTe “Tractatus de emendatione intellectus” hjih xotb 
BCTynHTejiBHBie cjioBa k 3TOMy TpaKTaTy. T oraa  bbi GyzieTe 3HaTB, hto CnHH03a, xax 
HexorAa Oajiec, npoBajinjica b nponacTB h hto H3 rjiyGnHBi nponacTH oh B3BiBaji k 
T ocnojjy.
131 See pp. 18-19 of Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea.
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The Other: J\a, a  HHTaji TpaKTaT, ho  oto Memi He ydeJKZjaeT b  Bamen npaBOTe! CnHH03a 
nnmeT h  paccyxcjjaeT o Bore, yMe h  CTpacTHX KaK paBHO^yuiHBiH reoMeTp, a He KaK 
CTpacTHbiH nncaTejib. O h nmeT noHHMaHHH, a He conyBCTBHa!
Shestov: H enpaB^a Toace, h t o  o h  TpaKTOBaji o Bore, yMe, o HejioBenecKHx CTpacTax, KaK 
TpaKTyiOT O JIHHHaX H nJIOCKOCTaX, H HTO OH, KaK H TOT cyzjba, KOTOpOTO OH HaBa3aJI 
jno^aM, 6biJi paBHO^ymeH h  k  ^ o 6 p y  h  k  3jiy, h  k  xopom eM y h  k  jjypHOMy, h  k  
npeKpacHOMy h  k  6e3o6pa3HOMy, h  t o j i b k o  jio6HBajica “noHHMaima” .
The Other: T or^a 3aneM , CKaaarre Ha m h jio ctb , oh nojib30Bajica MaTeMaranecKHM a3biKOM, 
ecjiH oh  6bui ctojib cTpacTeH BHyTpH, KaK B bi yTBepacaaeTe?!
Shestov: MaTeMaTHHecKHe pH3bi, b  KOTopbie o h  o6jianaji c b o i o  m b ic j ib ,  6b u i h  B3aTbi h m  
“HanpoKaT”, h t o 6b i npn^aTb no6ojibuie TaacejioBecHOCTH CBoeMy H3JioaceHHio -  Bejjb j h o j h i  
OTOaC^ eCTBJiaiOT TaK OXOTHO TaXCeJIOBeCHOCTb C 3HaHHTeJIBHOCTBIO.
We can carry on in the same fashion, but hopefully the above reconstruction is a sufficient 
illustration of our point and demonstrates the clear presence of the above type of discourse 
(the one which is constantly aware of the other's).
Moreover, the other two sub-types of type III are also present in Shestov's narrative: the 
one-directional two-voiced type which includes stylisation and a story told by a narrator, 
and the multi-directional two-voiced type which includes parody of all sorts. Blagova and 
Emelianov explicitly single out the characteristics of these types of discourse in Shestov's 
style of his earlier years (even if they do not refer to Bakhtin's classification as such). 
Indeed, his discourse at the stage of literary criticism rather than philosophical writings per 
se included numerous elements of parody and orientation towards oral narratives. Notably, 
according to Bakhtin, these elements as they decrease in objectivity tend to merge different 
voices, that is to say they tend towards type I, which, as we observed at the start, is the 
main and clearly evident type of Shestov’s narrative voice.
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However, we agree with Blagova’s and Emelianov’s view concerning the evolution of 
Shestov's style towards the stage of Biblical existentialism, which superseded his periods of 
literary criticism as well as the partly nihilistic and anarchistic phases of his aphoristic 
writings. More precisely, we agree that ‘b nocjie^HHH nepnofl TBOpuecTBa h3mchhjich h 
flncicypc IHecTOBa. Xoth ero flHCKypc ocTajica no-npe^cHeMy opneHTHpoBaHHBiM Ha 
ycTHyio pent, ho b hcm MeHbiiie napo^HHHtix oneMeHTOB, MeHbuie capKa3MOB h 
npoKjiaTHH. T oh CTan 6ojiee BbmepacaHHbiM, fiojibuie MecTa 3aHHMaiOT (j)HJioco(})CKHe
119paccyacAeHHB, <j)aKTbi H3 hctophh  4>hjioco(])h h ’. Indeed, as Shestov's life experience 
expanded to involve the immensely difficult years of revolution and civil war, followed by 
his emigration when he had to start from scratch, his outlook gained a certain gentleness 
and as it were lost its sharp uncompromising edge. These developments found their way 
into Shestov's writings, extending his philosophical vision and making his discourse shift 
towards deeper metaphors and more memorable images as opposed to polemical aphoristic 
fragments. For example Shestov's image of Dostoevskii as being endowed with a double 
vision by the angel of death in Overcoming the Self-evident was so memorable that it has 
easily become classical.
To conclude our analysis of Shestov's literary style we would like to emphasise the intimate 
relationship between, on the one hand, the content of Shestov's ideas, the purity of his 
existential revolt against universal necessity, and, on the other hand, his chosen style of 
writing (considered in its evolution). Indeed, right from the start in the fully-fledged style of 
his first book Shestov's narrative reflected his passionate involvement with the ultimate 
questions of existence. His monological tendency persevered from his youthful attempts at 
writing fiction, marked by an imitative style both semantically and syntactically, into his 
mature style of writing philosophical essays, while becoming enriched with an indirect 
mode of discourse. It acquired aphoristic fragments, elements of irony, sarcasm and parody 
and was oriented towards oral speech. Paradox, contradictions and oxymoron also became 
its chief characteristics.
132 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 115.
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As Shestov's world view was shifting towards tolerance, so did his literary discourse. At the
same time his style gained a certain monumentality in that his ad hoc aphoristic fragments
turned into more memorable and deeply thought through metaphors. Shestov's apparently
authoritarian discourse while being largely the direct single-voiced discourse of type I
(using Bakhtin's classification) was in fact interwoven with the two-voiced discourse of
type III with its orientation towards the discourse of ‘the other’ whether one-directional or
multi-directional, as well as the active sub-type (the reflected discourse of ‘the other’).
Shestov's narrative voice thus oscillated between single-voiced unambiguous direct
discourse and the ‘two-voiced’ discourse which takes account of the discourse of ‘the
other’. The gravitational tendency towards the latter can be increasingly observed, in our
view, in Shestov's later writings and reflects, in our opinion, his intrinsic inner conflict -  a
continuous struggle against his own deeply embedded rationalism. As Erofeev wittily
wrote, ‘BbicTaBHB pa3yM 3a flBepb, IIIecTOB He 3aMeTHji, KaK to t  npoBopHo BJie3 b okho h
BHOBb CTaJl X03AHH0M nOJIO)KeHHJI, TCM CaMbIM nOCTaBHB no a COMHeHHe Becb CMblCJI
1 ^
mecTOBCKOH Komjeninffl’. Similarly, we have already quoted Zenkovsky who talked 
about a ‘strange phenom enon’: ‘nocjie Top^cecTBeHHbix “noxopoH” pannoHajiH3Ma b  
OflHOH KHHre, o h  [IIIecTOB] CHOBa B03BpamaeTC5i b  cjie/iyiomeH KHHre k  KpHTHKe 
pauHOHajiH3Ma, KaK 6bi o>KHBuiero 3a s t o  BpeMa’.134
As Clowes writes,
Shestov legitimized an alternative “anti-philosophical” tradition. He devised fresh and challenging 
forms of philosophical writing that intrigued readers and piqued their curiosity. Finally, he turned 
the hierarchy of discourses, in which scientific empiricism was accepted as the “truest” and most 
authoritative form of writing, upside down, devaluing traditionally authoritative uses of language 
and re-legitimizing traditionally “weak”, non-authoritative ones.135
Finally, it is interesting to note the suggestion of Blagova and Emelianov that Shestov 
should be regarded as ‘npe^Teua ncnxoaHajiHTHHecKH opneHTHpoBaHHoro
133 Erofeev, p. 180.
134 Zenkovsldi, II, p. 367.
135 Clowes, p. 134.
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1jiHTepaTypoBeAeHHfl’. More precisely, they conjecture that he ‘npe^BocxHTHji
1 ^ 7nocTMOAepHHCTCKyio TeH^eHUHio jiHTepaTypoBejjeHHa ’ by taking a great interest in the
personal tragedy of his ‘heroes’ (various thinkers of various times). In doing so, they stress,
Shestov's interest was of a purely spiritual, existential nature, far from having anything to
1 ^ 8do with cheap sensational exposures. The latter observation was mentioned earlier by 
other scholars (for example by Milosz in ‘Shestov or The Purity of Despair’), and we have 
already touched upon it in the previous chapters.
136 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 118.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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Part II
Close readings of Shestov’s texts on classical Russian writers.
Chapter 4. Shestov and Pushkin. Before the philosophy of tragedy: the 
idealistic phase.
In Part I we have described and conceptually analysed a consistent set of characteristics that 
mark and justify our general literary approach to Shestov. In Part II these rather abstract 
characteristics will be invested with concrete meaning through a case study of each of the 
classical Russian writers under Shestov's consideration. Thus in this chapter we shall 
examine the existing material concerning Shestov's treatment of Pushkin in the framework 
of the above approach.
4.1. The enigma of Shestov’s ‘A.S. Pushkin’ article.
Interestingly, we begin the study of Shestov's insights into various classical Russian writers 
with the most unusual of his relevant writings which sharply stands out from the rest of 
them. This is his article on Pushkin which was found amongst Shestov's papers after his 
death and was first published only in 1960. This is the only coherent piece that Shestov 
ever wrote about the poet. However, Pushkin was clearly of high significance to Shestov, 
for his thought revolved around the poet during Shestov's writing career and the evidence 
for that is concealed in various scattered references to Pushkin in a variety of Shestov's 
works. They are invariably brief, but persistent, and it is this recurrence that illuminates 
Shestov's inner dependence on Pushkin, akin to that of Russian culture as a whole (even 
though this dependence for Shestov was never as intimate as that on some other Russian 
classics). Such an interesting distribution of chronologically diverse allusions to Pushkin 
constitutes very important and productive material for our study, since we can see Shestov's 
attitude to the poet in its evolution and apply a direct intertextual approach to our 
explorations.
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The first mention of Pushkin can be traced to Shestov’s early literary exercises which were 
cited in Part I. There the poet is listed alongside a large number of other Russian classics 
and used more as a manifestation of the Russian idea and way of life, as seen by Shestov at 
the time. Ironically, Shestov’s views then, as has been demonstrated in the previous 
sections, had a distinctly Slavophile and monarchic flavour, while facilitating his highly 
noble social aspirations. Thus, in a sense, the young Shestov already then displayed an 
inclination to tendentiousness in the interpretation of literary works and authors by way of 
making them compatible with his own voice. On the other hand Pushkin, historically, in his 
extreme literary richness and the determining role that he came to play in Russian culture, 
has always been a source from which all sorts of conclusions have been drawn to suit all 
sorts of tastes. For Shestov in his youthful literary attempts the poet was largely a symbol 
of truth and of good, raised on Shestov’s banner to support his idealistic patriotism and 
high moral aspirations.
As we know by now, Shestov’s parting with idealism and positivism was dramatic, and his 
first book, on Shakespeare and Brandes, as was mentioned previously, can be characterised 
metaphorically by the words of Ivanov-Razumnik, ‘nepezt 0 K0HHaTejn>HBiM HeBepneM 
ocofieHHO ropjma fibmaeT nocjie/maji Bcnbimica Bepbi’.1 His second book -  on Tolstoy and 
Nietzsche -  showed the world a substantially re-bom author, free from idealistic and 
dogmatic delusions and equipped instead with a sarcastic, vivid and quickly-paced style. 
This book, which appeared in early 1900, was basically finished (except for the preface) in 
1898. In the spring of the next year -  1899 -  Shestov wrote his only article on Pushkin, 
which, in our view, as was previously mentioned, is highly enigmatic, for it presents a great 
challenge to chronology and common sense logic. Indeed, this article, written after 
Shestov’s decisive departure from all sorts of ideals, after he had developed a strong 
disdain for the illusory consolations of morality and abstract good, demonstrates a clear and 
unequivocal step back to his Shakespeare and Brandes phase, and even exceeds the latter 
book in idealism and positivism.
1 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 201.
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The initial attempt to resolve this mystery is to conjecture that the date on the article is 
false. However, the first line points unambiguously to April-May of 1899, saying that 
‘nepe3 Mecaij 6e3 Majioro - HcnojiHaeTca p o b h o  cto  jieT co /ma po>KfleHHa AjieKcaH,apa 
CepreeBHHa nymKHHa’.2 This means that even if Shestov wrote the article much earlier, he 
then revised it for Pushkin’s jubilee at the time of the latter. Moreover, what he says there 
about Tolstoy clearly shows that he had already written his Tolstoy and Nietzsche. This 
forces us to conclude that the chronology here is correct and the article was most probably 
indeed written in 1899 and in any case prepared by Shestov himself for possible publication 
then. Therefore another important implication of this fact is that Shestov’s struggle against 
his own idealistic illusions lasted much longer than the gap between his first and second 
books, and was not chronologically linear. Just like Zenkovsky’s assertion that Shestov 
returned to his fight against rationalism in every new book of his after he had just buried 
the latter in the previous one, Shestov’s ‘A. S. Pushkin’ suggests that his idealism had 
deeper roots than he himself realised.
Below we shall analyse the marked and striking distinctions between this article and 
Shestov’s other works as well as trace in it the tendencies of ‘Shestov-proper’, as we know 
him. We will then demonstrate how his treatment of Pushkin evolved and eventually fitted 
into his usual pattern, thus illuminating the latter by way of contrast.
4.2. Shestov's article and the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva of 1899 in the context of 
the Pushkin myth and the centenary celebrations.
First of all it is important to consider Shestov’s article on Pushkin in the context o f the 
time, for, in our view, it profoundly reflects the spirit o f the epoch through the figure of 
Russia’s ‘first poet’. As Marcus Ch. Levitt wrote in his article ‘Pushkin in 1899’, ‘Ha 
npoTJDKeHHH XIX Bexa Bonpoc o MecTe nymKHHa b  h c t o p h h  pyccKOH JiHTepaTypti 
ocaBajica o c h o b h b im  npe,ziMeTOM zmcKyccHH b  HHTejuieKTyajibHOH cpe^e P o c c h h ; 6ojiee 
Toro -  ana HeKOTopbix k p h t h k o b  h m h  no3Ta MeTOHHMHnecKH 3aMemaJio caMy pyccxyio
2 Lev Shestov, A. C. IJym KUH  in Y M 0 3 p eH u e  u  o m K p o e e n u e  (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1964), p. 331.
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KyjibTypy’. The year 1899 -  the centenary of Pushkin’s birth -  became the culmination of 
the poet’s official acknowledgment and canonisation. Interestingly, in 1987 Iurii Lotman 
wrote an article about the forthcoming two hundred years of Pushkin, asking what the poet 
would represent for Russia another century on from 1899. In this paper Lotman looks back 
over the last almost 200 years at previous Pushkin celebrations, pointing out that they 
present the key to understanding the spiritual strivings and ideology of any given period in 
which Pushkin faces respectively yet another rebirth or another death.4
From this perspective the poet’s centenary in 1899 is a rich source of material, vital for 
understanding the huge-scale phenomenon o f constructing the ‘Pushkin myth’ in its 
everlasting dynamics. The year 1899 became without exaggeration the year of Pushkin, 
when celebrations on a nationwide scale were staged and orchestrated by the government, 
marking its explicit attempt to appropriate, under the umbrella of Pushkin’s canonisation, 
the Russian intelligentsia, traditionally subversive politically. In this way the government 
hoped to use culture directly to take ideological control over the large masses o f the 
population who were at the time rapidly becoming literate. As Peshekhonov quotes in his 
article written at the time, ‘Tpy^HO yica3aTb Ha ofimnpHOM npocipaHCTBe o t  Tuxoro 
oxeaHa a o  EajmracKoro Mopa h  o t  Jle^OBHToro jxo rpaHHn; AtjmaHHCTaHa Taicon 
reorpa<})HHecKHH nyHKT, r^e 6 b i  m o h c h o  6 b u io  3anoA03pHTb HajiHHHOCTb ofimecTBeHHOH 
>k h 3 h h , h  r^e He OTKjiHKHyjiHCb fibi Ha riymKHHCKHH loOmieS’.5 However, his article was 
entitled ‘HeyaaBimiHCJi npa3AHHK’, for he saw behind the officially organised pompous 
celebrations o f Pushkin a philistine and amateur promotion of a distorted and superficial 
image of the poet which did no good either to his name and heritage or to Russian literature
3 Marcus Ch. Levitt, ‘IlyiiiK H H  b 1899 ro,ay’, transl. M. B. Kuteeva, in C o e p e M e n n o e  c m e p u K c m c K o e  
n y i u K U H o e e d e n u e .  C d o p n u K  c m a m e u ,  pp. 21- 41 (p. 21).
4 Iurii Lotman, ‘riymKHH 1999 roAa. KaKHM o h  Sy/jeT?’, Tallinn, (1) 1987, p. 23. The creation of 
the Pushkin myth continues to attract considerable scholarly attention. See, for example, Paul 
Debreczeny, Social Functions of Literature. Alexander Pushkin and Russian Culture (Standford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1997), where Part Three is explicitly entitled ‘The Myth of a 
Poet’. See also H yuiK U H  u coepeMeHnan Kyjibmypa, ed. E. P. Chelyshev (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), 
and Catriona Kelly, Russian Literature: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 
2001).
5 A. Peshekhonov, ‘H eynaBiiiHH CJi npa3A H nic’ in Collection of the journal Pyccme dozamcmeo (St 
Petersburg: 1899), p . 385. Cited in Levitt, p . 22.
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and culture. This, in a way, can be compared to Pasternak’s analysis of Lilia Brik’s 
successful attempt to turn to Stalin for an official canonisation of Maiakovsky, which 
Pasternak labelled as the poet’s ‘second death’. These words resonate directly with those of 
Lotman given above about yet another rebirth or yet another death of Pushkin. However, 
despite the acutely critical analysis by Peshekhonov, 1899 can nevertheless be viewed as a 
mixture of the two tendencies, because, as can be expected in such a situation, the official 
appropriation of the poet evoked a certain opposition which served as a basis for further 
development of Pushkin’s image and studies of him.
Thus, as Levitt states, an issue of Mir Iskusstva of May 1899 can be regarded ‘h KaK 
Hanfiojiee OTKpoBeHHoe BtipaaceHHe Henpmrrafl otJmimajiBHoro npa3AHOBaHHJi, h KaK 
yHHKaJIBHBIH MaHH(J)eCT CHMBOJIHCTCKOrO flBH)KeHHfl, OTpa3KaK>mHH MHOHCeCTBO 
npoTHBopeuHH n b noHHMaHHH o6pa3a h 3HaneHHa nymKHHa y MaccoBOH ayzjHTopHH h b 
HHTejuieKTyajiBHBix Kpyrax Toro BpeMeHH’.6 To us it seems both natural and productive to 
consider Shestov’s article on Pushkin in the context of this issue o f the famous literary 
journal. Indeed, the Symbolists’ reception o f Pushkin, as Levitt observes, was in tune with 
the profound changes taking place in literature and society.7 At the same time Symbolism 
was at the forefront o f drawing various parallels between modernity and the Pushkin era, 
making explicit comparisons between the Golden and Silver Age. Thus, the Pushkin issue 
of Mir Iskusstva which essentially expressed a Symbolist perspective on the poet can serve 
as a useful reference point and provide an illuminating background for the analysis of 
Shestov’s views on Pushkin at the time.
Furthermore, it would not be altogether unreasonable to conjecture that Shestov was 
writing his article with a view to publishing it in Mir Iskusstva of May that year since by 
that time he had already become acquainted with some of the contributors to that issue, 
namely with D. Merezhkovsky and N. Minsky (although he did not yet know the other two, 
V. Rozanov and F. Sologub, personally), and in a sense he was himself becoming part of 
the same literary milieu. However, to our knowledge there is no documented evidence of
6 Levitt, p. 31.
7 Ibid, p. 34.
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Shestov’s collaboration of any kind with Mir Iskusstva as early as 1899. The first written 
mention of his participation in the journal dates back to 1901 when Shestov accepted the 
invitation of Diagilev to write for the journal and, in particular, to produce a review of the 
first volume of Merezhkovsky’s L. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Shestov wrote a favourable 
review for Nos 8-9 of September 1901 of Mir Iskusstva. However, his review of the second 
volume which appeared in the journal in 1903 (Nos 1-2) was much more critical and led to 
Merezhkovsky’s resentment. Yet, there is no reason to suppose that Shestov’s relationship 
with Merezhkovsky in 1899 was in any way sour. On the other hand, his attitude to the poet 
Minsky was already then rather sceptical as can be seen from Shestov’s private letters. 
Indeed, in one of them Shestov used rather strong derogatory language with respect to
Q
Minsky and his literary abilities. As for Shestov and Rozanov, they had apparently always 
enjoyed a mutual interest. In 1905 Rozanov responded with an interesting satirical essay 
‘New Tastes in Philosophy’ to Shestov's book Apotheosis o f Groundlessness, whereas 
Shestov in 1930 in Paris gave a meaningful talk about Rozanov's philosophical, religious 
and literary creativity which appeared later that year as an article in the journal Put'. 
However, in 1899 they were not yet acquainted - their first meeting took place only in 
1902. As far as Sologub is concerned, in 1909 Shestov dedicated a serious piece, ‘The 
Poetry and Prose of Fedor Sologub’, to his literary works which became part of Shestov’s 
sixth book Great Vigils. Shestov’s subsequent collaboration with Mir Iskusstva included 
the publication of his third book -  on Dostoevsky and Nietzsche -  in consecutive issues of 
the journal (Nos 2-9/10) in 1902.
Thus, although we have no tangible grounds to suppose that Shestov’s ‘Pushkin’ was 
intended for Mir Iskusstva of May 1899, there seems to be no particular logical obstacles 
either to making such a supposition, with the possible exception of the following argument. 
Shestov’s paper fits more with the high spirit of the large-scale mass celebrations of 
Pushkin’s centenary as they should have been -  understood first and foremost in the 
framework of culture and separated entirely from the official froth -  than it does with the
8 See, for example, Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 25, where she cites Shestov’s letter of April 1896 to his 
friend Varvara Grigor’evna Malakhieva-Mirovich, in which Shestov calls Minskii ‘acajiKHH
BbipOAOK pOCCHHCKOH CJTOBeCHOCTH’ .
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publications of Mir Iskusstva. Indeed, Shestov’s main focus is on Pushkin as a literary 
figure and a cultural icon, whereas the authors of the publications in Mir Iskusstva 
invariably discuss the poet in relation to the social context, regarding him as a lost ideal, 
exploited and thrown to the low crowds -  an aspect which Shestov essentially ignores. 
Thus it is interesting to note that his tendency to neglect the social and political dimension 
had already manifested itself at that time, in contrast to his youthful literary experiments.
The idea of claiming Pushkin as an elitist spiritual treasure and alienating him from the 
masses was foreign to Shestov and in any case lay completely outside the scope of his 
interests. At the same time this was the common Symbolist stance as expressed in Mir 
Iskusstva of May 1899. On the other hand Viacheslav Ivanov, in his collection of 1909 
‘Following the stars’ (‘IIo 3Be3^aM’) in an article dedicated to Pushkin's poem ‘The Poet 
and the Mob’ (‘Host h nepHt’) advances essentially the opposite view, as he deems 
Symbolism to be a genuinely democratic trend and does not view its aesthetic demands as 
subversive in their exclusiveness. He writes: ‘ h c t h h h b i h  c h m b o j i h 3m  flO JD K eH  n p H M H p H T B  
IIo3Ta h  HepHb b  fiojibinoM, BceHapoflHOM HcxyccTBe’.9 So, not only did Ivanov reject 
trying to claim Pushkin from the mob, but on the contrary he basically supported the latter 
in their opposition. It is significant that in his work on Ivanov written in 1916 Shestov 
argued strongly against such a point of view, especially coming from a poet. However, this 
was seventeen years later than Shestov's ‘A. S. Pushkin’ article, and this issue will be 
addressed in due course.
Back in 1899, however, Fedor Sologub in the ‘Pushkin issue’ of Mir Iskusstva pointed to 
the incompatibility between the poet’s great name and achievements on the one hand and 
their availability to a down-to-earth public and unrefined mass consumption on the other. 
Similar sentiments were native to Merezhkovsky who in his essay ‘Pushkin’ of 1896 had 
already spoken against the sweeping wave of democratic barbarism. In 1899 he denounced 
the old-fashioned views on Pushkin by Spasovich, Solovev and Tolstoy who essentially 
tried to push the poet “off the boat of modernity”, if we use the words of the Futurists who 
were to emerge on the Russian literary scene a couple of decades later. In general at any
9 Viacheslav Ivanov, IIo 3ee3daM, (St Petersburg, 1909), p. 41.
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given time there was always a literary group or individual who would provoke renewed 
polemics on Pushkin’s place in Russian culture by attempting to discard the poet from the 
contemporary cultural landscape. In this respect Shestov’s views were akin to 
Merezhkovsky’s in their vision of Pushkin’s eternal greatness. Shestov too mentioned 
Tolstoy’s opposition to Pushkin only to dismiss it as momentary -  as being Tolstoy’s 
tribute to his current preoccupation with preaching. ‘Bee, h t o  M oxceT  co /jeH C T B O B aT t u e jia M  
3 t o h  nponoBe^H, o h  x b 3 j i h t j  Bee, h t o  Bpe^HT h m  -  o h  nopnuaeT’.10 Indeed, very much 
along these lines Tolstoy objected to Pushkin’s sinful life and death being set as an example 
to the nation. In reality, Shestov asserted, the novelist’s literary roots can be traced back to 
Pushkin along with those of almost any significant Russian writer.
This important idea, perhaps not yet as widespread as later on, was nevertheless already in 
the air by 1899, in particular expressed in some sense by Turgenev and Dostoevsky, and 
was later developed and embraced by generations of critics and writers, both in Russia and 
abroad. Every now and again, however, it had its opponents, who would challenge 
Pushkin’s crucial influence on and significance to the development of the whole of Russian 
literature, but these voices never went any further than distinguishing between Pushkin’s 
diverse achievements in order to assign them different degrees of importance. In any case 
they had been rather lost in the midst of the acknowledgements of Pushkin’s grandeur. 
Thus, for example, A.D.P. Briggs, while arguing against the high merit of Pushkin’s prose 
in a literary and historical sense, nevertheless agrees with the depth of his linguistic 
achievement. Briggs quotes the famous words of Turgenev that Pushkin ‘gave the final 
form to our language’,11 and Henry Gifford expresses the similar idea that ‘there can be no
1 9doubt that Pushkin blended his genius with that of the Russian language’. Indeed, it is by 
now set in stone that Pushkin revolutionised the language of his day and gave rise to what 
modem Russian has largely become. At the same time, Briggs is not fully at home with 
numerous suggestions which ‘corroborate Pushkin’s title as the initiator of the modem
10 Shestov, A. C. TlyiuKUH, p. 333.
11 A. D. P. Briggs, Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 3.
12 Henry Gifford, The Novel in Russia, From Pushkin to Pasternak (London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1964), p. 15.
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Russian prose tradition’. ‘There is no inconsistency’, he writes, ‘in accepting this claim
while at the same time regretting one of its effects -  the sweeping together of linguistic,
historical and artistic attributes which has resulted in an exaggeration of the literary merits 
1 ^of Pushkin’s stories’.
Yet, contrary to Briggs’s objections, the idea of Pushkin being largely the father and the 
founder of modem Russian literature spiritually as well as linguistically remains in the 
leading current of critical opinions. Interestingly, the distinction is rarely drav/n between 
Pushkin’s poetry and prose, although many influential voices, such as Akhmatova, 
expressed their deep admiration of Pushkin’s neat and allegedly unsurpassed prose which 
equates to poetry in its concise, laconic features. Yet, it is predominantly Pushkin’s poetry 
that is implicitly referred to when talking about his undeniable impact on the future 
generations of writers. Thus, Joseph Brodsky wrote about Pushkin and the poets known as 
the Pushkin Pleiad that ‘Russian poetry of the nineteenth century -  of its first half 
especially -  should be read if only because it gives you an idea of what gave birth to that 
century’s Russian psychological novel’.14
These very sentiments, only restricted to Pushkin alone, can be found in Shestov’s article, 
written almost a century earlier. ‘flyiiiKHH y Hac 6 b u i ’ , Shestov exclaims, ‘h  o t  Hero 
ocTajiocb BejiHKoe Hacjie^ne, KOTopoe y>Ke h h k u k h m h  CHJiaMH He mojkct 6 b i t b  BBipBaHO y 
Hac. 3 t o  Hacjieflne -  Bca pyccxaa JiHTepaTypa’.15 Shestov claims that thanks to Pushkin the 
very literary landscape has changed because its gravitational centre has swung from 
W estern Europe to Russia. If  before we would turn to the W est for literature, now it is the 
W est which turns to us, its recent pupils, with surprise and almost in disbelief, Shestov 
claims, in order to listen in ‘c aca/iHOH pa^ocTBio [...]  k  h o b b im  cnoBaM, pa3flaiomHMCfl b  
pyccKOH jiHTepaType’.16 W ithout hesitation he labels Tolstoy and Dostoevsky ‘^yxoBHBie
13 Briggs, p. 216.
14 Joseph Brodsky, ‘Foreword’ to An Age Ago. A Selection of Nineteenth-Century Russian Poetry, 
selected, p. xvii.
15 Shestov, A. C. IlyiuKUH, p. 332.
16 Ibid.
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1 7aera nymKHHa’. Moreover, with the same enthusiastic force Shestov claims that Pushkin 
lies at the roots o f Tolstoy’s deepest thought: ‘mm 3HaeM’, he writes, ‘ot koto 3Ta MMCJib 
nojiyuHjia Hanajio, mm 3HaeM tot cahhmh, 6e3flOHHbm h rjiydoHanmHH hctohhhk, H3
1RKOToporo Ha bckh BenHbie Syzjyr 6paTb Hauajio Bee TeueHHa Hameh jiHTepaTypM’. And as 
if  this were not clear enough Shestov further spells it out by saying that ‘HHocTpaHijM, 
Bocxnmaioiimecfl Tenepb Tojictbim h JJoctocbckhm, -  b cymHocTH OT/jaiOT ,aaHb 
nyuiKHHy’.19
Notably, in the above quotations Shestov displays his usual pattern of focusing on the 
spiritual, or, as it were ideological, value of Pushkin’s works rather than their artistic 
merits. Yet, he notices as if in passing the acknowledged beauty of Pushkin’s writings 
(again almost automatically referring to his poetry rather than prose) by saying that Pushkin 
is inaccessible to foreigners because they do not speak Russian and poetry is largely lost in 
translation. This, as if by default, tribute that he gives to the artistic merits of Pushkin while 
concentrating instead on the semantics of his writings and their spiritual impact upon his 
literary successors, once again reinforces Shestov’s complex relationship with aesthetics 
discussed in the previous chapter. Namely, it exemplifies our point about Shestov’s 
demonstration of a conscious ethical preference simultaneously with an explicit tendency 
toward a rather subconscious aesthetic appreciation.
In his claim that Pushkin lies at the source of all Russian literature Shestov names many 
more writers than just Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, whom he describes as ‘Handojiee KpynHbie,
70TajiaHTJiHBbie h THnnuecKHe Bbipa3HTejiH nyunoiHCKoro ayxa’. However, following them 
on this list there is, using Shestov’s own words, ‘eme orpOMHaa Macca nncaTejieH, c
71SojibiHHMH hjih MeHbuiHMH /japoBaHHaMH ’. They all ‘hocbt Ha ce6e nenaTb bjihbhjih
77IlymKHHa’, Shestov affirms. To conclude this thought Shestov exclaims that ‘Bee jiymnne
17 Shestov, A. C. IlyucKUH, p. 332.
18 Ibid, p. 333.
19 -n • ,19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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pyccKHe imcaTejiH h m c j ih  Ha 3HaMeHH c b o c m  o/my BeHHyio Ha^ nHCB ad majorem gloriam 
riymKHHa. TaK Bceo6BeMmom 6 b ij i  reHHH Hamero BejiHKoro noaTa’. These lines in 
particular exemplify once again the extremely rhetorical and pathetic element o f this article, 
which are so uncharacteristic of Shestov’s usual discourse, as we know it. They illustrate 
the point made above concerning the relative excess of these expressions in comparison 
with the style o f even the most idealistic of his works -  Shakespeare and Brandes -  the 
book which for Shestov, as he later told Fondane, was a unique occasion when he ‘reached 
for the sublime’.24
Unfolding his claim of all subsequent writers being in fact heirs of Pushkin, Shestov makes 
the interesting assertion that none of them actually said more than their great Father- 
Founder (poflOHaHajiBHHK). Yet, what makes them so great, Shestov continues, is that they 
could keep on the track once shown to them by Pushkin. In these somewhat peculiar words 
one can see the origins of Shestov’s development of a certain flair for paradoxical 
discourse. However, in this case he explains himself by clarifying the actual common 
ground which he describes as the general route and unifying pattern set by Pushkin: to 
teach humanity to be humane.
4.3. The conflict between art and reality in Shestov’s Pushkin. Gogol as the opposing 
genius.
The above claim deserves close attention, for it encompasses one of the fundamental ideas 
of Shestov’s article on Pushkin which can be formulated as the conflict between art and 
reality. On the one hand, Shestov asserts, an artist is supposed to portray life as it is, 
truthfully, with all its horrors and cruelty. On the other hand, life, as we know, he 
continues, least of all teaches us to be humane; its law is to promote the strong and to defeat 
the weak. Thus, the question is, ‘icaic ace mohcct no3T, ocTaBaact BepHtiM 5kh3hchhoh 
n p a B f le ,  coxpaHHTb BBicmne, jiyHume nopBiBBi CBoen ayum? rio-BHflHMOMy, BBiSopa HeT h  
He MoaceT 6 b i t b ’ , Shestov says, ‘no-BH^HMOMy ^ByM 6oraM cjiy^ KHTB HenB3a; HyacHO h j i h
23 Shestov, A. C. IlytuKUH, p. 333.
24 Fondane, p. 112.
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OnncaTb e^HCTBHTeJIbHOCTL, HJIH yHTH B o6jiaCTB Hec6bITOHHbIX 4>aHTa3HH’. Shestov 
asserts that in the new Western European literature this question still remains unresolved 
and has produced a clear border-line between the great idealists like Victor Hugo or George 
Sand, or realists like Flaubert, the Goncourts, Zola and many others. However, this 
seemingly unresolvable question was posed and solved, according to Shestov, by Russian 
literature and notably by Pushkin: ‘oh nepBbiH He yrneji c flopora, yBHfleB nepe# co6oh
9 f%rpo3Horo c(j)HHKca, noxcpaBiuero yxce He oflHoro BejiHKoro 6opua 3a HejiOBenecTBo’. In 
short, Shestov sees in Pushkin a harmonious union of idealist and realist, someone who, 
having encountered real life, can still believe in truth and good. In the rest of his article 
Shestov is essentially engaged in developing and illustrating this central idea.
In doing so he emphasises how incredibly difficult this tour-de-force must have been for 
Pushkin and points to various failed attempts of other writers to achieve this union o f life 
and art. In particular Shestov gives the example o f Gogol, who, despite his great talent 
‘cnacoBaji nepea HenocHJibHOH 3a^aHeH’.27 ‘ “CicyHHo m iT b  Ha stom CBeTe, rocno.ua”, -
9RBOCKjiHKHyji oh, H3MyHeHHbiH HanpacHbiMH noHCKaMH’, Shestov writes about Gogol. 
‘YflHBHTejibHO jih, hto oh c tukhm GjiaroroBeHHeM numeji Ha nyuiKHHa. noMHHTe bbi ero
9QcnoBa? “nymKHH ecTb HBJieHHe BejiHKoe, upe3BbiHaHHoe” ’, Shestov quotes. In this 
connection it is interesting to recall Vasilii Rozanov’s article ‘Pushkin and Gogol’ written 
in 1891, where he makes a comparison between the two by opposing them to one another. 
In his as always peculiar and unique manner Rozanov claims that Gogol’s genius 
essentially extinguished that of Pushkin, because they were o f two opposite types, one fatal 
for the existence o f the other. Yet, Rozanov says, ‘Ejiaroaapa o6pa3aM nyimcHHa h 
6jiaro,zjapfl hoboh JiHTeparype, KOTopaa Bca cnjiHTca BoccTaHOBHTb ero, no6opaa Torojia, h 
b Hamefi xch3hh paHbme hjih no33xce stot reHHii noracHeT’.30 For Rozanov Gogol’s 
imagination corrupted our souls and filled them with the deepest suffering. ‘C Torojia
25 Fondane, p. 334.
26 Shestov, A. C. TlyiuKUH, p. 334.
27 Ibid, p. 338.
28 Ibid.
30Ibid'V. V. Rozanov, ‘nyuiKHH h Torojib’ in HecoeMecmuMbie Konmpacmu Dtcumun. JIumepamypHO- 
scmemmecKue pa6om u pa3Hbixjiem  (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1990), p. 232.
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HMeHHo HaHHHaeTca b  HarneM oS m ecT B e nomepn nyecmea deucmeumejibuocmu\ Rozanov
3 1
claims, ‘paBHO KaK o t  Hero a ce  H ^ eT  hohoro h  omepameHUR k ueu \ On the other hand, 
Pushkin represents a healthy attitude to life, his poetry is the ideal o f  ‘HOpMajibHoro,
39
3£OpOBoro pa3BHTHfl\ For Rozanov ‘FlymKHH ecTb KaK 6bi c h m b o j i  3 k h 3 h h : o h  -  Beet b  
ABH^ ceHHH, h  o t  3Toro-TO TaK pa3HOo6pa3Ho ero TBopnecTBo. Bee, h t o  5 k h b c t ,  -  BJieueT
33ero, h  noAxo^H k o  BceMy -  o h  jiio 6 h t  ero h  BonjiomaeT’. Rozanov describes Pushkin as a 
founder of the natural school, always faithful to human nature and human destiny. In 
contrast to Gogol Rozanov finds in Pushkin no sick imagination or incorrect feeling.
Rozanov’s analysis of Pushkin is in fact very close to that of Shestov, for Rozanov too 
essentially acknowledges Pushkin’s power of finding harmony between real life and human 
ideals. He asserts that Pushkin’s poetry not only truthfully depicts life, but also contains 
instructions on how art should provide a constructive response to the reality depicted. 
Within it poetry only illuminates and warms up life, but does not distort it. Importantly, it 
does not create a second imaginative world to which it tries to adjust the first -  real -  one. 
‘nyuiKHH HaynaeT Hac HHUje h  bjiaropoAHee uyB C T B O B aT b’ , Rozanov writes, ‘o T r o H a e T  b  
CTopoHy b c a k h h  Harap ayuieBHbiH, h o  o h  He HajiaraeT Ha Hac HHKaKOH ynyimiHBOH 
(J)opMbi. H, jno6a ero no33HK>, Ka3K£biH ocTaeTca ccmim co6o jo \34 Furthermore, in 
Rozanov’s essay we can find the same statement that Shestov makes in his article -  that 
Pushkin had shown the way to which future generations of Russian literature are bound to 
adhere. Only in Rozanov’s case he refers to life rather than literature, while meaning the 
impact on readers of Pushkin’s creative world, of life as depicted by the poet. Indeed, he 
says that Pushkin’s poetry has already established those directions following which our life 
will keep its course without diversions, no matter how much more complicated it may 
become. This life will preserve the same unity and consistency as well as calm and clarity 
that Pushkin had found in it.
31 Rozanov, ‘FlyiiiKHH h  Torojib’, p. 233.
32 Ibid, p. 227.
33 Ibid, p. 226.
34 Ibid, p. 227.
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In his article written for the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva which served as the opening of 
the journal, Rozanov returned again to the theme of Pushkin and Gogol, only to show once 
more the opposite nature of the two. In fact he juxtaposed Pushkin not only to Gogol, but 
also to other Russian classics such as Lermontov, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Rozanov 
insisted that these writers were slaves to their literary talent which intoxicated them and 
took over their lives, making them search for the conditions of perfect external solitude 
necessary for writing. Pushkin, on the other hand, according to Rozanov, belonged first of
c
all to life and loved life and people. Gogol, who rushed to St Petersburg to see Pushkin, 
was indifferently informed by the poet’s servant that his master was still asleep, and when 
Gogol conjectured that this was due to a sleepless night spent writing poetry, the servant 
said: ‘No, he had been playing cards’. The whole article by Rozanov is based on this 
incident from which he draws far-reaching conclusions about the nature of Pushkin’s poetic 
character, allegedly opposite to the ongoing creative urges and self-sacrificial demands of 
other classics. Such assertions seem strange at the very least in that they seem to ignore all 
the existing evidence of Pushkin’s intense productivity and the fact that his writings were 
the result of the most scrupulous, immensely laborious work, consuming both time and 
effort. In a way Rozanov appears to be making the usual error of confusing the invariable 
perfect ease of Pushkin’s final literary production with the ease of a laid-back attitude, 
almost laziness, that must therefore be inherent in the producer. However, Pushkin’s genius 
overturns this false logic, and his intensity in writing seems to have equalled his intensity in 
living his life. And it is not surprising that Vladimir Solovev in his criticism of the Pushkin 
issue of Mir Iskusstva accused Rozanov of simply neglecting concrete historical facts.
It must also be noted that Rozanov’s article substantially differed from the rest of the 
publications in the Pushkin issue. When eight years earlier, in his article of 1891 discussed 
above, Rozanov set Gogol and Pushkin against one another, posing the question of whose 
genius would have a more lasting effect on society, he essentially acknowledged Pushkin as 
healthy and constructive, but not necessarily stable, and Gogol as corrupting and 
destructive, although captivating for the modem mind. This time, in 1899, Rozanov in 
some sense acted more decisively along the lines of Pushkin’s adversaries by questioning
35 See V. V. Rozanov, 3aMemKa o IlyuiKUHe, Mup ucicyccmea, 1899, No 13-14.
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the poet’s relevance to modem literary culture. More precisely, he accused the poet of not 
being sufficiently romantic and not being able to contribute to contemporary Russia as 
much as the other classics whom he juxtaposed to Pushkin also in existential terms, as 
described above. As Marcus Ch. Levitt writes, ‘co c b o h c t b c h h o h  eMy c k j i o h h o c t b i o  k  
napa^oKcaM (Jjh j io c o i]) HacTanBaji Ha t o m , h t o  IlymKHH 6bui “ c j i h i h k o m  CTpor”, “cepte3eH” 
h  “Tpe3B”, b  t o  BpeMB Kax Ha3BaHHtie nncaTejiH36 6b u i h  “onbjmeHbi” h  noTOMy cnocofiHBi
'in
k  npopHLjaHHio’. Rozanov spoke of the current absence o f practical demand for Pushkin 
and concluded that his role now was only to be sanctified and admired from a distance
-JO
rather than to contribute to the life of society. Similar to his assertions described above 
about Pushkin’s creative life, these claims about the poet’s ‘practical’ irrelevance sound 
equally ungrounded and, as Levitt notes, resonate with the famous statement by Belinsky in 
1844 that Pushkin did not respond to the burning questions of the day.
Thus, curiously, both Shestov and Rozanov used Gogol’s admiration for Pushkin to draw 
different conclusions about the poet. Rozanov deemed them equally great, but incompatible 
in the very character of their genius, while Shestov considered Gogol as looking up to 
Pushkin, who had won in the battle in which Gogol failed -  of reconciling art and reality. In 
general, Gogol’s role in constmcting the ‘Pushkin myth’ was extremely significant. His 
lines about Pushkin that Shestov partially quoted in his article was taken up by many 
representatives of Russian culture: they served as an opening in Dostoevsky’s famous 
speech in 1880 as well as in Merezhkovsky’s article for Mir Iskusstva in 1899. Moreover, 
these sentiments of Gogol that Pushkin is ‘pyccKHH u e j iO B e K  b  k o h c h h o m  ero pa3BHTHH, b  
KaKOM o h , MoaceT 6b i t b , HBHTCH uepe3 / jB e c T H  jieT’ in a way prefigured the Nietzschean 
motives in the reception of Pushkin at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
36 The reference is to the earlier line where Lermontov, Gogol’, Dostoevskii and Tolstoi were 
mentioned.
37 Levitt, p. 31.
38 See Levitt, p. 31.
39 Nikolai Gogol', ‘H ecKOJibKO c jio b  o  n y m ic H H e ’ (1832). Cited in Papemo, p. 44.
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4.4. The role of Nietzsche in constructing the Pushkin myth. The struggle between an 
author and his heroes.
Such motives were particularly strong in the Symbolist movement. Thus, the Pushkin issue 
of Mir Iskusstva, by reclaiming Pushkin back from the broad masses, represented an 
aesthetic opposition front which strove to rescue the poet from the barbarians and to 
establish a Nietzschean rejection of exoteric plebeian culture, redeeming instead the priority 
of the esoteric aristocratic culture, using the words of Levitt.40 Similarly, the Nietzschean 
theme of the Superman permeates Andrei Belyi’s Arabeski, where, as Irina Papemo notices 
in her article on ‘Pushkin in the life of a person of the Silver Age’, the image of Pushkin is 
implicit. In many of his articles, Papemo states, Belyi revives Gogol’s themes, formulated 
in terms of the Russian Schellingean trend, via the new Nietzschean-Symbolist approach 41 
Amongst these themes, which Papemo lists, is the one raised by Shestov in his article as the 
k e y  o n e  -  ‘T p arn n ecK oro  HecooTBeTCTBua n /jea jia  h flencTBHTejiBHOCTH, H cxyccT B a h 
)k h 3 h h ’42 that was discussed above.
As Papemo writes, ‘cb ji3b  nyuiKHHHaHCTBa h  pyccKoro HHumeaHCTBa (o^Horo H3 
ueHTpajitHBix HfleojioriiHecKHX TeueHHH onoxn) h  h x  B3anMHaa npoeiojHa oboraTHJin h  
noAKpennjiH o6e 3 t h  KyjiBTypHBie napa^HrMBi’.43 Yet, in the Silver Age, it was mainly the 
Symbolists such as Merezhkovsky, Belyi, Briusov, Blok and others who made and 
developed this connection, and not Shestov. For our purposes it is very instructive to note 
that almost immediately after having written his Tolstoy and Nietzsche and just before 
starting his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, Shestov made no mention of the German 
philosopher when writing about Pushkin. This fact is certainly o f great significance and 
should help us understand Shestov’s point o f departure in his treatment of Pushkin, as 
reflected in his ‘A S. Pushkin’ article.
40 Levitt, p. 33.
41 Irina Papemo, ‘IlyuiKHH b hokhh nejioBeica CepebpaHoro Beica’, in CoepeMemoe OMepuKancKoe 
nyiuKUHoeedenue. Cdopnm cmameu, pp. 42- 68 (p. 44).
4 Papemo, p. 44.
43 Ibid, p. 43.
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In his essay on Shestov entitled ‘Tragedy and the Mundane’ Berdiaev classifies Shestov’s 
aproach to the existential experience of a writer under Shestov’s study as projected onto the 
writer’s literary works either as self-denial or self-justification.44
Indeed, for Tolstoy Shestov seems to use the latter psychological scheme, whereas for 
Dostoevsky it is the former. In each case, however, Shestov involved the figure of 
Nietzsche to create a background against which the Russian writer in question would 
expose his true nature, no longer shaded by any secondary considerations or masked by 
various disguises. In other words, Nietzsche taught Shestov to read between the lines, not 
trusting direct and explicit discourse. In the case of Tolstoy Shestov drew a parallel 
between him and Nietzsche in that both sought a refuge from tragedy since they were 
unable to withstand it, and eventually escaped: one into preaching as a form of self- 
justification, the other into constructing his Superman. On the other hand Dostoevsky, 
according to Shestov, had long been engaged in self-denial until he realised the useless 
nature of the humanist ideals that he had once embraced, and came to hate the power of 
ideas and idealism over human life. In this Shestov sees a direct parallel with Nietzsche 
who also diligently served the good until fate taught him a cruel lesson and made him see 
the true and terrible nature of life. Thus, in a sense, in both cases Shestov used Nietzsche to 
illustrate the deceptive nature of judging writers at face-value and called upon readers to 
search always for the concealed meaning of their writings and for the authors’ breaking 
point. In the case of Pushkin, however, in contrast to the above, Shestov did not even 
attempt to seek such a transformation of convictions, to seek the moment at which Pushkin 
might have undergone a total crisis and emerged a different person with a new set of values 
and beliefs.
Thus, with writers like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky Shestov invariably assumed in them a 
profound dynamics of the same nature -  leading to the renunciation of humanist ideals, 
disillusionment and revelations as a result of trying to overcome existential tragedy. 
Pushkin, on the other hand, appeared to Shestov at the time of writing his article as a 
completed motionless image invested with absolute features characteristic rather of a
44 Berdiaev, ‘Tpareami h obfcweHHOCTb’, p. 471.
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monument than a person. In other words, Shestov’s schematic and restricted perception of 
Pushkin in 1899 is largely orthogonal to his usual hermeneutic approach to writers through 
the development of their existential experience which he decoded in their writings. When 
we say ‘largely orthogonal’ we mean that there are still certain features of this approach 
that are akin to Shestov’s usual method. These features, in our view, lie on the plane of 
interpretation of the writer through his heroes.
Indeed, Shestov read from the Underground Man’s contemplations, as well as the 
behaviour and ideas of Raskolnikov and Ivan Karamazov, Dostoevsky’s own doubts and 
soul-searching. Similarly, he deciphered Tolstoy’s heroes such as the seemingly exemplary 
Levin from Anna Karenina or the apparently self-contented Natasha, Pierre or Sonia from 
War and Peace, together with the agonising Ivan Ilich as Tolstoy’s personal attempts to 
resolve the eternal questions of existence. He, as it were, used those characters as deceptive 
double-pictures in which under the superficial layer there lies concealed and waiting to be 
exposed the second, true image. This image for Shestov served as a conductor of the 
writer’s true self, as a mirror of his real existential struggle.
On the surface it seems that in the case of Pushkin Shestov abandoned this game, started in 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche, and returned to a rather straightforward technique reminiscent more 
of his Shakespeare and Brandes. Indeed, when discussing Pushkin, just as when writing 
about Shakespeare, Shestov does not interrogate their negative characters in order to extract 
from the latter classified information about the writers; he does not rub off their colours to 
discover very different, hidden images. He takes them at face-value, largely within the 
established critical tradition, and interprets their positive heroes as the direct embodiment 
of the authors’ intentions. On the contrary, when exploring Tolstoy and Dostoevsky 
Shestov does not trust their positive heroes and turns to the negative ones for a hidden key 
to the writer’s soul. Yet, we claim, although the game Shestov plays is indeed different in 
spirit in the case of Pushkin or Shakespeare on the one hand and Tolstoy, Dostoevsky et al 
on the other, there is still a common root in this game in the form of the interplay between 
the characters and the writers. Namely, Shestov perceives a literary work as a battlefield 
between the author united with his (often pathetic) representatives -  his positive characters
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-  against his negative characters as the enemy army. In this battle Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and 
others almost invariably failed while Pushkin and Shakespeare won (to be more precise, in 
the case of Shakespeare the latter, according to Shestov, revealed a new dimension in a 
negative character which rendered him positive or rather uncovered the hidden and highest 
meaning of existential tragedy).
It is interesting that even Shestov’s terminology unambiguously suggests the above 
interpretation. Indeed, he exclaims about Pushkin that he ‘BOCTopacecTBOBaji naa c b o h m  
OHerHHtiM’45 and that this victory is ‘He <j)HKTHBHaa’, that Pushkin ‘3Ty no6e/jy [...] He 
BtmyMaJI -  OH TOJIBKO OTMeTHJI TO, HTO 6bIJIO Ha CaMOM flejie, HTO OH CBOHMH ma3aMH 
BHAeji b  pyccKOH 5KH3HH’.46 It must be said that this difference is quite clearly due to the 
stage of Shestov’s inner development rather than to the writers in question. This is so 
simply because in his article on Pushkin Shestov explicitly equated Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky to Pushkin in their alleged victory over the tragedy of life, thus essentially 
contradicting his conclusions in Tolstoy and Nietzsche which he had just written. Contrary 
to his accusations, implicit in the book, against Tolstoy for his flight from tragedy to the 
mundane, Shestov wrote in his Pushkin article that Tolstoy ‘He 6 o h t c b  TpareflHH - h  npaMO 
nra/mT eft b  rjia3a’ 47 Shestov asserts that Tolstoy emerged a victor from his impossible 
task o f portraying the tragic (like the war o f 1812) in a way that would not kill all faith and 
all hope. For him ‘xyzumecTBeHHaa 3a#ana HHKoraa He onpe^ejiajiacb h h c t o  
acTeTHuecKHMH 3anpocaMH zjymn’,48 Shestov claims. Instead, he says, Tolstoy ‘6paji nepo 
b  pyKH j i h h i b  Tor^a h  3aTeM, Kor^a, nocjie ynopHoro h  TpeBO)KHoro pa3MbiuuieHHfl, o h  m o t  
ocBeTHTb j\ ji% cebfl h  jyra apyrax 3ara^xy > k h 3 h h ’ .49 Hence Shestov asserts that in Tolstoy 
‘bm nyBCTByeTe BejiHKoro yneHHKa BejiHKoro IlymKHHa’.50 Moreover, Shestov makes 
similar remarks about Dostoevsky -  and this is on the verge of writing his Dostoevsky and
45 Shestov, A. C. IlyiuKUH, p. 336.
46 Ibid, p. 338.
47 Ibid, p. 343.
48 Ibid, p. 342.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid, p. 343.
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Nietzsche, portraying the novelist as engaged in a tormenting battle against the humanist 
tradition.
4.5. ‘A. S. Pushkin9 against Shakespeare and his critic Brandes as evidence of 
Shestov’s inner development.
Thus it must be emphasised once again that this apparent fluidity of opinions and a clear 
lack of established views serve as a transparent indication of these views being still in the 
process of formation. The destiny of Shestov’s article on Pushkin is a further testimony to 
it. Indeed, whether intended for publication in the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva or written 
regardless and independently of it, simply on the wave of the poet’s centenary, Shestov’s 
article was only discovered posthumously and subsequently appeared in the almanac 
Vozdushnye Puti in New York as late as 1960. Given its extremely idealistic tone the most 
likely scenario seems to be that it was Shestov’s own independent decision to leave this 
work unpublished. Therefore it is quite likely that Shestov’s sincere admiration of Pushkin 
exceeded the force of his new world outlook which prevailed by 1899 and which was 
unambiguously established in Tolstoy and Nietzsche. The fact that he wrote this article at a 
time when he had divested himself, with near-disgust, of his previous intoxication with 
ideals and naive youthful beliefs must testify to the victory of scepticism being still 
incomplete in Shestov. Yet, never publishing this work and apparently not even showing it 
to others can be interpreted as another sign of Shestov’s inner struggle, with his new 
convictions ultimately taking the upper hand. Incidentally, another proof of the fact that 
Shestov’s convictions at the time were a result of his own idealism, which was still alive, 
rather than being due to the nature of the authors under study is that, as we shall see, he 
later lost his awe of Pushkin, in the sense that he was no longer under the spell of the poet’s 
overpowering positive characters, whom Shestov had regarded as instructive for posterity.
Notably, Shestov’s exclamations about Pushkin in his article are very similar to those he 
made about Shakespeare in his first book. Thus, he proclaims in admiration:
C n n a  h  BejiH K oe yH H B ep can b H oe 3H aneH H e lU e K c n n p a  h m c h h o  b t o m , h to  b s t o h  6ecnpocB eT H O H  
TbMe oh  H arneji n y n > . TaM , rzje / y w  H ac x a o c ,  c jiy n a H , 6eccM b icjieH H aa  6 o p b 6 a  MepTBOH, 
paBHO/jyuiHOH, h o  GecKOHeHHO M oryn eH  ch jib i c hchbbim , nyBCTByiomHM , h o  H eM om nbiM
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nejioBeKOM (t. e. TaM, rae aJia Hac objiacTb Hejienoro TparH3Ma), -  TaM noaT bh^ht ocMbicjieHHbiH 
npouecc AyxoBHoro pa3BHTHH.51
Along the same lines he exclaims about Pushkin that
Bee caM bie M panH bie cT opoH bi mch3 h h  npHKOBbmajiH e r o  BHHMaHHe h o h  c ao jirH M , HeycTaHHbiM 
T epneH H eM  B rjiaab iB ajica  b  h h x , n o x a  He H a x o a m i a jih  h h x  HyjK Horo 06 'bHCHeHHa. [ . . . ]  K aicne 
yacacb i TOJibKO He n p o x o aH jiH  n e p e a  e r o  ayxoB H biM  B3opoM . H  TeM He M eHee -  o h  He C M ym jica . 
B e3A e, bo  BceM o h  yM eji OTbiCKaTb BHyrpeHHHH, rayboK H H  cm bicji, t o h h o  xch3h b  p e m n n a c b  BbiaaTb 
CBoeMy jn o S u M u y  h  H36paHHHKy Bee c b o h  coK poBeH Hbie TaHH bi.52
Yet, his praise of Shakespeare in his first book sounds stylistically relatively low-key in 
comparison. Thus, for example, Shestov writes in the opening lines o f his article on 
Pushkin the following phrase: ‘Ha 3eMJie HeaoBenecKHe pyKH He co3HaaaH eme xpaMa, 
KOToptm Mor 6bi cpaBHHTbca no KpacoTe CBoen c bcjihkoh flyrnoH IlymKHHa’. In the 
same vein later on Shestov calls Pushkin’s art Divine54 and labels him after Dostoevsky 
‘BcenejioBeK’.55 In general such expressions are very representative o f the stylistic and 
semantic texture of this article.
As Valevicius concludes in his book analysing Shestov’s Shakespeare and Brandes, ‘for 
Shestov in 1898 there still was an answer to the question of the meaning of life and 
Shakespeare held it’.56 The same, even with more force, can be asserted about Pushkin in 
the sense of holding the ultimate answer for Shestov in 1899, solely on the basis of 
Shestov’s article. The difference is, however, that for Shestov in 1899 this was only the 
sunlit, daytime part of the picture. But, taking an intertextual approach and considering this 
article in the context of his preceding book on Tolstoy and Nietzsche and the subsequent 
one on Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, we can see that the shadow, hidden, night-time part of 
the picture was completely opposite, full of tormenting doubts. This observation links very 
naturally with the analysis by Viktor Erofeev who asserts that Shestov's thought operated
51 Shestov, UJeKcnup u ezo xpumuK Epaudec, p. 177.
52 Shestov, A. C. IJyuiKUH, p. 338.
53 Ibid, p. 331.
54 Ibid, p. 339.
55 Ibid, p. 343.
56 Valevicius, p. 10.
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on two levels: a day-time one and a night-time one, i. e. on the level of the mundane and the 
level of tragedy (to borrow from the title of Berdiaev's article on Shestov), and these two 
levels were constantly fighting and undermining each other. The mundane was linked with 
humanism and as such largely represented the human norm, that is to say largely the 
mediocre, whereas the night vision was tragic and full of forbidden discoveries that
cn
contradicted all accepted values.
The very discourses of Shestov’s mature works on the one hand and his ‘A. S. Pushkin’ 
article on the other are opposite in that in the former he uses an indirect mode of discourse, 
whereas in the latter it is clearly direct. The typically scornful vigour of Shestov’s fully- 
fledged style is manifested in advance in his Pushkin article by a loud pathos reminiscent 
more of that inherent in the later hypocritical tradition of socialist realism. Therefore this 
article is even difficult to read in our time, since from the perspective of modernity any 
open pathos is hard to take seriously, and it is Shestov’s usual irony and shrewd 
deconstructive analysis that have much more appeal for the modem reader. In fact, if 
Shestov had written all his works in the style of his ‘A. S. Pushkin’, he almost certainly 
would be forgotten by now and would not have left his distinct footprint on Russian 
thought. It is precisely the opposite type of discourse -  critical and rebellious in virtually all 
its manifestations -  by which we know and remember Shestov to the present day and hold 
him in high regard. In Shestov’s time too, largely due to Gogol and his successors such as 
Saltykov-Shchedrin and the authors of Kozma Prutkov,58 and ironically due to Pushkin too, 
the ironic and subversive tradition was popular and fast developing.
The debate following Dostoevsky’s Pushkin speech only highlights these two different 
trends which were developing in Russian culture and for that matter in world culture too. In 
a way they are as described by Rozanov in his article about Pushkin and Gogol whom he 
essentially deems to be representatives respectively of each of these trends, and views the
57 Erofeev, pp. 173-174.
58 Kozma Prutkov (Ko3bMa IIpyTKOB) was a fictional character invented by Aleksei Tolstoi and his 
cousins: Aleksandr, Aleksei and Vladimir Zhemchuzhnikov. Using Prutkov as an imaginary author 
they produced a highly satirical account of the bureaucratic and authoritarian Russian regime of the 
1850s and 1860s.
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two writers and hence the two currents as cancelling one another out in their intrinsic 
incompatibility and inner opposition.59 Continuing Rozanov’s rather intuitive division we 
can extend it as follows. With the due correction that the tradition originated by Pushkin 
harmoniously united idealism with realism and organically blended romantic and ironic 
styles, thus falling between two stools, they can be, nevertheless, crudely labelled as direct, 
serious, idealistic and utopian, and indirect, ironic and anti-utopian respectively. The 
division in reality is, of course, much more complex, allowing for all sorts of subdivisions 
and the fluidity of borders. Apart from Pushkin, there is also Dostoevsky whose 
camivalesque tradition permeates both trends, spilling over their boundaries, and he is far 
from being the only example of this kind. Nevertheless, there are writers like Turgenev and 
Tolstoy who largely belong to the first trend, or those like Saltykov-Shchedrin from the 
second. On the other hand, Chekhov is again a mixture of ironic undercurrents with waves 
of open lyricism.
In any case, within this broad classification, the later evolution of these two cultural and 
literary discourses has been complicated and marked by their alternating division and 
reunification giving rise to new and rich genres. The anti-utopian tradition eventually 
evolved into post-modernism, while the utopian has shifted substantially into the same 
direction of irony bordering on cynicism as a form of despair (to rephrase Joseph 
Brodsky).60 In the light of this it is important to emphasise that, generally speaking, what 
makes Shestov still readable in our day is the kernel and quintessence of his whole 
philosophy -  his distrust of, and disdain for self-evident truths, as reflected in his ironic and 
aphoristic style. And this is exactly what his article on Pushkin lacks, being fully composed 
of the self-evident, of what lies on the surface and fits into the frame of idealism and 
dogmatism which in turn are currents of the aforementioned utopian trend. The extreme 
forms of the latter had started to outlive themselves in Shestov’s time, then were embraced 
by the totalitarian ideology to serve its needs, and now, historically, after the overwhelming 
dominance of hypocrisy both in literary and social terms, are hardly tolerable and thus
59 See Rozanov, ‘IlyiiiKHH h Torojib’, pp. 228-229.
60 In his ‘IlyTemecTBHe b C r a M b y j i ’ Brodskii says, ‘C h o 6 h 3 m ?  Ho o h  J in u ib  (JiopMa o T H aflH b a’ , in 
CoHuneHM Hocucfra EpodcKOZO, vol. V, p. 288.
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almost completely extinct. What came to succeed these forms, is neo-romanticism which 
represents a substantial degree of sobriety that has been added to the romantic tradition, 
thus in a way returning to Pushkin.
In the light of this we can now see why Shestov’s Shakespeare and his critic Brandes61 is, 
as we said above, less idealistic and dogmatic than his ‘A. S. Pushkin’. Indeed, although in 
his Shakespeare and Brandes Shestov’s ideology was still within the first -  utopian -  
tradition, this way of communicating this ideology was already beginning to take a turn 
towards Shestov’s ‘proper’ style belonging clearly to the other, anti-utopian trend. On the 
other hand, his ‘A. S. Pushkin’ is a step back towards being fully subordinated to this 
ideology, both semantically and stylistically. Interestingly, there is just one phrase in his 
whole article on Pushkin which sharply stands out and gives us an example of Shestov's 
‘true style’ -  masterfully concise and semantically non-obvious as well as acutely modem. 
This phrase is given in the context of describing the extraordinary strength of Pushkin's 
faith in life and reads as follows: ‘H h b im h  cnoBaMH, ero Bepa He Hy^naeTca b  h jijik >3h h , 
Ajhi KOTopoh, b  c b o k ) onepeAb, Heo6xo,zuiMbiM ycjiOBneM HBJifleTCfl nepcneKTHBa’.62
Thus from the point of view of the two opposite literary trends and taking into account this 
reverse chronology in the context of Shestov’s other works, we can conjecture not only that 
his rapid route from one tradition to the other was not entirely linear, but also that it was 
profoundly and painfully marked by Shestov’s premonitions of the doomed destiny of this 
serious and idealistic discourse as such, from which he himself originated in literary terms 
and to which his heart was initially strongly attached. Dostoevsky’s speech of 1880 clearly 
contributed to this struggle, even though it did not change the eventual outcome. Baranova- 
Shestova also acknowledges the impact of this speech on Shestov’s ‘Pushkin’, saying that it 
was written under its strong influence. Thus the struggle between the above two literary 
trends reflected and coincided with Shestov’s own existential and ideological struggle and 
formed that prism through which he later viewed writers and their works.
61 In the sequel this book will be referred to in short as Shakespeare and Brandes.
62 Shestov, A. C. IlyiuKUH, p. 341.
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Our comparison of Shestov’s Shakespeare and Brandes with his ‘Pushkin’ can be further 
supported by the words of Valevicius that in the former work ‘in many ways the entire 
Shestov in all his audacity is already in evidence and, retrospectively, we can distinguish
f\%certain themes which were to become leitmotifs in all his future works’. This is definitely 
so, with the conflict between art and science, reason and soul already present, whereas in 
‘Pushkin’ the only elements of Shestov proper are the intensity of his temperament, only in 
the form of pathos rather than scornful vigour, and his approach to the problem of 
existential tragedy and its artistic solution. The central conflict for Shestov of mind and 
soul, reason and faith, art and science is not really present in his ‘Pushkin’, but already 
comes on to the scene, if only in a sketchy form, in his first book. The problem of the 
author and his heroes is also already evident in Shakespeare and Brandes, but is only in the 
embryonic state in ‘Pushkin’. The existential approach to the writer crucial for Shestov is 
virtually non-existent in ‘Pushkin’, but is apparent in Shakespeare and Brandes. Valevicius 
remarks that the latter ‘suffers a little in terms of historical accuracy regarding 
Shakespeare’s life’, but emphasises that Shestov only had ‘nineteenth-century 
Shakespearean scholarship to go by’.64 This is a very important distinction between the two 
works, as, for the mature Shestov, relying on a writer’s biography was crucial. Moreover, 
as Valevicius points out, it is probably from Brandes that Shestov learned his person- 
centred approach.65 Yet, obviously Shestov’s glorification of Pushkin prevented him from 
going into any biographical analysis of the poet -  a fact which is even more peculiar given 
that this was the age when, precisely due to Pushkin studies, two critical movements were 
establishing themselves: biographism and formalism.
4.6. Shestov's method versus biographism and formalism in the case study of Pushkin.
As Papemo points out, the Pushkin myth held him to be the universal model which 
harmoniously united ‘a man and a poet’. One of the first to enter the polemics around this 
problem was Vladimir Solov’ev, who, as Papemo writes, tried to reject the Pushkin cult 
and asserted that in fact the figure of Pushkin accommodated the striking contradiction
63 Valevicius, p. 11.
64 Ibid, p. 11.
65 Ibid, p. 13.
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between a poetic ideal and everyday reality. Symbolists such as Briusov and Belyi 
essentially asserted the concept of i>KH3HeTBopHecTBO’, insisting on the inevitability of a 
poet's life merging with and moreover being modelled and shaped by his creativity. As 
Papemo explains, it was Vladislav Khodasevich who decisively criticised this Symbolist 
concept and claimed that their theory that life had to be artificially merged with poetry 
failed miserably since both life and poetry were wrecked as a result.66
In a sense Khodasevich juxtaposed Pushkin to the Symbolists in that Pushkin consciously 
realised the innate connection of his existential tragedy with his poetic personality while the 
Symbolists were trying to construct and rule their life so that it was inseparable from their 
poetry. Thus Khodasevich, while criticising the Symbolists' concept of uniting poet and 
man was in fact himself far from fully splitting the two. At the same time Modest Goftnan, 
as Papemo explains, was decisively promoting such a split when studying the poet. 
Khodasevich and Goftnan were engaged in a heated polemic on this topic, and it is the 
principle of such a split that according to Khodasevich gave rise to the above movements. 
Biographism is preoccupied purely by the life path of a writer, while formalism only 
studies his works. For Khodasevich a clear example of biographism was Veresaev's study 
of Pushkin which came to the conclusion that there is always a discrepancy between 
Pushkin the man and Pushkin the poet. Thus Veresaev offered a study of Pushkin based 
entirely on the evidence of his life and not on his poetry, deeming a concentration on his 
poetry massively misleading in conventional Pushkin studies. Veresaev called this 
erroneous approach of treating Pushkin's poetry as evidence of his personality ‘Bepa b  
AorMaT 0 6  aficojnoTHOH aBTo6 norpa(j)HHHOCTH nyniKHHa’, and saw it in Khodasevich. 
The latter denounced both biographism and formalism as products of the emerging Soviet 
materialistic tradition which promoted ‘j ik > 6 o b i » k  MaTepnanaM pa^H MaTepnajiOB’. 
Interestingly, Papemo makes a connection between these approaches on the one hand and
66 See Papemo, pp. 46-48.
67 V. Veresaev, IJymKUH e otcmnu (Moscow, 1926), p. 43. Cited in Papemo, p. 49.
68 V. Khodasevich, lIJyiuKUH e Dtcmnu (llo noBojiy KHnrn B. B. BepecaeBa)’, nocneduue noeocmu 
(Paris), (2120) 13.01.1927, p. 3. Cited in Papemo, p. 50.
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the christological polemics of the divine and human sides o f Christ, o f the God-man 
(EoroHejiOBeic) and man-God (HejiOBeKofior) on the other.69
All these debates are directly relevant to our study of Shestov, since we claim that he found 
yet another way o f looking at the two approaches. Instead o f uniting or splitting them 
Shestov as it were filtered formalism through the sieve of biographism, thus offering an 
original paradigm of decoding literary works in a new light. Instead of juxtaposing the 
writer to the man he attempted to peel the man off the writer. Yet, as we pointed out, he 
was not ready to do it to Pushkin in 1899. However, already in 1903 when writing his 
Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness, Shestov was already doing precisely that. Thus, he submits 
to doubt the sincerity of Pushkin's line that the supreme judge o f his own poetry is the poet 
himself rather than the reading crowd. ‘Mo)KeT 6 b i t b , o h  h  nyBCTBOBan, KaK Mano MoaceT 
6 b i t b  flOBOJieH c b o h m h  TpyzjaMH nooT -  h o  ropaocTB Memana eMy npH3HaTbca b  CBoen 
cjiafiocTH, h  o h  ntrrajica j i h h i h h h  pa3 yremHTt cefia co3HaHHeM CBoero npeBocxoflCTBa
70 . .1
Haa TOJinofi. [...] nyuiKHH 6 b u i  yMHbiM uejiOBeKOM h  oueHb rnyfioKOH HaTypofi’. Thus 
Shestov for the first time after his ‘Pushkin’ article starts treating the poet in his usual 
distrustful way, finding discrepancies between Pushkin's claims and his actual beliefs. 
Notably, Shestov compares Pushkin to Shakespeare, claiming that the latter would never 
have accepted Pushkin's statement about a poet's satisfaction about his writings. The same 
Shestov who only five years previously had thought that Shakespeare could pacify and 
resolve our existential anxiety, now said that ‘nocjie raMJiema nejioBeK MoaceT
71ycnoKOHTbca TOJibKO b  rpofiy...’.
4.7. Shestov’s Pushkin in evolution.
The evolution of Shestov's attitudes can be traced most distinctly when looking at his 
treatment of Pushkin's Tat’iana. Back in 1899 she, and not Onegin, was for Shestov the 
central figure of Pushkin's famous work, and she symbolised the moral victory of the ideal 
over reality. In 1905, in his Apotheosis o f Groundlessness, Shestov still views her as a
69 See Papemo, pp. 50-51.
70 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoHeeHHOcmu, p. 118.
71 Ibid.
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moral paragon, but his sentiments about it are altogether different. Before Pushkin defeated 
Onegin by introducing Tatiana who was to symbolise the victory of the ideal over reality,
77but now Tatiana is a keeper of morality because ‘oto jxejio He npncTajio My^ CHHHe’, as 
Shestov writes. Men have different functions -  they are to fight wars, not to promote peace 
and humility, as the impostor in Boris Godunov explains to Pimen, Shestov observes. But, 
Shestov continues, when a man comes home he needs to know that his rights are reliably 
protected, and that is when Tatiana comes on to the scene with her famous ‘a flpyroMy
7^OTflana h 6yay Bex eMy Bepna’. This phrase in which, as Shestov claimed in 1899, the 
quintessence of the whole novel is concealed, at the time unambiguously meant for him that 
falsehood and immorality ultimately fail in the face of the ideals of good. ‘TaTbjma [...] 
Morjia 6bi ohihOhtbcji, xax oum6jiacb, Koiyja BnepBbie BCTperajiacb c OHerHHbiM, He 
pa3ra#aTb OHeraHa h OTKjiHKHyTbca Ha ero npH3biB. Ho nyuiKHH He Mor h He .ziojmeH 
6bui omnGHTbca’,74 Shestov wrote then. Because the task of Pushkin ‘cBO/uinacb k  TOMy, 
HToObI OTblCKaTb B XCH3HH, B fleHCTBHTeJlbHOH 3KH3HH TaKOH 3J1CMCHT, nepefl KOTOpbIM 6bl 
pacnanacb b npax ^ep3HOBeHHaa, ho nycTaa cxeMa HCKaTejien ayxoBHbix npHKjnoneHHH
ne
OHerHHbix’. In 1905 Tatiana's fidelity and high morality are only there to provide an 
opportunity for a man who is implicitly free to misbehave in any way he likes, since he 
openly disregards the peaceful appeals of the Christian commandments, to have a hearth of 
rest and peace. This new perspective clearly shows that Shestov himself over a period as 
short as five years at most (because in 1904 the Apotheosis was finished) had turned 
drastically away from his idealistic interpretations of Pushkin.
Moreover, in 1904 Shestov no longer sees in Turgenev's female characters the continuation 
of Pushkin's Tatiana, as he did in 1899. Indeed, back then he wrote that all Turgenev's 
heroines, ‘3to y^ce flaBHO noaMeneHO -  hmciot cboh npoTOTHn b TaTbHHe nyniKHHa, h 
noaoOHO eH HBJIillOTCJI HpaBCTBeHHblMH CyflbHMH H CBeTOHaMH B 5KH3HH’ .76 In the
72 Shestov, Ano<peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, p. 72.
73 A.S. Pushkin, Eeaenuu Oneam in Codpanue conmenuu e 10 moMax, vol. 4, p. 160. Cited in 
Shestov, Ano(peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, p. 72.
74 Shestov, A. C. IJyiuxuH, p. 337.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, p. 342.
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Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness he claims that the critics making such a comparison had been 
misled by the external resemblance. Instead Shestov emphasises that a heroine in 
Turgenev's works -  in contrast to Pushkin's Tatiana -  ‘aBJiaeTca cyzjteH h Harpa^on (a 
H H o r,z ja  h  B /jo x H O B H T e j ib H H ije H )  n o G e /u r r e jr a -M y jK H H H b T .77 ‘Pa3mma c j i h u i k o m  BejiHKa’,78 
he then exclaims. Thus for Shestov in 1904 Turgenev's female almost instigates a fight, 
judges the participants and rewards the victor with her own self. Tatiana, on the other hand, 
is not a judge, but simply an embodiment of reliability, if you like an insurance against 
infidelity and betrayal, a symbol of a solid home front. Thus, this topic alone shows that 
Shestov's attitudes between 1899 and 1904 evolved considerably to produce his own 
independent opinion, cutting across conventional views. In Apotheosis o f Groundlessness 
we encounter an independently-minded mature Shestov, sceptical, shrewd and distrustful.
A similar example is Shestov's discussion on Pushkin's Onegin as opposed to Lermontov's 
Pechorin. This migrates to his next book -  on Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, but is marked by 
quite different sentiments, even though the book followed almost immediately after the 
Pushkin article. This time Shestov concentrates almost entirely on Pechorin; yet, although 
he largely repeats his claims from the article, under closer scrutiny we can see in them a 
clear change of attitude or at least a change of focus on Shestov's part, and certainly a 
drastic change of discourse. Indeed, in 1899 Shestov described The Hero o f Our Time as
70
‘ano(J)eo3 6e3^ymHoro 3roH3Ma’, as a victory in our life of ‘rpyfiaa, fiecnoma^Haa cmia’. 
Shestov claimed that Lermontov could not defeat his hero and so, in order to stay truthful, 
started to sing praises to him instead, which every victor is entitled to. Pechorin with his 
mighty abilities and only one fault -  his extreme and cold-blooded cruelty -  comes on top
QA
of the world and thus ‘yfinBaeT BcaKyio Bepy, Bcjncyio H a ^ e ^ y ’, Shestov concluded in 
1899. However, in contrast to that Pushkin did not fall a victim of his Onegin and found the 
character of Tatiana to defeat him. The meaning of our whole Russian literature, Shestov 
asserts, is that its heroes are Tatianas rather than Onegins, so ‘y Hac nofioK^aeT He rpyfiaa
77 Shestov, Ano(peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, p. 72.
78 Ibid.
79 Shestov, A. C. IJyiuKUH, p. 336.
80 Ibid.
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caMoyBepeHHaa, aroHCTHHecicaa CHjia, He fieccepAeHHaji j k c c t o k o c t b ,  a rjiySoKaa, x o t h
o 1
rax aa  h  HecjiLiHiHaa Bepa b  CBoe a o c t o h h c t b o  h  b  a o c t o h h c t b o  Kaac^oro HejiOBexa’.
Now, in 1901 in the Introduction to his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, Shestov seemingly 
rehearses the same arguments. He describes Pechorin as a victor in front o f whom all other 
heroes are destroyed. In Lermontov’s novel, Shestov exclaims, ‘h c t  aa)Ke, KaK b  
nyuiKHHCKOM Oueeune, TaTbflHbi, KOTOpaa xoTa 6bi pa3 3a Bee BpeMa HanoMHHjia repoio, 
h t o  Ha CBeTe cymecTByex h c h t o  6ojiee CBjmieHHoe, HeacejiH ero, HenopHHa, b o j m , h t o  ecTb 
AO Jir, H^ea h j i h  H TO -H H 6ym > b  TaKOM po^e’. However, already in these lines we can 
detect a change o f perspective in Shestov. Tatiana is no longer glorified, Shestov is no 
longer interested in asserting Pushkin’s overwhelming inner harmony -  instead he mentions 
Tatiana almost in passing, almost dismissively, only as a background against which the 
figure o f Pechorin is better highlighted. What interests Shestov this time is Lermontov's 
intentions. He no longer emphasises that Lermontov fell victim to his hero. Instead he 
swings to the other side to show that Pechorin in fact is very dear to Lermontov, that this 
‘disease’ (using Lermontov's own words from his preface to the second edition of the 
novel), is ‘ojuia H3 Tex 6ojie3HeH, KOTopbie aBTOpy Aopoxce b c a k o t o  3AopoBba’. This is 
Shestov's answer to the question that he himself posed: ‘Ornero ace y nejioBeKa, TaK 
yMeBinero OTKpbiTb h  onncaTb 6ojie3Hb, HeT HHKaKoro JKejiaHHJi JieHHTb ee. H, Boofime,
Qy|
OTuero npe^HCJiOBHe TaK cnoKOHHO, x o t a  h  c h j i b h o  HanncaHo?’. Shestov implicates 
Lermontov in a deliberately misleading statement:
‘T jia B H o e , HTo6bi 6 o jie3 H b  6 b u ia  yK a3aH a, a  KaK jienH Tb ee -  B o r  3H aeT” . 3 T a  M aneHbKaa jiojKb, 
3aKJHOHaiomaH c o6 o k > K opoTK oe npeAHCJiOBHe k juiHHHOMy poM aH y, Hpe3BbinaHHO xapaK T epH a. B b i  
e e  He y  O AH oro JlepMOHTOBa H aiiA eT e. H o h th  y  BCHKoro S o j ib u io r o  n o sT a , He HCKjHonaa h  
n yu iK H H a, o t  BpeM eHH a o  BpeMeHH, K orAa onw caH H e “ 6ojie3H H ” cTaHOBHTca c ah ujk o m  
C06Aa3HHTeAbHbIM, OHa HaCKOpO, MOKAy ACAOM, BblSpaCblBaeTCH HHTaTeAK) KaK AaHb, OT KOTOpOH 
He cB odoA H bi h  npH BH A erH poBaH H eH iiiH e yM bi.85
81 Shestov, A. C. IJymKUH, p. 337.
82 Shestov, JdocmoeecKUU u Hutjiue, p. 325.
83 Ibid, p. 324.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, p. 325.
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These accusations are part of Shestov’s argument to prove his very own point -  about the 
suffocating power of self-evident truths, the violence of accepted ideas, ideologies and
o r
ethical norms over ‘pBymHMca k CBoSo^e HejiOBenecKHM yMOM\ Unlike critics, who want 
to stitch any artistic work with the underlying morality, Shestov asserts, artists strive for 
freedom from any restrictions whatsoever. In Lermontov's phrase above, that Shestov calls 
a little lie, he sees the poet's ‘caMyio 3aaymeBHyio h niyfioKyio mbicjib [...]: KaK 6bi hh
07
Gbijio Tpyzmo c IleHOpHHBiMH - oh He oxaacT hx b 3KepTBy cepeflHHe, HopMe’. The same 
reasoning Shestov applies to Pushkin and exemplifies it with Pugachev's tale about an eagle 
and a raven from the The Captain's Daughter, and the answer given by Grinev. A critic 
wants to cure the disease, Shestov repeats. ‘O h  BepHT hjih ofijreaH BepHTB b coBpeMeHHBie 
H^en -  b fiyaymee cuacTBe HejiOBenecTBa, b mhp Ha 3eMjie, b mohh3m, b hco6xo,zjhmoctb 
yHHHTO^ CeHHH Bcex OpjIOB, nHTaiOHIHXCJI 2KHBBIM MflCOM, BBipa^ CaHCB H3BIKOM nyraueBa, 
pa^H coxpaHeHHa bopohbh, xcHBymero na^ajiBio. OpjiBi h  opjiHHaa >kh3hb, 3to -  
“HeHOpMaJIBHOCTB”... ’ ,88
Thus Shestov's opinions this time are quite opposite to his 1899 ones and represent a 
different person -  both ethically and aesthetically. Not that he is prepared to agree (or 
indeed to assign such a claim to Lermontov) that Pechorin's cruelty can be forgiven on 
account of all his other superior qualities -  no. Rather, Shestov is now much more 
interested in emphasising his own issues: freedom from the oppressive power of ideals, 
from the categories of good and evil and discovering writers' urge for such a freedom in 
their inner world which bears witness to their existential experience. Shestov now steps 
decisively -  from his disillusionment about getting any positive or consoling answers about 
the human predicament in classical literature -  into the domain of tragedy, where all those 
‘KOTopBie oTBeprHyTBi HayKOH h MopajiBio’,89 all those who dare to think and feel 
differently, exist. And his main stance now is opposite to the one he held in his youth and 
which he adhered to in his Pushkin article in 1899. Now, the writer no longer exists for the 
reader. ‘HaofiopoT’, Shestov now exclaims,
86 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu uHuvfiue, p. 326.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, p. 328.
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HHTaTejib c y m ec T B y eT  j y i H  nH caT ejia . ^ o c to c bc k h h  h H n m iie  roBopH T He 3aTeM, h to 6  
pacnp ocT p aH H T b cp e^ H  jh o ac h  c bo h  y6e>K^eHHa h  npocBeTH Tb 6 jth>k h h x . O h h  c b m h  H iuyT CBeTa, 
o h h  He B ep»T  c e d e ,  hto  t o , hto  hm  K m e i c a  c b c t o m , ecT b t o h h o  c b c t , a He odMaHHHBbiH  
Sjiy^cA aiom H H  oroH eK  h jih , x y x c e  T o r o  -  rajuiiouH H auH Ji h x  p a ccT p o eH H o ro  BOodpaxceHHfl. O h h  
3 0 B y r  k c e 6 e  HHTaTejia, xax CBH^eTejia, o h h  o t  H ero  x o t b t  nojiyH H Tb n p a B o  flyM aTb no-C B oeM y, 
H aA eaT bca -  npaBO  cym ecT B O B aT b. [ . . . ]  M o x ceT  SbiTb, 6ojibniHHCTBO HHTaTejien He x o n e T  3 T o ro  
3HaTb, h o  coHHHeHHB ,ZJocToeBCKoro h  H H u m e  3aKJiK)HaiOT b c e 6 e  He OTBeT, a B o n p o c .90
This, we think, shows quite clearly that the real Shestov has finally been hatched from his 
youthful idealism and that now his own perspective is distilled: his work and philosophy 
are now too about asking questions rather than giving answers.
Having said that, it is worth pointing out that, interestingly, Shestov's understanding of 
Pechorin and Onegin appears throughout quite one-dimensional. Indeed, he follows more 
literally than not Belinsky's rather socially, not existentially, oriented arguments about 
Pechorin being a superfluous person in Russia of the time. Essentially this very label of a 
‘superfluous person’, introduced in these words by Turgenev, has stuck profoundly in 
Russian literary criticism and has been endlessly applied, in particular in connection to 
Pechorin. In our view this requires a little more precision because Pechorin is an outsider 
not so much in social terms as in existential terms. More precisely, a revealing and 
productive approach to him would be to consider him a victim rather than a victor and 
tyrant. Indeed, the victims of his cruelty suffer from very human feelings of humiliated love 
and betrayed trust, while he himself undergoes a much more fundamental suffering -  his 
emotional deficiency, his inability to love, or in other words his inability to be human. 
Moreover, with his brilliant mental capacities he consciously realises that and there is no 
worse punishment to him than to be essentially excluded from the human race. This, in our 
view, most important observation is completely missing in Shestov's analysis of Pechorin. 
Shestov glides on the surface to see only Pechorin's superficial victories and not his inner 
emptiness and related torment which renders him the most profound and incurable victim 
of all.
90 Shestov, JHocmoeecKuu u Hmjiue, p. 328.
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Onegin, who seems to be of the same kind, is nevertheless very different, for he is 
ultimately capable of repentance and genuine emotional involvement. No less importantly, 
Pushkin's ironic style throughout the novel also makes this hero much more light-hearted 
than Lermontov's hero of our time. This important point also escapes Shestov's attention 
and he omits to observe that Eugene Onegin, unlike Lermontov's novel, is written (and 
quite deliberately too) in such a way that it does not evoke any pity for the protagonists on 
the part of the reader. Shestov's inability to pick up all these important clues once again 
reinforces in particular our point about Shestov's rather under-developed relationship with 
aesthetics. In a sense Shestov's Pushkin article can be viewed as the climax of his aesthetic 
lapse due to the extent of its open and unquestioning glorification of the poet. However, in 
all fairness one must say that such a direct idolisation of Pushkin permeates almost entirely 
the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva, and from this perspective Shestov's article would have 
fitted perfectly into the journal. In fact, in his criticism of this issue Solov’ev blamed its 
authors precisely for their idolisation of Pushkin (with the exception of Rozanov who, as 
we mentioned above, was out of step with the others in this respect).
However, Shestov was soon to part forever with such a kind of aesthetic failure. His rather 
blind glorification of Pushkin in its totality in 1899 gradually sobered up and by 1905 
Shestov's Pushkin descended from divine status to an earthly one and acquired some 
interesting features that are worth discussing. The most distinct of these features is actually 
not particularly original -  it is Pushkin's vibrant love for life, his natural intrinsic ability to 
go with the wave of life, not resisting, but enjoying it. However, Shestov does add 
something of his own to this idea: namely, he puts a slightly different -  as it were utilitarian 
-  spin on it, turning this ability of Pushkin to another one -  of being extremely adaptable.
Thus, writing in the Apotheothis o f  Groundlessness about Pushkin again, Shestov expresses 
the view that for the poet there was nothing hopelessly bad. Moreover, Shestov said, 
everything would become useful to him. And in this Shestov saw the mystery of Pushkin's 
‘inner harmony’91 which implies in particular that although, as we saw, by 1905 Shestov 
started applying to Pushkin his usual subversive criteria, he still was essentially in
91 Shestov, Ano<peo3 6ecnoneeHHOcmu, p. 23.
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agreement with the general trend of opinions in tune with the Dostoevsky speech, 
uncritically describing the poet as a unique cultural phenomenon. This trend included in 
particular the Symbolist representatives from the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva as well as 
their oppositionists such as Khodasevich.
Going further in the same direction -  of looking beyond Pushkin's verve and naturalness to 
his skill in being psychologically adaptable, Shestov actually implies that Pushkin
‘CHaCTBeM CBOHM [...] 6bUI c6fl3aH HCKJIIOHHTCJIBHO TOMy 0 6 CT0 flTeJIbCTBy, HTO yMeji B 
c b o h x  CTpeMjieHHflx He nepexoflHTb 3a H3BecTHyio nepTy’. This means essentially that 
Pushkin, in Shestov's opinion, was a master o f  his happy temperament and his joie de vivre 
-  that he him self quite consciously controlled his desires. W hile in itself this claim seems 
very disputable, it nevertheless demonstrates the familiar pattern o f Shestov trying to read 
(or rather guess) between the lines and his distrust o f  the obvious and commonly accepted. 
Interestingly, Shestov then applies, even if  ffagmentarily, his usual technique and, if  we call 
a spade a spade, talks about Pushkin's mask, implying that the poet had to pretend to be 
content and superior in order to overcome all the resentments that he was to suffer in life.
Rather expectedly Shestov persists with a discussion on Pushkin's survival mechanisms. He 
takes further the above claim of the poet's ability to control his aspirations and fits it into 
his own assertion of the utilitarian nature of human truths. More precisely, Shestov argues 
that Pushkin, despite having a powerful and daring mind, convinced himself, akin to the 
way innocent youngsters tend to do, that there is no contradiction between ideal aspirations 
and selfish ones. For example, Shestov says, such people manage to persuade themselves 
that a striving for fame and for useful activity are different words to designate the same 
thing. Moreover, Shestov believed that Pushkin would not have parted with this conviction 
even if he had lived to be very old.94 Thus Shestov's arguments on the whole translate 
Pushkin's ability to enjoy life wherever it takes him into his quality of being a very practical 
and flexible person in psychological terms. This demonstrates again that with time Shestov
92 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoH6enHocmu, p. 117.
93 See Ibid, p. 118.
94 See Ibid, p. 55.
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‘unglorified’ Pushkin and dismantled the commonly accepted romantic perception of the 
poet which he himself had previously had.
In doing so Shestov would sometimes go too far and his voice would even acquire a cynical 
ring to it. This, however, was due, in our opinion, to Shestov's general tendency to shock 
the reader, which can be exemplified by his Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness, than to him 
losing respect for Pushkin. It will not be a mistake to repeat after Natalia Baranova- 
Shestova that her father preserved a deep and genuine respect for the poet throughout his 
entire life. Yet, Shestov was capable of uttering the following lines, deliberately free of any 
sort of awe relating to Pushkin's famous words from his ‘The Poet’:
“ IIoK a He T pebyeT  noaTa k  CBameHHOH >xepTBe AnojuiOH - H3 /jereM  h h h to jk h b ix  MHpa, 6bm>  
MOHCeT, B cex  HHHTOHCHen o h ” . PaCCKaHCHTe 06bIKH0BeHHbIM H3bIKOM MbICJIb nyiUKHHa, H 
nojiyHHTca cTpaHHHKa H3 HeBponaTOJiorHH: Bee HeBpacTeHHKH odbiKHOBeHHO n ep exoflflT  o t  
COCTOflHHtf KpaHHeH B036)0KAeHH0CTH - K COBepmeHHOH npOCTpaUHH. Il03TbI - TOHCe: H ropAflTCfl 
3THM.95
It may even be that precisely due to Pushkin's glory and his huge role for Russian culture in 
general and Shestov's personal development in particular, such statements helped Shestov 
to liberate himself from the pressure of Pushkin's name and authority, thus rendering this 
phenomenon a rather adolescent rebellion against the authority of one's parents.
Yet, in the second part o f  Apotheosis o f Groundlessness Shestov elaborates on these lines 
o f Pushkin in a more serious tone and essentially twists them around in order to advance 
one o f  his own ideas. As Viktor Erofeev noted, ‘3aMeHHB nyimcHHCKyio “hhhtojkhoctb” Ha 
caMOBOJibHyio “nopoHHOCTb”, IIIecTOB peniHTejiBHO nepecMaTpHBaeT cbjob reHHa h 
3Jio^eHCTBa. 3 th  noHjmui ctbho bbtcb  He npocTO c o bm c c th m m m h , ho  ropa3^o 6ojiee Toro 
-  Hepa3JiyHHbiMH.’96 Indeed, Shestov confuses vice and insignificance to argue that the
95 S h estov , Ano(peo3 6ecnoneeHHOcmu, p. 61 . N o tic e  that the ‘q uotation’ from  Pushkin  that S h estov  
cites is  im precise and represents S h esto v ’s o w n  ‘ed ited ’ version  o f  the original (the correct on e  
reads: ‘IIoKa He TpebyeT noaTa / /  K CBameHHOH acepTBe AnojuiO H , / /  B  3a6oTax cyeTHoro CBeTa / /  
O h ManonyiiiHO norpyaceH; / /  M o j ih h t  ero cBHTaa Jinpa; / /  Jfym a BKymaeT xjia^HbiH c o h , / /  H  Me^c 
AeTeil HHHTO^CHblX MHpa, / /  BblTb MOHCeT, Bcex HHHTOMCHeH o h ’).
96 E rofeev , p. 166.
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gods favour the fallacious and depraved rather than the virtuous, and that the latter find 
their reward in being content with themselves. In fact, ‘/joSpOfleTejib [...] HacTOJibKO
Q7
A O BO jibH a codon, h t o  h h  b  KaKOH Harpa^e He HyamaeTCfl’, whereas vice is rewarded by 
Apollo’s favours. This faulty reasoning, by the way, replaces Pushkin's words that if you 
are a poet you are an insignificant person in all your other capacities, by a different idea 
which is not equivalent and does not follow: that if you are an insignificant person, you will 
be welcomed in Parnassus (i.e. you will be suited to being an artist of some kind). In 
mathematics such confusion that can be expected only from a non-professional is known as 
confusing a statement with its converse. Also, in his attempts to portray artists as invariably 
depraved, Shestov's profound tendency to ‘unmask’, to uncover the hidden inner world of a 
writer, his true self, manifests itself in a rather obvious way. In this connection Shestov's 
contemplation of the figure of Pushkin in the context of morality deserves consideration.
E ssen tia lly  S h esto v  co n tin u es  h is  c la im  ab o u t th e  h a rm o n y  o f  P u sh k in 's  p e rso n a lity  w ith  
th e  flo w  o f  life , o f  tru s tin g  life , as it w ere. He asse rts  th a t P u sh k in , as w e ll as L erm o n to v  fo r 
th a t m atte r, w as b ra v e  -  m o reo v er, th ey  b o th  lo v ed  danger. A n d  th ere fo re  th ey  loved  
w o m en  and  w e re  n o t a fra id  o f  th em , S h esto v  states. ‘O h h  /jo p o ro n  ijeHOH 3anjiaTHjiH 3a 
c b o k ) CMejiocTb’, h e  w rites , ‘3aT0 hchjih  jienco h  c b o Go / j h o . B e ^ b ,  b  cymHOCTH, ecjin  6 m  
o h h  3axoTejiH 3arjiBHyTb b  KHHry cyzjed -  o h h  MorjiH 6bi npe/jOTBpaTHTb nenajibHyio 
pa3BH3Ky. Ho o h h  npeanoHHTajiH 6e3 npoBepKH nojiaraT bca Ha cbokd  cnacTJiHByio 
3Be3fly’.98 S h esto v  b u ild s  up  th ese  o b serv a tio n s  o n ly  to  b rin g  u s  c lo se r to  h is  d iscu ss io n  on 
th e  u tilita r ian  n a tu re  o f  m o ra lity  and  idealism . He ju x tap o ses  T o ls to y  and  D o sto ev sk y  to 
P u sh k in  and  L erm on tov , say in g  th a t T o ls to y  fe ll in to  op en  m o ra lis in g  p rec ise ly  b ecau se  he  
w as h id in g  from  life  and  its  d angers and  tem p ta tio n s . A cco rd in g  to  S hestov  T o lstoy 's  
in s tin c t w o u ld  a lw ays stop  h im  at th e  b o rd e rlin e  b ey o n d  w h ich  h is  sou l w o u ld  b e  exposed  
to  v ice. ‘E c jih  6bi He 3Ta c,zjep>KHBaiomaa cnocodHOCTb, o h , BepoaTHO, n n o x o  k o h h h j i  6 b i , 
Kax nyuiKHH h j ih  JlepMOHTOB ’ Shes t ov w ro te  ab o u t T o lstoy . A n d  h e  co n tin u ed  to  say  
th a t in  re tu rn  th e  w rite r m ig h t h av e  u n co v e red  a  v a r ie ty  o f  im p o rtan t m y ste ries , b u t th is  ro le
97 Shestov, Ano(peo3 decnoweHHOcmu, p. 92.
98 Ibid, p. 94.
99 Ibid.
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w as to  b e  p lay ed  b y  D o sto ev sk y , w h o  also , acco rd in g  to  S hestov , ‘nMeji oueHb cjioxcHbie h  
3anyraHHi>ie Aejia c M opanbio’.100 S hestov  th en  argues th a t D o sto ev sk y  w ith  h is  d isto rted  
sen se  o f  v irtu e  and  v ice  h as  n ev e rth e less  d isp lay ed  a  g reat sen s itiv ity  w h ich  o u r h ig h  
m o ra lity  o m itted  to  teach  us. Id ea lists , S h esto v  con c lu d es, ‘cnpaBeAAHBo onacaioT ca, hto 
AO hcthhbi He AobepenibCfl h 3aBH3Heim> b rpfl3H. HfleajiHCTbi pacneTJiHBbie m o ah  h BOBce 
He TaK rn y n b i, KaK moxcho AyMaTb, ec jin  npHHHMaTb b coobpaxceHHe tojibko hx hack ’.101
T h u s S h esto v  e ffec tiv e ly  u ses  th e  fig u re  o f  P u sh k in  p rec ise ly  to  b u ild  up  th e  above 
ju x ta p o s itio n  b e tw een  h im  and  m o ra lis ts  lik e  T o ls to y  in  o rd e r to  ad v an ce  h is  ow n  p o in t, 
d e ro g a to ry  o f  id ea lism  an d  its  d ecep tiv e  n a tu re , w h ich  tu rn s  o u t to  b e  m o re  u tilita rian  th an  
idea lis tic . On th e  o th er h an d , as w e saw  above , h e  b lam es  P u sh k in  in  m an y  re sp ec ts  fo r  the  
sam e sin  -  o f  ad ju stin g  ideal to  u tilita r ian  needs. Y e t, h e  n ev e r ch a llen g es th e  co m m o n  
asse rtio n  th a t P u sh k in  w as a  realist. ‘X o th  y Hac He 6buio HacTOflmHx TeopeTHKOB 
peanH3Ma, ho nocjie  IlymKHHa pyccKOMy nHcaTem o Hem>3fl 6 biao cjihuikom AaJieico
109
yHOCHTbca ot xch3h h ’, Shestov writes.
An illustration of the considerable spectrum in the evolution of Shestov's attitude to 
Pushkin is given by a comparison between the awe of the poet displayed in Shestov's article 
of 1899 and his open reference in Apotheosis o f Groundlessness in 1905 to Pushkin's 
dissipated life which Tolstoy, as Shestov mentions, was not prepared to forgive. As shown 
above, the debate about the schism between Pushkin the man and Pushkin the poet never 
stopped. The Veresaev-Khodasevich polemics, mentioned earlier, on the acceptability of 
strict biographism as the basis for Pushkin studies re-emphasise the complexity of 
Pushkin's personality. What is interesting for us though is that Shestov ultimately seems to 
have acknowledged all the unflattering facts about Pushkin's life, as he later did with 
respect to Dostoevsky and others. Moreover, he came to believe, as we demonstrated, that it 
is precisely great artists that are most prone to vice. To prove this Shestov had to stretch 
Pushkin's lines from his ‘Poet’ too far, to the point of twisting them. However, we note that
100 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoHeenHOcmu, p. 94.
101 Ibid, p. 95.
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a bridge of sorts between Pushkin's idea of poets being insignificant outside their direct 
function of poetic creativity and Shestov's attempts to assign poets necessarily to the camp 
of the depraved is supplied by Tsvetaeva's famous:
H6o pa3 rojioc T e 6 e , n oaT ,
-  OCTaJlbHOe B3HT0.103
Yet, despite his accusatory claims, Shestov never really uncovered to its full extent the 
schism between Pushkin's pen and his soul, although he did so, in our view, with respect to 
every other writer he wrote about. Thus, in particular, Shestov never set against one another 
(for what would be his typical analysis) Pushkin's carefree personality and his daring 
pattern of behaviour in real life with its rather self-centred slant, and his poetic courage 
which acquired a different dimension of a superior nature. The latter was Shestov's own 
important idea expressed in 1899 in his ‘A. S. Pushkin’ -  about the courage of an artist in 
the face of reality. Indeed, Shestov then wrote that ‘nyuiKHH B^oxHOBJiaeTca TeM, hto 
napajiH3yeT Bcex apyrnx jno^en’.104 He is brave and firm in those moments, Shestov said, 
when we, like ostriches, hide our head in the sand.
H b  3t o m  MyacecTBe nepea 5KH3HbK> -  Ha3HaneHHe no3Ta; b  s t o m  -  h c t o h h h k  ero BfloxHOBemw, b 
3 t o m  TaiiHa ero TBopnecTBa, KOTopoe m u , oGbiKHOBeHHbie jh o a h , cnpaBe/uiHBO Ha3biBaeM 
GoacecTBeHHbiM -  Tax ^ajiexo o h  o t  Hac, Tax HeaocTyneH HaM. TaM, r/je Mbi pbi^aeM, pBeM Ha ce6e 
Bonocbi, oTHaHBaeMca -  TaM noaT coxpaHaeT TBepflocTb h  cnoKOHCTBHe, b  b c h h o h  Haaeacae, h t o  
CTynameMyca OTKpoeTca h  HmyiuHH - HaitaeT.105
Perhaps such was his intrinsic respect for the great Russian poet that even in his mature 
years when Shestov stepped over any commonly accepted boundaries and took on every 
world thinker, his awe of Pushkin somehow still did not permit him to apply his usual 
technique to the poet. Indeed, any attempts to expose Pushkin's inner contradictions, his 
dramas and crises in Shestov's works are fragmentary and made in passing. On the other 
hand, it is possible that Pushkin indeed seemed so harmonious to Shestov that he was not
103 Tsvetaeva, ‘E cT b cnacTJiHBUbi h  cnacTJiHBHUbi’ in C o 6 p a n u e  c o H U H e n u u  e  7  moMax, vol. 2, p. 
324.
104 Shestov, A. C. IlyiuKUH, p. 339.
105 Ibid.
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interesting enough as an object of study, because Shestov would draw inspiration first of all 
from people who lived in suffering, who underwent great inner traumas. So, either Pushkin 
was not counted by Shestov as one of them, or Shestov was simply afraid to ‘push down 
such a giant’106 -  the words he used, curiously, with respect to Tolstoi, who, according to 
Shestov, on the contrary was not scared by such a task. Also in this connection it is possible 
that Rozanov's statement about Pushkin and Gogol being opposing geniuses was very 
shrewd, in the sense that maybe for Shestov it was the genius of Gogol that really lay closer 
to his heart. The discourse of sarcasm and disillusionment together with great lyricism, so 
characteristic of Gogol, might have outweighed for Shestov Pushkin's perfect ease 
combined with the classical posture of his writings, as well as his mischievous smile 
invariably overshadowing the narrative and his light irony which extinguishes tragedy. 
Another contributory factor could have been, as it were, Pushkin's detachment and Gogol's 
involvement. Thus, Gogol might have been perceived by Shestov as more alive and 
therefore more inspiring, whereas Pushkin forever maintained about him a touch of 
monumentality that might have cooled down Shestov's creative enthusiasm.
On the other hand, Shestov's references to Gogol are not abundant either, and he never 
wrote a piece fully dedicated to the writer, although the allusions to him are more dense and 
regular throughout Shestov's writing than those to Pushkin. One way or another, Pushkin 
never occupied the same place in Shestov's writings as did, for example, Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy. Interestingly, when talking about Tolstoy's moralising and the latter's accusations 
against Pushkin, Shestov draws a direct connection between these sentiments and the 
novelist's disdain for anything that does not serve a utilitarian purpose. Thus, according to 
Shestov the formula of art for art’s sake is hostile to Tolstoy, but, implicitly, is akin to 
Pushkin. Therefore Shestov's position on the poet in 1905 was not entirely opposed to that 
of the contributors to the Pushkin issue of Mir Iskusstva of 1899. Indeed, they were 
basically reclaiming Pushkin for the aesthetes such as the Russian Symbolists from all 
kinds of other national cultural movements, and Shestov would probably have only 
disagreed with them about their possessiveness. Indeed, it must be noted that Shestov
106 Shestov, Ano<peo3 6ecnoHeenHocmu, p . 9 3 .  The o r ig in a l  r e a d s :  lY  T ojiC T oro  MOpajib /jocTaTOHHo 
CHJibHa, h t o 6 bi cnpaB H T bca flaace c  TaKHM BejiHKaHOM, x a x  lly u iK H H ’ .
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107himself did not belong to aestheticism as a cultural trend and, as Erofeev observes, was 
critical of the latter, most explicitly in his article ‘Viacheslav Velikolepnyi’ on Viacheslav 
Ivanov, to which we shall return shortly.
Another article in the ‘Pushkin issue’ -  that of Minsky -  to a large extent also continued the 
aspirations of the other contributors. It is interesting that despite the characteristic of being 
shallow and unworthy that Shestov assigned to Minsky, the latter formulated in his article 
three of Pushkin’s imperatives which under close scrutiny seem to resonate highly with 
Shestov’s philosophical views. These imperatives, which in Minsky’s view Pushkin left to 
Russian literature, were fully recognised and appreciated by the Symbolists alone, Minsky 
asserts. These three imperatives, according to Minsky are firstly, the juxtaposition of poetry 
to reason and morality, secondly, the victory of the aesthetic ideal over the ethical, of
1 ORintuition over mind, and thirdly indifference towards good and evil.
Now, for Shestov poetry understood in the sense of the irrational, as a way of exploring the 
world by means of revelation and stemming from unrestricted spiritual freedom, would 
indeed be juxtaposed to reason and autonomous ethics which encompasses morality. In his 
philosophy of tragedy the power of intuition has far more weight than the power of mind 
which he deems intrinsically limited. However, this is not equivalent for him to the 
juxtaposition of aesthetics and ethics. Indeed, the question of the aesthetic versus the ethical 
is a more complex one and was discussed in some detail in Part I, especially with respect to 
the case of Shestov. On the surface it can be reduced to the previous formula of intuition 
versus mind, but if we view content as opposed to form, or ideas as opposed to the way of 
expressing them, as ethical versus aesthetic, then the former for Shestov would prevail over 
the latter. As for the indifference to good and evil, Shestov largely agreed with the famous 
Nietzschean formula of being beyond both, and proclaimed the search for God to be a 
priority which is superior to morality and must be placed indeed above the categories of 
good and evil. Yet, Shestov never joined the Symbolist movement and never responded to 
Minsky's article (and just as well, never took the man seriously enough which, by the way,
107 Erofeev, p. 170.
108 See Levitt, p. 33.
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can n o t b e  sa id  th e  o th er w a y  around) and  d ev e lo p ed  h is  a rgum en ts an d  h is  p h ilo so p h y  in  
h is  o w n  sep a ra te  an d  in d ep en d en t w ay  w h ich  rem a in ed  fo rev er iso la ted  from  the ex is tin g  
trends.
Apart from his ‘A. S. Pushkin’ article and references to the poet in Apotheosis o f 
Groundlessness and the introduction to his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche Shestov turned to 
Pushkin again in 1915 in his aphorism ‘Motionless stars’ and in the aforementioned article 
of 1916 on Viacheslav Ivanov. In 1927 Shestov wrote an article on Vladimir Solov’ev, 
‘Speculation and Apocalypsis’, where he returned again to the theme of Pushkin. The 
former two works became part of Shestov's book Potestas Clavium. The title of the book is 
concerned with the power of the Roman clergy to lock and unlock the heavenly gates for 
the believers, but for Shestov it has a much broader meaning about the power of reason, 
which any religion and philosophy is enslaved by, to rule over the human soul.
T h u s in  h is  a rtic le  o n  Ivanov , S hestov  p e rce iv es  in  th e  la tte r an  a ttem p t to  p lace  S ch ille r 
ab o v e  P u sh k in  as b e in g  c lo ser to  th e  sp irit o f  S y m b o lism  and  sees in  it Ivanov 's  a ffilia tio n  
w ith  th e  ‘THnHHecKaa inmuiepo-KaHTOBCKaji inKOJia, pacT am aa b  jnojxax Bepy b  BenHLie h  
He3bi6jieMbie HopMbi /jo jia o io ro ’.109 S h esto v  fo llo w s Iv an o v 's  p ro c lam atio n s that 
S y m b o lism  g ives rise  to  a m y th -c rea tio n  w h ich , acco rd in g  to  Ivanov , rep resen ts  rea l art. 
T h e  la tte r is u n iv ersa l, Iv an o v  cla im s, and  b e lo n g s  to  ev e ry o n e  w ith o u t d istinc tion . T h is 
leads to  Iv an o v 's  p o lem ics  ag a in st P u sh k in 's  fam o u s ju x ta p o s itio n  o f  th e  p o e t to  th e  m ob. 
Q u ite  to  S h estov 's  su rp rise , ‘B. M b u h o b  b  Taac6e IlyuiKHHa c nepH bio 6epeT CTopoHy o t o h  
nocjieflH en’,110 and  ju s tif ie s  h im s e lf  b y  p ro v id in g  a  th eo re tica l b as is  fo r h is  poetics. S hestov  
accu ses  Iv an o v  o f  a  p re te n s io n  to  p ro p h esy  ab o u t th e  p o e try  o f  th e  fu tu re  w h ich  sh o u ld  b e  
‘d ith y ram b ic ’. In  th is  k in d  o f  p o e try  Ivan o v  d em an d s  from  a p o e t ‘epaHeeanm u onuufeum 
e ucKynumejibHOM  pa3pem aiom eM  BOCTopre’.111 S h esto v  c la im s th a t d ith y ram b ic  p o e try  fo r 
IvanOV ‘HBJIHeTCfl BblCIQHM H e/JHHCTBeHHblM nO/JJIHHHblM pOflOM CJlOBeCHOrO
109 Lev Shestov, ‘B n n e c j ia B  B e jiH K O J ien H b in ’ in Potestas Clavium (Berlin: Skify, 1923), p. 224.
110 Ibid.
1,1 Ibid, p. 225.
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wo
HCKyccTBa’. and  is co n stru c ted  to  affirm  and  g lo rify  th e  c rea tio n s o f  S ch ille r and h is  type
of poetry and world-view. Thus for Shestov it is obvious that Ivanov, as it were, implicitly
sacrifices Pushkin ‘ajm Toro, hto6 otkpmtb nyn> chmbojihcthhcckhm nooTaM,
1 11
npe^B03BemeHHbiM acHOBHAflmHM ninjuiepOM...’. Shestov finishes his advance in 
defence of Pushkin by the following brilliantly written passage about the free and 
unrestrained nature of true poetry:
Ban. HBaHOB yT B epac^aeT , h t o  o h  3HaeT £OJDKHoe h  3HaeT 6 y n y m e e :  n o 3 T  a o a x c c h  cjiyxcHTb H epH H , 
n o 3 T  6yaeT cjiyxcHTb H epH H , h  He IlyiiiK H H , a  II lH ju iep  ecT b n p eA T en a  3aB T p auiH ero  n p o p o K a . A 
Mbi oTBeTHM: n o3T  He x o h c t  cjiyxcHTb H epH H , n o 3 T  He 6 y A eT  cjiyxcHTb H epH H , e r o  n ecH b  CBoboAHa  
K ax B eT ep h  S e c iu io A H a  R ax B eT ep; n o 3 T  h h  y  K oro  HHKorAa h h k b k h x  pa3pem eH H H  He cn p a u iH B a n  h  
cnpau iH B aT b He CTaHeT -  HopM bi tke  h  HMnepaTHBbi cy m ec T B y io T  TOJibKo a a h  T ex , k t o  G o h tc h  
B c a x o r o  oxpH K a h  b o  B c e x , b 3 » b u ih x  b  pyKH n a j ix y , BHAHT KanpaAOB.114
Thus, somewhat ironically, Shestov's position in 1916 was closer to that of Mir Iskusstva of 
1899 than his own stance that year. Indeed, the authors of the Pushkin issue of Mir 
Iskusstva protested against the poet being given to the mob, while Shestov in contrast to his 
earlier virtual neglect of this issue, was in 1916 defending the right of the poet to be free 
from having to serve the mob, or, better still, just to be free. This brings us back to 
Shestov's arguments in the preface to his Philosophy o f Tragedy about ideologies being the 
destiny of the critics, whereas writers, engaged in genuine creativity, are free from any 
ideologies and tend, in fact, to ask questions rather than to give answers.
Curiously, Shestov's aphorism on Pushkin of 1915, ‘Motionless Stars’, also revolved 
around the poem ‘HepHb’ (‘The Mob’). In it Shestov quotes the concluding lines of the 
poem about the poet's vocation being in sweet sounds and prayers rather than earthly 
matters. Shestov then argues that Pushkin's sentiments contradicted his everyday reality as 
reflected in his correspondence and overall biography because his turbulent life was full of 
mundane worries, petty battles and never-ending financial troubles. Shestov implicitly 
compares his own life to Pushkin's, especially given that at that time he was burdened by 
having to be in charge of his father's family business and this occupation, which he found
112 Shestov, ‘BflnecjiaB BejiHmnenHbiH’, p. 225.
113 Ibid, p. 226.
114 Ibid, p. 226.
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quite hateful, really wore him down and drained him emotionally. He emphasises that real 
poets work at night precisely because during the day they have to be involved in everyday 
hassles. And here we can spot again an echo of the pattern observed by Erofeev of the 
juxtaposition of day and night visions, of the dual nature of the artist. As Baranova- 
Shestova writes in her biography of Shestov, he returned to this poem of Pushkin several 
years later, in 1920, when in his notebook he commented on the miracles of transformation 
which science and philosophy, in his view, neglect to see and talk instead about the natural. 
Such a miracle for Shestov was the power of poetry to turn the mundane into divine music. 
Thus again, we can conclude, Shestov used Pushkin to exemplify his own philosophical 
point.
Equally, in the aphorism itself Shestov highlighted Pushkin's rather subtle observation that 
poetry must be a bit foolish and interpreted it in terms of Pushkin's understanding of the 
virtually pointless role of mind. Moreover, Shestov conjectured that the reason for 
Pushkin's attractiveness to the reader is concealed in his desire to be foolish while the 
majority attempts, on the contrary, to come across as more intelligent than they really are. 
Yet, intelligence and reason are of no use, Shestov continues -  they did not save Pushkin 
(whom Shestov calls one of the most intelligent, if not the most intelligent Russian person) 
from falling victim to a mediocre philistine, Dantes. This phenomenon is inexplicable, 
Shestov concludes, and turns the argument towards his beloved topic, implicitly referring to 
the figure of Job for whom weeping, laughing and cursing was better than understanding. 
‘Ectb Beiim, KOTopue Jiymne He o6t>hchjiti>, He noHHMaTt’,115 he exclaims. Knowledge 
implies ordinary appetites, it conceals utilitarian demands of certainty and guarantees and is 
anyway deceptive. The self-assurance of knowledge is disgusting and treacherous, and that 
is why speculative philosophy a la longue becomes unbearable. Philosophy, just like our 
whole life, must be mad. These are Shestov's sentiments in his aphorism on Pushkin of 
1915.
Thus, if in 1899 Shestov was mostly preoccupied by the phenomenon of Pushkin as such 
and, as it were, submitted himself to the poet, then writing about the poet in 1915 meant
115 Lev Shestov , ‘HenoflBiDKHbie 3Be3/u>i’ in Potestas Clavium, p. 49.
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for Shestov speaking his mind on the philosophical topics that had come to be of the utmost 
significance to him.
EeflHbiH IlyuiKHH co c b o h m h  cjiaflKHMH 3ByicaMH h  m o jih tb b m h ! O h  neji h  m o jih jich , a /(aHTec 
npmjejiHBajicH h , pa3yMeeTca, noflCTpejiHJi neBua. Pa3yMHaa (JjHJiocotJma aojDKHa, k o h c h h o ,  b 3 h tb  
CTopoHy ^aHTeca, npeAnocjiaB, Kaic BceiTja, cBoeMy BOJieH3bHBjieHHio jierwoHbi 6jiaropo,zjHbix 
c j io b . H6o (J jh jio c o ^ h b , KaK /famec, xoneT 6nTb HaBepmnca, 6e3 npoMaxa, opueHTHpyacb no
HenoABH>KHbiM 3B e3^aM .116
In this rather poetic way Shestov finished his essentially philosophical piece in which 
Pushkin was more the means for, than the object of, Shestov's contemplation.
Largely the same pattern can be observed in Shestov's treatment of Pushkin in 1927, in his 
article on Vladimir Solovev. Shestov passionately defends the poet against Solovev's 
accusations about the incompatibility of Pushkin's poetic genius and his unsatisfactory 
moral stance as reflected in his life. However, this defence of Pushkin, in fact, represents a 
larger battlefield where Shestov fights against the speculative philosophy of Solovev which 
the latter proclaims to be religious.
Solovev argues that Pushkin's destiny was essentially just and well deserved, and therefore 
we should see in it a touch o f the Divine hand rather than call it blind fate. ‘C o j i o b b c b  
BOJieH, KOHeuHO, ayMaTb, h t o  eMy yro/mo. Ho noneMy, no KaKOMy npaBy o h  c b o h  
yfieaqjeHUfl npnnncbiBaeT h  BbicmeMy CymecTBy? Oncyzja o h  3HaeT, h t o  Ha nocjie^HeM 
cyae nooTHnecKHH reHHH u c h h t c b  MeHbrne, neM cpe^HHe h  ^aace b b i c o k h c  
aofipofleTejiH?’.117 Shestov insinuates that if  Solovev wanted to be really truthful he should 
have said that for him virtues were superior to any poetic talents and therefore Pushkin's 
story instilled in him  gladness rather than sadness, at least because it would teach others a 
moral lesson. But Solovev desired the highest sanction, Shestov insists, -  that o f  reason, 
good and God Himself. ‘H, h t o 6  a o 6 h t b c b  ^cejiaeMoro, c b o h  c o 6 c t b c h h i >i h  pa3yM, CBoe
116 Lev Shestov, ‘HenoflBHxcHbie 3 B e 3 flb i’ in  Potestas Clavium, p. 49.
117 Lev S h e s t o v ,  ‘Y M 03p eH H e h  a n o x a j iH n c H c  (pejiH T H 03H aa cJ)HJioco(j)Hii B-71- C o j io B b e B a ) ’ in  
YM03peuue u omKpoeeuue (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1964), p. 33.
195
noHHTHe o Ao6pe, h h c k o j ib k o  He K o n e d n a c b ,  CTaBHT Ha MecTO Bora. H o t o  Ha3biBaeT
110
pejinrH03H0H <J)HJioco(])HeH’, Shestov concludes with indignation.
In his defence Shestov again draws an admirable portrait of Pushkin, decisively rejecting 
the attacks of moralists like Vladimir Solovev or Lev Tolstoy against the poet. He writes:
IIo-BHflHMOMy, h C oA O BbeBa h T ojiC T oro  60/ ib iu e  B c e r o  pa3A paacajm  b Ilym K H H e e r o  noHCTHHe 
u ap cT B eH H oe, TaK peAKO B C T penajom eecH  y  aioach A O B epne k >kh3hh h JiiodoB b k M Hpo3AaHHio. B 
EhGahh p accK a3bmaeTCfl, hto, co3AaBUiH  H eAOBexa, B o r  d jiarocjioB H Ji e r o .  K o r ^ a  HHTaenib 
Ily illK H H a, HHOH p a 3  XaACeTCfl, HTO BHOBb AO H ac AOXOABT CAOBa BCeMH 3a6bITOrO dAarOCAOBeHHB 
HAH, TOBOpA e r o  COScTBeHHblMH CAOBaMH, HTO “ x a x  HeKHH XepyBHM  OH HeCKOAbKO 3aHeC HaM 
n e c e H  p a n c x u x ” . IlyiiiK H H  peAKO orAAAbiBaeTca Ha3aA, n p o B ep a eT , A on pau iH B aeT . Oh BOAbHO h 
CMeAO ABHAceTCH, He 3araA biB an o  S y a y m e M . H  He noTOM y, hto mbao AyM aeT: hhkto H3 p yccK H x  
n n caT eA eH  He yM eA T ax r A y S o x o  h HanpaAceHHO AyM aTb, x a x  oh, h CoAOBbeB 6b u i, kohchho, oneH b  
A a n e x  ot hcthhw, x o r A a  AOKa3biBaA, hto y  Ily iiiK H H a HaAO n cx a T b  x p a c o T b i, a  3a  “mwcahmh” hath 
b HHbie M ecTa. T o A b x o  nyuiKHHCKaa mbicab uiA a coB ceM  hhmmh n y n iM H , neM  Ta mbicab, x o T o p y io  
UeHHA C oA O B beB .119
Thus, as the quoted lines unambiguously illustrate, Shestov remained faithful to his main 
cause of defending art against science, revelation against speculation, and juxtaposing 
Pushkin to the Puritan trend was for Shestov an important landmark in this struggle .
These instances basically exhaust the main references to Pushkin in Shestov’s writings. 
Paradoxically, the numerous loose ends from the multitude of opinions on and around 
Pushkin permanently brewing in Shestov's lifetime, giving rise to all sorts of ideas and 
literary-philosophical movements, do not seem ever to have been picked up and developed 
by Shestov. Not the last reason for this must have been because Pushkin's harmony lay 
outside Shestov's immediate interests (which were first and foremost in tormented souls), in 
the same way in which people not tom apart by passions remained essentially outside 
Dostoevsky's concern in his novels. And yet, Shestov stayed, together with the whole of 
Russia, in awe of Pushkin, who was regarded as part of Russian cultural canon and even a 
symbol of the Russian ‘super-person’. Still, Shestov's views on Pushkin underwent a 
considerable evolution within a relatively short time-span which essentially corresponds to
118 S h e s t o v ,  ‘Y M 03peH H e h  a n o x a A H n cH c (peA H rH 03H aa 4 )h a o co (J )h a  B a .  C oA O B beB a)’ , p . 3 3 .
119 Ibid.
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the inner evolution of Shestov himself as he settled into his mature ways and fully 
established his philosophy of tragedy. Pushkin remained an inseparable part of Shestov's 
world, but he was more of a deeply respected and cherished elder of a tribe than a family 
member with whom an intense and heated relationship is inevitable and enduring because 
they are forever part of you. Such roles for Shestov were played by the figures of Tolstoy 
and Dostoevsky, to whom our following chapters are dedicated.
197
Chapter 5. Shestov and Tolstoy. The tragic and the ordinary
‘T ojictoh He AaeT noicofl IIIecTOBy’,1 wrote Berdiaev in his penetrating article. Indeed, the 
significance of Tolstoy to Shestov is hard to exaggerate, and the frequency and 
substantiality of Shestov's references to the great Russian novelist is another evidence of 
that. Shestov wrote in total four large pieces dedicated to Tolstoy, and this does not include 
an abundance of mentions of Tolstoy in the overwhelming majority of his other writings. 
As we stressed in the previous chapter, Shestov's second book, written just before his 
article on Pushkin, was dedicated to Tolstoy and Nietzsche, and marked Shestov's parting 
with idealism and positivism; yet it was only after the Pushkin article, never published at 
the time, as a step back before the leap forward, that this divorce became final and 
irreversible. Such works on Tolstoy as ‘Creating and Destroying Worlds’ in Great Vigils, 
‘The Last Judgements: Tolstoy's Last Works’ in On Job's Balances and ‘Iasnaia Poliana 
and Astapovo’ were to follow in 1908, 1929 and 1935 respectively and reflected the 
development of Shestov's views on Tolstoy as well as his general philosophical evolution.
Shestov cherished most in Tolstoy the latter's continuous, intense inner struggle, which may 
be defined in different ways: as that between his behaviour and principles; his instincts or 
urges and his beliefs; his ability to grasp details and his striving for a holistic vision instead; 
his search for truth and his self-justification, or if  you like, self-deception -  according to 
Shestov: his philosophy and his preaching. These contradictions can also be described as 
those between irrationalism and rationalism, between the heavenly and earthly in Tolstoy -  
which, in turn, can be translated into the conflict between Tolstoy, the writer, and Tolstoy, 
the man. The two sides of Tolstoy were constantly influencing and reshaping one another 
and their interaction manifested itself in his works. Tolstoy's intrinsic duality, being a 
manifestation of his inner contradictions, can also be viewed as hypocrisy until one 
recognises his underlying suffering and tormenting doubt. Shestov's writings on Tolstoy 
show a slow transition from the former perception to the latter.
1 Berdiaev, Tpaeednn u  o 6 b i d e H H O c m b ,  p. 472.
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If in the case of Pushkin, where there was a lot of debate around this theme of the 
discrepancy between Pushkin, the artist, and Pushkin, the man, Shestov did not comment 
on it, in the case of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and others it became his central theme, even 
though such a debate in their cases was much less evident. Shestov exposed this conflict by 
penetrating into the above schism, thus illustrating our thesis.
In this chapter we first attempt to show how Shestov's analysis of Tolstoy fits between 
some radical artistic and rather informal opinions, such as those by Anna Akhmatova, on 
the one hand and formal psychoanalytic and literary-critical views on the other. We do that 
first in the case studies of War and Peace and Anna Karenina, and trace the development of 
Shestov's views on these novels and on their creator. We then move on to see the evolution 
of Shestov's treatment of Tolstoy more generally and transfer our focus to Shestov's later 
works, which, interestingly, also concentrate more on Tolstoy's later works. The slant there 
shifts from being rather literary to becoming more distinctly philosophical and religious. 
The aim is to reveal how, according to Shestov, the evolution of Tolstoy's world-view 
developed from his escape from the tragic to the ordinary, from philosophy to preaching 
and expanded into the religious domain. We show how Tolstoy's struggle is portrayed by 
Shestov as that between mind and soul, or reason and faith, which, as Shestov 
demonstrates, received its more developed form in Tolstoy's latest works. Shestov 
illustrates this struggle through the juxtaposition of brutal force, in figurative terms 
represented by Nikolai Rostov, and the never-ending spiritual search of Pierre, or, in other 
words, of the compulsion of reason and the defencelessness of faith, and claims that it was 
ultimately the latter which won, almost despite Tolstoy's own will.
5.1. The predictability of Shestov’s pattern. His first book on Tolstoy -  its publication 
and reception.
As Berdiaev correctly observes, Shestov in his philosophical quest was first and foremost 
concerned with ‘the truth about the person’ (‘npaB^a o uejiOBeKe’). And since he
2 Berdiaev, Tpazedun u o6bideHHocmb, p. 471.
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‘philosophised with all his being’, it is not surprising that this search was immensely 
personal, and mirrored Shestov's own tormenting concerns. The giant figure of Tolstoy, just 
like that o f Shakespeare previously, provided Shestov with the fulcrum for his own outlook 
and his own struggle, it was only ‘nmpMa, 3a KOTopon CKpbiBaeTca JI. IllecTOB’,4 using the 
words o f Ivanov-Razumnik, who also pointed out that ‘jikwm Hainero pocTa Bcer/ja 
yzjodHo cTaTb no# 3amHTy TaKoro BejiHKaHa, KaK llIeKcnHp’.5 The chief meaning o f these 
remarks is that Shestov tested out, or even more precisely, sought confirmation for, his 
specific paradigm generated from his own existential experience, in the great thinkers he 
studied. In his treatment of Tolstoy we can explicitly trace the typical pattern that Shestov 
was to adhere to when writing about virtually any thinker. In fact, Ivanov-Razumnik makes 
a witty observation concerning the predictability of Shestov's pattern. He claims in relation 
to Shestov's then forthcoming book on Ibsen that we can see in advance what scheme 
Shestov will follow because we can extrapolate from what he has already said about 
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.6
However, Ivanov-Razumnik does not view this repetition of the same old scheme as 
something bad because he regards it only as an auxiliary construction, as ‘jieca npn
n
nocTpoHKe 3£aHHfl’, and values in Shestov his passionate obsession with the fundamental 
questions of the human predicament and the intensity o f his thoughts and feelings as well as
Q
the perfect form of his delivery. Yet, with some writers whose inner struggle was 
particularly close to Shestov's own tragic world this ‘scheme’ became especially apparent.
Thus, as Berdiaev writes, ‘oTHomemie IIIecTOBa k  TojiCTOMy o c o S c h h o  xapaicrepHo h  
oSHapyxcHBaeT HeKOTopyio “npaB^y” o HeM caMOM’.9 Berdiaev sums up this attitude in 
claiming that Shestov simultaneously loves Tolstoy ‘ h  HeHaBH^ HT, h  6 o h t c a ,  O o h t c h ,  KaK
3 ‘Onnoco(f)CTBOBan BceM cbohm cymecTBOM’ -  B erd ia ev ’s phrase about Shestov from  h is essa y  
‘OcHOBHaa hflea (J)hjioco4)hh JIbBa IIIecTOBa’ (p. 5 ), c ited  in  Chapter 2.
4 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 198.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p. 229 .
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, p. 253 .
9 Berdiaev, Tpaaedun u odbideHuocmb, p. 472.
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6bi Tojictoh He OKa3ajica npaB’.10 He draws a parallel between Shestov the author and 
Tolstoy, the hero o f Shestov's writings, by saying that ‘HlecTOB, no-BHflHMOMy, Toxce 
OTpHijaeT caMoro ce6a b cbohx npoH3BeAeHnax [...] 3a cjiOBaMH UlecTOBa o Tojictom 
OTKptmaeTCH ero coScTBeHHaa njioTb h KpoBb, oh BbmaeT ceba’.11 In this chapter we aim to 
uncover these revelations in the general context of exploring Shestov's treatment of Tolstoy 
and analysing how the results of Shestov's hermeneutic psychological method woven into 
his philosophy relate to the major ideas o f the existing body of critical literature on Tolstoy.
Shestov's first book on Tolstoy entitled Good in the Teaching o f  Tolstoy and Nietzsche: 
Philosophy and Preaching was started in March 1897 and finished, except for the preface, 
in December 1898 in Lausanne. Shestov then brought the manuscript to Russia and went to 
St. Petersburg where he started looking for a publisher, which proved rather difficult. As 
Shestov himself wrote,
)KypHajibi 0TKa3biBajiHCb ee nenaTaTb. B p y x o n H C H  OHa 6buia y MnxaHJioBCKoro, B j i . Co/iOBbeBa, 
CnacoBHHa, b “ )K h 3 h h ” , b  “Bonpocax O h jio c o 4)h h  h  ncHxojiorHn”. IIpaBAa, a j ih h h o  h h  c KeM H3 
H33BaHHbix j ih u  h  peflaxuHH ^ejia He h m c j i . 3a m c h h  xjionoTajm 3HaKOMbie. Ho Tax h jih  HHane -  bo  
Bcex peflaiojHax o t b c t  6 w ji o j ih h , x o t h  m o t h b h p o b k h  6buiH pa3Hbie. Tae OTKa3biBanHCb H3-3a 
HanpaBJieHHa, rae H3-3a “Hana^ox” Ha TojiCToro.12
Shestov then explains that the reaction of Vladimir Solovev was particularly interesting.
‘CoBecTb MHe He no3BOJiaeT co^encTBOBaTb HaneuaTaHHio b “BecTHHKe EBponbi” TaxoH
pafioTbi’,13 Solovev allegedly said to his friend L. A. Sev (the literary figure, translator,
philosopher and editor who brought Shestov's manuscript to Solovev), and then added:
‘nepe^aHTe ot MeH« aBTopy, hto a Boofime He coBeTyio eMy nenaTaTb 3Ty cTaTbio, -  oh,
5 14HaBepHoe, Bnocjie^cTBHH pacxaeTca, ecjiH HanenaTaeT .
However, Solovev did help Sev to publish the manuscript, even though it was done on 
credit. The introduction to the book was written by Shestov in July 1899, and in December
10 Berdiaev, Tpaeedm u odbidenHocmb, p. 472.
11 Ibid.
12 From Shestov’s autobiography. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 42.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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of that year the book finally appeared (dated 1900). It was received favourably, and the 
rather good reception that it enjoyed essentially opened the road for Shestov with respect to 
publishing his subsequent works. In particular Mikhailovsky, who initially refused to 
publish the manuscript in P y c c K o e  d o z a m c m e o ,  wrote a sympathetic review of it in 1900.15 
He described the book as ‘cTpaHHaa, ho HHTepecHo h KpacHBo HanncaHHaa’.16 Also in the 
same year M u p  u c K y c c m e a  published a review o f the book (written by Pertsov).
It is also worth noting that Shestov sent his book to Tolstoy. Gorky recalls in his memoirs 
that Tolstoy, unlike Chekhov who expressed his dislike of Shestov's book, was rather
1 7sympathetic to it and said that he found it curious. Interestingly, the remarks he made 
about it go right to the heart o f Shestov's approach to Tolstoy in his subsequent writings on 
him as well as Shestov's understanding of philosophy as a whole. Indeed, Tolstoy talked 
about ultimate truth in relation to death, essentially dismissing the former in the face of the 
latter and claiming that a thinking person, including all the philosophers, invariably thinks 
about his death, no matter what appears to be the subject of his thoughts. Tolstoy then, 
according to Gorky, started preaching love towards God as the ultimate truth, but did so 
‘xojioziho h ycTano’.18 Thus, Shestov's main theme that permeates all his later writings was 
essentially guessed by Tolstoy's rather passing remark. This theme is summarised in what 
became Shestov's cherished phrase from Plato's P h a e d o : moflefi 3to TaHHa: ho Bee,
KOToptie no-HacTOJimeMy oxaaBajincb (})hjioco(J)hh, Hnnero HHoro He AenajiH, KaK 
roTOBHJiHCB k yMHpaHHio h CMepTH’.19 As we shall see below, Shestov's decoding of 
Tolstoy is governed first and foremost by this idea applied to Tolstoy's personal case. We 
note that this idea is somewhat different, although not completely divorced, from Hamlet's 
‘KJiaflfinmeHCKafl (jmjiococjma’,20 using the words o f Ivanov-Razumnik, as well as the 
philosophy of some of Chekhov's heroes, most notably o f Ragin from ‘Ward No 6’. The 
distinction is in the different functions that the imminence of death serves -  whether it
15 This review was published in the issues 2 and 3 (1900) of PyccKoe 6oeamcmeo.
16 See Baranova-Shestova, I, footnote *** on p. 42.
17 See Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 106.
18 Maksim Gorkii, Lev Tolstoy (Letchworth: Bradda Books, 1966), pp. 58-59. Cited in Baranova- 
Shestova, I, p. 106.
19 Plato, Phaedo. Cited in Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 25.
20 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 189.
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provides a justification of sorts or creates a productive framework for general 
contemplation of the human predicament.
We shall now turn to discussing the content of Shestov's first book on Tolstoy as well as 
Shestov's almost immediate development of this topic in his subsequent book on 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. However, before doing so we should note in conclusion to the 
previous paragraph that some other remarks made by Tolstoy with respect to Shestov were 
already described in Part I, where we also explained that Shestov visited the great Russian 
novelist in Iasnaia Poliana in March 1910. Generally speaking, neither Shestov nor Tolstoy 
were particularly impressed by their interaction even though it was reasonably long (it 
lasted for one and a half hours). Shestov tried to explain to Tolstoy the nature of Nietzsche's 
writings as originating in his personal tragedy, but apparently to no avail. Tolstoy, on the 
other hand, in all probability misconstrued the nature of Shestov himself and recorded in 
his diary that the latter was uninteresting and a ‘literary figure’ ( ‘jiHTepaTOp’) rather than a 
philosopher.21 For more details on Tolstoy's impressions on Shestov and vice versa we refer 
the reader to Baranova-Shestova's biography of her father.
5.2. Analysis of Shestov's early views on Tolstoy.
In a way, the gist of Shestov's main claims in his book Good in the Teaching o f Tolstoy and 
Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching has been summed up already in the preface, where 
Shestov launches a decisive attack against idealism and its doomed attempts to attain the 
truth. He effectively asserts that the very essence of idealism is to give consoling answers, 
to create an illusion of harmony and reasonable necessity. In contrast to that there are 
writers who are permanently dissatisfied with the false answers given and disturbed by the 
existing world order. Yet, they are split between their search for truth, no matter how 
frightening that truth might turn out to be, and their duty to the public who look up to them 
in the hope of learning from them some great and ultimate wisdom, the answers that the 
writers in fact do not have. Moreover (and more subtly) this public duty conceals within it 
the writers' own, personal craving for a way out, for a consoling answer of some sort, and 
this creates an on-going inner conflict. To such writers Shestov evidently assigns Tolstoy in
21 See Baranova-Shestova, pp. 106-108.
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the main body of the book, even though his name, unlike that of Belinsky, is not explicitly 
mentioned in the preface. However, Shestov comes up with the powerful image of a 
wounded tigress ‘npufioKaBiiieH b CBoe JioroBHme k £eTem>miaM. Y Hee cipejia b cnHHe, a 
OHa aojiacHa KopMHTB cbohm mojiokom GecnoMomHbie cymecTBa, KOTOptiM aejia HeT flo ee
99Pokoboh paH bi’. This is to a large extent the image of Tolstoy that Shestov reconstructs in 
the book -  the writer tom by a compromise between what he perceives as his public duty 
(i.e. his preaching, including preaching to himself, for it equally applies to him as a member 
of that public craving consolation), and his inner duty (i.e. his philosophy), which does not 
tolerate any lies, no matter how sweet and resembling the truth.
This juxtaposition between philosophy and preaching was analysed in one of the most 
interesting and exhaustive studies of Shestov's Good in the Teaching o f Tolstoy and 
Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching, as well as one of the first, conducted by Ivanov- 
Razumnik. He saw as the book's main subject Shestov's old preoccupation with the problem 
of the meaning of life which Shestov had already addressed in his book on Shakespeare. 
However, this time, as Razumnik observes, Shestov, following his own inner development 
and thus having rejected idealistic solutions, considered instead the above two routes: the 
way of preaching and the way of philosophy. Ivanov-Razumnik describes the first one as 
that of Hamlet -  theoretical, ideological, which lies away from real life ( ‘^ CHBaa 3k h 3 h b ’)  
and which essentially is an attempt ‘3aTymeBaTb myMHXon cjiob rHeTymne uenoBeKa 
Bonpocti o CMbicne fibmnT.23 In the ethical sphere this constitutes the norms and 
humanistic principles which are then implicitly deemed false. Contrary to that there is the 
way of philosophy which reflects the desire for a genuine solution. However, this task 
ultimately proves impossibly difficult, and even such giants as Tolstoy and Nietzsche 
eventually defect from philosophy to the camp of preaching.
Some seventy years on Andrius Valevicius gave a similar assessment of Shestov's ideas 
expressed in his book on Tolstoy and Nietzsche. Valevicius observed that in this book in 
contrast to Shestov's previous one -  on Shakespeare -  the author reconsidered his old views
22 Shestov, Jfodpo eyuenuu epa<pa Tojicmoeo u Huijiue: (pwocofuR u nponoeedb, p. 219.
23 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 203.
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about reasonable necessity, because they were not solving the problems of life and offered 
no real solution to existential horrors. According to Shestov, as Valevicius pointed out, 
Tolstoy was making the same error, only his ‘idealism’ ‘was not the Hegelian type of 
“reason in history”, but a desperate clinging to the Good’,24 ready to sacrifice everything in 
order to rid himself of tormenting doubts. This is an important point, already mentioned 
above, about Tolstoy's drive engendered not only by his genuine striving for ultimate truth, 
but also by his search for inner harmony and peace, for protection from horrors and doubts. 
And it is rather to be expected that in his attempts to portray life truthfully Tolstoy arrived 
at a breaking point. Like Nietzsche he broke down before the horrors of reality, but their 
escape routes were different. While Nietzsche invented his Superman, Tolstoy ‘turned to 
the Good, to brotherly love and tried to identify them with God’.
This interpretation by Shestov of Tolstoy is also given in Berdiaev's article on Shestov from 
which we have already quoted above. However, Berdiaev’s emphasis, which is rather akin 
to the view of Ivanov-Razumnik and more distant from that of Valevicius, is predominantly 
on the profound similarity between Shestov's own existential experience and his view of
Tolstoy. According to Berdiaev, Shestov in his writings ‘npoKJiHHaeT “MOpajit” 3a to, hto
26 *OHa eMy MemaeT achtb, asbht ero CBoen npH3panHOH BJiacTbio’. Instead Shestov resists 
with all his strength embarking on Tolstoy's route o f hiding behind morality, even though 
this hiding is a result o f an intense inner struggle and search for the meaning of existence. 
Berdiaev quotes Shestov's words on the abyss that opened up in front of Tolstoy, implying 
that Shestov himself faced the same abyss and that is why Shestov's descriptions of it are so 
vivid and passionate. Indeed, Shestov writes with respect to Tolstoy that
npe,q hum pacxpbuiacb nponacTb, rpo3HBiuaa norjioTHTb ero, oh bhacji TopacecTBo cMepra Ha 
3eMJie, oh ce6a caMoro BHAen jkhbwm TpynoM. OxBaneHHbiH yacacoM, oh npomiaji Bee Bbicume 
3anpocbi CBoen Ayum, cTan yHHTbca y nocpeACTBeHHocra, y cepeAHHbi, y nouuiocTH, BepHO 
nOHyBCTBOBaBIHH, HTO TOJlbKO H3 3THX 3JieMeHTOB B03M05KH0 B03ABHrHyTb Ty CTCHy, KOTOpafl, eCJIH 
He HaBcerAa, to xoTb HAAOJiro cxpoeT ot rjia3 CTpaiiiHyio “ncTHHy”. H oh Harneji cboio “Ding an
24 Valevicius, p. 31.
25 Ibid, p. 32.
26 Berdiaev, Tpaaedun u o6bidemocmb, p. 472.
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sich” h cboh CHHTeTHHecKHe cy^caeHHB a priori, to  ecTb y3Haji, KaK OT/jejibiBaiOTCfl o t  Bcero 
npo6jieMaTHHecKoro h co3,aaiOTCfl TBepflbie npHHunnbi, no KOTopbiM mo^kho acHTb nenoBeKy.27
cB o t CTpaumaa npaB/ja o Tojictom’, Berdiaev concludes. ‘Be/jb tojictobckoc  
xpHcraaHCTBO ecTL fleHCTBHTejibHo “Hfleaji ycTpoeHHoro HejioBeuecTBa”. TojicTOBCKaa 
pejiHrna h (jmjiococjma ecTB OTpimaHHe TparHHecKoro ontiTa, nepe^cHToro cbmhm 
Tojictbim, cnacemie b oribmeHHOcra o t  npoBanoB, o t  yxcaca Bcero nporijieMaTHHecKoro. 
Kanoe HecooTBeTCTBHe MOK^ y rpaH,zjH03H0CTbio HCKaHHH h toh  chctcmoh ycnoKoeHHJi, k 
KOTopoii ohh npHBejiH5, Berdiaev exclaims.
Thus he agrees with Shestov's criticisms of Tolstoy and acknowledges the permanent 
struggle against the latter inside Shestov himself.
As Ivanov-Razumnik explains, Shestov in his book on Tolstoy and Nietzsche attempts to 
reach to the bottom of their true philosophy, thus taking off the protective covers of their 
preaching. Shestov draws a parallel between Nietzsche's desperate attempts to hide in the 
Good and Tolstoy's no less desperate proclamations that Good is God. From the example of 
Nietzsche's life, Shestov asserts, we are given an extraordinary lesson that Good is not only 
incapable of saving lives dedicated to it, but can easily exterminate them. This is because a 
human being, in order to protect himself from personal grief and tormenting questions, 
tends to shield himself with an ideal and leaps to love his fellow-man, but this is nothing 
more than self-deception which does not offer any real answer or salvation. As a result life 
is wasted and irreversibly so. Nietzsche realised that, Shestov asserts, and turned around to 
face the ‘accursed’ questions, but could not hold on in the end and surrendered to the 
invention of his Superman. Similarly Tolstoy, after posing his questions and demands ‘to 
account for every victim of history’, using the famous words of Belinsky, then faced the 
true horror of Liapin's refuge for the homeless during the Census in Moscow of 1884-1885, 
and broke down. At this point, Shestov observes, Nietzsche's formula that one should not 
desire to be a doctor to the mortally ill was accepted by Tolstoy. In his soul he surrendered 
by separating himself from suffering and torment because he realised the futility of a fight
27 Shestov, JlocmoeecKUU u Huyiue, p. 363. Cited in Berdiaev, Tpazedtm u odbideHHOcmb, p. 472.
28 Berdiaev, Tpazedun u odbidenHocmb, p. 472.
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against them, and his formula that Good is God was intrinsically false, for, in fact, he 
instinctively, out of self-preservation, put life before the Good.
Shestov claims that both Nietzsche and Tolstoy ultimately proclaimed ‘amor fatV -  love of 
fate, acceptance of necessity, therefore viewing the world holistically, with good and evil at 
once, non-split, effectively standing beyond good and evil. Shestov's original finding was 
that one's good conscience torments one not only for bad deeds, but for good ones too -  for 
sacrificing one's life to the good instead of living it to the full, according to one's will. And 
life does not forgive it, Shestov claims, as in the case of Nietzsche -  it takes revenge for 
being thrown away. Shestov denounces autonomous morality for sacrificing a human being 
for the sake of good and compares it to the phenomenon of Brutus's wife swallowing 
burning coal. Following Nietzsche, Shestov curses the dictate of the Good which swallows 
up human life, submits it to itself, subordinates reality to idealism. Thus, Ivanov- 
Razumnik's analysis of Shestov's exploration of Tolstoy suggests that Shestov saw 
Tolstoy's humanism only as a mask, as discharging his duty to the norms of morality and 
using it as a protective curtain, while running away from his own fundamental doubts and 
extraordinarily demanding questions to take refuge in preaching, in the life of the ordinary 
and in acknowledging the right to life in everyone. Later on, as we shall see, Shestov took a 
more compassionate attitude to Tolstoy, increasingly sympathetic to his genuine inner 
struggle. However, Ivanov-Razumnik chronologically was a witness only to the beginning 
of Shestov's investigations into Tolstoy's soul.
5.3. Mapping Shestov’s approach to Tolstoy: between formal psychoanalysis and 
Akhmatova's psychological observations.
It is also worth noting that in his extensive analysis of Shestov's book on Shakespeare 
Ivanov-Razumnik does not make any references to Tolstoy and his influence on Shestov. 
Berdiaev, on the other hand, in his article remarks in a footnote that Shestov in his book on 
Shakespeare was still under the strong influence of Tolstoy. Apparently what he means is 
that Shestov at the time was taking Tolstoy at face value and followed him in his praises to 
the Good, reasonable necessity and the clear purpose of existence. By contrast, in his 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche Shestov had already become engaged in his favourite activity:
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reading between the lines and unmasking Tolstoy in accordance with his own ‘Shestovian’ 
paradigm by exposing the schism between Tolstoy the man and Tolstoy the writer by 
means of tracing through Tolstoy's existential experience, if you like by psychoanalysing 
Tolstoy on the basis of his novels taken as testimonies. Yet, this kind of psychoanalysis, as 
we are about to show, is very different from the standard Freudian school or any branches 
and followings of it.
We would say that the main difference is that Shestov's psychological approach operates on 
the philosophical plane by focusing predominantly on the spiritual drama of an individual, 
on the evolution of the latter's own existential philosophy, that is not exactly detached from, 
but rather raised above one's intimate experience in the sense of one's private circumstances 
rooted in one's childhood and adolescence, the awakening of one’s sexuality, one’s family 
relationships, and so on. Whereas a psychoanalyst would prefer to appeal to the Oedipus 
complex and the subconscious, Shestov speaks of the utilitarian nature of human virtues 
and explains that the origins of high and noble human aspirations lie in selfish motives and 
represent a cover-up for self-love.29 In other words, Shestov is operating with different -  
more abstract -  categories, and the physiological or sensual for him is rarely, if at all, 
connected in a dominating way with the moral and spiritual, whereas in psychoanalysis the 
roots of the spiritual are almost invariably concealed in the physical, and in any case the 
two are always considered in combination. However, human psychology is at the core of 
Shestov's philosophising, just as it is at the core of writings by Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and 
other artists. And it is from this psychological perspective that Shestov considers them.
Moreover, as is clear from Shestov's letter to his friend and relation Sofia Grigor’evna Peti 
of May 1900, he always felt much more at home with philosophical ideas expressed 
through artistic means on the psychological plane than with the established methodologies 
of theoretical philosophers:
Y  M eHfl B e e  n o -C T a p o M y . I I p o B e j i  n o c n e /jH H e  H e /j e n n  b cxyH H O M  o d m e c T B e  T e o p eT H H ecK H x  
4>hjioco(J)ob. H a c m i y  A O T arH B aio n o c j ie a H H e  C T p aH H u w . f l a a c e ,  e c j i n  y a c  n p H 3 H a B a T b ca , H e
29 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoweHHOcmu, p p .  82-83.
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B biflepacan  B e en  nporpaM M bi -  h  o n aT b  b  to c tbx  y  H h t u ic  h  / fo c r o e B C K o r o . 3 to  c b o h  jiio a h . C  
h h m h  n o cco p H iu b C B , p a 3 6 p a H H m b ca  -  h o  yjK He n p o c K y n a e m b . A 6 e 3  4 )hjioco(J)o b  H arneM y 6 p a T y  
T oace H ejib3«: H a3B anca rpy3A eM  -  n o n e 3 a n  b  K y30B. B n p o n e M , yac He AOJiro c  h h m h  B03H Tbca. 
CKOpO COBCeM KOHHy.30
Furthermore, Shestov clearly believed, and expressed this view more than once in his 
writings, that ‘pyccKaa <j)HJioco<j)CKafl m b ic a b ,  Tanaa rjiySoxaa h  Taxaa CBoeo6pa3Haa, 
nojiynnjia CBoe BBipaxceHHe h m c h h o  b  x y A o a cecT B eH H O H  jiHTepaType’.31
On the other hand it is most likely that Shestov's response to conventional psycho-analysis, 
had he followed its development, would have been as unflattering as his response to 
theoretical philosophy, because of its attempt to apply a scientific systematic method to the 
human psyche, to try and squeeze the irrational life of the human soul into the ready-made 
and par excellence limited framework of rational categories and constructs. Of course, his 
own method lends itself quite easily to a systematic characterisation, yet for Shestov 
himself it clearly appeared as a fresh, passionate and sincere attempt at a ‘pilgrimage 
through souls’ (the subtitle of his book) in a spontaneous way with the sole purpose of 
finding the truth by way of revelation rather than rational speculation.
In the light of the above it is interesting to compare Shestov's approach to Tolstoy, first of 
all with that of an artist embarked on his or her own personal psychological quest, not 
subordinated to any specific system or methodology. To this end we shall bring into focus 
the collection of remarks on Tolstoy made by Anna Akhmatova, whose penetrating analysis 
was also directed at the writer's psychology in a rather similar way to Shestov's, especially 
given that both Shestov and Akhmatova attempted to interpret Tolstoy through his writings, 
and vice versa (or more precisely, Shestov explained Tolstoy via his works, while 
Akhmatova explained Tolstoy's works via the peculiarities of his character and biography, 
but both, it seems, met midway).
30 Shestov’s letter to S. G. Peti to Paris, of 31 May 1900. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 47.
31 Shestov, yM03penue u omKpoeenue, p. 35.
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It would be fair to say that Akhmatova's opinion of Tolstoy stemmed from two essential 
roots (often interwoven): his intrinsic hypocrisy and his attitude to women. Effectively 
Akhmatova shared an existing trend of thought, in particular in Western criticism, which 
perceives Tolstoy not only as a humanist dedicated to serving the good, but also as a 
sanctimonious egocentric aristocrat, who was nevertheless quite clearly endowed with 
artistic literary genius. She talked of the ‘cnepTbin flyx -  xamKecKHH ayx Rchoh
9^nojm m f, and recalled with laughter how the literary scholar B. V. Tomashevsky who 
visited the estate to gather the peasants' recollections of their extraordinary master was 
repeatedly told stories about Tolstoy's wife Sofia Andreevna rather than the writer himself. 
When Tomashevsky attempted to direct the conversation back to Tolstoy and asked 
specifically about him, one of the peasants said: ‘Ra hto o hcm BcnoMHHan>! Mycopm>iH
"X6biu cTapnK’. The latter description was often used by Akhmatova as a condescending 
nickname for Tolstoy whose magnificent literary genius she certainly recognized at the 
same time. Yet, she never ceased to remember Tolstoy's didactic pretensions, his double 
nature, the existence of his two diaries -  one to show Sofia Andreevna and one for 
himself,34 and invariably, when speaking of him, displayed ‘cMect HeroflOBaHHfl h 
BOCTopra’.35
Symbolically speaking, notwithstanding Tolstoy's literary gift Akhmatova was always 
aware (and never forgiving) of Tolstoy having the finest underwear under the canvas of his 
peasant-like clothes (a fact which a particularly lucky visitor to Yasnaia Poliana, let in to 
normally closed rooms and wardrobes, may have a chance of discovering). As E. Lampert 
writes, ‘Gor'ky, who in a few short sketches gave a superb picture of both the massiveness 
and the infinite convolutions of Tolstoy's character, was right when he said that “from 
behind the muzhiks beard, from behind the crumpled democratic frock there shows through 
the old Russian barin, the magnificent aristocrat..., the creature of blue blood’” . Lampert
32 Lidiia Chukovskaia, 3anucm 06 Anne AxMamoeou (St. Petersburg: Zhumal ‘Neva’, 1996), I, p. 
16.
33 Ibid, p. 106, footnote.
34 See Ibid, II, p. 110.
35 Chukovskaia, II, p. 50.
36 E. Lampert, ‘The body and pressure of time’ in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 131.
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then adds that ‘whether one goes back to what Tolstoy himself chose to call his “twenty 
years of vanity and lust” or beyond to the days of agonized self-abasement, he could not 
subdue his aristocratic temper. His pride was enormous. “I at any rate”, he wrote in 1873, 
“whatever I do, am always convinced that du haut de ces pyramides 40 siecles me 
contemplent and that the whole world will perish if I come to a halt”’. Similar remarks on 
Tolstoy's incredible pride can be found in Frank Seeley's analysis where he recalls the
declaration of young Irtenev from Adolescence that whatever a man does is done out of
< )0
pride. Moreover, the definition of pride there is the conviction that one is ‘the best and the 
most intelligent of men’.39 ‘In this urge’, Seeley writes, ‘to be not merely one of the best 
and most intelligent, but the best and most intelligent of men -  we can see one of the main 
roots of all Tolstoy's philosophizing’.40
Shestov too in his Tolstoy and Nietzsche as well as Dostoevsky and Nietzsche written at the 
turn of the century pointed out the underlying ‘vital egoism’ of Tolstoy as ‘the real quality 
celebrated in the undercurrent’ of both War and Peace and Anna Karenina, as E. B. 
Greenwood observes.41 However, it is instructive to note that already in 1907 this obsessive 
pride merging with vanity, this self-love of Tolstoy was primarily interesting for Shestov in 
so far as it led to Tolstoy's solipsism in his view of the universe, which Shestov deemed 
necessary for solving some most profound and immense inner task. And this extraordinary 
concentration on such an intense search for truth is what Shestov saw and cherished above 
all in Tolstoy the thinker. In 1907 in his article ‘Penultimate Words’ Shestov, in particular, 
when talking about Tolstoy, looked through his moralising and subjugating tendencies to 
discover beneath them Tolstoy's true aspirations to solve the eternal questions of life and 
death. Shestov wrote:
37 Lampert, ‘The body and pressure of time’, p. 131.
38 Frank Seeley, Saviour or Superman? Old and New Essays on Tolstoy and Dostoevsky 
(Nottingham: Astra Press, 1999), p. 9.
39 Ibid, p. 10.
40 Ibid.
41 E. B. Greenwood, ‘Tolstoy and religion’ in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 151.
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T o a c t o h  n p e x c a e  B c e ro  MopanHCT. ,Hnx H ero  ce iiH ac , KaK h  b m o a o a o c th ,  BjracTb HaA a io a b m h  
A opoxce B c e ro  h  KaxceTcx oSaxT eA bH ee B cex  npoH H x 6 j i a r  MHpa. O h  Bee eme npoA onxcaeT  
npHKa3biBaTb, T pe6oB aT b h  x o n eT , h t o 6  eM y b o  h t o  6b i t o  h h  CTajio noBHHOBajiHCb. M o x ch o  h  Aaxce 
A oaxcho , noxcaA yn , c  BHHMaHHeM h  yBaxceHHeM oTHocHTbcx k  o to h  o c o 6 c h h o c t h  t o a c t o b c k o h  
H aTypbi. B eA b He o a h h  T o a c t o h ,  a M H orne papCTBeHHbie OTineAbHHKH m m cah  a o  KOHpa cB oefi 
XCH3HH n p e  A"bX BAX AH K HeAOBCHCCTBy 6e3yCAOBHbie TpeSOBaHHX nOAHHHeHHX. C o x p a T  B AeHb 
cM epTH, 3 a  n a c  n ep eA  CMepTbio ynHA, h t o  ecT b AHuib OAHa HCTHHa h  h m c h h o  Ta, KOTopyio o h  
OTKpbiA. IXnaTOH, 6yAyHH rAySoKHM cTapHKOM, e3AHA b CH paK y3bi HacaxcAaTb c b o io  M yApocTb. 
B epoxTH O , T ax o e  y n o p cT B o  b c a h k h x  a io a c h  HMeeT cB oe oG bxcH eH H e h  c b o h  rAySoKHH cm m ca . H  
ToACTOMy, h  C o x p a T y , h  IXnaTOHy, h  eBpencKHM  n p o p o x a M , KOTopbie b s to m  oTHomeHHH, xax h  b o  
M H ornx  A pyrH x , 6 b ia h  oneH b n o x o x cn  Ha yHHTeAen MyApocTH, BepoxTHO, HyxcHo 6 w a o  BceueAO 
cocpeAOTOHHTb c b o h  c h a w  Ha o a h o h  orpoM HOH BHyrpeHHeH 3aA ane, ycAOBHeM yA aH H oro 
BbinOAHeHHX KOTOpOH XBAXCTCX HAAI03HX, HTO BeCb MHp, BCX BCCAeHHaX A^HCTByeT 3aOAHO H B
yHHcoH c  h h m h . A  yxce yKa3biBaA n o  noBOAy ToACToro, h t o  b H acT oxm ee BpeMx o h  b c b o c m  
MHponOHHMaHHH HBXOAHTCX Ha rpaHHIje COAHnCH3Ma. ToACTOH H BeCb MHp - paBH03HanaiAHe 
noHXTHx: 6 e3  T axoro  BpeMeHHoro 3a6Ayxg^eHHx B cero e r o  cym ecT B a (He yMCTBeHHOH, t o a o b h o h  
o ih h 6 k h :  roAOBa 3HaeT x o p o in o , h t o  MHp - caM n o  c e 6 e ,  T o a c t o h  - caM n o  c e 6 e )  eMy n p n m n o cb  6bi 
OTKa3aTbcx o t  caM oro BaxcHoro CBoero R e n a .42
When already in his first book on Tolstoy, eight years earlier, Shestov had pointed to 
Tolstoy's underlying egoism, he had emphasised the above fundamental feature of Tolstoy 
-  his urge to teach mankind -  as being the chief characteristic of the writer's outlook. 
However, the difference seems to be that in the above quotation Shestov portrays Tolstoy's 
aspirations to moral and intellectual leadership as a manifestation of his fulfilment of his 
profound inner task, akin to Socrates who wanted to impose his truth on everyone as the 
universal truth. In Tolstoy and Nietzsche, on the other hand, the implication given by 
Shestov is that Tolstoy was focusing more on trying to convince himself of some deep 
truth, rather than imposing it on the rest of the world. Not that the latter task escaped him, 
no, but the former one seemed more urgent and primary. Indeed, Shestov says that already 
in Anna Karenina Tolstoy judges people, but not in the way ‘KaK a o a x c c h  cyAHTb 
SecnpHCTpacTHbiii, cnoKOHHbiH cym>x, He BeAaiomHH xcaAOCTH, h o  He 3HaiomHH h  raeBa, a 
KaK nenoBeK, rny6oKO h  CTpacTHO 3aHHTepecoBaHHbiH b  h c x o a c  p a 3 6 H p a e M o r o  h m  
npouecca. KaxcAax cTpoHKa 3Toro 3aMenaTeAbHoro npoH3BeA£HHx HanpaBAeHa npoTHB 
HeBHAHMoro, h o  onpeAeneHHoro Bpara h a h  b  3amHTy HeBHAHMoro xce, h o  Toxce BnoAHe 
onpeAeAeHHoro coio3HHKa\43
42 Lev Shestov, ‘IIpeAnocAeAHHe cAOBa’ in ConuHeuun e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 1996), II, 
p. 248.
43 Shestov, ‘.ZJoGpo b yneHHH rpa(j)a ToACToro h  HHume: 4>h aoco(])h x  h nponoBeAb’, pp. 221-222.
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In a similar way to Shestov (although with a more personal rather than philosophical slant) 
Akhmatova too stressed Tolstoy's solipsism as his most profound, as well as limiting 
characteristic. She spoke of his invariable projection of his own life and feelings onto his 
perception of the world around him and anything he wrote about -  in other words, his 
immensely egocentric personality. ‘IIoK a o h  jik >6hji Co(J>mo AH^peeBHy, OHa h  b  K h t h , 
OHa h  b  HaTame’,44 Akhmatova asserted and emphasised that the initially generous Natasha 
unrealistically turning stingy in the epilogue can only be explained by the fact that Sofia 
Andreevna had turned out to be stingy. ‘A Kor^a o h  pa3jno6nji Co(J)i>K) AH^peeBHy -  Tor^a 
h  “KpeiiHepoBa CoHaTa”, h  Boobuje h t o 6 bi h h k t o  h h k o id  HHKoraa He jik >6hji -  h h k t o , 
HHKoraa! -  h  h t o 6  h h k t o  h h  Ha k o m  He CMeji ^ceHHTbca’,45 Akhmatova insisted.
In the same way Akhmatova traced in Tolstoy's novels his contemptuous and patriarchal 
attitude to women. Thus she radically called The Kreutzer Sonata the most superb 
foolishness that she had ever read, exclaiming that apparently ‘3a b c io  ero /jojiryio 3k h 3h b  
eMy h h  pa3y h  b  rojiOBy He npHHiJio, h t o  HceHiijHHa He to jiko  acepTBa, h o  h  ynacTHHua Ha 
50%’.46 Akhmatova considered Anna Karenina to be a novel based on ‘(J)H3HOJiorHHecKOH 
h  ncHxojiorHHecKOH jd k h ’,47 because Anna is moral and virtuous while living with the 
husband she does not love, but suddenly becomes promiscuous and flirtatious when she is 
at last with the man she is in love with. Akhmatova scornfully denounced the main idea 
‘ 3Toro BejiHKoro npoH3BeAeHHfl’ as being the following: ‘ecjin JKeHiipiHa pa3omjiact c 
3aKOHHbIM My5KeM H COIHJiaCb C apyrHM My^ CHHHOH, OHa HeH36e>KHO CTaHOBHTCH 
npocTHTyTKOH’,48 It is interesting that Akhmatova’s friend, the writer Lidiia Chukovskaia, 
who gives these accounts o f Akhmatova's opinions, was initially in disagreement with 
them. However, later on when going through some literary documents she came across a 
chapter not included by Tolstoy in the final version of the novel, which completely 
confirmed Akhmatova's conjectures about Tolstoy's intentions. ‘npoHHTaB 3Ty rjiaBy, x
44 Chukovskaia, II, p. 50.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, II, p. 143.
47 Ibid, I, p. 104.
48 Ibid, I, p. 16.
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noHfljia, hto, xoth Tojictoh h BbinepKHyji 3th CTpaHHHBi, -  A. A. rjiy6oKO npoHHKjia b ero
» 49 3aMbiceji .
Now, the same novel has evoked completely different, not to say opposite, opinions with 
respect to the portrayal of women and their situation on the part of some critics. Thus, for 
example, John Bayley wrote that Tolstoy
almost inadvertently [...] has contributed a powerful demonstration in his novel about the position 
of women, and the injustice to which society subjects them. [...] Anna is a victim, like all women in 
her position. [...] And as her story unfolds the question in it seems to be asked with increasing 
insistence: what social change is necessary to end this kind of suffering, to make it possible for men 
and women to live together in society, to follow the road of their own passion and desires and live 
in the way that best suits them?50
This, of course, speaks more of Bayley as a reader than of Tolstoy as a writer, but then the 
same is true with respect to Akhmatova or any other interpreter of literature.
The third -  perhaps, intermediate -  position is in thinking that Tolstoy ‘really loved Anna 
Karenina, she was a living person for him. [...] But she was a moral transgressor and had to 
perish’.51 This is a stance taken by Valevicius which he apparently assigns to Shestov in 
analysing the latter's treatment of Tolstoy. Incidentally, Akhmatova too believes that 
Tolstoy loved Anna Karenina, but only at first, at the beginning of the novel, whereas 
towards the end he is humiliating her to the point of mocking her dead body: ‘KaxoH-TO 
Mopr Ha xcejie3HOH aopore ycTponji’,52 Akhmatova exclaimed. This therefore suggests that 
Tolstoy's intentions were not so unambiguous -  yet, he had to prove a moral point which he 
placed above everything. As Valevicius writes (again, assigning this analysis to Shestov), 
‘for the sake of the Good Tolstoy was ready to sacrifice everything’.
49 Chukovskaia, I, p. 106, footnote.
50 John Bayley, Leo Tolstoy (England: Northcote House in association with the British Council, 
1997), p. 32.
51 Valevicius, p. 31.
52 Chukovskaia, I, p. 105.
53 Valevicius, p. 31.
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From our perspective, Shestov's explorations first of all demonstrate once again his field of 
focus and interest. It again becomes clear that he was far from asking social questions (once 
he had parted with them in his extreme youth) and rather than exuding compassion for a 
woman’s, and in particular Anna's, fate he traced Tolstoy's intentions to reveal the truth 
about his convictions and beliefs of a broader, or perhaps more metaphysical, nature than 
gender roles and social injustice.
Yet, he did comment on specific issues such as Tolstoy's attitude to women. For instance, 
in his Apotheosis o f Groundlessness written in 1904, Shestov describes it in the following 
way:
O h n p « 3 H a eT  h noH H M aeT e m e  J iiob oB b , KOTopaa HMeeT cboch u e j ib io  ocH O BaH ne ceM bH. Ho He 
b o j ib u ie .  J h o S o B b  ,ZIpH-0KyaHa x aaceT ca  eM y CM eprabiM  r p e x o M . noM H H T e paccyacA eH H a JleBHHa n o  
noB O A y n a flu iH x , ho mhjiwx co3#aH H H  h n a ih ca ?  JleBHH 3aTbiKaeT rn a 3 a  h y u iH , h to6  TOJibKO He 
cjib iu iaT b  p accK a30B  Cthbw O bjiOH CK oro. H  H eroA yeT , B 03M ym aeT ca , 3 a 6 b m a eT  Aaace  
o 6 a 3 a T ejib H o e  a j ih  H ero  cocT paA aH H e k naAinH M , KOTopbix oh r p y b o  H a3biBaeT "TBapHMH". C 
npeACTaBjieHHeM  o "bchho 5KeHCTBeHHOM" y  T ojiC T oro  H epa3pbiB H 0 cB «3aH a M bicjib o co 6 jia 3 H e,  
r p e x e ,  HCKyuieHHH, o  eenuKou onacnocmu. A pa3 onacHOCTb, cAeAOBaTejibHO, npe>KAe B c e r o  hjokho 
o c T e p e r a T b c a , t .  e .  n o  bo3mohchocth A a jib iu e  A epacaT bca. Ho Be,zu> onacHOCTb - s to  ApaKOH, 
KOTopbiH npHCTaBJieH ko B ceM y, h to  6biB aeT  B aacH oro, 3H aH H TejibH oro, 3aM aHHHBoro Ha 3eM Jie.54
Shestov claims that Tolstoy was the first in Russian literature who started to be afraid and 
suspicious of life and started to moralise openly. Temptations appeared fatal to Tolstoy, 
Shestov concludes, and he stayed intact only because of his innate instinct of self- 
preservation. Shestov explains Tolstoy's disdain for Pushkin and Lermontov in that they 
were not afraid of women in particular and danger in general. Thus, Shestov effectively 
points again at Tolstoy's hypocrisy, and in a way very similar to that of Akhmatova. Indeed, 
it seems most likely that she would probably have commented in this connection that 
Tolstoy was simply envious of Pushkin, Lermontov and their like just as so-called 
‘virtuous’ mediocrities are envious of those who step over the commonly accepted moral 
boundaries because they, the mediocre, want to do this too, but do not dare. Otherwise why 
would Akhmatova have made the following point about Tolstoy's BocKpecenue: ‘B neM 
KopeHb KHHrn? B t o m ,  h t o  caM o h ,  JleB HnKOJiaeBHH, He AoraAajica aceHHTtca Ha
54 Shestov, Ano<peo3 decnoneenHOcmu, p. 94.
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npocTHTynce, ynycraji C B o e B p e M e H H O  TaKyio b o s m o k h o c t b . . . ’ .55 Which, given Tolstoy's 
moralising attitudes, implies a suppressed desire, rather than simply a missed opportunity. 
This of course relates to the Tolstoy of mature years, when his moralising began, and he 
denounced all the promiscuous adventures of his youth, and the suggestion therefore is that 
although his convictions had changed (or at least he wanted them to have changed), his 
desires and attitudes had not.
It is interesting that Shestov's own attitude to women was also marked, like that of Tolstoy, 
by a touch of patriarchy, as can be seen from his Apotheosis o f Groundlessness where he 
wrote that women's desire to liberate themselves from men's power and women's striving 
for equality, although fully understandable, is to be regretted since they tend to do it by 
self-education and ultimately by losing their charming and illogical female attitudes. This 
clearly demonstrates Shestov's own rather condescending and patronising attitude, even 
though he had no direct intention of being offensive. It must be added to this that in terms 
of real life Shestov had always been very supportive and encouraging of his numerous 
friends, making no distinction between male and female ones. He invariably helped his 
female friends to achieve their aims in the contemporary male-dominated environment.
However, as we started saying, Shestov's central focus already in his first book on Tolstoy 
was essentially religious and philosophical, and any comments of a specific nature, 
psychological, moral or social, were subjugated to a central metaphysical theme, and were 
raised with the sole purpose of serving that theme. Indeed, Shestov's main claim was that 
Tolstoy increasingly replaces God by the Good, even though in Anna Karenina he does not 
yet do this to the full extent. Shestov writes:
Bee /jeHCTByiomHe jm ija  “A hhli KapeHHHOH”pa3aejieH bi Ha ABe KaTeropHH. Qahh cjieayiO T  
npaBHjiy, npaBHJiaM h BMecTe c  JleBHHbiM n a y r  k G jiary, k cnaceH H io; a p y r n e  caeayiO T  cbohm 
HcejiaHHBM, HapymaiOT npaBHjia h, n o  M epe cmcjiocth h peuiHMOCTH cbohx aghctbhh, noanaaaiO T  
d o n e e  hjih MeHee xcecTOKOMy Haica3aHHio. [ . . . ]  O aH aico, b “A hhc KapeHHHOH” o6beM  “ npaBHji” , 
noHHTaeMbix rp. TojicTbiM 3a o6»3aTejibH bie, eme cpaBHHTejibHO HeBejiHK. B a n o x y  co3aaH H a 3T oro
55 Chukovskaia, II, p. 50.
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poM aH a x y ,a o 5KHHK ^ aeT  flobpy TOJibKo oT H ocH T ejibH yio BjiacTb H a# H ejioBenecK OH  m r m b io .  E o j ie e  
T o r o , c jiy jK eH n e Aobpy Kan HCKjnoHHTejibHaa h co3H aT ejibH aa u e jib  >kh3hh e m e  O T pm jaeT ca hm.56
Shestov then continues with examples from War and Peace to demonstrate that at the time 
of the two novels Tolstoy still put life above the good and even considered submitting life 
to the exclusive service of the good as unnatural. However, Shestov claims that Anna 
Karenina was ‘nocjieAmw nonbmca, CAejiaHHaa rp. T o j ic t b im , h t o 6  yaepacaTtca Ha 
npemieft noHBe’, that ‘Bee t o , h t o  HanojiHJuio Kor^a-To co6oio jieBHHCKoe cymecTBOBaHHe 
- yyKe He yAOBjieTBopaeT ero, h t o  CHOBa ABHjiact KaKaa-To nycTOTa, h t o  CHOBa HeAOCTaeT 
t o h  npoHHOcra, KOTopaa AaBajia eMy npaBO CMOTpeTb Ha Bcex jnoAefl cBepxy b h h 3 h  
CHHTaTb, h t o  3a Hero - Eor h  npoTHB Bcex ero BparoB -  Bor’.57 However, later on the Good 
for Tolstoy becomes increasingly all-encompassing and shields him from real life. Tolstoy 
fully sinks into preaching since ‘serving good’ becomes not just a noble burden for him, but 
a relief from a burden, for it shows him a new and definite light that he desperately needs, 
Shestov asserts.
Notably, Shestov implies that the idea about following the rules and the inevitable 
punishment that breaking the rules entails, remains continuously relevant to Tolstoy, for 
‘TaKOBO yace c b o h c t b o  Aofipa. K t o  He 3a Hero, t o t  npoTHB Hero’,58 Shestov claims. Thus, 
in Anna Karenina Shestov takes a broader view of interpreting Tolstoy's intentions than 
Akhmatova does, for in her interpretation there is one fundamental rule, for breaking which 
Anna is punished, while for Shestov there is a whole system of norms and a range of 
degrees of breaching them and punishments for it. In this connection what also attracts 
attention is the difference in interpretations given to the epigraph of the novel.
Shestov says that contrary to the conventional interpretation of this evangelical quotation 
that the ultimate judgement over people lies with God, Tolstoy takes this task into his own 
hands. This echoes, in a certain sense, the aforementioned thoughts of Frank Seeley, who 
claims that Tolstoy ‘is driven to cast down and destroy existing authorities -  or to put
56 Shestov, JJ,o6po eynenuu zpacfra Toncmoao u Huifiue: (pwiocofpun u nponoeedb, p. 223.
57 Ibid, p. 233.
58 Ibid, p. 243.
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h im s e lf  in  th e ir  p la c e ’.59 S ee ley  traces  T o ls to y  d isav o w in g  N ap o leo n , S h ak esp eare  and  
fin a lly  C hrist, en d in g  u p  in  real theom achy : ‘G od  b y  god  goes ou t d iscro w n ed  and  
d isa n o in te d ’.60 A k h m ato v a  too  sees th e  final ju d g em en t p ass in g  from  th e  h an d s o f  G od  to  
T o ls to y  h im s e lf  w ho  execu tes it th ro u g h  th e  m o s t p h ilis tin e  and  h y p o critica l ch a rac te rs  
re p resen tin g  h ig h  society : ‘H  no/jyM aiiTe tojibko’, A k h m ato v a  exc la im s: ‘koto ace 
“Mycopm>iH CTapmc” H36paji opyzjHeM B ora? K to ace coBepm aeT ofiem am ioe b 3imrpa(j>e 
OTMiueHne? Bbicuihh cbct: rpa(})HHa JIhahx HBaHOBHa h inapjiaTaH-nponoBeflHHK. Beflb 
HMeHHO ohh flO B o^T  AHHy # 0  caMoyfiHHCTBa’.61 C o n tra ry  to  th ese  sen tim en ts, Jo h n  
B ay ley  sp ecu la tes  th a t T o ls to y  d id  n o t ‘n ecessa rily  feel th a t A n n a  w o u ld  o r shou ld  su ffe r
£S)punishment in the world's eye, or in God's’. In fact Bayley conjectures that her suicide 
might have been committed ‘in a momentary fit almost of pique, of “I'll show him’” , thus 
putting a totally different spin on the epigraph, as if its implication is that the punishment is 
that of Anna exercised over Vronsky. Similar ideas, although in a more definite form, can 
be found in Seeley's essay where he suggests that Anna indeed takes revenge on Vronsky, 
but in doing so she in fact avenges her own self. More precisely, as Seeley puts it: ‘in 
projecting onto him her own sins, she deflects to him her craving for punishment: he must 
be punished for his (imagined) guilt. Thus she strikes at herself in him and through him. 
Till finally, in her despairing last hours, she reaches the point of projecting onto all around 
her her own self-disgust and self-hatred’.64 This is in total contradiction to Bayley's view 
that Anna ‘feels no guilt as such’ and only longs for ‘her lost son, like an animal deprived 
of its young’.65
59 Frank Seeley, ‘Tolstoy’s Philosophy of History’ in Saviour or Superman. Old and New Essays on 
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Nottingham: Astra Press, 1999), p. 10.
60 Ibid.
61 Chukovskaia, I, p. 16.
62 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 34.
63 Ibid, p. 35.
64 Frank Seeley, ‘The Fate of Anna Karenina’ in Saviour or Superman. Old and New Essays on 
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, p. 64.
65 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 35.
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5.4. Writing a philosophical psychobiography of Tolstoy: Shestov’s hermeneutic 
method versus the formal psychoanalytical school. Shestov as a precursor of 
‘narrative psychology’.
The strong psychoanalytical flavour of the above claims by Seeley with respect to Anna's 
actions and feelings is far from being unique in the critical studies of Tolstoy. Having seen 
Shestov's ideas of Tolstoy in the context of Akhmatova's informal, but shrewd 
psychological observations of him, we shall now analyse in more detail, as promised above, 
Shestov's hermeneutic psychological method versus the more formal psychoanalysis of 
other researchers. The primary issue here is that of the identification of Tolstoy with his 
characters.
It is perhaps due to Tolstoy's immense creative powers that his heroes always appear so 
alive that they are perceived by the readers as real people, which makes it easier and in 
some way even natural to consider them on the same plane as the author who gave life to 
them. For example, Shestov's contemporary Konstantin Leont’ev was preoccupied by the 
question, which Donald Fanger found ‘astonishingly extraliterary’,66 of who is more 
valuable to Russia -  Lev Tolstoy himself or his fictional character Vronsky? Leont’ev in 
his passionate conservatism regarded Vronsky as an exemplary warrior whom Leontiev in 
his own words preferred from his patriotic point of view not only to Levin, but also to the 
great novelist Tolstoy himself ,67 This is obviously an example of taking literary characters 
more than seriously, and clearly as real people. In such a context Shestov's identification of 
Tolstoy with his characters does not even seem extreme, because it is not the ‘reality’ of 
fictional characters that is central for him (sometimes he even mocks certain positive types 
as one-dimensional and unrealistic!), but the information about the author encoded into and 
conveyed through the literary heroes of the latter.
In this respect a literary space constitutes a very specific coded system where on the one 
hand the writer is indeed represented, but through a huge variety of disguises, while, on the
66 Donald Fanger, ‘Introduction’ to Konstantin Leontiev, A hcuiu3, cmtuib u eenmie. O poManax rp . 
JI.H. Tojicmoeo (Providence: Brown University Press, 1968), p. vii.
67 Konstantin Leontiev, A hcuiu3, cmwib u eenmie. O poManax rp. JI. H. Toncmozo (Providence: 
Brown University Press, 1968), p. 3.
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other hand, every character is more open to the reader than a real person would be in the 
space of real life. As Daniel Rancour-Laferriere states, ‘the fictional character of Pierre is
/TO
even more “real” than a real person is likely to be’, because ‘most readers are not likely to 
know even their friends as well as they know the self-revealing Pierre. [...] The stories real 
people tell about themselves or about other real people are usually not nearly as interesting, 
as honest, and as detailed as the story Tolstoy tells us about Pierre’.69 Rancour-Laferriere 
then goes on to quote, almost in passing, E. M. Forster’s statement that the creator and the
70narrator are one. The latter statement is in itself an entry point to an unending debate and 
the focus of extensive studies giving rise to a wide range of viewpoints. An alternative 
opinion we find, for example, in Andrew Wachtel's article on Tolstoy: ‘the literary work is 
not a mirror o f the author’s life but is, instead, a substitute life in which Tolstoy can try out 
solutions to his own crisis’.71 However, Shestov obviously believed that, if  carefully read, 
these tested solutions are instructive enough. In the existing labyrinth of opinions he chose 
a distinct and quite consistent path, convinced that it is through his characters that the writer 
reveals himself most clearly, more so than through his officially declared confessions and 
diaries written on purpose, let alone through biographies of him. ‘06cTOflTejibHbix 
6uorpa(})HH He fibmaeT —  a, no KpaimeH Mepe, He Mory Ha3BaTb hh oahoh’, Shestov wrote. 
‘06bIKHOBeHHO B 5KH3HeOnHCaHH5IX HaM paCCKa3bIBaiOT Bee, KpOMe Toro, HTO BaaCHO 6bUIO 
6bi y3HaTb’.72 While proclaiming that life and literature are two different things, he 
nevertheless insisted that many writers leave enough clues in their literary works to enable 
us to decipher the ‘authorial’ reality behind it -  one just has to be able to read ‘properly’ 
(‘Hy>KHo yMeTb HHTaTb’), Shestov suggested.
In this respect Shestov’s project is substantially different from that of Rancour-Laferriere. 
Indeed, the latter makes the point that the imagined space of the novel is continuous with
68 Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, Tolstoy's Pierre Bezukhov, A Psychoanalytic Study (England: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1993), p. 5.
69 Ibid.
70 E. M. Forster, The Death Of The Author (1955 [1927]), 55-56. Cited in Rancour-Laferriere, p. 5, 
ref. 18).
71 Andrew Wachtel, ‘History and autobiograhy in Tolstoy’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
Tolstoy, ed. Donna Tusing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 188.
72 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nuneeo, p. 186.
73 Shestov, Ano<peo3 decnoneeHHOcmu, p. 131.
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his interior space, as well as that of every appreciative reader. He then affirms that it is 
because Pierre belongs to the interior lives of countless readers, not only to that of Tolstoy, 
that Pierre is psychoanalysable at a broader level than the ‘very narrow level of the author’s 
psyche’.74 Yet, for Shestov, it seems, it is precisely that ‘narrow level of the author's 
psyche’ that truly interests him. Instead of composing, like Rancour-Laferriere, a 
psychobiography of Pierre -  a selected fictional character of Tolstoy -  Shestov pursues a 
different task -  he composes a psychobiography of Tolstoy himself. Incidentally, Rancour- 
Laferriere recognises this task as ‘significant and fascinating’,75 but considers it as never 
undertaken, even though, as he says, ‘some psychoanalytic studies of Tolstoy do in fact 
already exist’. Rancour-Laferriere produces a lengthy list of the latter, but almost all of 
them are entirely orthogonal to what Shestov is doing. This is not so much due to their 
specific terminology and methodology, but because, in the essence of things, they 
invariably deal with Tolstoy's sexuality and private biography, where privacy concerns 
primarily physiological and personal aspects of his character rooted in Tolstoy's childhood 
and youth, and includes such issues as his sadistic tendencies and attitudes, the early loss of 
his mother, the peculiarities of his upbringing, etc, rather than spiritual and philosophical 
matters per se (as in the case of Shestov's analysis).
One of the main differences lies in the fact that if the former characteristics, such as, for 
instance, Tolstoy's attitude to women, ever enter Shestov’s analysis, they do so invariably 
as a means of investigating the latter (principal) issues and are never substitutes for them. 
Thus, for example, in the considerations above we showed how Tolstoy's ambivalent 
treatment of women, his recognition of love only if  it is sealed by the marriage vows as 
well as his general fear of femininity and his view of it as a danger are regarded by Shestov 
as leads to be pursued in order to reveal Tolstoy's general pattern of being in general afraid 
and suspicious of women, femininity and gender relations, and of regarding any of the 
aspects of the above that do not have an obvious practical meaning as potentially fatal 
temptations. At the same time psychoanalytical studies of Tolstoy tend to assign the
74 Rancour-Laferriere, p. 2.
75 Ibid, p. 9.
76 Ibid.
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novelist’s ambivalence towards women and his inability to reconcile a woman's role as a 
mother with her also being a sexual creature to Tolstoy's own early loss of his mother (who 
died when he was two).
In other words, to speak more generally-just before embarking on concrete illustrations of 
these general claims -  what Shestov does can perhaps be called writing a philosophical (or, 
if you like, spiritual) psychobiography of Tolstoy (or, for that matter, of any other writer). 
This is because he is interested primarily in the writer's philosophical convictions and 
beliefs and their evolution, but through the latter's individual inner growth traced via his 
literary works and most notably documented in his characters. The level at which Shestov 
operates differs, as we mentioned above, from contemporary psychoanalytical methods, 
and is instead more akin to Tolstoy's own method of Russian nineteenth-century 
psychological realism. What Rancour-Laferriere says about Tolstoy, he would have 
undoubtedly said about Shestov's attempts at analysing Tolstoy: ‘he is a “psychologist”, 
yes, but he is rather half-baked as a psychoanalyst’.77 This is because of the issues and 
insights that appear to Rancour-Laferriere as abandoned mid-way, but in fact they simply 
lie outside Shestov's interests. Curiously, having agreed with the depth and subtlety of 
Tolstoy's psychological analysis, Rancour-Laferriere objects to endowing Tolstoy scholars
no
with these characteristics. ‘Tolstoy is the “psychologist”, not the Tolstoy scholar’, he 
claims. This makes one wonder if he is at all familiar with Shestov's writings on Tolstoy.
One has to emphasise that the identification of Pierre with Tolstoy himself that Rancour- 
Laferriere, by his own admission, occasionally makes is quite different from that of 
Shestov. The former occurs as an unavoidable consequence of psychoanalytic observations 
on Tolstoy while psychoanalysing Pierre. Thus, for example, he draws a parallel between 
the significance of Tolstoy's famous ‘ant brothers’ and Pierre's Masonic ‘brothers’.79 At the 
same time Rancour-Laferriere is very aware of the multitude of similarities between 
Tolstoy and his creation. He does not deny that ‘the principal prototype for Pierre seems to
77 Rancour-Laferriere, p. 10.
78 Ibid, p . 9 .
79 Ibid, p . 8 .
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have been Tolstoy him self.80 He gives examples of the evident parallels between them, 
such as Tolstoy's and Pierre's youthful experiences in Petersburg, the similarities in their 
family life and their overall quest for philosophical and spiritual truth, as well as Pierre's 
attempts to improve the lot of his peasants which parallel Tolstoy's endeavours on his estate
O 1
in Iasnaia Poliana. Yet, it is not Rancour-Laferriere's aim to highlight these similarities 
since it is Pierre, not Tolstoy that constitutes his main focus. On the other hand Shestov 
identifies Tolstoy with Pierre Bezukhov only to reveal the existential truth about Tolstoy. 
Thus, as we shall see later, Shestov compares Pierre's spiritual evolution and his 
extraordinary experience of the whole world breaking down in his soul and then 
resurrecting itself again with those of Tolstoy. In other words, while Rancour-Laferriere 
goes from Tolstoy to Pierre, Shestov's quest unfolds in the opposite direction: from Pierre 
to Tolstoy.
Amongst the psychoanalytic studies of Tolstoy that Rancour-Laferriere mentions, perhaps
the only exception which bears any approximation to Shestov's type of exploration is the
study by Heinz Kohut who draws a contrast between the two sides of Tolstoy's personality:
the guilty and the tragic. He assigns didacticism to the guilty man in Tolstoy, and the
8^more creative and non-moralising passages to the tragic one. This, in a certain sense, is 
reminiscent of the view that Tolstoy's inner conflict was rooted in his never-ending 
attempts to harmonise his behaviour with his principles. This view is expressed in 
particular by Frank Seeley who calls this struggle of Tolstoy’s ‘desperate and largely
84unavailing’. Yet, the type of analysis that Kohut provides is different again from 
Shestov's, for his conclusions are reached by general contemplation rather than an explicit 
effort to unmask the writer by decoding his behaviour and double-guessing the motivations 
of his heroes.
80 Rancour-Laferriere, p. 8.
81 Ibid.
82 See Heinz Kohut, The Search for the Self. Selected Writings o f Heinz Kohut: 1950-1978 (vols. I 
and II); ed. Paul Omstein (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1978), pp. 761-762.
83 See Rancour-Laferriere, ref. 41 on p. 9.
84 Seeley, Tolstoy’s Philosophy of History, p. 9.
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To do this careful work composed to a large extent of genuine insights Shestov first of all 
makes an interesting selection of the characters that will drive his point home, but 
furthermore, he focuses on those of their actions and ideas that serve his main purpose, and 
often ignores the multi-dimensional nature of the characters. In other words he super­
imposes his paradigm on the text to derive exactly what he needs from it. Thus, although 
exposing the characters in the most unexpected light (and through them their creator 
Tolstoy), Shestov nevertheless often borders on turning them into simplified schemes by 
neglecting their depths. This is particularly interesting given Shestov's objections to the 
scientific method of generalisation which inevitably simplifies things by ignoring their least 
relevant characteristics. In contrast, what Shestov chooses to ignore is dictated by his own 
subjective vision rather than the objective demands of the case. Of course, it is necessary in 
order to make particular points to concentrate selectively on the appropriate manifestations 
of them and in a sense to neglect the rest. Without this strategy no logical reasoning would 
be possible. Yet, Shestov on the one hand refused to acknowledge that, and on the other he 
inadvertently repeated the same pattern himself.
We shall now substantiate our claims and demonstrate the distinctly philosophical slant of 
Shestov's psychological analysis as opposed to the different emphases, particularly of the 
psychoanalytic school. Our aim is also to exhibit the evolution of his ideas on Tolstoy in 
the context of his own philosophical development. In the course of this we shall attempt to 
analyse his subjective choice of heroes as the writer's representatives, and in particular the 
above tendency to simplify characters through a tendentious selection.
However, before embarking on this task, we need to address another issue: that Shestov’s 
treatment of Tolstoy, and for that matter any other author, not only resonates with the 
psychoanalytical approach to literature, but also anticipates the (very modem) ‘narrative 
psychology’ approach. The latter occupies an important place within contemporary 
psychology and ‘attributes a central role to language, but more specifically to “stories”, in
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the process of self-construction’. 85 It ‘thus considers narratives as fundamental for 
understanding individuals’ lives and constructions of meaning’86 and ‘is considered 
especially important when the object of analysis is personal experience and personal
87identity’. It is therefore normally applied to self-narratives such as ‘autobiographies, 
memoirs, personal and life histories, even interviews’ which, as Freeman explains, 
constitute ‘texts of lives, literary artifacts that generally seek to recount in some fashion
QQ
what these lives were like’. Hence ‘in “narrating the self’, people make sense of their 
lived experience, construct and convey meanings, and also construct their own individual 
[...] identities’.89
In other words, narrative psychology attempts to decode (i.e. deconstruct and reassemble in 
a more ‘authentic’ way) a self-myth inherent in self-narratives. This is, however, precisely 
what Shestov tries to do in his analysis of literary works. Thus he essentially treats fictional 
literature as a self-narrative of the author, as if it were a ‘coded autobiography’ or memoir 
of sorts. In this respect the above quotation from Andrew Wachtel's article on Tolstoy, 
which claims that in his fictional writings he creates ‘a substitute life in which Tolstoy can 
try out solutions to his own crisis’, is of high relevance. For, as Freeman writes, ‘narratives 
[...] rather than being the mere fictions they are sometimes assumed to be, might instead be 
in the service of attaining exactly those forms of truth that are unavailable in the flux of the 
immediate’.90 In other words, this ‘substitute life’ could in fact be a reappraisal by the 
writer of past reality, which, with time, gains a new meaning and new inner resolution to 
past events. Moreover, if in the genres of direct self-narrative such as autobiographies and 
memoirs, authors ‘tend to be prescriptive, presenting one’s own life as an example of a 
moral code in action’,91 in fictional works the author, by hiding behind a hero, can
85 M. Freeman, Re-writing the Self: History, Memory, Narrative (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993). Cited in Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war”: an 
analysis of the self-narratives of neofascist protagonists’.
86 Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’” .
87 Ibid.
88 M. Freeman, Re-writing the Self: History, Memory, Narrative (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 7. Cited in Bull.
89 Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’” .
90 Freeman, p. 224. Cited in Bull.
91 Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’” .
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deliberately violate any moral codes and free himself of all ethical bonds. This is the view 
Shestov took with regard to the literary works under his study, and that is why he was 
interested above all in this fictional genre rather than in autobiographies, diaries or memoirs 
per se. In other words, while ‘what we might call the moral space of self-interpretation, and
QOthus the space of autobiographical memory itself, remains very much circumscribed’, a 
piece of fiction does not carry with it any moral obligations on the part of the author who 
can reveal himself through his negative characters without any fear of being ‘caught’, of 
being ‘personally accused’.
Furthermore, what is of utmost importance in the link between Shestov’s approach and 
narrative psychology is that the latter, as Anna Bull explains, ‘is applied mainly to the study 
of illness narratives, which often deal with personal traumas, focussing on significant 
moments of change in the life of an individual. [...] Such moments tend to be seen as the 
beginning of a new journey in one’s life, and are often narrated as part of a “conversion 
genre” which presents numerous points of contact with a religious conversion’. As a 
result, Bull writes, ‘our understanding of what constitutes “the truth” can change 
dramatically’.94 She then quotes M. L. Crossley to point out that we thus revisit our 
‘conceptions of selfhood and its ultimate connection with issues of morality, “rightness” 
and “goodness’” .95 The conclusion is that ‘in doing so, we create new narratives that help 
us make sense of life after the trauma’.96
This coincides almost precisely with what Shestov does to the writers under his study. As 
was explained earlier and will be demonstrated in the rest of the thesis, Shestov searches for
92 M. Freeman and J. Brockmeier, ‘Narrative integrity: Autobiographical identity and the meaning 
of the “good life’” in Narrative and Identity. Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture, eds. J. 
Brockmeier and D. Carbaugh (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2001), pp. 85-86. Cited in Bull, 
forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war”.
93 A. Cento Bull, Italian Neofascism: The Strategy of Tension and The Politics o f Non- 
Reconciliation (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, forthcoming in 2007).
94 Ibid.
95 M. L. Crossley, ‘Formulating Narrative Psychology: The Limitations of Contemporary Social 
Constructionalism’, Narrative Inquiry, vol. 13, No 2, 2003, pp. 287-300 (p. 297). Cited in Bull, 
Italian Neofascism, forthcoming.
96 Bull, Italian Neofascism, forthcoming.
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a breaking point in their life, for a central crisis -  or, in other words, for a defining trauma. 
Having lived through a traumatic experience himself, he then embarks on a journey through 
the souls of great thinkers to find in their lives the same trauma-caused re-birth of 
personality and re-evaluation of old convictions and values, i.e. precisely the above case of 
revisiting our old conceptions of selfhood in connection to morality. It is this new journey 
(starting with Nietszche after -  according to Shestov -  his realisation of his hopeless 
condition and continuing in the case of others), on which the doomed person sets off, that 
most interests Shestov. The old ideals of ‘good’ are no longer of any use, and a new reality 
opens up which needs urgent assimilation. Hence Shestov, by reading classical literary 
works as self-narratives, as attempts to create a self-myth, in a way constructs an alternative 
myth of the writers’ lives being centred around a major trauma. The original conclusions 
that he salvages from such a treatment often shed an unexpected light on the conventional 
interpretations of these writers, and add a useful new dimension to understanding their 
works, as will be shown in this and following chapters.
It is also worth pointing out that while narrative psychology seems to be largely based on a 
discursive analysis, on paying attention to the linguistic, syntactical and structural 
properties of a story, Shestov’s approach is less focused on these aspects of the text and 
examines more the direct content of the heroes interchanges and authorial comments, 
looking for a hidden meaning, as we shall continuously see. In particular, it is characters’ 
actions and behaviour that he compares and contrasts with their verbal communication. In 
this Shestov displays more of a blend between narrative psychology and a psychoanalytic 
approach, with the ultimate outcome being, as we are about to see, in deriving a 
philosophical (even anthropological) meaning from the interpretation of the author’s 
experience as reflected in the latter’s literary works.
5.5. The tragic and the ordinary. Tolstoy's fear of the Underground.
We shall focus first of all on Shestov's treatment of the two major novels of Tolstoy: War 
and Peace and Anna Karenina, which were most significant for Shestov already in his early 
explorations of Tolstoy. In contrast to Kohut's analysis of the emanations of the tragic as 
opposed to the guilty in Tolstoy, Shestov spoke of the tragic and the ordinary as being the
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two poles between which Tolstoy drifted, and illustrates it above all via the epic of War and 
Peace. More precisely, Shestov focuses on the epilogue to the novel, and considers all the 
married couples, but with the main emphasis on the Rostovs. As Bayley observes, Shestov 
refers sardonically to Princess Mary and Nicholas Rostov as the true heroes of War and
97Peace. Indeed, Shestov writes: ‘nocMOTpHTe, Kaicoe rnyboKoe yBaxceHHe mrraeT rp. 
Tojtctoh k PocTOBy. “/Jojiro, - paccKa3bmaeT oh HaM, - nocjie ero (HnKOJiaa) CMepTH b 
Hapofle xpaHHJiacb HaboxcHaa naMan* o ero ynpaBjieHHH” . HaboxcHaa naMaTb! JJojiro 
xpaHHaacb! IlepecMOTpHTe Bee, hto  nncaji rp. Tojictoh: hh 0 6  o^hom H3 cbohx repoeB oh
n o
He roBopnji c TaKHM nyBCTBOM 6jiaro^apHocTH h yMHjieHHa’. Why was Tolstoy so fond 
of Rostov, Shestov asks; and answers that it is because of Rostov’s extraordinary 
ordinariness. He writes:
P o c t o b  3H aji, K ax acHTb, h  6 b u i noTOM y B c e r a a  TBepA. Bo b c io  ace c b o io  nH caT eabC K yio  
AeH TejibH ocTb rp . T o j i c t o h  HHHero TaK He ueHHJi, KaK onp e,ne.n eH H oe 3HaHHe h  T B ep /iocT b , h 6 o  y  
c e 6 a  He HaxoflHJi h h  T o r o , h h  / ip y r o r o .  O h  M or TOJibKO no/jpaacaT b P ocT O B y h , caMO co 6 o k >  
p a 3 y M eeT ca , 6biJi npH H yacaeH  p acT onaT b  x B a n y  CBoeM y BbicoKOMy o 6 p a 3 u y .  3 T a  “ H aboacH aa  
naM aTb” , KaK h  B ecb  a n n n o r  k  “ B o h h c  h  M Hpy”  -  ^ep3KHH, co3HaTejibH O  A ep3KHH b b b o b ,  
6p om eH H b iH  rp . T oacT biM  BceM  o6pa30BaH H biM  jtio a ^ m , B e e n , e ca H  x o t h t c ,  coeecmu H arnero  
B peM eH H ."
Shestov claims that Tolstoy knew very well what he was doing and that the meaning of the 
epilogue can be expressed as Tolstoy's open worship of Rostov as opposed to Pushkin and 
Shakespeare whom he, also openly, rejected. (Here, by the way, it is worth noting that we 
are witnessing the same ‘Leontiev’ phenomenon again -  of regarding literary heroes 
alongside real people (writers); the ‘natural ease’ of it implicitly indicates the degree to 
which for Shestov characters and their creators merged together.) If before Tolstoy 
juxtaposed to Pushkin and Shakespeare the whole of the Russian people (the simple folk, 
the narod), in War and Peace he chose Rostov instead -  the embodiment of ordinariness, of 
‘HHCTenmax MaTepmi, kochoctb, HenoflBHXCHOCTb’,100 using Shestov's words. As for 
Princess Maria, Shestov reveals her hypocrisy hidden under the fa9ade of high and lofty
97 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 27.
98 Shestov, JdocmoeecKuu u Huijiue, pp. 364-365.
99 Ibid, p. 365.
1°° ru: a
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morality. ‘Pa3yMeeTca [...], o h  npaB’101 -  Shestov cites her talking to Rostov about Pierre 
and his tormenting questions concerning the suffering of others and one's duty towards 
them. ‘3 t o  “pa3yMeeTca” b c j i h k o nenHo! ’,102 Shestov exclaims, and then continues the 
quote where Maria reminds Nikolai of their other duties -  to their children, to the family. 
Rostov is consoled and moves on to petty subjects, which seems too abrupt a change to 
Maria. Yet, she does not voice her frustration for the sake of keeping their marital union 
and peace intact. In this Shestov finds the most extreme hypocrisy and emphasises that 
Tolstoy makes this ‘leap over the abyss’ quite deliberately and remains ‘as usual clear, 
peaceful and transparent’: ‘T o j i c t o h  h  BH/iy He no^aeT, h t o  noHHMaeT, nepe3 KaKyio 
nponacTb o h  t o j i b k o  h t o  nepecKOHHJi. O h  no o S b i k h o b c h h i o  aceH, c b c t c j i ,  npo3paHeH’.103
T o ls to y  thus reach es a d o u b le  g o a l, S h esto v  asserts, to  speak  the truth, but to  m a k e sure that 
th is  truth is  b y  n o  m ea n s su b v ersiv e  o f  th e fou n d ation s o f  life . A fter  a ll, it w a s  o n e  o f  
S h esto v 's  o w n  central p o in ts  con cern in g  War and Peace, that the n o v e l first and forem o st  
ce leb ra tes  life , and that at th e tim e  o f  w ritin g  T o ls to y  had put l i fe  a b o v e  th e  G ood . 
H o w ev er , th is w a s  S h estov 's p o sit io n  in  h is  Tolstoy and Nietzsche, but already a c o u p le  o f  
years later, in  Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, S h e sto v  m o v e s  o n  b y  reform u latin g  T o lsto y 's  
esc a p e  from  the horrors o f  l ife  in to  p reach in g  as a so m ew h a t stronger statem ent o f  T o lsto y 's  
attem pt ‘to  h id e  in  the m e d io c r e ’. In T o ls to y , S h esto v  asserts, ‘m b i  HMeeM eaHHCTBeHHBm 
npHMep reHHajiBHoro nejioBeKa, b o  h t o  6 b i  t o  h h  CTano CTpeMJimerocfl cpaBHHTBca c 
nocpe/iCTBeHHocTBio, caMOMy CTaTB nocpejicTBeHHOCTBio’.104 Indeed , S h esto v  im p lie s  that 
in  th e  R o sto v s  T o ls to y  sm u g g le s  in  and se e m in g ly  ‘in n o c e n tly ’ ce leb ra tes the trium ph o f  
th e  m ed io cre , p h ilis tin e  and co n serv a tiv e  -  o f  all th o se  w h o  w ill  u p h o ld  to  the la st their  
se lf ish  b e lie fs , but co v er  th em  w ith  h ig h  and n o b le  w ord s, thus r eco n c ilin g  rea lity  w ith  
id ea ls . In th is , for S h esto v , T o lsto y 's  attem pts to  m e lt in  w ith  the ord inary g e t fu lf illed , and  
at th e sa m e tim e  h is  a forem en tion ed  id e o lo g y  centred on  th e u b iq u itou s and om n ip o ten t  
p o w e r  o f  l i fe  still p erseveres. For S h esto v  th e form er ten d en cy  (tow ards th e ordinary from  
th e tragic) is  far m o re  im portant than the latter (the ce leb ration  o f  l ife  at w h atever  c o st) , or,
101 Shestov, JdocmoeecKuu u Huiivue, p. 366.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid, p .  360.
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more precisely, he sees them as merging in Tolstoy: in order to remain on board, in the full 
stream of life rather than in the terrifying ‘underground’, the writer is prepared to become a 
mediocrity. And the Rostovs for Shestov symbolise first of all that former tendency, and it 
is the manifestations of it that Shestov highlights in his study.
At the same time, if we look, in contrast, at Gary Saul Morson's analysis of the novel, we 
find that it is the latter tendency which comes to the forefront, and that he too characterises 
the Rostovs as the main heroes of the novel, only unlike Shestov he does it quite seriously, 
without any irony. Morson writes: ‘If by the hero of a novel we mean the character who 
best embodies its values and lessons, then Rostov, not Andrei or Pierre, is the hero of War 
and Peace\ and it testifies to Tolstoy's genius that he can make such a thoroughly ordinary, 
indeed mediocre, character both heroic and supremely interesting. By the same token, the 
book's heroine is Princess Marya, who more than anyone can perceive the value, in fact the 
sanctity, of each ordinary moment. The marriage of Marya and Nikolai, more than Pierre's 
and Natasha's, defines the book's central point and establishes its happy ending’ . 105 Thus 
both Morson and Shestov are selective in their analysis and highlight different sides of the 
Rostovs that serve their respective goals. Morson wants to demonstrate Tolstoy's 
extraordinary literary craftsmanship and his ability to celebrate life, while Shestov, 
following his own agenda, derives conclusions about Tolstoy's hidden aspirations and 
conflicts. Yet, Morson, as it were, gives the Rostovs a chance, while Shestov's verdict on 
them is more characteristically categorical. For Morson, as for Shestov, the ordinariness of 
Nikolai Rostov is indisputable. Yet, if Morson sees in its portrayal the genius of Tolstoy to 
make the mediocre seem heroic, Shestov derives from it Tolstoy's own striving to equal the 
mediocre. Similarly, Morson sees in Maria first of all her ability to live every moment to 
the full, while Shestov reveals her underlying hypocrisy.
This hypocrisy Shestov in a sense assigns to Tolstoy himself as a manifestation of the 
writer's eternal struggle against the subversive power of the tragic, of the underground and 
its ‘psychology’. Shestov focuses predominantly on Tolstoy's extraordinary ability
105 Gary Saul Morson, ‘War and Peace’ in The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy, ed. Donna Tusing 
Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 76.
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se e m in g ly  to  o v erco m e  the tragic in  h is  literature, but at th e sam e tim e  dem onstrates the  
partial and d e cep tiv e  nature o f  th is v ic to ry , b e c a u se  for S h esto v  T o lsto y 's  fa te  w a s  to  b e  
fo rev er  haunted  b y  th e tragic till the end. A cco rd in g  to S h esto v , T o ls to y ’s entire literary  
w ork , i f  n o t h is  entire life , w a s  d efin ed  b y  h is  stru gg le  against ‘un d ergrou n d ’ thou gh ts, 
a ga in st th e  tragic h o p e le ssn e ss  o f  ex isten ce . ‘E ro  [ . . . ]  nucaTejibCKaa jieaTejibHOCTb - o / jh o  
H enpeptiBH oe CTpeMJieHHe Tax h j ih  HHane - c h j io h , XHTpocTbio, ofiMaHOM - nofiejiHTb 
yn op H oro  Bpara, nojipbiB aiom ero b  caMbix ocHOBax B03M0>KH0CTb cnacTjiHBoro h  CBeTJioro 
cymecTBOBaHHa’. 106 T h is  statem ent m a n ifests  in  particular the sp e c if ic  p h ilo so p h ica l strand  
in  S h esto v 's  p sy ch o a n a ly s is  o f  the writer.
In contrast to this vision of Tolstoy, there has always existed an overwhelming opposite 
trend which has viewed Tolstoy as a humanist never compelled to defect to the camp of 
complete disillusionment and nihilism. Thus Henry Gifford writes quite radically that 
‘Tolstoy never for a moment enrolled in the army of the underground. He belongs to the 
moral tradition which in modem eyes may seem part of the “idyll” that replaces reality’. 107 
Even in the Death o f  Ivan Ilich, the story that Shestov came to discuss in his later writings 
on Tolstoy, Gifford sees the ultimate victory of hope over nihilism, ‘a confidence in right 
feeling and in the sense of human responsibility’ . 108
However strong and numerous the defenders o f the above stance on Tolstoy may be, one 
has to admit that Shestov's arguments have their undeniable force. Shestov illustrates his 
point by showing how Tolstoy's heroes amazingly manage to reconcile ideals with reality 
by accepting the latter, but not stopping to respect the former. Shestov penetratingly 
observes that the impression from this phenomenon should have been like that from the 
famous formula o f Dostoevsky's Underground Man: ‘Mupy j ih  npoBajiHTbca h j ih  M H e naio 
He nHTb’, however it is not so. Shestov demonstrates that Tolstoy ‘B e 3 j je ,  r^e t o j i b k o  
MoaceT, HanoMHHaeT HaM, h t o  j i j w  jiynniHX jn o j je H  12-ro rojia HecnacTba P o c c h h  3H anH JiH  
MeHbine, n e M  h x  coficTBeHHbie, jiHHHbie oropneHHa. Ho npn 3 t h x  H a n o M H H a H H a x  o h  y M e e T
106 Shestov, flocmoeecKUU u Hutfiue, p. 354.
107 Henry Gifford, Tolstoy (Oxford-Toronto-Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 76.
108 Ibid.
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COXpaHHTb H eo6bIK H O B eH H yK > H a BH fl HCHOCTb XjyiHH, TOHHO H HH erO  O C o6eH H O rO  H e  
n p o H 3 0 im i o ,  t o h h o  h  b  caM OM  f l e j i e  p a 3 y M  h  c o B e c T t  M o r y T  cnoK O H H O  r j ia ^ e T B  H a  
n p o H B jie H H e  T a x o r o  H y a o B H i im o r o  3TO H 3M a’ . 109 Shestov quotes the descriptions of this in 
the case of Princess Maria and points to the striking proximity of her stance to that of the 
Underground Man, because in the essence of their content her words embody the same 
sentiment: ‘P o c c h h  jih  n o n i 6 H y T b ,  h jih  M H e n a i o  H e  n H T b ? JI c x a a c y  -  n y c T b  cede radHeT 
P o c c h h , a h t o 6  M H e n a n  6 b u i ’ . 110 Yet, Shestov notices, the impression is not at all like that 
because of the entirely different form that Maria's words take. In other words, this is 
because Tolstoy takes great care to dress up people's egoism as completely natural, 
harmless and, moreover, compatible with high ideals and noble principles. We wish to note 
here also, that Shestov, although right in principle, is still stretching or twisting the nature 
of the case somewhat, because the Underground Man demands his tea fo r  himself whereas 
Maria is worried about her family (in that particular instance about her brother), which is a 
mitigating circumstance to some extent, altering the character of her ‘guilt’.
In contrast to that, if we look instead at John Bayley's elaborations, we notice that the same 
elements are seen in a somewhat different light, even though it is precisely Shestov’s 
analysis that he contemplates. Bayley's summary of the latter is as follows: ‘In a brilliant 
exposition of the hidden politics of War and Peace the Russian-Jewish philosopher Shestov 
has shown how subtly equivocal is Tolstoy's own position as the book nears its end’. 111 
Bayley then explains that position as the conflict between our sacrificial and endless 
striving to resolve what is right and good on the one hand, and our possessive desire to 
cling to our own little domain of our family and possessions on the other. In other words, 
Bayley expresses very nearly the idea that Shestov so concisely formulated as a conflict 
between the tragic and the ordinary in Tolstoy, but carries on to reach a somewhat different 
conclusion (or rather to highlight a different side of the problem). And this highlights in 
particular the fact of the multi-dimensional nature of truth by demonstrating that the human 
striving for a heroic, noble stance may not necessarily be regarded as inevitably tragic, and
109 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu uHuipue, p. 355.
1,0 Ibid.
111 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 26.
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equally human personal aspirations as invariably ordinary. Instead, for Bayley the conflict 
of Tolstoy lies between the writer’s deepest instincts on the one hand and his reasoning 
conscience and intelligence on the other. ‘Tolstoy's own spiritual future is thus explicitly 
foreshadowed in War and Peace. His art could, in a sense, solve the tormenting problem 
which the pilgrimage of his life could not, for War and Peace leaves the problem
119unresolved, in the full aesthetic harmony of its close’, Bayley writes.
What we can see from this is that Bayley's emphasis, just like that of Kohut described 
above, was more at the level of morality and psychology, while Shestov's was indeed 
philosophical, with, if  you like, an existential spin. As Berdiaev pointed out, it was 
essentially a question of theodicy, because Shestov pursued above all Tolstoy's search for 
truth, his attempts to answer the eternal questions of the meaning of life, of faith and 
reason, of the place of the individual in the universe. That is why, as we have now shown, 
Shestov dug up from beneath the surface of Tolstoy's narrative, as manifestations of this 
tormenting quest, his fear of the underground, of the tragic, and his attempted escape to the 
ordinary.
Shestov's vision of Tolstoy at the time of Shestov's first book on him was an attempt first 
and foremost to reveal this underlying struggle in Tolstoy, resulting in him shifting from 
philosophy to preaching and hiding behind the Good. At the same time Shestov admired 
Tolstoy's ability to celebrate life in all its manifestations, to immerse himself in its full 
flow, and it is in this ability of Tolstoy, in his deep interest in life and people that Shestov 
then saw his significance as a philosopher: ‘b c h  TBopnecKaa ^ ejrrejibH O C T b ero 6 buia
BbI3BaHa nOTpefiHOCTbK) nOHJITb )KH3Hb, T. e. TOH HMeHHO nOTpefiHOCTbK), KOTOpafl BbI3BaJia
11? t # 
k  c y m e c T B O B a H H io  < J )h j io c o (] )h k ) \  He explained that the right to be called a philospher is
not defined by a technical preoccupation with specific questions such as space and time,
monism and dualism, and gnoseological theory in general, because ‘c o 6 c t b c h h o  a ce
(j)HJIOCO(j)HJI /JOJDKHa HaHHHaTbCfl TaM, rzje B03HHKaiOT BOnpOCbl O MeCTe H Ha3HaneHHH
112 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 27.
113 Shestov, JJodpo eynenuu zpacfra Toncmozo u Huifiue: (pmocofpuH u nponoeedb, p. 255.
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nejioBeica b  MHpe, o  ero  npaBax h  pojiH b o  BcejieHHon’.114 Ivan ov-R azu m n ik  supports this  
c la im  b y  S h e sto v  about th e ca u ses and fu n ction  o f  p h ilo so p h y  and interprets the latter as an  
attem pt to  understand and ju s t ify  life , to  ex p la in  the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  e v il in  th e  w o rld , and to  
fin d  th e m ea n in g  o f  life . T ^ e  B03HHKaiOT o t h  B o n p o cti, TaM HaHHHaeTca $ h j io c o $ h x , b  
KaKHX 6 b i  4>°PMax 0Ha HH npoHBJianacB: b  (j)opMe j ih  (j)HJioco(])CKoro TpaicraTa, h jih  
KpHTHHecKOH c t b t l h , h j ih  TparejjHH h  poMaHa’, 115 Ivan o v -R a zu m n ik  w rites.
Perhaps Shestov's own passionate desire at the time was to equal Tolstoy in this ability to
turn to life in its fullness and glory and to be able to cope with its horrors. As Erofeev
points out, the essence of Shestov's contemplation of Tolstoy's War and Peace at the time
is that the latter when creating the novel lived in full harmony with the secret laws of life
and m an aged  ‘b o  b c c m  [ . . . ]  yBH^eTB pyicy IlpoBHAeHHa’;116 h e  d id  n ot teach  life , but
learned from it. At the end of the book Shestov, using Nietzsche as an example, summons
the reader to go beyond or above the suffering and the Good -  in search of God. Shestov
claims that this is because Nietzsche had shown him the way. Erofeev essentially adds to
this that such a call was made by Shestov because Tolstoy could see the divine hand in
everything and thus had set the example. 117 Indeed, Shestov did say that Tolstoy in War
and Peace, having demanded an answer from fate for every human life, came to the
118conclusion that this answer should be sought elsewhere, ‘B B im e , BHe Hac’.
Already in Shestov's next book -  The Philosophy o f Tragedy -  that came out only three 
years after his Tolstoy and Nietzsche, Shestov appeared to be no longer trying to find in his 
own self Tolstoy's gift of celebrating life, but not yet to have found any religious answer, 
from ‘above and beyond us’ either. Instead tragedy seemed to have taken the upper hand in 
Shestov's own search for the meaning of life and for human salvation. Shestov's portrait of 
Tolstoy was even more radicalised by further shifting the focus from Tolstoy's knowledge
114 Shestov, ffodpo e yuenuu zpa<pa Toncmozo u Huifiue: <punoco<pwi u nponoeedb, p. 255.
115 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 166.
116 Shestov, Jdo6po e yuenuu zpacpa Toncmozo u Huiftue: (pnnocopw u nponoeedb, p. 262. Cited in 
Erofeev, p. 167.
117 See Ibid.
118 Shestov, ffodpo eynenuu zpacpa Toncmozo u Hmpue: (punocopun u nponoeedb, p. 256.
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of life's secrets to his continuing inner compromise and escape to the ordinary. This is how 
Shestov described Tolstoy in the preface to his Philosophy o f Tragedy:
KaK HeHaBHCTeH, KaK npoTH BeH  6biJi eM y B ecb  CTpoft coBpeMeHHOH m w c j ih ! E m e  c m o a o a b ix  jieT  
o h  k o  B ceM y, k  neM y H ayKa r o B o p n jia  "Aa", roBopH Ji " h c t " , He ocT aH aB jiH B aacb Aaxce nepeA 
onacH O C T bio CKa3aTb H en en o cT b . [ . . . ]  A Me>KAy TeM, o h  k o h h h ji TeM, h t o  b  rjiaBHOM npHHJui B ee, 
neM y yHHT H ayKa, h  TaK t k e  AepacH Tca "nojiojK H TenbH bix" H A eanoB , KaK h  6 o jib iu h h c t b o  
pe(J)opM aT opoB  b  E B p o n e . E r o  x p h c t h b h c t b o  ecT b HAeaji y cT p o eH H o ro  H en oB en ecT B a. O t  
HCKyccTBa o h  T p e 6 y e T  n p o n o B eA H  A o b p b ix  nyBCTB, o t  HayKH -  c o b c t o b  MyacHKy. Oh He noHHM aeT, 
3aneM  n ooT b i TOCKyioT h cTpeM HTca Bbipa3HTb TOHHaniiiHe o t t c h k h  c b o h x  H acTpoeHHH, eM y  
K ancyrca  CTpaHHbiMH 3t h  SecnoK O H H bie HCKarejiH, m a T a io m H e ca  n o  ceBepH O M y n o m o c y  h jih  
n p o B O A a m n e  S ecco H H b ie  h o h h  b  HaGniOAeHHH 3B e3A H oro H e6 a . 3 an eM  B ee  s t h  C T peM nem ui k  
HeH3BecTHOMy, HeH3BeAaHHOMy? Bee 3 t o  6 ecn o jie3 H O , 3HaHHT -  HeHopM anbHO. CTpauiH biH  
npH 3paK  "HeHopM ajibHocTH" B ee  BpeMH AaBHJi h  AaBHT 3t o t  KOJioccanbHbiH yM h  3acT aB jiaeT  e r o  
MHpHTbCH C nOCpeACTBeHHOCTbK), B C e6 e  eaMOM HCKaTb noepeACTBeHHOCTH.119
Tolstoy was afraid of insanity as the most probable result of his intense inner search, of his
19ftinterrogations of life, and therefore ‘BepHynca k  nonoKHTenbHMM HAeajiaM’, Shestov 
concludes.
More than thirty years later, in 1935, in his last work on Tolstoy, Shestov repeated the idea 
of Tolstoy's War and Peace being a hymn to life, a justification of the human apotheosis in 
the universe, but only to show how Tolstoy's views over time became transformed and how 
he kept increasingly failing in his obstinate self-deception. Shestov asserted that at the time 
of War and Peace Tolstoy believed essentially in the power of brute force ruling the world
191-  the force that Rostov (with Arakcheev looming over him) embodied. Bezukhov, on the 
other hand, represented only the force of his own conscience. He could not resurrect his 
faith after having witnessed a brutal execution of the prisoners; his world collapsed, even if 
this collapse turned out to be only temporary. Shestov draws a direct parallel between the 
juxtaposition of Rostov and Pierre on the one hand and Tolstoy's inner conflict on the other. 
He sees Tolstoy as standing behind Rostov at the time of War and Peace, and behind Pierre 
at the time of the Confession. As he wrote in 1935,
119 Shestov, ffocmoeecKuu u Huijiue, p. 327.
120 Ibid.
121 Count Aleksei Andreevich Arakcheev (1769-1834) was a general and statesman whose name 
came to symbolise for Russians brute force and a military-type autocracy.
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...pa3Be npHHyAHTejibHoe Hanano, OAHueTBopHBineeca b P octobc, b cHJiy Toro, h to  oho oaho  
TOJibKO h mojkct oSecneHHTb CTpoHHocTb, nop^AOK h rapMOHHio 6brnm, He TpeGyeT h He 
3acjiy>KHBaeT HaSoacHoro OTHomeHHA k ce6e? O h o ,  oho oaho TOJibKo aoctoh h o  6bm> npeAMeTOM 
Hamero GnaroroBeiiHoro noHHTaHHH. KorAa T ojictoh KOHHan “BoiiHy h Mnp”, oh, KaK 6yATO He 
Mor h He xoTeA HHane AyMaTb. Ho, beAt, oh Mor h He paccKa3biBaTb o tom , h to  oh AyMaji: 
HAAoShOCTH B 3TOM He 6bIAO H HHKTO He 3aCTaBAAA eTO 3TO AeAaTb. H Bee 7KQ OH CKa3aJI -  H CKa3an 
C TaKOH yMblUIAeHHOH, BbI3bIBaiOmeH pe3KOCTbK) -  CAOBHO nOArOTOBAflfl HHTaTeJIH K TOMy, HTO 
nepe3 noATopa Aecimca AeT eMy cyacAeHO 6bino B03BecTHTb b “HcnoBeAH”.122
And it is then, Shestov affirms, that the Rostov-Arakcheev type of justification of the world 
based on their readiness to exterminate any resistance on their path had become for Tolstoy 
a ‘disgusting blasphemy’ ( ‘oTBpaTHTentHbiM KomyHCTBOM’), and, ‘tohho o6e3yMeB, oh 
fipocaeTca k Cb. IlHcaHHio, k EBaHrennio, Hina TaM cnaceHHa ot AyniHBinero ero
123KoniMapa’.
5.6. Reading Tolstoy through his heroes. Interpretations of Levin.
Thus, in a sense, throughout War and Peace Shestov saw Tolstoy as a dialectical merging 
of Rostov and Pierre, which is not a standard critical opinion. Tolstoy is very rarely 
identified with Rostov, but very frequently parallels are drawn between him and Pierre and 
to some extent between him and Andrei Bolkonsky. Having said that, it is interesting to 
point out that, for example, W. Gareth Jones is convinced that Nikolai Rostov is as much an 
emanation of Tolstoy's own self as Prince Andrei and Pierre, 124 and, curiously, has 
translated Rostov's belief that a lie is a necessary attribute of life into Tolstoy's attitude to 
writing fiction. On the other hand, Shestov himself, as we shall see later, also came openly 
to identify Tolstoy with Pierre, but in 1900 he did not yet spell it out and was less free with 
direct identifications.
However, in Anna Karenina Shestov focused most of all on the character of Levin, 
regarding him and essentially him alone as the writer's mirror-image. Thus Shestov moved 
to a more subtle picture by transferring, as it were, Tolstoy's inner struggle from two
122 Shestov, ‘JlcHafl noAAHa h AcTanoBo’ in l/M03peHue u omKpoeenue, pp. 163-164.
123 Ibid, p. 165.
124 W. Gareth Jones, ‘A man speaking to men: the narratives of War and Peace’ in New Essays on 
Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 6 6 .
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conflicting heroes in War and Peace to one hero in Anna Karenina. This again does not 
exactly coincide with the existing critical opinions, because often Tolstoy is seen in more 
than just one central character of the novel -  for example parallels are drawn between 
Tolstoy and Koznyshev or Tolstoy and Vronsky. Thus Bayley speaks of Vronsky as ‘the 
kind of man he [Tolstoy] himself might once have been’ .125 In a more sophisticated 
fashion, Tolstoy is perceived in a variety of characters through the interplay of episodes 
displaying them from different angles. For example, Judith M. Armstrong sees in 
‘Koznyshev's relinquishing of Varenka’ Tolstoy’s ‘last gesture of homage to the image of 
purity and abstention’ and claims that although it is a minor episode, it is ‘as liberating as a 
confession’ because it clears the way for another character -  Levin -  by releasing him 
‘from his single-minded dedication to the family ideal’ and thus allowing him ‘to become
1 OAthe mouthpiece for the other preoccupations of his creator’.
Armstrong's perspective is distinctly psychoanalytical. As Rancour-Laferriere identifies,
1 9 7she employs in her study orthodox Freudian analysis as well as psychoanalytic criticism. 
Therefore for our purposes it is particularly instructive to compare Armstrong's conclusions 
with those of Shestov, especially when her focus is identical to that of the philosopher -  for 
instance, in the case of the character of Levin.
For Shestov, as we mentioned, Levin is the direct embodiment of Tolstoy himself, his alter 
ego, as Shestov states, and explains that even Levin's surname is derived from Tolstoy's 
first name (Lev) . 128 In him Shestov sees an open manifestation of Tolstoy's hypocritical 
attempts to escape into preaching and unravels constant discrepancies in the character of 
Levin which demonstrate for Shestov Tolstoy's losing battle against his own genuine 
philosophy. In other words, Shestov uses Levin to unmask Tolstoy and to reveal the 
doomed nature of the writer's preaching. Shestov finds Levin unconvincing precisely 
because he expresses a false ideal, Tolstoy's attempts to fool himself. Shestov notices how 
Tolstoy describes Levin's inner evolution as a development from his futile and personally
125 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 28.
126 Judith M. Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina (England: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 46.
127 See Rancour-Laferriere, p. 17.
128 Shestov, ffo6po eynenuu zpacpa Toncmoeo u Hui{iue: (piuiococpw u nponoeedb, p. 225.
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unsatisfying attempts to live for the common good to his subsequent more satisfactory ‘life 
for him self. Shestov decodes this development as a direct statement by Levin that 
‘co3HaTejn»Hoe cjiyaceHHe Aobpy -  ecTb HeHyxcHaa j i o )k i> \ 129 Nevertheless, it is Levin
i mwhose life has ‘HecoMHeHHbiH c m b ic ji  Aobpa’, and even if  Tolstoy depicts all his 
shortcomings very vividly, good is still on his side, and on his side alone. By this Tolstoy 
provides himself, according to Shestov, with a sense o f inner firmness and security, he 
justifies his inner moral stance and the sense o f direction in his own life. Yet, Shestov 
affirms that this sense is only deceptive, it will not last. He sees Levin's image as steeped 
in hypocrisy. Having made his position clear in Tolstoy and Nietzsche, Shestov then 
reaffirms it in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. There he writes openly that ‘ueM 6ojibine ero 
[Tolstoy’s] JleBHH 3aMbncaeTCH b  y3Kyio c(j)epy c b o h x  j i h h h b i x  HHTepecoB, TeM "Harjiee" 
[ . . . ]  CTaHOBHTca o h  b  BocxBajieHHH Aodpa’.131 Shestov then focuses on what he finds most 
revealing with respect to Tolstoy -  Levin's behaviour regarding his wedding in particular 
and his marriage in general.
B ayM a H T ecb  to jibk o  x o p o m e H b K o  b  acH3Hb JleBH H a h  b w  yd eziH T ecb , h to  He to jilk o  Jiran o h  A o 6 p y ,  
K or^ a Bbipancan eM y c bo io  r j iy d o K y io  npH3HaTejibHOCTb, h o  odM aH biBan h  “ c n a c T b e ” , K or^a y B ep a ji  
c e 6 a  h  K h t h , h to  o h  cnacTJiHB. Bee -  H enpaB A a, o t  n e p B o r o  a o  n o c j ieA H e ro  cAOBa. JleBHH HHKorAa 
He 6 b u i cnacTAH B - h h  T orA a, K orAa o h  6 b m  hcchhxom  K h t h , h h  T orA a, KorAa o h  Ha Heft aceHHJica. 
O h  TOJibKO n p H T B o p a a ca  cnacTAHBbiM ,132
Shestov says categorically. Amongst Shestov's reasons are Kitty's total incompatibility with 
Levin, and the improbability of the latter falling in love with such ‘6 0 >Kbfl xopoBKa’, 133 as 
Shestov calls her, implying Kitty's rather narrow-minded outlook, her limited philistine 
aspirations and interests, at least in comparison with Levin's. Shestov claims further that 
family life is not a suitable atmosphere for a man like Levin, and that he comes across in 
those family scenes as somebody who is resolute to do exactly what happy people in love 
do in identical circumstances. Levin's feverish happiness on the eve of his wedding, his 
high anxiety during Kitty's pregnancy, his ridiculous and uncivilised scene of jealousy
129 Shestov, JJo6po eynenuu apatfta Toncmoeo u Huipue: <fiujioco(pM u nponoeedb, p. 225.
130 Ibid, p. 226.
131 Shestov, JdocmoeecKUU uHuifiue, p. 357.
132 Ibid, p. 358.
133 Ibid.
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when Veselovsky comes to visit, all this, Shestov says, evokes in Levin a feeling o f joy that 
he is capable o f being like everyone else. Marriage for Levin was proof that he was no 
worse than other people, Shestov claims. That is why Levin answered an innocent question 
‘Bti HceHaTM, a cjibiuiaji?’ with a feeling o f ‘proud joy’ (‘c ropflbiM yaoBOJibCTBHeM’).134 ‘C 
rop^BiM yuoBOJiBCTBHeM! HeM T y r  ropanTbca?’ -  Shestov asks; ‘what is there to be proud 
about, it is not a big achievement to get married’, (‘nejiOBeic acemuica, 3acjiyra H e  H3 
6 o j i b i h h x ’) ,  he continues.
For Shestov this reveals the hidden truth about Levin's aspirations to have firm ground
under his feet, to equal the common world where to be married is the established
foundation of a proper life path. Shestov asserts that Levin was as alien to the good as he
was far from happiness; yet it was Tolstoy's task to portray Levin as both good and happy,
to attach him to ordinary life. Levin should stand firmly on his feet, should be firmly
planted in the earth, so that no storm can overturn him. This was what Tolstoy intended for
Levin, because it was Tolstoy's own deepest aspiration, Shestov says, not to enter into the
1category of the underground people, of all those fallen and buried alive. This is the way 
in which Shestov, making subtle psychological observations and deductions with respect to 
the character of Levin, substantiates his criticism that Tolstoy's Good is only an artificial 
shield.
On the other hand, Judith M. Armstrong uses her psychological insights into Levin's 
behaviour and feelings to derive conclusions about Tolstoy which are very different from 
Shestov's. First of all, her identification of Tolstoy with Levin is not as unambiguous as in 
Shestov's case. Interestingly, it is precisely in those moments before the wedding which 
Shestov perceives as false (betraying Levin's attempts to imitate happiness) that Armstrong 
sees as betraying Tolstoy's separation from the character of Levin. She explains this ‘clear 
and new separation of writer from hero’ by the fact that ‘here not Tolstoy's wrcconscious, 
but his only too cynical conscious is operative. Brilliantly capable of retelling the emotions
134 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huiftue, pp. 358-359.
135 Ibid, p. 359.
136 See Ibid, p. 359.
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of his own courtship of Sonya Behrs, he cannot totally approve them and hence does not 
fail to ironise his recreation of them in Levin’.137
Thus both Shestov and Armstrong sense Tolstoy's sarcasm in the same episodes, but 
interpret it in different ways -  according to their different agendas. Armstrong reveals 
Tolstoy's ambivalent, if not directly sceptical and disillusioned, attitude to marriage which 
for her serves as evidence of his personal experience and psychological evolution, the roots 
of which are largely concealed in the early loss of his mother. It is in the light of this major 
factor that Armstrong views Tolstoy's biography. Shestov, on the other hand, interprets 
Tolstoy's personal experience reflected in the novel in the broader context of Tolstoy's 
philosophical and moral stance. In a way it is paradoxical that despite his existential 
approach his perspective is, as it were, more socially than personally oriented with respect 
to Tolstoy, unlike that of Armstrong. However, under closer scrutiny it is not that surprising 
because while Armstrong wants to find out the truth about Tolstoy for the sake of research, 
Shestov is seeking a personal answer. He searches for the meaning of life, he craves the 
way to salvation -  for himself and for mankind. That is why his investigation is invariably 
biased and free with interpretations -  because for him it is, at least spiritually, a matter of 
life and death, rather than mere research.
These differences are further manifested in the interpretation of the following events of the 
novel. After Levin and Kitty have returned home following Nikolai's death, as Armstrong 
points out, ‘the Levin persona undergoes a significant and obvious split’.138 Armstrong 
explains that ‘it is as if Tolstoy is now dissatisfied with the hitherto constant identification
1 TOof himself with Levin, and wishes to project his dilemma on to two separate horns’. She 
identifies the latter as launching Levin upon the path of family happiness while burdening 
him with the commitment of a wife, soon to be a mother. Tolstoy's own marital experience, 
by the time quite ambiguous, comes across visibly in his portrayal of Levin's family life 
which acquires some evident signs of disquiet. Armstrong quotes Marianna Torgovnick
137 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, pp. 39-40.
138 Ibid, p. 44.
139 Ibid.
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who points to ‘lack of communication’ becoming ‘a way of life for Kitty and her 
husband’.140 Interestingly, just like Shestov Torgovnick highlights the incompatibility of 
Levin with his absorption in his philosophical search and Kitty, whose horizons are limited 
to domesticity. Armstrong states that at this point family life has become ‘an ambivalent 
concept, both retained as the shining ideal, and subverted not just by its own petty 
betrayals, but by the subtle inclusion of another, contradictory ideal’,141 which she sees as 
carefully concealed in the character of Koznyshev.
Armstrong explains that ‘Tolstoy's twin but incompatible ideals are split between the two 
brothers, with Levin choosing the path of family happiness, and Koznyshev a “spiritual” 
life, befitting his “pure and lofty” nature’.142 Armstrong senses in Tolstoy ‘a nostalgia for 
purity’143 and essentially admits that all Levin's declarations of happiness are thus 
undermined.144 This brings us back to Shestov's disbelief regarding Levin's happiness, even 
though Shestov is led to this conclusion through a different argument. For Armstrong it is 
basically a conflict between Tolstoy's intellectual and personal aspirations, while for 
Shestov it is a completely philosophical conflict in Tolstoy reflecting his desire to equal the 
mediocre. Moreover, Koznyshev for Armstrong is as representative of Tolstoy's inner 
world as Levin is, while Shestov quite clearly separates this character from the author. He 
claims that Koznyshev is simply an object of severe judgement for Tolstoy because he 
represents a pillar of the high society contemporary to Tolstoy. ‘Ero yBjieneHHa - ecTb 
t o j i b k o  MOtfHaa noapaxcaTejibHOCTb. Ero aymeBHaa pa6oTa - noBepxHOCTHaa jjeaTejibHOCTb 
yMa, KOTopaa TeM MeHbme 3HanHT, neM nojmee n nocjiejjOBaTejibHee oHa BbipaacaeTca. 
HTor ero j k h 3h h  - HHKOMy He Hyamaa KHHra, ocTpoyMHbie pa3roBopbi b  rocTHHbix h  
6ecnojie3Hoe ynacTHe b  pa3JiHHHbix Hacrabix h  odmecTBeHHbix ynpeacaeHHax’,145 Shestov 
claims.
140 Marianna Torgovnik, Closure in the Novel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 73. 
Cited in Armstrong, p. 44.
141 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 44.
142 Ibid, p. 45.
143 Ibid.
j44 Ibid.
145 Shestov, Jdo6po eynenuu zpapa Toncmoeo u Huijiue: (pmococpun u nponoeedb, p. 222.
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Another instructive difference is Armstrong's interpretation of Levin's anxiety preceding his 
marriage. She traces its roots to Tolstoy's deep psychological peculiarities resulting from 
the early loss of his mother. According to Freudian theory Tolstoy had bypassed the 
Oedipal stage, and ‘similarly Levin can also be surmised to have failed to resolve the 
Oedipal triangle of desire for the mother and prohibition by the father’,146 Armstrong 
writes. She states that ‘having therefore retained into adult life a sublimated desire for the 
mother , and having felt punished at least once for entertaining the thought of a rival love, 
the composite Tolstoy-Olenin-Levin cannot make another attempt to establish a supplanter 
(Kitty) and thus effect the final separation from the mother without hesitation or profound 
side-effects’.147
To add to the given examples which illustrate a fundamental difference of perspective in 
the case of Shestov's ‘psycho-philosophical’ approach and Armstrong's psychoanalytical 
one, it is useful to look at the epigraph that she gives to her chapter on Levin: 
‘Interpretation lays claim to an approximation of the truth. [...] the value of this 
approximation [...] does not lie in analysing the author, but rather in seeking to discover 
what underlies the text's effect on the potential reader...’. For Shestov it is almost 
entirely the opposite: he is not really troubled by the text's effect on the reader, save for his 
own self, but he is interested precisely in uncovering the author's intentions, whether 
conscious or unconscious. In fact, in the case of Shestov's treatment of Tolstoy, we 
encounter his general pattern of striving to unravel the true existential path of the writer as 
if to compare it with his own, to see the writer's struggle with the ‘eternal’ questions. 
Shestov needs to see how the writer managed to deal with these questions, what his way is 
of reconciling himself with reality. And since despite their divine creative genius writers 
are still people, Shestov invariably runs into a contradiction between, on the one hand, the 
heights of their work, the harmony concealed there -  not so much within the heroes as 
within the mastery of the text, -  and, on the other hand, their solely human nature that
146 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 37.
147 Ibid.
148 Andre Green, ‘The Double and the Absent’ in Psychoanalysis, Creativity and Literature: a 
French-American Inquiry, ed. Alan Roland (New-York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 298. 
Cited in Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 22.
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Shestov is so eagerly prepared to expose. His drive and enthusiasm on the path of 
unmasking are in fact engendered by the desperate hope of a polemicist who attacks his 
opponent the more viciously the more he wants to be defeated and persuaded that the latter, 
unlike himself, does hold the magic key. As a result it is precisely the schism between the 
pen and the soul which we described in Part I that Shestov actually uncovers.
It is also worth noting that Armstrong, following Andre Green, personifies the text and 
takes into account both the text's articulations as well as its silences. Behind the sublimated 
loss of the author we find in the text also ‘the text's anxiety and loss about something which 
inhabits the text's space and emerges from it’.149 In other words, according to Green and 
Armstrong we find not only the author's unconscious, but also the text's unconscious. In 
contrast to that a more orthodox psychoanalyst, such as, for instance, Rancour-Laferriere, 
strongly objects to the personification of inanimate objects such as texts. ‘To my 
knowledge’, he writes, ‘texts do not desire, or postulate, or know, or assert, or tell stories. 
Rather, persons do these things. Pierre Bezukhov, for example, does these things, or Lev 
Tolstoy -  but not Tolstoy's text’.150 Rancour-Laferriere then refers to his earlier work of 
1979 which provides a critique of structuralism and quasi-semiotics.151 Having said that, 
Armstrong recognises that in order to decode the causes of the effects of the text on the 
reader one may be taken outside the text, which means, in particular, to the life of the 
author.152 Thus, essentially, she recognises a place for both the structuralist and 
biographical approach that we talked about in the previous chapter -  a mixture which, as 
was mentioned, Shestov adheres to, even if in his own fashion. To add to our explanations 
in the previous chapter, we emphasise that for Shestov the author's intentions are concealed 
not so much in the text as in the heroes, although he often tends to take into account the 
narrative itself as well as the narrator. The latter technique is, of course, more conventional 
than a direct identification of the author with his heroes. Thus Shestov does not reject the 
existing critical technique or replace it with his own, but rather he builds on it and expands 
it, even if this expansion often takes a distorted form.
149 Ibid, p. 284. Cited in Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, pp. 22-23.
150 Rancour-Laferriere, pp. 10-11, endnote 1.
151 Ibid, p. 11.
152 See Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 23.
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To exemplify the above point let us look at Shestov's explanations of the lines about the 
sacred memory that people kept of Rostov for many years after his death. He interprets it as 
Tolstoy's own admiration of his hero and draws far-reaching conclusions from this, as we 
have already demonstrated. On the other hand this can be interpreted as Tolstoy's depiction 
of the moral and mental state of the narod, of peasants, of the simple people, and may 
reflect their rather ‘slave’ mentality and possibly a primitive form of patriotism. To what 
extent this is the view of Tolstoy himself is a different question -  an issue which Shestov 
handles too freely and essentially brushes over in terms of substantiating his claims about 
Tolstoy being fully behind his hero, Rostov. Basically, Shestov’s interpretation of the 
narrative and narrator is tied up with the author's personal stance. Yet, the assertions quoted 
above by Gary Saul Morson that Tolstoy managed to portray the mediocre Rostov as a 
heroic figure ring true, and must indeed be telling us something about Tolstoy's own stance 
through his attitude to his hero. Furthermore, to what extent Tolstoy is true to reality in 
these depictions is a question in itself, for, although he was often praised for his great 
precision in portraying real life there were also alternative voices which accused him of 
imprecision and substitution. Thus Akhmatova stressed that his descriptions of the high 
society of 1812 are in fact false and constitute a portrayal (and this time a very precise one) 
of the high society contemporary to Tolstoy himself. Akhmatova said:
B b ic m e e  o b m ec T B O  M e m u io c b  M eH ee B c e r o ,  h o  Bce-TaK H  o h o  M e m u io c b . F IpH  A n e c K a u a p e ,  
H a n p H M ep , o h o  6 b iJ io  r o p a 3 f lo  o 6 p a 3 0 B a H H e e , n eM  noTOM . H a T a m a  -  e c jiH  6 b i o h  H a n H c a ji  e e  b 
cooTBeTCTBHH c  B peM eH eM  -  flOJUKHa 6 b u ia  6 b i 3H aT b nyuiK H H C K H e c t h x h , n b e p  a o jd k c h  6 w ji 6 b i 
npH B e3T H  b J Ib ic b ie  T o p h i  H 3B ecTH e o  c c b u iic e  n y u iK H H a . H ,  p a 3 y M e e T c a , HHKaKHX n e jie H o x :  
HceHiijHHbi a n eK c a H flp o B C K o ro  BpeM eHH 3 aH H M ajin cb  H T em ieM , My3biKOH, c b c t c k h m h  S e c e /ja M H  Ha 
jiH T e p a T y p H b ie  TeM bi h  c b m h  a e T e H  H e h b h h h j ih . 3 t o  Co(J)bB A u a p e e B H a  n o r p y 3 n n a c b  b ne jieH K H , 
noT O M y h  H a T a m a .153
5.7. Literary ways of portraying reality. Shestov’s silences. The problem of 
communicability.
In this connection it is unavoidable to ask the question about the extent to which Tolstoy 
was a realist -  how precise was he in his depictions of reality, how true to it did he stay?
153 Chukovskaia, II, pp. 50-51.
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Shestov, it seems, contrasts realism and moralism and asserts that Tolstoy's art is bom 
purely out of his need to resolve tormenting questions, and therefore it is fully sensible to 
ask why the Good takes Levin's side rather than Anna's or other heroes'. In other words, the 
injustice of life, which for a realist (a naturalist, as Shestov puts it) would go without saying 
and any questions in this respect would be meaningless, for a moralist such as Tolstoy has 
an undoubted meaning. Unlike Tolstoy, a true realist does not quote the Gospels and does 
not talk about vengeance, Shestov says, and emphasises Tolstoy's explicit tendency to 
judge.154 ‘Oh He onncbraaeT )kh3hi>, a AonpauiHBaeT ee, TpedyeT ot Hee OTBeTa’,155 Shestov 
writes. On the other hand, Saburov, who like many other critics drew a parallel between the 
character of Pierre and Tolstoy himself, stresses that at Borodino Pierre is an alter ego of 
Tolstoy, and ‘in contrast to Andrei Bolkonsky, he asserts nothing. He only observes and 
questions’.156 The issue becomes even more complicated if we recall the statement above 
by W. Gareth Jones that Tolstoy is to be found equally behind Pierre, Rostov and 
Bolkonsky. Of course, War and Peace, written earlier than Anna Karenina, might still have 
been free from the moralising and judging tendency described by Shestov, but in fact the 
latter sees very little difference between the two novels in terms of the outlook of their 
creator, and talks constantly about ‘Tojictoh BpeMeHH “Bohhbi h Mnpa” h “Ahhbi 
KapeHHHOH’” .157
To resolve this issue of Tolstoy's simultaneous accommodation of realism and moralism we 
need to raise another -  closely related -  question of sincerity in literature. For Shestov this 
problem was an important one, since he was troubled by the frequent discrepancy between 
a writer's own personal ideology and the ideology that the writer was promoting in his 
books. In other words, Shestov passionately objected to a writer's hypocrisy bom out of the 
latter's desire to stay loyal to commonly accepted ideals, whatever his own personal moral 
stance and behaviour might have been. This, of course, is fully consistent with Shestov’s 
tendency to identify a writer with his heroes and leads directly to unmasking the writer.
154 See Shestov, Jdo6po eynenuu epa(pa Toncmoeo u Huifiue: (punoco(pm u nponoeedb, p. 226.
155 Shestov, Ibid.
156 A. A. Saburov, ‘Boima u Mup’ JI. H. Toncmoeo: npodjieMamma u nosmuKa (Moscow: Izd-vo 
Moskovskogo universiteta, 1959), pp. 181, 187. Cited in Rancour-Laferriere, p. 8, endnote 40.
157 Shestov, Jdo6po eynenuu epacfra Toncmoeo u Huvpue: <pwioco(pnH u nponoeedb, p. 242.
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Since Shestov contrasted the ideals of a writer with those of his heroes, in the case of 
positive heroes this evoked, not surprisingly, Shestov's distrust and in the case of negative 
ones it led to condemnation. As Erofeev observes,
OraBH m eKO TjiHByio n p o 6 jie M y  HCKpeHHOCTH b  J iirrep aT yp e, UJecTOB 6 o j ib m e  BHHMaHim y f le j w e r  
CBOHCTBaM H ejioBenecK O H  npHpOAbi, h o k c j t h  n p H p o ^ e  jiH T epaT ypbi. M eacA y TeM M ecTb ca M o n  
jn rrep a T y p b i 3a  n n caT ejibC K yio  HencKpeHHOCTb AOCTaTOHHO atJx^eKTHBHa ju in  T o r o , HTodbi He 
A onycT H T b Top5KecTBa 4>ajn>uiHBbix h  B bicnpeH H bix “ h c t h h ” . JlyicaBflm HH xyAO>KHHK coB epm eH H O  
6e33am H T eH  nepeA raeBOM  My3; napanH H  TajiaHTa H acT yn aeT  b t a k o m  c j iy n a e  noHTH 4>aTajibHO. Pi 
e c jm  H 3B ecxH oe KOJiHHecTBO “ HAeajiOB” c o x p a n a e T c a  b  jiH T epaT yp e, x a x  n n rn eT  caM  LUecTOB, “c 
H e3anaM 3T H bix BpeM eH ” , t o  He S j ia r o A a p a  x h t p o c t a m  KOHTpaGaHAbi, h o  d jia r o A a p a  CBoen  
AOCTOBepHOCTH.158
Therefore, Tolstoy, being a great artist, is forced as it were to stay truthful to real life 
phenomena regardless of where his moral judgement actually takes him. As a result Tolstoy 
unites two contradictory processes: (according to Shestov) he tends to punish ‘naughty’ 
heroes and reward those who carry forward his own ideology, but at the same time he, as it 
were, accepts the unacceptable, because the latter has its place in reality. In other words he 
plays the divine (rather in the Old Testament sense) role as a creator of his novels, but at 
the same time he, thanks to his genius, cannot but stay within the natural constraints 
imposed on him by reality. This is, to a large extent, what Yves Bonnefoy wrote in his 
essay on Shestov about writers' rather ambivalent liberty. Bonnefoy suggested that Shestov 
sought in literature the boundless divine freedom which in fact is only limited due to the 
inner laws of literary craft, of its need to remain genuine.159
Thus Tolstoy, even with his strong moralising streak, could not distort real life precisely 
because he was too good a writer. In particular he had to ‘accept’ what from the standpoint 
of morality would seem unacceptable in human behaviour and relationships, but constitutes 
nevertheless the canvas of real life. For example, he depicts the coexistence of Anna's true 
love for Vronsky and her inability to trust him with her deepest concern -  that about her 
son -  which altogether undermines the value of this relationship. For Shestov, on the other
158 Erofeev, pp. 165-166.
159 See Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’.
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hand, the unacceptable apparently remained unacceptable until the end. He, it often seems, 
could not forgive Tolstoy his contradictions, he wanted consistency, he wanted a clear 
answer. And this only characterises Shestov, paradoxically, despite his endless struggle 
against idealism, as an immortal idealist. Shestov's passionate striving for salvation, 
towards the truth, was clearly marked by absolutism, extremism and in a certain sense by a 
distinct dogmatism, and these are a testimony to nothing other than the same undefeatable 
idealism.
The roots of this phenomenon grew from Shestov's obstinate craving for an answer to his 
own quest about life -  of how to accommodate the unacceptable in our existence, how to 
accept all its horrors and injustice and yet to remain sane, to retain meaning in life. He 
sought an answer in Tolstoy, as if forgetting that it is only the latter's art which may be 
divine and perfect, but not the writer himself. More precisely, Shestov did not forget this -  
on the contrary he knew this only too well and was constantly repeating that writers are 
only human beings, but this repetition had some desperate ring to it, it sounded as if  he was 
angered by this fact and dug up writers' life with a restless passion as if in the hope that he 
was still missing something vital, that the writer was after all different from an ordinary 
mortal and would in the end reveal to him some deep secrets. In the end Shestov imposed 
his own life path and torment on Tolstoy, as well as on every other author he studied, as if 
to test how the latter managed to cope with the same existential experience.
Interestingly, Shestov in his works on Tolstoy essentially disregards Tolstoy's first writings, 
and does not attempt any deciphering of the images of Irtenev or Olenin from lOnocmb and 
Ka3aKu, who are most often identified with Tolstoy himself. A possible reason for this 
could be that a work which is too explicitly autobiographical did not evoke in Shestov a 
sufficient degree of interest, because he believed that real secrets are always carefully 
hidden and what is presented as too obvious a truth cannot be really truthful. It is people’s 
missions in life, the roles which they play and the images of themselves which they create 
and try so hard to maintain that prevent them from being really truthful (even with 
themselves, let alone the outside world). ‘Bee j i k w i , h t o 6 b i  cnacTH CBoe ztejio, 
npHHy)K£em>i CKptreaTb MHoroe -  6 m t b  m o h c c t , caMoe Bamioe h 3HauHTejiLHoe ajw
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h h x ’ , 160 Shestov suggested. In this connection he would certainly have agreed with Judith 
Armstrong that one has to attend in a text to its silences as well as to its voices. Silence was 
always meaningful for Shestov. Moreover, the question of the potential non- 
communicability of truth was for him a fundamental one. This is most distinctly manifested 
in his philosophical book Sola Fide which remained unpublished during his lifetime. As we 
have already mentioned in Part I, Section 3.2, Erofeev claims that Shestov actually never 
resolved this complicated problem, but that he essentially remained convinced that truth is 
lost in communication. It is because of this, Erofeev writes, that Shestov believed that total 
solitude was the beginning and condition of coming close to the ultimate mystery.161
If we try to attend to Shestov's own silences, we discover that one of their patterns lies in an 
area quite distant from pure philosophy, but belongs instead to the domain of human 
psychology. This pattern is in avoiding any explicit discussion of sexual issues. 
Interestingly, the same is true with respect to Tolstoy. Thus, as Armstrong observes with 
respect to Anna Karenina, Tolstoy skips any discussions of sexual matters. He skates over 
the honeymoon of Levin and Kitty, calling it ‘the most difficult and humiliating time of 
their lives’ and a few months into the marriage he sublimates ‘any discussion of the sexual 
side of Levin's conjugal life to accounts of Kitty's absorption in the organisation of her new 
house, or to Levin's perseverance with his indoor and outdoor work’. Armstrong suggests 
that ‘for Tolstoy the issue of sexuality within marriage, that is, legal sexuality, was a 
paradox too difficult to confront; its erasure from the text has to be read as a repression, and 
one which he gives no evidence of being aware of. Predictably, however, in a situation 
where the sources of repression go unacknowledged, guilt comes to the fore’. Armstrong 
then goes on to explain how Levin feels guilty and projects his sense of guilt upon Kitty.164 
Equally, one notices with respect to Anna and Vronsky the same avoidance of any 
discussions related to sexual matters. Armstrong traces the roots of Tolstoy's suppressed 
guilt and regret in this connection to his fear of betraying the image of his dead mother. ‘In
160 Shestov, BenuKue Kanynu, p. 282.
161 Erofeev, p. 181.
162 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 41.
163 Ibid, p. 42.
164 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 42.
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Anna Karenina he contrives, on the whole, to avoid imposing this guilt on the 
autobiographical ‘I’, by transferring the alternative path to another character’, Armstrong 
writes, meaning that Levin's marriage goes in parallel with Koznyshev's non-marriage, ‘but 
any readers still unconvinced that such a guilt existed’, she continues, ‘need only glance at 
the hostile references to sex and marriage in his diaries and letters to have their doubts 
roundly dispelled’.165
In Shestov's biography the incident which most probably equalled Tolstoy's early loss of 
his mother in terms of irredeemable psychological damage, may have been the birth of 
Shestov's illegitimate son by a maid in his parents' houshold, as well as a sequence of 
unhappy love affairs, with his Orthodox Jewish father being totally against Shestov 
marrying a gentile. As was mentione previously, Igor Balakhovsky wrote about ‘BJiacTb 
Tejia, t o  caMoe no3Hairae co6ctb ch h oh  Harora, KOTopoe JleB HcaKOBHH ctbi^jihbo npaneT 
nozt jiaTHHCKHM cjiobom “concupiscentia”’.166 Apparently referring to sexual matters as 
such, Balakhovsky then continues to say that everyone solves this question for themselves 
with varying degrees of success, but the problem gets much more complicated when 
children appear. In the case of Shestov Balakhovsky speaks of a mystery surrounding his 
private life and connects it to Shestov's profound personal crisis, with the birth of his 
illegitimate child being at the culmination of it. Balakhovsky suggests that Shestov's 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche was written in the mood of a feast in a time of plague, where on the 
outside all is well, but inside there are horrors. ‘To, h to  y Hero ecTB, HHHero yace He c t o h t ’ 
-  these words of Shestov about Tolstoy Balakhovsky applies to Shestov himself; ‘ero 
5KH3HB Morjia 6bi 6biTb hhoh, ecjiH 6bi He 3 th  Hejienbie, 6e35KajiocTHbie 3aKOHbi 
HeobxoflHMocTH... 3 t o  mo5kho cxpbiBaTb, ho 06 3tom Hejib3a 3a6biTb, TeM 6ojiee, HTO Tfle- 
t o  cymecTByeT s t o  ManeHbKoe h juobHMoe cymecTBo...’.167
Contemplating, or rather making guesses, about the development of the relationship 
between Shestov and the mother of their son, Balakhovsky asks if it was akin to that of
165 Ibid, p . 4 6 .
166 Balakhovskii, p. 49.
167 Balakhovskii, pp. 50-51.
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Nekhliudov from Tolstoy's Resurrection or of Versilov from Dostoevsky's Raw Youth, and
sees in Shestov's avoidance of either of these heroes (despite his multiple returns to both
1 68writers) ‘Ta6y h o^HOBpeMeHHo HaMeic’. Thus both Tolstoy's and Shestov's suppressed 
sexuality is evident from the ‘speaking’ silences of their respective texts.
On the other hand Bayley refers to Tolstoy as ‘the Seer of the Flesh’ and points to the 
novelist's ‘joyful solipsism of the body which is characteristic of so many of his 
descriptions’.169 Malcolm Jones also speaks of ‘Tolstoy's amazing sensitivity to the
1 H(\physical aspects of human experience’, brilliantly highlighted by Merezhkovsky in his 
classic work on Tolstoy. Yet the writer's shrewd awareness of human physicality gets 
silenced, it seems, when sexual relations as such are concerned; moreover, such scenes are 
normally surrounded by guilt. At the same time it is important to point out that the role of 
non-verbal communication in Tolstoy's writings is difficult to exaggerate and his mastery 
of depicting the subtle psychology of human interactions reflected in and conducted 
through the body is essentially unsurpassed. In a sense a lot of Tolstoy's own silences in his 
texts can be translated into his heroes’ opting for silence, or more precisely, into their clear 
preference for non-verbal communication. In our view Tolstoy's aristocratic social 
background carries the main weight of responsibility for this phenomenon.
Indeed, Tolstoy was raised with the rules and code of behaviour of the high society 
contemporary to him. For such a society, being reserved and able to contain your feelings 
constituted indisputable values and served as a mark of being well bred. In particular, all 
the hysterics of Dostoevsky's heroes were completely impossible for those of Tolstoy. 
Instead, they had to keep smiling whatever their inner feelings may have been. In other 
words insincerity passed as a virtue, and all the hidden politics of human interactions, all 
the intrigues of high society only promoted its merits. True feelings under this kind of 
upbringing were to be suppressed and consequently communicated by other -  mostly non­
168 Ibid, p. 50.
169 Bayley, Leo Tolstoy, p. 29.
170 Malcolm Jones, ‘Problems of communication in Anna Karenina’in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. 
Malcolm Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 85.
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verbal -  means. This in our view explains why, as Merezhkovsky rightly noticed, in
171Tolstoy ‘we hear because we see’, while in Dostoevsky ‘we see because we hear’.
Dostoevsky, on the other hand, was only a petit bourgeois, not an aristocrat, and for him the 
above rules did not apply, or, rather, were not an intrinsic part of his nature. Joseph 
Brodsky in his essay on Dostoevsky quotes Elizaveta Stackenschneider, ‘a fervent admirer 
of the writer’, who wrote in her diary in 1880:
...but he is a petit bourgeois, yes, a petit bourgeois. Not of the gentry, nor of the clergy, not a 
merchant, nor an oddball, like an artist or scholar, but precisely a petit bourgeois. And yet this petit 
bourgeois is the most profound thinker and a writer of genius [...] Now he frequents the houses of 
the aristocracy and even those of the high nobility, and of course he bears himself with dignity, and 
yet the petit bourgeois in him trickles through. It can be spotted in certain traits, surfacing in private 
conversations, but most of all, in his works [...] in his depiction of big capital he will always regard
6,000 rubles as a vast amount of money.172
It seems quite probable to us that this social profile of the writer accounts for the ways in 
which Dostoevsky's heroes manifest their emotions, not being restrained by the same code 
of behaviour as the heroes of Tolstoy. As a result they are much more free in expressing 
their feelings and have the liberty to scream and shout their ultimate truths to one another. 
In other words, their sincerity does not fall victim to manners and their feelings are 
portrayed in a raw form. Thus in Dostoevsky verbal communications prevail, while in 
Tolstoy's world of immaculate reserve human interactions are forced more into non-verbal 
channels.
The issue of human interactions in Tolstoy including both verbal and non-verbal forms is, 
in particular, discussed by Malcolm Jones in his psychologically penetrating essay 
‘Problems of Communication in Anna Karenina’, mentioned above. In it Jones takes a 
rather formalist approach, very different from that of Shestov. Indeed, Jones's concern is 
not in attempting to probe the inner world of Tolstoy the man, to second-guess his
171 Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, Tolstoi as Man and Artist (London, 1902). Cited in R. F. Christian, 
Introduction to New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), p. 7.
172 Joseph Brodsky, ‘The Power of Elements’ in Less Than One. Selected Essays (England: Penguin 
Books, 1987), pp. 157-158.
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intentions, or to analyse his psychology. Instead he studies the means by which Tolstoy the 
writer operates, and portrays the tragedy of Anna as a tragedy of communication. His 
interest is in the ways in which ‘feelings are transmitted, or alternatively, are not
17^transmitted, between characters’. Yet, Jones is similar to Shestov in the psychological 
subtlety of his analysis, even though it targets the characters themselves without reading off 
them the story of their creator. Jones describes various types of breakdown in 
communication that occur within the space of the novel. These include errors in 
transmitting the subtext of a message betv/een parties who have a developed emotional 
connection with each other, as well as the conscious withholding of information or 
deliberately narrowing its channel, and conscious deception. Importantly, all this is relevant 
to one’s communication with one's own self, as Jones observes.174
Largely because of Shestov's focus on the author it appears that for him an individual’s 
communication with himself plays the most important role. After all, his treatment of 
Tolstoy is focused in particular on the latter's self-justification with its underlying refusal to 
face the truth which can be considered as a breakdown in the communication of Tolstoy 
with himself. More subtly, Shestov's understanding of this communication problem 
involves his ultimate disbelief in the very possibility of an adequate transmission of our 
deepest feelings and experiences to the outside world. This, as was discussed in Part I, in a
175sense resonates with Tiutchev's famous lines that ‘M bicjib H3peneHHaH ecTB jiohcb’ . Of 
course, for the poet (or, for that matter, a poet) this carries an additional meaning by 
capturing the main problem of literary creativity -  of constantly reaching for a never fully 
attainable equivalence between his creative aspirations and their verbal expression. Tolstoy, 
not surprisingly, was also preoccupied with this problem, and, as Armstrong points out, 
‘complained of his dissatisfaction with the verbal expression of ideas which always
1 7 f\ •appeared to lose their meaning as soon as they were set on paper’. However, Tolstoy did 
not deny the communicability of ideas as such (precisely because he was an artist), but 
pointed to the difficulties with which this process is fraught. Thus in his letter to Strakhov
173 Jones, ‘Problems of communication in Anna Karenina’, p. 90.
174 Ibid, p. 98.
175 Tiutchev, ‘Silentium!’, p. 69.
176 Armstrong, The Unsaid Anna Karenina, p. 22.
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Tolstoy wrote that ‘every idea expressed by itself in words loses its meaning, becomes
1 77terribly debased when it is taken alone, out of the linkage in which it is found’. He then 
suggested that this linkage is based on something other than an idea and that one can
1 7 R __express it, but only indirectly, ‘with words describing images, actions, situations’. This 
suggests that, in fact, Tolstoy did believe in the ultimate powers of art to solve the question 
of communication.
On the other hand, Shestov poses the problem more radically by taking it outside the frame 
of art and its aspirations. The message of his Sola Fide that truth is lost in communication 
suggests in particular that either our language, or our non-verbal interactions are 
intrinsically incapable o f providing an adequate exchange between people. ‘B pe3yjibTaTe’, 
Erofeev concludes, ‘acecTOKo jiHMHTHpya npe^ejiBi HejioBenecKoro B3aHMonoHnMam«i, 
IlIecTOB cymecTBeHHo o6ecueHHBaeT c b o i o  codcTBeHHyio (J)Hjioco$CKyio
1 7 0aeaTejiBHocTb’. In a way the route that is looming over Shestov's lonely revelations is 
akin to that of the hermit monks consciously estranged from the rest of the world for the 
purposes of intense spiritual activity. This estrangement from communal life is not 
accidental in the case of Shestov's philosophy because of his essentially inverse
understanding of life and death. The question that the mature Shestov often poses,
180following Euripides, is ‘k t o  3HaeT, -  MO^ ceT, 5 k h 3 h l  ecTb CMepTb, a CMepTb ecTb >KH3Hb’. 
Furthermore, as was mentioned earlier, over time Shestov increasingly came to understand 
philosophy, following Plato's Phaedo, as a contemplation of dying and death.
5.8. The theme of death. Shestov’s interpretation of Tolstoy’s crises.
Thus having started with appreciating in Tolstoy his ability to embrace real life, Shestov 
subsequently sees the writer as preoccupied chiefly with the question of death, and hence 
with the problem of faith. Indeed, the fear of death and attempts to deal with it constituted
177 Tolstoy’s letter to N. Strakhov, April, 1876. PSS (the Academy, or Jubilee, in 90 vol-s) 62:269; 
Cited in Barbara Lonnqvist, ‘Anna Karenina’ in The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy, ed. Donna 
Tusing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 81.
178 Tolstoy’s letter to N. Strakhov, April, 1876. PSS (the Academy, or Jubilee, in 90 vol-s) 62:269; 
Cited in Barbara Lonnqvist, ‘Anna Karenina’, p. 81.
179 Erofeev, p. 18L
180 See, for example, Shestov’s Ha eecax Hoea, p. 26.
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for Tolstoy, especially given his immense pride, a constant source of torment, and to trace 
his evolution with respect to the subject of death would have been in any case a fascinating 
project. For Shestov, however, it also took on a very personal slant because of its 
coincidence with his own philosophical evolution. Indeed, Shestov’s interpretation of 
Tolstoy to a large extent equals his own personal development and reflects the vector of his 
own inner preoccupations. More precisely, his metaphysical search for the meaning of life 
and for the path to salvation -  the search that sprang from tragedy and despair -  was 
becoming increasingly more formed, especially the more Shestov learned formal 
philosophy, by his contemplations on death, and signified a distinctly religious stage in his 
philosophical evolution.
Thus in 1908, when Shestov wrote an article on Tolstoy dedicated to the novelist's eightieth 
birthday, he considered Tolstoy's entire life through the prism of death and Tolstoy's 
contemplation of death, and extensively discussed Tolstoy's religious views. Shestov 
focused on Tolstoy's profound crises, especially the two major ones which occurred shortly 
before Tolstoy turned thirty and fifty years of age respectively and which were followed by 
the appearance of War and Peace and Anna Karenina after the first one, and of his 
Confession and a number of religious-philosophical tracts after the second one. Shestov 
was particularly interested in the mechanisms of Tolstoy's invariable re-emergence from 
these crises. Shestov captured the writer's God-like ability to resurrect himself from an 
inner dead-end and rebuild his inner world as if anew in the title of the article: ‘Destroying 
and Recreating Worlds’ (‘Pa3pymaiomHH h co3HflaiomHH Mnpti’). The parallel that 
Shestov drew was with Pierre's amazing inner death and subsequent resurrection when he 
was very nearly executed by the French alongside other prisoners, but then arbitrarily 
pardoned, and following that had an encounter with Platon Karataev. The inner 
transformation of Pierre from total loss of faith to its complete restoration which took place 
in a span of just a few hours Shestov compared to the miracle of the resurrection of 
Lazarus. Generally speaking, Shestov's previous view about Tolstoy escaping from the 
tragic to the ordinary received in this article a more sympathetic as well as a more specific 
interpretation in terms of Tolstoy's struggle against the horror of death and the revelations 
of faith in which it resulted.
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Shestov asserts that Tolstoy, just like Pierre whom he had created, ‘conpmcocHyjicJi c 
KaKOH-To TaHHCTBeHHOH c h j i o h ,  KOTopaa ,zi;aeT eMy aep^caBHoe npaBO
3aKOHOAaTejibCTBOBaTB —  C03HflaTb h  pa3pyinaTb MHpbi. Oh npHHHMaeT t o ,  h t o  eMy 
Hy>KHo, o h  OTBepraeT Bee, h t o  eMy MemaeT, x o t b  6bi s t o  6bino BejiHHanmeH i j c h h o c t b i o  b
101
rjia3ax Bcero HejioBenecTBa’. Shestov sees the source of this independence in despair, 
which is consistent with his whole understanding o f philosophy being bom out of despair. 
‘OTOMy caMOAepacaBHK) mbicjih Bbiynnjio ero [Tojictoto] OTnajuiHe: OTnaaHKe MKoroMy
1 89BbiynHBaeT5, Shestov writes and points out that ‘y T o j i c t o t o  HeBbmocHMbie MyKH
1 81OTHaflHHA Bcer^a npe^mecTByioT b c b k h m  nepeBopOTaM b  ero ztyme’. Yet, Shestov does 
not abandon his previous stance about Tolstoy's amazing gift for life. He repeats his ideas 
from Tolstoy and Nietzsche about the writer's love for life, but stresses this time that it was 
evidence o f the divine presence in Tolstoy. ‘E c j ih  Bor ecTb >KH3Hb, ecjin npncyrcTBHe Bora 
b  nejioBeKe y3HaeTca noTOMy, h t o  b  nejioBeice npo6y3K^aeTca cnjia > k h 3 h h , t o  6e3ycjioBHo 
Bor 6bui b  T o j i c t o m  snoxn “ B o h h b i  h  Mnpa’” .184 Also, Shestov repeats again his criticism 
of Tolstoy’s egoism, but, although this time he actually spells it out, it lacks the sting of 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche and acquires more of a ring o f praise than o f irony or sarcasm. ‘Oh 
6 b u i  “ 3 t o h c t o m ” , h o  3TOHCTOM b  jiyHiueM CMbicjie SToro cjiOBa’,185 Shestov says about 
Tolstoy now, and connects this to Tolstoy's ability to love both his family and his country.
Yet, this time Shestov drafts a consistent picture of the life of the eighty-year-old Tolstoy as 
being a curve of spiritual ups and downs of immense amplitude. Shestov's aim is to 
demonstrate how the novelist's expressions of sunny and joyful sentiments persistently 
changed into profound crises of total disbelief and were then followed again by a 
resurrection to life. Thus the inner transformation of Pierre, whose name Shestov writes 
almost invariably hyphenated with that of Tolstoy, constitutes the leading thread of
181 Shestov, ‘Pa3pyuiaK>mHH h co3naaiomHH M Hpbi’ in Cohumhur e deyx moMax (Tomsk: Vodolei, 
1996), II, p . 323.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid, p. 319.
184 Ibid, p. 331.
185 Ibid.
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Shestov's article. The main point of these transformations, simply put, reads as follows: the 
crude power o f death and the fear of death can destroy men, but stemming from its very 
depth there is some mystic and mysterious force, some divine revelation which brings one 
back to life, which instils faith, and this is what happened to Tolstoy. Its roots are 
completely irrational, and thus represented for Tolstoy, with his high rationalist demands, 
an endless inner conflict. In this sense, Shestov views Tolstoy's life, just as he did before, as 
a continuous struggle. Not only does this struggle represent a clash between reason and 
faith -  which for Shestov himself v/as becoming the central one and was to be found in 
every writer, but it also has, in a sense, more ‘applied’ manifestations. Thus, Shestov wrote 
about Tolstoy's aspirations that ‘ o h  xoneT npeoAOJieTb h  nepeaejiaTb ^ehcTBHTejibHocTb, 
KOTopyio o h  HCKpeHHe, o t  Been flyurn HeHaBH^ HT, h  b  6opb6e c Hen pa3BHBaeT 
HeobbiKHOBeHHyio, THTaHHHecKyio Moujb h CHJiy’.186 This, o f course, resonates very highly 
with Shestov's own struggle with reality when understood as necessity.
Shestov declares that Tolstoy's method o f  fighting against reality (which, o f  course, refuses 
to submit) was quite arbitrary. This is yet another parallel to be drawn between Shestov and 
Tolstoy as Shestov's object o f study, if  w e recall Shestov's arbitrary method o f 
interpretation, which he him self labelled as such, ‘ . . . h t o  noMoraeT eMy b  ero 6opb6e h  
HCKaHHHX B erO BeJIHKOM 3KH3HCHHOM flejie, TO OH, He CnpaBJHMCb h h  y k o t o  o 
pa3pemeHHH, o 6 b h b j i b c t  xopouiHM, Bee ace, h t o  eMy MemaeT, o h  c t o j i b  tkq npOH3BOJibHO 
( h j i h ,  ecjiH BaM 6ojibiiie HpaBHTca, aBTOHOMHo) npHHHCJiaeT k  aypHOMy, jioacHOMy,
1 87npHTBOpHOMy, He 3acjiy)KHBaioin;eMy B H H M a H iw  h  HHTepeca’, Shestov writes about 
Tolstoy. Shestov, through his identification o f Tolstoy with Pierre, traces the roots of this 
arbitrary method to the aforementioned mysterious force that Pierre-Tolstoy feels on his 
side.
What is important here for Shestov conceptually, as it were, is to state that this irrational 
foundation for Tolstoy's repeated inner redemptions is real and constitutes his spiritual 
driving force. In other words, Shestov strives to acknowledge revelation as a legitimate
186 S h e s t o v ,  ‘P a 3 p y m a io m H H  h  c o 3 H ^ a io m H H  M H pbi’ , p. 316.
187 Ibid, p .  323.
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source of knowledge and to demonstrate that this very phenomenon had occurred in the 
case of Tolstoy whose rationalism was only superficial, but whose irrational experience had 
defeated and overpowered it. Shestov refers to William James's book (then recent), The 
varieties o f religious experience to emphasise that what Dostoevsky did stealthily in his 
fiction is now done as part of scientific research -  namely, the legitimising of the idea that 
an abnormal mental state brings one closer to the truth. Shestov derives from Dostoevsky 
and James the idea that delusions and other revelations of this type which are commonly 
considered as the fruit of a sick imagination are no less real and instructive than thoughts
1 OQ
th a t o cc u r in  a  n o rm al s ta te  o f  m ind . N o w , desp a ir, w h ich  fo r S h esto v  lies  a t th e  o rig in  o f  
p h ilo so p h y , b eco m es p a r t o f  th is  cha in  since  it is lin k ed  to  a  s ta te  o f  p o o r m en ta l h ea lth , to  a 
d e lirio u s  and  fev erish  s ta te  o f  m in d  w h ich  serv es  as th e  so u rce  o f  in v a lu ab le  m y stica l, and  
u ltim a te ly  re lig io u s, experience . E ro feev  co m m en ts  on  the  in trin sic  co n trad ic tio n  o f  
S h esto v 's  lo g ic  h e re  in  th e  fo llo w in g  w ay: ‘HeHopMajiBHocTB b  CBoefi c o o t h c c c h h o c t h  c  
6oJie3HbK) H CMepTLK) OKa3BIBaeTC5I 0TKa30M He TOJIBKO OT pa3yMa. “/JpyrOH MHp” , 
odecneHHBaiomHH “cnaceH ne” , no3HaeTca nepe3 KaK m o h c h o  Sojibinee y z ja j ie H n e  o t  ) k h 3 h h  
(b  np e^e jie : CMepTb), b  pe3yjiBTaTe n e ro  “cnaceHHe” b m c c t o  nepBOHanajiBHoro
npHMHpeHHH C HCH3HBIO, KBKHM OHO BBICTynaJIO B nepBOH KHHTe IIIeCTOBa, obpamaeTCJI B 
pa3pBIB C nOCIOCTOpOHHeH )KH3HBK)’.189
H a v in g  sa id  th a t, on e  sh ou ld , how ever, n o te  th a t S hestov , in  fact, links life  and  dea th  
irrev ers ib ly . H en ce  h is  c la im  th a t all th e  b e s t ach iev em en ts  o f  th e  h u m an  sp irit h av e  a t th e ir 
ro o ts  th e  co n tem p la tio n  o f  d ea th  an d  th e  h o rro r o f  dea th . ‘TpyzjHO ^aace Boo6pa3HTB ce6e, 
# 0  n e ro  njiocKOH CTaJia 6 b i  5KH3HB, ecjin  6 b i  nejiOBeKy He #aHO 6 b i j io  npeflnyBCTBOBaTB 
c b o k )  HeMHHyeMyio raSejiB  h  yacacaTBca e h ’, S h esto v  w ro te  and  ap p lied  th is  to  T o ls to y  b y  
c la im in g  th a t ‘^aace nepB aa nojiOBHHa 5KH3HH TojiCToro n o jiy n n jia  c b o i o  cnjiy  h  
TBopnecKoe HanpaaceHHe t o j i b k o  noTOMy, h t o  m b ic j ib  o  CM epra h  rn6ejiH  flOBO^HJia e ro  j\o 
OTnaaHHa’.190 F u rth erm o re , S h esto v  asserts th a t in  th is  sen se  T o ls to y 's  second  crisis  w as 
e sse n tia lly  equal to  th e  firs t one. M o re  g en e ra lly , S h esto v  d esc rib es  th e  sim ilar
188 Shestov, Pa3pywaiou{uu u co3udaioufuu Mupu, pp. 324-327.
189 Erofeev, p. 111.
190 Shestov, Pa3pymaiou{uu u co3udaioiquu Mupu, pp. 333-334.
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characteristics of both crises: the horror of death as their cause, despair as the resulting state 
of mind, the same means of treatment that Tolstoy chose for himself and, finally, the same 
way out. The self-treatment that Shestov ascribes to Tolstoy, he calls ‘pa3pbiBaHne 
o6e3bjffl’,191 since this (according to Heine whom Shestov quotes) was the treatment that a 
sick lion would employ to cure himself. In Tolstoy's case Shestov sees the ‘monkeys’ that 
the novelist attacked in Napoleon as well as military and pedagogical science in the first 
crisis, and cultivated society, progress, medicine and the Church in the second. It is only the 
Russian people (narod) that were exempt from Tolstoy's wrath, Shestov asserts, but adds 
that this was not for long either. His faith in the narod eventually faded away and gave way
109to Tolstoy's faith in God-the-Good, Shestov claims. It is Tolstoy's religious sentiments, 
his faith and general beliefs that attract Shestov's interest most, and it is religion that 
Shestov sees as constituting for Tolstoy the way out of both of his crises.
5.9. Tolstoy's religiosity. Tolstoy, the writer, and Tolstoy, the man.
Thus, eight years after his first major work on Tolstoy, Shestov was still interested first and 
foremost in Tolstoy's vision of God, in equating God with the Good. However, this time 
Shestov's emphasis has somewhat shifted -  instead of Tolstoy's underlying hypocrisy as a 
way of resolving his inner struggle, Shestov's focus now is on the novelist's religiosity and, 
unlike in Tolstoy and Nietzsche, where the seeking of God was not filled with any concrete 
meaning, this time the slant is on Tolstoy's religious sentiments as such and more 
specifically on his relationship with Christianity. Having emphasised the great significance 
of revelation and extraordinary, or abnormal, experiences in human life, Shestov draws a 
parallel between Luther, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, despite the fact that Tolstoy criticised the 
other two. Shestov claims that Nietzsche, who saw suffering as a constructive, redeeming 
and perfecting force, must have felt the same as Luther. Shestov quotes Luther's words 
‘ cb iH  E o 5 k h h  yMep — 3 t o  [...] aaeT MHe My^ cecTBO. j x j i z  ce6a npmmMaio 3Ty CMepTb: b  
s t o m  HCTHHHaa CHJia Bepbi. H6o Oh yMep He ^ j ih  Toro, h t o 6 b i  onpaB^aTb npaBeflHHKOB, h o
i cn
H T ofib i o n p a B f la T b  rpeuiHHKOB’. Shestov assigns deep meaning to Luther's formula which
191 Ibid, p. 337.
192 Ibid, p. 334.
193 Shestov, P a 3 p y u i a j o u f u u  u  c o 3 u d a i o u f u u  M u p u ,  p. 328.
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he deems paradoxical and believes that this paradox ‘c t o h t  Ha nyra BcaKoro, k t o  He xoneT 
HJIH He MOaceT y^OBJieTBOpHTbCfl oGbmeHHBIMH npeflCTaBJieHHJIMH O CymHOCTH HCH3HH’ . 194
Tolstoy, or more precisely Tolstoy-Pierre, according to Shestov, also experienced this death 
of God, and only after that was able to find true faith. Shestov with respect to Tolstoy 
follows James's claims with respect to Luther -  namely, that their faith bom out of the 
death of God is the result of their personal experience. It is this experience that Shestov 
juxtaposes to rational, accepted, ‘scientific’ experience and claims that the two are 
irreconcilable. It is also, clearly, the development of Shestov's juxtaposition of the rational 
and irrational, turning into the beginning of his fundamental juxtapositon of faith and 
reason, Jerusalem and Athens which attained its full development in the years to come.
In these ideas about Tolstoy's religiosity, about the nature of his crises and inner torments, 
and his faith stemming from his horror of death, Shestov reveals himself most explicitly. It 
becomes evident that he is still writing about his own self, or more precisely he is trying to 
resolve his own inner torments by drawing on the examples of sages like Tolstoy. This 
becomes clear from the following most explicit lines which we feel compelled to quote 
fully because of their extreme importance in elucidating Shestov's own inner world:
T e n e p b ,  x a x  b CBoe BpeM a l lb e p ,  oh yTBepaczjaeT, hto y a ce  6 o j ib iu e  He boH T ca CMepTH, hto oh 
G o jib iu e  He b o ir r c a  H u n er o  b MHpe. H o  ecjiH  CHOBa n p im e T  OHa, —  hto b y a e T  c Tojictbim? Y3H aeT  
jth oh e e  T e n e p b ?  Hjih om rrb  eM y n o K a a c er ca , hto OHa aB JiaeT ca B n ep B b ie?  B caMOM jih a e j ie  oh T ax  
cnoK O H H o BCTpeTHT e e ,  hjih CHOBa BCKOJibixHyrcfl b HeM B ee npH C M H peBiune ya ca cb i, CHOBa 
HanHeTCH THTaHHnecKaa H eH ejiO BenecK aa 6 o p b 6 a ,  p a 3 p y m eH H e h co3H £aH H e MHpoB? —  H e  3H aio, 
x a x  CMOTpjiT A p y r n e , He 3H aio , hto AyM aeT caM  Tojictoh, ho AJia MeHa B ecb  cmmcji H 3yneHH a  
B ejiH K oro 3eM H oro jje jia  BejiH K oro p y c c x o r o  n n c a T e jia  b stom B o n p o c e . H MHe K aaceTca, hto 
KajKAbiH p a 3 , K or^ a  Tojictoh c o n p H K a ca eT ca  c  M aT epbio CM epTbio, b HeM poa<A aioT ca HOBbie 
T B opnecK H e cH jibi. O r r o r o ,  BepoaTH O, MeHa npeH M ym ecTBeH H O  B jieneT  k c e 6 e  Tojictoh 
H3M yneHHbiH, p a cT ep a m ib iH , H cn yraH H biii, H3HeMoraioiJUHH, h a S o j ie e  paBH O Aym eH  k TojiCTOMy 
T O pacecT B yiom eM y, k TojiCTOMy n o S eA H T ejn o , TojiCTOMy yH H Tejiio. K o r a a  a  b cothh pa3  HHTaio 
“ C M epT b H B aH a H jib H n a” , “ K p e H u ep o B y  co H a T y ” , “ T p n  CMepTH” —  y  MeHa A y x  3axBaTbiBaeT. A  
nyB C T B yio, r o B o p a  cjiOBaMH J h o T e p a , hto B o r  B3aji b p y x n  cboh cT pan iH biii MOJiOT-3aKOH, ho a  
T a io x e  nyB C T B yio, hto CTpauiHbift mojiot —  b p y x a x  B o r a .195
194 Ibid, p. 329.
195 Shestov, Pa3pymajoufuu u co3udajoufuu Mupu, p. 335.
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Thus the same familiar pattern emerges again: mixing Tolstoy, the great writer, with 
Tolstoy who is only human gives mixed results -  every mortal is controlled by the same 
unbeatable mechanisms which Shestov is desperately trying to unscrew as if in the hope 
that what he discovers will be different this time. The impression is that Shestov, 
disappointed or at least dissatisfied by the outcome, is sinking further into unmasking as if 
in fear that he may have missed something vital, but all he sees behind Tolstoy, the sage, is 
Tolstoy who is only human and does not hold any magic answers. But the unmasking has 
taken place and the man has been dragged from behind the writer, exposing the fascinating 
schism between them.
Thus in his analysis of Tolstoy's religiosity as well as the writer's general thoughts on the 
subject Shestov, as expected, exposes Tolstoy's contradictions, putting the main emphasis 
on the underlying conflict between reason and faith which for Shestov himself is 
fundamental. Shestov begins his discussion on Tolstoy's new faith and new God after his 
second crisis by observing that Tolstoy himself turned away from the similarities of both 
crises because, in order to redeem himself, to build his new world, he needed to reject his 
old self. Shestov sees in it the urge for destruction and first of all for self-destruction and 
recalls Dostoevsky who was an expert in questions of self-destruction and believed that the 
destructive instinct in man is as strong as the constructive one. However, Shestov does not 
quite trust Tolstoy in his destructive stage, for it was, according to Shestov, only a way of 
curing himself, ‘a lion tearing monkeys apart’. What interests Shestov much more is the 
constructive element, the new system of beliefs with which Tolstoy re-emerges from his 
second crisis. Shestov looks into Tolstoy's claim that his new religion will be based on the 
Gospel and on it alone, and that he will not try to interpret it.196
Yet, having declared this, Tolstoy does nothing else but try to interpret the Scriptures, 
Shestov claims. And, in doing so Tolstoy is looking for a faith that would not require to 
denounce reason, that could be, instead, reconciled with it. For Shestov this, of course, is 
most important, since, growing sure himself that faith and reason are irreconcilable, 
Shestov traces the source of Tolstoy's contradictions to this very conflict of faith and
196 Ibid, pp. 336-341.
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reason. Shestov questions the validity of Tolstoy's judgements and this is, if  you like, 
precisely because the man takes the upper hand over the writer -  the private in Tolstoy wins 
over the general. To demonstrate this Shestov quotes Tolstoy saying, even if in retrospect: 
‘“HcTHHa Bcer^a 6tuia HCTHHa, h o  x  He npn3HaBaji ee, noTOMy h t o ,  npH3HaB, h t o  
/ma neTbipe, x  y^ce aojixceH 6 b u i  npH3HaTb t o ,  h t o  x  He xopom. A nyecmeoeamb ce6n
197 .xopomuM djix Mem 6buio eajfcnee u o6x3amejibHee, HeM deaofcdbi dea nemupe Thus, 
Shestov concludes, we cannot trust Tolstoy's reasoning if his mind is capable of such 
compromises. However, he found his paths to salvation, he managed to recreate worlds that 
had been destroyed. Hence he had within him the inner force capable of doing it, but it 
could not have been his reason, so it must have been something else, Shestov says, which 
Tolstoy himself called, driven by reason, just ‘cnjia )k h 3 h h \
S h esto v  th en  traces  T o ls to y 's  a ttem pts to  seek  re lig io n , em p h asis in g  th a t it w as p rec ise ly  
re lig io n  ra th e r th an  G o d , and  k eep s h is  m a in  fo cu s on  ex p o sin g  th e  s trugg le  in d u ced  in  
T o ls to y  b e tw e en  reaso n  an d  fa ith , b e tw een  h is  ra tio n a l v o ice  and  h is  irra tio n a l d rives. 
S h es to v  accu ses T o ls to y  o f  try in g  to  reco n c ile  th e  tw o  and  sees in  su ch  attem pts so m eth in g  
b ro a d e r  th an  T o ls to y 's  p e rso n a l ch a rac te ris tic s  -  n am ely , th e  sp irit o f  th e  tim e  w h ich  
s ig n ifican tly  in flu en ced  th e  w riter. S h esto v  p o rtray s  th is  as a  p a rad o x  in  T o ls to y  -  a lthough  
h e  is so  an tag o n is tic  to  and  reb e llio u s w ith  re sp ec t to  m an y  o f  th e  socia l, cu ltu ra l and  
sc ien tif ic  tren d s co n tem p o ra ry  to  h im , T o ls to y  fo llo w s th e  m o s t co m m o n  b e lie f  o f  ou r 
ep o ch , S h esto v  w rite s .199 T h is  b e l ie f  is in  th in k in g  th a t, b as ica lly , re lig io n  is d e te rm in ed  b y  
m o d e m  k n o w led g e . S h esto v  qu o tes T o ls to y 's  d e fin itio n  o f  re lig io n  to  d em o n stra te  th a t th e  
w rite r  h as  fa llen  in to  th is  w id esp read  trap: ‘PejinrHH ecTb ycTaHOBjieHHoe, corjiacH oe c 
pa3yMOM h  c coBpeMeHHbiMH 3HaHHAMH OTHouieHHe HejiOBexa k  BeHHOH 3KH3HH, k  B o ry ’.200 
G iv en  th e  re la tiv ism  o f  sc ien tific  k n o w led g e , S h esto v  says, T o ls to y 's  c la im  th a t re lig io n  
sh o u ld  b e  in  ag reem en t w ith  th is  k n o w led g e  ap p ears  co m p le te ly  ab su rd  an d  can n o t b e  tak en  
serio u sly . S h esto v  sees th e  sad  and  p itifu l s ig n  o f  ev e ry  ep o ch  in  its  a ttem pts to  d efin e  the  
in fin ite  b y  m ean s  o f  lim ited  u n d ers tan d in g . ‘T o j i c t o h  aa ji npaBHjibHoe onpe/jejieHHe t o t o ,
197 Shestov, Pa3pywajoufui( u co3udaK)nyuu Mupu, p. 341.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid, p. 344.
200 Shestov, Pa3pymaioufuu u co3udaioufuu Mupbi, p. 344.
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h t o  npuHjrro b  o6pa30BaHHbix Kpyrax Ha3bmaTb pejiHraeH, h o  3Ta yneHaa pejranw h  ecTb
901
rjiy6oH aH iiiee H eBepae’, S h esto v  w rites.
Shestov's basic message is that Tolstoy's search for faith was poisoned by a compromise 
that is intrinsically incompatible with faith. Tolstoy was looking to adjust the teaching of 
Christ to our everyday needs, his vision of Christianity was that of a settled, satisfied 
humanity which is nothing more than a paradise for the petit bourgeois, Shestov claims. 
The source of this erroneous vision for Shestov is Tolstoy's attempt to subjugate faith to 
reason, to reconcile the two. Shestov distinguishes between the revelations of death in 
Tolstoy on the one hand and his striving for life on the other. The fruits that they bore were 
very different, and Tolstoy did not have enough strength to follow through the lessons that 
death taught him -  this is what Shestov is essentially telling us. In his own words Shestov 
expresses these ideas as follows:
... Kor/ja Tojictoh, Becb oxBaneHHbiH TpeneTOM yacaca h pa/jocra, naeT k CBoen “TaHHCTBeHHOH 
KHHre” h, BonpeKH TbicanejieTHHM Tpa/nmHUM h cjiohchbuihmch “/jorMaM”, Haxo/jHT b Hen caoBa, 
onpoKHflbiBaiomHe Becb CTpofi Hamen BHyrpeHHeft h BHeiimeH hokhh, —  Mbi nopaacaeMCfl ero 
chjioh h BejiHHHeM. [. . .] Ho, —  yBbi! —  HejiOBex, aaace BejiHnaHuiHH HejioBex, ocTaeTca 
HeaoBexoM [...].  Haaoaro BbmecTH bha Bora, HaBceraa coeanHHTbca c SecKOHenHbiM He aaHO 
CMepTHOMy. ^aace to BoaHeHHe, KOTopoe Bbi3biBaeT y HeaoBexa 6aH30CTb CMepTH, xotb 6bi oh, xax 
ToacTOH, asaacabi npjiMO B3ra«Hya eft b raa3a, He MoaceT aaTb cHa, HyacHbix aaa Toro, hto6 
Haaoaro OTopBaTbca ot 3eMaH. Ha MrHOBeHHe neaoBex, xax xy3HeHHx, B3aeTHT b BbicoTy —  h bot 
oh yace CHOBa Ha CBoeM npeacHeM MecTe.202
He accu ses  T o ls to y  o f  re p ea tin g  firm  ru les and  e tern a l tru ths p ro m p ted  b y  reason . ‘T ohctoh 
Tax  HMeHHO h nocTynaeT c EBaHreaneM ’, S h esto v  asserts; ‘oh HmeT b otoh “TaHHCTBeHHOH 
KHHre” npaBHa acH3HH’.203
In  T o ls to y 's  in ab ility  to  g iv e  u p  life  fo r th e  rev e la tio n s  o f  dea th , to  g iv e  u p  reaso n  fo r fa ith  
an d  its sac rific ia l d em an d s  th a t req u ire  th e  ab an d o n m en t o f  an y  rea so n in g  S h esto v  sees the  
so u rce  an d  q u in te ssen ce  o f  T o ls to y 's  re lig io u s quest. In  T o ls to y  in  th e  a fte rm ath  o f  b o th  h is 
crises S h esto v  o b serv es ‘opraHHHecKoe coe^HHeHHe flByx, no-BH^HMOMy, coBepmeHHO
201 Ibid, p. 346.
202 Ibid, pp. 346-347.
203 Shestov, Pa3pyuicuoufuu u co3udaTOU}uu Mupbi, p. 347.
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HecoeflHHHMbix a y m ’.204 O n  one h an d  h e  sees in  T o lsto y , in  the  tim es o f  h is  crises, a 
p ro p h e t ‘roTOBbra nocjie^OBaTb npHMepy ABpaaMa h ^a^ce IteeK H H jui, roTOBtm 
cpoflHHTBCfl c 6e3yMHeM, BbBBaTb Ha CMepTHbiH 6oh  3ApaBbiH cm hcji h npeH edpenb bccmh 
pa^ocTBMH jkh3hh’. O n th e  o th er h an d , w h e n  co m m o n  sen se  p ersu ad es T o ls to y  to  jo in  
th e  o rd in ary , ‘oh  cyzjopo>KHO /jepJKHTca 3a pa3yM h yHHT m o /jen  Ha^e^Tbca, h to  p e jm rn a  
ecTb KaK pa3 to ,  h to  noM oraeT HaM ycTpanBaTb cboio h ob h b ’. Y et, T o ls to y  does no t 
su cceed  in  assu rin g  u s  th a t th e  la tte r is p o ssib le , says S hestov , and  p o in ts  to  th e  d isc rep an cy  
b e tw e en  th e  an sw ers  T o ls to y  suggests  and  th e  q u estio n s  th a t h e  p oses. D esp ite  T o lstoy 's  
co n s tan t and  s tead fast appeal to  reason , ‘Majio mo^kho Ha3BaTb nHcaTejien, KOTopbie yM enn 
6bi TaK noapbiBaTb Bepy b pa3yM h B03M0»CH0CTb cnacTjiHBoro ycT poem w  Ha 3eMJie, KaK 
T o jic to h ’, S h esto v  w rites. T h e  m o st p rec io u s  th in g  fo r S h esto v  is T o ls to y 's  inner 
re b e llio n  ag a in s t reaso n , and  it  is in  th is  th a t S h esto v  sees th e  sou rce  o f  T o ls to y 's  genius. 
V ik to r E ro feev  n o tes  th a t S h esto v  b eco m es d isap p o in ted  w h en  T o ls to y , h av in g  re -em erg ed  
fro m  a  c ris is , b eg in s  to  ce leb ra te  life  aga in , b ec au se  th is  o n ly  p ro v es th a t h e  h a s  fa llen  in to  
a  s ta te  o f  m e tap h y sica l sleep  again . O n ly  th e  h o rro r o f  d ea th  can  rev ea l th e  tru th , b u t a 
h u m an  b e in g  is n o t w o rth y  o f  th is  tru th  b ecau se  h e  can n o t su sta in  th is  fear, h e  goes b ack  to  
life  ag a in , th u s fo rg e ttin g  th e  u ltim a te  m y ste ries  th a t d ea th  h as  rev ea led  to  h im . F o r such  a 
p e rso n , th a t is fo r T o ls to y  a fte r h is  ‘re su rrec tio n s’, “ ‘oKaMeHeBume b cbocm 6e3pa3JiHHHH 
HCTHHbi pa3yMa” 3arpa^cflaiOT nyn> k “cnaceHHio” , E ro feev  w rites , ‘h3 n e ro  hcho bh/iho, 
HTO KpHTHKa paiJH0HaJIH3Ma B HieCTOBCKOM TBOpHeCTBe nOflHHHCHa Hflee “cnaceHHJl” , 
o6ycjiOBjieHa eio , h h to  rH oceojiornH ecK aa npoSneM a juia. LUecTOBa BTopHHHa, HecMOTpa 
Ha t o  BaacHoe MecTo, KOTopoe OHa 3aHHMaeT b e ro  paSoT ax’.208
Yet, Shestov irreversibly linked salvation with gnoseology at the very foundations of his 
philosophy. Salvation for him lay intrinsically away from the ways of reason, and was only 
attainable via defeating rationalism. E. B. Greenwood gives a brief analysis of Shestov's 
treatment of Tolstoy's attitude to religion from the point of view of rationalism versus
204 Ibid, p. 349.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid, p. 350.
208 Erofeev, p. 178.
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irrationalism. He connects Shestov to Father Georges Florovsky in their accusations that 
Tolstoy was a shallow rationalist in matters of religion. Yet, Greenwood acknowledges the 
evolution of Shestov's attitude to Tolstoy. He points out that at the beginning Shestov saw 
Tolstoy's worship at the shrine of the Good as hypocritical or at least two-sided because 
beneath it there lay Tolstoy's vital egoism, and there was very little Christianity in his 
doctrine. The Tolstoy of the time of War and Peace and Anna Karenina ‘does not wish to 
persuade men but to intimidate them’, ‘such a faith does not really exclude absolute 
atheism, complete unbelief, and it leads inevitably to the desire to destroy [...] to crush 
others, in the name of a principle’,209 Greenwood quotes Shestov. However, Greenwood 
then points to the ultimate failure even of Shestov, however hard he tried, to divorce 
moralism, the idea of the Good, from the idea of God. Shestov in his later writings came to 
view Tolstoy differently from the image of the writer that he created in his early works on 
Tolstoy, Greenwood asserts. In this later image the unequivocal nature of Tolstoy's 
dedication to rationalism is questioned, if not altogether overturned. As Greenwood 
implies, Shestov discovered in the end that ‘Tolstoy was not a shallow Enlightenment 
rationalist remote from the spirit of Christianity after all, but one willing to err with Christ 
against all reason’.210
5.10. Revelations of death. Faith and Reason. Shestov’s later works on Tolstoy.
This view of Tolstoy's hidden irrationalism Shestov continued in his subsequent works on 
Tolstoy. The next most substantial piece appeared twelve years later -  in 1920 -  already in 
emigration, in CoepeMennbie 3anucKu (Nos 1 and 2), and later became part of Shestov's 
very significant philosophical book On Job's Balances {Ha eecax Hoed) (Paris, 1929). The 
essay on Tolstoy is entitled ‘The Last Judgement: Tolstoy's Last Works’ (‘Ha cipaniHOM 
cy#e. nocjie/ume npoH3Be£emm ToncToro’) and is part of the section quite instructively 
called ‘Revelations of Death’ (‘OTKpoBemnt CMepTH’). Valevicius observes that in this 
work Shestov ‘finally recognized the depth of character and the suffering’ of Tolstoy,
209 E. B. Greenwood, ‘Tolstoy and Religion’ in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 152. Quotations from Shestov are taken from 
Lev Shestov, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, transl. Bernard Martin and Spenser Roberts 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969), pp. 69 and 71-72 respectively.
210 E. B. Greenwood, ‘Tolstoy and Religion’, p. 152.
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911which ‘had been hidden behind the mask of moralizing’. Valevicius contrasts Shestov's 
understanding of the young and old Tolstoy, as Shestov himself grew much older. To the 
duplicity of young Tolstoy and his gift and urge to melt in with the common world, 
‘Aristotle's world’, as Shestov now calls it, the latter juxtaposes the lonely world of old 
Tolstoy whose values are changing as he approaches the ultimate mystery of death. ‘In his 
old age, Tolstoy abandons the “common world” for a world of miserable solitude as he 
prepares for death, but with the result that he has finally learned that he is right and not
919they’, Valevicius writes. He quotes the following words that Shestov puts in Tolstoy's 
mouth: ‘They declared that I was subject to fits and other things of the sort, but I was of
9 1 o
sane mind. They certified this, but I know that I am mad’. Shestov embraced such 
declarations and stated that ‘Tojictoh bcio >kh3hl nyBCTBOBaji b cBoen Ayrne hto-to, hto 
BBiTajiKHBajio ero H3 “ofiujero MHpa’” .214 Valevicius observes that ‘Shestov in 1929 saw 
Tolstoy as having perceived the rules of death's game, something given to very few to 
perceive’.215 These rules, Valevicius explains, are in the overturning of old values: ‘that 
which we our life long have considered to be true, suddenly before death, appears false.
916Death destroys the common world, it is an exit from the common world’.
Thus, as we can see, Shestov in 1929 maintains the same views with respect to the 
revelations of death that he held back in 1908. But his style becomes more striking with the 
clarity and simplicity that were brought by experience and conviction. Shestov traces the 
aforementioned inner force that drove Tolstoy out of the common world, back to his early 
years. Again, not preoccupied by its empirical causes as adherents of the psychoanalytic 
approach would, Shestov simply mentions the unusual fits of emotional disturbance that 
would come over Tolstoy as a child. For Shestov there is an obvious connection between 
these and the fears of madness of the mature Tolstoy. The latter ‘aejiaji BejiHHaHmne 
HanpjDKeHHH, hto6bi jkhtb “KaK Bee” h bh^ctb tojibko to, hto He BtiSnBaeT nejioBeKa H3
211 Valevicius, p. 34.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid. Valevicius quotes Shestov’s ‘Ha cTpaumoM cyzje. nocne/urne npoH3Be/jeHHa TojicToro’.
214 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. Hocjiednue npomeedenuH Toncmozo in Ha eecax Hoea (Moscow: 
Folio, 2001), p. 113.
215 Valevicius, p. 34.
2,6 Ibid.
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o 6 b i h h o h  KOJien’, Shestov wrote, thus returning to his recurrent theme of Tolstoy's 
attempts to escape from the tragic to the ordinary. Given this particular spin that Shestov 
put on Tolstoy, it is not surprising that Shestov pointed to Tolstoy's unfinished story ‘Notes 
of a Madman’ as being, in a sense, the key to Tolstoy's whole creativity. At the core of the 
story there is a fit of sudden inexplicable angst and torment that occurs to a very sane, 
ordinary and down-to-earth landowner. Shestov identifies this character with the writer 
himself, but this time, contrary to his usually arbitrary method, Shestov tries to substantiate 
his claim by quoting from Tolstoy's real letter to his wife. In it Tolstoy described such a fit 
of madness, as well as some practical details concerning land-trade and even geography 
which were almost identical to those of the landowner from the story.
Shestov continues to insist that Tolstoy during his life ‘yHHJi mo/ten merojurrb j ih h c b o h  
CTopoHon >kh3hh h ry6HTt npaBfly’.218 These regulated well-established foundations of 
ordinary existence freed Tolstoy from the need to create an alternative world, Shestov says. 
Thus, essentially, he comes back again to his writing on Tolstoy o f 1908 where he had a 
vision of the latter as destroying and creating worlds throughout his life. Similarly now, 
Shestov states that the author of the ‘Notes o f a Madman’ was facing the need to reconsider 
his entire world-view. ‘Oh y B H ^ e j i,  h t o  o a h o  H3 ^ B y x :  j ih 6 o  c^eHa h  flOManiHHe, 
HanaaaBimie Ha Hero 3a h o b b ih  o6pa3 m l ic j ih , 6 b ijih  npaBM h  o h  t o h h o  6 o jic h  h  Hy^aaeTca 
b  JieneHHH, j ih 6 o  Beet MHp 6ojieH h  h c h bc t  b  6e3yMHH’,219 Shestov affirmed. He claimed 
that the ‘Notes of a Madman’ can be regarded as a summary title to everything written by 
Tolstoy since the age o f fifty. Shestov drew a parallel between Tolstoy's and Gogol's 
striving beyond the boundaries o f the real world to the unknown, and claimed that Tolstoy 
had taken his title for the ‘Notes’ from Gogol.
In fact, Shestov's thoughts on Gogol expressed in ‘The Last Judgement’ as an engine to 
take forward his ideas on Tolstoy can be inscribed without any alterations into Shestov's 
leading conviction, as formulated by Euripides, of the reverse roles of life and death, of life
2.7 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. Hocnednue npomeedenun Toncmozo, p. 114.
2.8 Ibid, p. 117.
219 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. Hocnednue npomeedemm Toncmozo, p. 117.
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being nothing more than a long and profound metaphysical sleep. Unusually for him, 
Shestov denies even Pushkin the full understanding of the significance of Gogol’s Dead 
Souls. Pushkin saw this work as a weeping over ignorant, savage and backward Russia, 
Shestov says, and suggests a broader interpretation of the novel as a vision of the entire 
world being under the spell of a deep and senseless slumber with people turned into 
submissive automata, into ‘dead souls’. He sees the roots of this slumber, as before, in 
hypnotising and enslaving reason, in self-evident truth. The above words of Euripides, that 
Shestov embraced, are this time put into Tolstoy's mouth.
EecnpH H H H H bie C T paxn npH B oa^T  k  h h  Ha neM  He ocHOBaHHOMy S e c c T p a m m o . Y M ep eT b  He 
CTpauiHO, CTpauiHO - 5Kjrn> HarneH 6eccM bicjieH H O H , T y n o fi >KH3Hbio. H a m a  >KH3Hb ecT b  CMepTb, 
H am a CMepTb -  ecT b  >KH3Hb h j ih  H a n a n o  >kh3hh. B o t  h t o  roB opH T  o x p yaca iom H M  T o j i c t o h  h  b o t  
n e r o  o h h  He noHHM ajiH h  HHKorfla He noH M yr. JJp p a3B e 3 t o  m ohcho “ n o m iT b ” ? P a3B e caM  T o j i c t o h  
smo “ noH H M aji” ? ,220
Shestov exclaims.
He reinforces again his own ‘misological’ conscience by portraying Tolstoy as having 
followed the voice of reason in order to hold on to sane existence, but ultimately as having 
renounced reason on the threshold of death. Shestov quotes from Tolstoy's posthumously 
published play a conversation between Nikolai Ivanovich and a priest where the former 
insists on the divine nature of reason as the only means of finding the truth. ‘Pa3yM o^hh 
fljM Bcex h  Bcerfla caM cede paBeH’,221 this is the thought that Tolstoy deemed organically 
intrinsic to his entire being, Shestov claims, and sees the cause of Tolstoy's horrors and 
madness in the futility of his attempts to overcome the overwhelming power of reason. In 
the rest of his article Shestov engages in his customary activity of illustrating the 
underlying struggle in Tolstoy between his reason together with his conviction of its 
powerful dominance on the one hand, and his feelings of angst, disturbance and torment 
stemming from a different source than mind and expressing Tolstoy's deep doubts about the 
latter's capability of getting to the truth.
220 Ibid, p . 131.
221 Shestov, Ha cmpauiHOM cyde. Tlocnednue npouseedenuH Toncmozo, p . 128.
267
Importantly, in contrast to ‘Destroying and Creating Worlds’, in ‘The Last Judgement’ 
Shestov's focus is on different -  predominantly the last -  works of Tolstoy. Shestov 
discusses at length the following three: ‘Father Sergius’, ‘Death of Ivan Il’ich’ and ‘Master 
and Man’. It is interesting to note here that Shestov very rarely mentions ‘The Kreutzer 
Sonata’ (in ‘The Last Judgement’ he does not do so at all) -  which may be another piece of 
evidence to substantiate our conjecture above about Shestov's unease and consequently 
reluctance to deal with sexual issues. When he does mention this work, as, for example, in 
Tolstoy and Nietzsche, he only does it once and in passing -  only to say that it was bom out 
of a deep self-contempt, but that the depth of despair there is not comparable to that of
9 9 9really tormented souls (like, in Shestov's analysis, Nietzsche's). The philosophical depth 
of this novel is undeniable and it should have been both an imperative and a temptation for 
Shestov to analyse this work on his usual metaphysical and religious plane. However, 
because of the nature of the novel’s themes this would have required Shestov with his 
inevitable psychological approach to immerse himself into dealing with matters of sexual 
relations that he clearly did not feel comfortable with. This may serve to confirm our 
conjecture about the ‘wounded’ and traumatic personal memories lying at the roots of such 
matters for Shestov.
Having started with the key importance of ‘Notes of a Madman’ for understanding all of 
Tolstoy's last works Shestov moves on to discussing ‘Father Sergius’. He first speaks of 
Tolstoy's distinction from Socrates in that the former knew that he was a sinner and hated 
his sinful life. He knew the truth about himself that the rest of the world essentially refused 
to believe, and he craved fame only in order to smash it. One needs real acknowledgement 
of being a sage only to reject it -  this truth, according to Shestov, Tolstoy tells us in his 
‘Father Sergius’. Shestov identifies Tolstoy with Sergius first in their ability to recognise 
the erroneous nature of their previous path. ‘Korfla oh [T ojictoh] noflxoflHT k uejin, oh 
y6e)KflaeTCJi, hto meji He Tyfla, Kyzja Hymio 6 bijio’, Shestov writes and sees in it Tolstoy's
9 90
‘BejiHKHH h  3 a r a a o H H b iH  flap’. It is reason that misled Sergius, and implicitly Tolstoy, 
Shestov declares again. ‘Pa3yM ofiMaHyji, Bee “TpyflBi” nponajin flapoM. HejiOBex nocjie
222 See Shestov, Toncmou u Huvpue, p. 293.
223 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. nocnednue npou3eedemiH Toncmozo, p. 133.
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flOJITHX MyHHTejIBHbIX CKHTaHHH BepHyjICfl Ha TO MeCTO, C KOTOpOTO BBIHieJl’.224 In h is
usual way Shestov makes no distinction between the fictional Sergius and the real Tolstoy. 
‘HacKOJiBKO to ,  h to  5L aejiaio, - Rim  Bora, HacKOJiBKO - rjisl jno^eh?’, Shestov quotes 
Sergius and proceeds to say without any hesitations or side remarks: ‘Taicne mbicjih 
npecjie^yiOT TojicToro’.225
On the other hand, says Shestov, Tolstoy had all the grounds at exactly that moment to be 
proud of his life and work which were fully dedicated to helping others. Yet, he had those 
fits of horror tearing his soul apart. Shestov seeks to explain this phenomenon and warns 
against any simplified explanation (for example, Tolstoy's deliberate humility), and indeed 
against any rushed answer. Shestov's own answer, however, is rather to be expected. 
Shestov interprets the existential struggle of Father Sergius against his vanity and vices, his 
tormenting and futile attempts to live up to his fame, to cope with it while maintaining the 
purity of his aspirations, as Tolstoy's realisation that his good deeds are in vain, that his 
soul is not redeemed by them. Shestov then disregards the ‘positive’ ending to the novella 
as a tribute that Tolstoy paid to classicism, since he was afraid to rebel openly against 
reason. What Shestov sees behind the novel is Tolstoy's torment, his loss of orientation and 
search for truth as if anew, which Shestov once again equates to Tolstoy's attempts to leave 
the domain of reason, to leave the common world with its commonly accepted values. In 
particular, Shestov repeats his old point which he learned from Nietzsche's painful 
experience that good deeds do not lead to salvation.
This illustrates our point about Shestov seeking a way to salvation in the wisdom of 
literature without realising the secondary character of any ethical implications in art. Thus 
Shestov's rather ‘applied’ approach pays off only very partially, leaving aside all the 
intricate texture of a literary piece which represents an inseparable blend of ethics and 
aesthetics. In ‘The Last Judgement’ this is particularly evident because Shestov's viewpoint 
at this stage had become distinctly philosophical rather than literary. Because of this his 
paradigm of disavowing reason through revelations of death, into which he inscribes
225 Ibid, p. 134.
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Tolstoy, stands out in an especially transparent way. By adjusting Tolstoy's work to fit into 
this paradigm Shestov inevitably loses the multi-dimensional nature of Tolstoy's art and 
ends up with a simplified version of it, perhaps akin to Tolstoy's own, rather scholastic, 
moralising stories for children. The difference is, though, in Shestov's passion and 
temperament which illustrate the importance for him of his own life-long struggle against 
the accepted norms of human life, against the self-evident (and, if we accept the analogy 
here, this may indeed reveal something, rather along the Shestovian line of accusations, 
about Tolstoy's attitude to his charitable and educational work).
S h e s t o v 's  c o n c lu s io n s  a r e  fo r m u la te d  th r o u g h o u t  th e  a r t ic le  a s  d is t in c t  e c h o e s  o f  h is  
p r e v io u s  th o u g h t s .  T h u s  h e  c la im s  th a t ‘p a3yM , cKOBaBiiiHH H ac c b o h m h  3 0 jio t b im h  n em iM H , 
flOJDKeH CMHpHTBCfl. B 5KH3HH eCTB HCHTO SoJIB IIiee, HeM pa3yM . C aM a 5KH3HB T eneT  H3 
HCTOHHHKa B B ic in e r o , HeM pa3yM . T. e. t o , n e r o  pa3yM  He n o c r a r a e T ,  H e B c e iy ta  ecTB  
HeB03M o>K Hoe. H  H a o 6 o p o T : TaM, r ^ e  p a3yM  K O H C TarapyeT H eob xoflH M ocT B , -  c b a 3 h  M o r y r
9 9A
6 b it b  pa3opBaH Bi’ . R e a s o n  is  in c a p a b le  o f  le a d in g  u s  to  th e  truth , b e c a u s e ,  as S h e s to v  
th in k s , ‘pa3yM  [ . . . ]  h 3 m c h h j i CBoen n p n p o a e  h  Tax BHyrpeHHe n ep ep o zm jic ji, h t o  Mo^ceT 
AaBaTB HaM t o j ib k o  npaKTHHecKH nojie3H Bie n ojioaceH m i, n o M o ra io m n e  b 6 o p B 6 e  3a
9 9 7cymecTBOBaHHe’. Interestingly, Shestov affirms that ‘HCTHHa He b b ih o c h t  obmero 
Bjia^eHHa’, it cannot be utilised, and quotes Bergson’s statement that only great artists free 
from the power of general common concepts can penetrate into and truthfully portray the 
inner life of man.228 Again, as always, Shestov takes what suits him -  that artists are free 
from the power of general concepts. This for him reinforces his own position that the 
poison lies exactly in those concepts which are generated by reason, and it is against the 
latter that Shestov then launches his attacks. The artistic means and the individuality of art's 
very nature seem to remain outside Shestov's concern. And, paradoxically, he intervenes 
into the beatifully woven world of literary craft with the sole purpose of extracting some 
general concepts, thus violating the very nature of this world.
226 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. Hocnednue npou3eedenuR Toncmozo, p. 138.
227 Ibid, p. 141.
228 Shestov, Ha cmpaiunoM cyde. nocnednue npomeedemm Toncmozo, p. 143.
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Science is preoccupied by the general, art is dedicated to the accidental. Once again 
Shestov denies scientific power in the domain of art, thus specifying the limits of reason. 
But he falls short of understanding that means other than the artistic break the boundaries 
and encroach with naked reason into the domain of the irrational. Thus Shestov was right in 
equating Plotinus with Tolstoy in their interest in the accidental rather than the general, but 
he forgot that he himself with his philosophical rather than literary devices intrinsically 
could not extract from Tolstoy's art its ‘hidden truth’ precisely because this truth could only 
be told by Tolstoy, the artist, but otherwise, like poetry retold in prose, would lose its 
magic.
Thus the powerful beauty of ‘The Death of Ivan Ilich’ is reduced by Shestov to those very 
statements, to general concepts against which he so strongly argues. Yet, despite the 
intrinsic contradiction of his task, despite ‘fighting against reason on the territory of this 
very reason’, it is vital for Shestov to express his ideas about the deep sleep that constitutes 
human life and from which only death with its revelations is capable of awakening people. 
The Good which will count at the Last Judgement is very different from what is commonly 
accepted as good, Shestov states. ‘Ha “cTpaniHOM cyzje”, OTKpbrameMca TojiCTOMy [...],
99Q •BbicoKne 5KH3HeHHBie flocTiDKeHHJi He CMaraaioT HeBH/jHMoro cyzjHH ’, Shestov writes. 
‘CMepTb nepepe3biBaeT Bee HeBHxmMbie hhth, kotopmmh mm CBinaHbi Ha 3eMjie c ce6e 
noflo6HbiMH cymecTBaMH’, he continues, and the absolute solitude ‘ecTb ycjiOBHe h Hanajio 
npeo6pa>KeHHfl HejiOBenecKOH aymn’.230
A p a rt fro m  h is  p h ilo so p h ica l affirm atio n s d irec ted  ag a in st g n o seo lo g ica l th eo rie s  an d  the 
sp ec u la tiv e  tren d  in  general, S hestov  co n tin u es h is  o n g o in g  th em atic  lin e  o f  a ttrac tin g  
a tten tio n  to  th e  fa llen , to  th o se  b ey o n d  red em p tio n . ‘Oahhohcctbo, ocTaBJieHHocTb, 
H enponum H aa TbMa, xaoc , HeB03M05KH0CTb npeaBH^eHKH h n o jm aa  HeH3BecTHOCTb -
9^  1MoaceT 3tno npHHUTb HenoBeK?’, Shestov asks. He draws a parallel between ‘The Death 
of Ivan Ilich’ and another story written by Tolstoy ten years later: ‘Master and Man’. ‘B
229 Ibid, p. 153.
230 Shestov, Ha cmpaiunoM cyde. Hocjiednue npotoeedemm Toncmozo, p. 153.
231 Ibid, p. 155.
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o6ohx paccKa3ax Tojictoh npeflCTaBjraeT HaM nejiOBeica cnepBa b o6bihhbix, bccm 
3HaKOMMX H BCCMH npHHBTblX yCJIOBHHX CymeCTBOBaHHfl, H 3aTeM, nOHTH BHe3anHO [ . . . ]  
nepeHOCHT e ro  b to  oflHHonecTBO, nojiHee KOTOporo HeT hh Ha R ue  MOpCKOM, hh n o jx 
3eM jieio’,232 S h esto v  w rites. In ‘M aste r and  M a n ’, S h esto v  exp la in s, T o ls to y  w an ted  to  
fo rce  a  h ead -o n  en co u n te r b e tw een  d ea th  and  a  full an d  se lf-assu red  life. Ind eed , in  th is 
s to ry  a  p ro sp e ro u s , su ccessfu l se lf-m ad e trad esm an  B rek h u n o v  trav e ls  w ith  h is  w o rk e r b ack  
h o m e, b u t gets in to  a  sn o w sto rm  and  d ies, w h ile  h is w o rk e r su rv ives ag a in s t a ll th e  odds. It 
is th e  m en ta l s ta te  and  b eh a v io u r o f  th e  d o o m ed  hero  w h ich  co n stitu te  th e  m a in  g is t o f  th e  
s to ry  an d  on  w h ich  S h es to v ’s ana lysis  is based .
Having realised the imminence of death Brekhunov suddenly starts worrying about his 
servant and tries to warm him up. But he soon feels instead of his usual typical strength and 
power total weakness, but this weakness brings him some special joy, never before 
experienced. This joy about his weakness, Shestov says, in a man who always rejoiced in 
nothing but his powers, is ‘Hanajio toto ny/ja npeBpameHHA, bchho 3araaouHoro h
Oil
HenoHBTHoro, KOTOpoe Ha HejiOBenecKOM H3biKe Ha3biBaeTCfl CMepTbio’. Only great joy
about his weakness and freedom remained in Brekhunov, Shestov writes. While strength is
afraid of death, weakness is not, he remarks further. ‘CnadocTb cjibihiht, hto ee 30ByT
Kyna-TO, rjje 0Ha, Tax aojiro roHHMaa h npe3HpaeMaa, HaftaeT cede HaxoHeu nocne/mee
ybemmje’. When reason and all that constitutes strength in life is renounced, the great
m y ste ry  op en s up , S h esto v  states: ‘H  oh n om eji, BepHee B03Hecca Ha CBoeii "cjia6ocTH",
xax Ha Kpbijibax, He 3Haa, Ky/ja ero npHHeceT, - B03Hecca b HenoHJiTHyio, CTpauiHyio jym
jHOAen nocjie^HioK), BeHHyio hohb...’. With these words Shestov finishes his contemplation
on the story and says that its ending was prophetic for Tolstoy's own end when ‘JIbBy
HnKOJiaeBHHy npHuuiocb okohhhtb cboh ahh b rjiyxon CTenH, cpe^H CHera, Bbiorn h 
235MeTejien .
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid, p. 165.
234 Shestov, H a cmpaiuHOM cyde. nocnednue npom eedenw i Toncmozo, p. 165.
235 Ibid, p. 166.
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Of course the theme of death was present in Tolstoy's earlier works too. He described 
death's numerous ocurrences throughout War and Peace, and the fear of death emerges 
strongly in Levin's obsessions in Anna Karenina, as well as, for that matter, in fits of 
madness -  for example, in Anna's last hours. However, it is only in Tolstoy's last works that 
the question of death and the human consciousness at its threshold becomes the main focus 
and gains real grandeur and solemn significance, which Shestov unfailingly observed. 
Importantly, while he deems death as the main cause of Tolstoy's new inner discoveries, 
Shestov refuses to ascribe the novelist's life-long struggle for answers to the ultimate 
questions simply to his fear of death. For Shestov this issue has a much more profound 
depth. Thus Shestov speaks of the whole phenomenon which he calls the pathos of death 
(na(J>oc CMepTH) and which he deems the most important and significant of all kinds of 
‘na(J)oc’ known to humans. In his premonitions Shestov goes as far as to call death our 
mother. In this connection it is illuminating to turn to Erofeev's interpretation of Shestov's 
treatment of this topic.
Essentially Erofeev in his article on Shestov expressed some sarcasm in relation to the 
latter's obsession with death. He said that the pathos of death strikes when it is released 
inadvertently, when it breaks out by itself. If, instead, it is a subject of endless 
contemplation then it loses its tragic streak and acquires more the features of a farce. 
However, despite the impression that Erofeev derived from Shestov's works, the latter's 
actual stance was far from morbid. This becomes particularly evident from Shestov's 
private correspondence. Thus in 1921, in his rather moving letter to his daughters, Shestov 
wrote, commenting on his recently published article on Tolstoy’s last works, that
Aaace OTKpoBeHne CMepTH ecT b , b  nocjieflH eM  c n e T e , HCKaHne 3a  b h a h m m m h  yacacaM H  pa3Jio>KeHHa 
h  KOHua HeBHAHMbix H anaji h o b o h  K pacoT bi. [ . . .]  y  T o jiC T o ro , KaK y  ELnaTOHa h  rbioT H H a, M bicjib o  
CMepTH B cerA a  co n p o B o > K A ajiacb  ocobeH H biM  nyBCTBOM, neM-TO B poA e co3HaHHH, h t o  B nepeA H  
y a ca cb i, h o  3 a  cnH H O io BbipacTaiOT xpb iA ba. B epoH T H o, b  TaKOM p o A e  h t o -t o  c  r y ce H H u en  
npoH CxoAH T, K orA a OHa n p o rp b i3 a e T  c b o h  k o k o h . O r T o r o  h  rpbi3eT , h t o  xpb uib fl B bipocA H . Tax h t o  
h h  T oA C T oro, h h  H aoT H H a, h h  IlnaT O H a He CAeAyeT noHHMaTb b t o m  c m b ic a c , h t o  o h h  H ac 3 0 B y r  
3a6bITb O 5KH3HH. KoHeHHO, TOT, KTO 3H8A COCTOHHHe H B aH a IinbH H a, HHaHe O MHOTOM CyAHT, HeM 
A p y r n e . Ho o t  ach3h h  He O T BopanH BaeTca. C x o p e e  H a y n a eT ca  BHAeTb M H oroe u eH H o e  b  t o m , h t o  
K a3aA ocb npeACAe 6e3pa3AHHHbiM . [ . . .]  C t b a o  6biT b, OTKpoBeHHe C M epra -  He ecT b  O TpnuaHHe
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5KH3HH, a HaoSopoT, CKopee yTBepx<AeHHe -  raribKo yTBep^eHHe He t o h  oGm h h o h  “MbmibeH 
6eroTHH”, Ha KOTopyio a io a h  pa3MeHHBaiOT ce6a.236
Thus, perhaps Valevicius was right when he pointed out that Shestov had to grow old 
himself to appreciate and understand the mature Tolstoy. Valevicius cites the following 
concluding passage from Shestov's work which, he says, demonstrates Shestov's brilliant 
insight which came with increased maturity:
C a a B a  o BejiHKHx A e n a x  T o j ic T o r o  euje n p n  aotchh e r o  o d o u u ia  B ecb  MHp. H  Bce-TaKH BCKope 
n o c n e  C B oero  8 0 -jieT H er o  lodHJiea, o k o t o p o m  ro B o p u n H  T ax  M H oro Ha B c e x  A3bncax B c e x  rurra  
n a c T e h  cB eT a -  T axoH  n e c r a  a o  T o j ic T o r o  He yAOCTaHBanca h h k to  H3 cM epT H bix, -  o h  S p o c a e T  B ee  
h  TeM H ofi HOHbio 6e5KHT H3 AOMy, He 3Haa x y A a  h  He 3H aa 3aneM . E r o  noA B H rn, e r o  c a a B a  -  B ee  
o n o c T b iA e a o  eM y, B ee  c r a n o  TJDKenbiM, M ynHTenbHbiM, HeBbiHOCHMbiM. K aAceTca, h to  A poA cam eft h 
HeT epneaH B O H  pyKOH cp b m a eT  o h  c c e 6 a  MacraTOCTb -  h H aBH cm H e HaA BnaBuiHMH rna3aM H  
6 p o B H , h  C T ap necK yio  6opoAy, B ee  BHeuiHHe CHMBOAbi M yApocTH h  yHHTenbCTBa. H t o 6  npeACTaTb c 
n e n c o H  h a h  x o T b  oSnerneH H O H  AyuiOH npeA nocAeAHHM  c y A b e ii -  eM y npHLUAOCb 3a6biT b h  
OTp e n b c a  o t  B c e r o  C B oero  BeAH Koro n p o u iA o r o . T axoB O  oTK poBeHH e C M epra: “TaM, Ha 3eM Ae, B ee  
3 to  6biAO BaACHO, 3A ecb  Ace HyACHO A p y r o e ” : (peuycopev 5r| cp(X,T]v eu; 7caxpi5a... Flaxpi; 5 t] fipi'tv, 
o0ev7cep f|^0o)iev, xai 7iaxr|p exel “ E cachm b  A o p o r o e  O TenecTBo! O T en ecT B o  Ace H a u ie  TaM, OTKyAa 
MbI npHHIAH, TaM ACe H OTen H am ” .237
Just three years before his own death Shestov paid another tribute to Tolstoy by giving a 
talk at the meeting of the religious-philosophical society in Paris dedicated to the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the novelist's death. In the next year, 1936, this talk was published in 
the journal CoepeMenubie 3anucKu. The title of Shestov's talk was ‘Yasnaia Poliana and 
Astapovo’ which encompasses both the life and death of the great Russian writer. In 
Shestov's own words he could not, of course, aspire to capture all the immense topic of 
Tolstoy and his creativity, but wanted to remind everybody of this great figure and to talk 
about the struggles that filled Tolstoy's soul and left a clear mark on his works. In this paper 
Shestov essentially gave a summary of his previous writings on Tolstoy.
This talk is distinguished by the feeling of a return to Shestov's article on Pushkin -  more in 
its lofty and admiring style than its idealistic content. It is free from any attempts at 
unmasking and any exposure of Tolstoy's duplicity -  instead it describes Tolstoy's inner
236 Shestov’s letter to his daughters of 13.04.1921. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 207.
237 Shestov, Ha cmpaumoM cyde. nocnednue npoiaeedenm Toncmozo, p. 166. Cited in English 
translation in Valevicius, p. 36; (the quotation cited by Shestov is from Plotinus, Enn. I, vi, 8).
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conflict in a very positive light as being a result of his tremendous inner work and 
uncompromising striving for the truth. Thus in its spirit it can be assigned to the general 
humanistic trend in Tolstoy criticism, even though Shestov remained faithful to his earlier 
observations on the writer. He began by talking again, as in his early works on Tolstoy, of 
the latter's ability to embrace and celebrate life, as can be seen from War and Peace. 
Shestov described Tolstoy in the words of Pushkin about Mozart that the novelist ‘KaK 
HeKHH xepyBHM o h  H ecK OJiBK o 3aHec k  HaM  neceH paficKHx’ and proceeded to talk about 
Tolstoy's virtuous soul. However, this soul knew all the horrors of existence, Shestov said, 
but it managed to overcome them, although at the price of the most tormenting inner 
search. Shestov drew again, as in his ‘Destroying and Creating Worlds’, on the powerful 
image of Pierre-Tolstoy with his inner world crumbling irreversibly, but then becoming 
resurrected in his soul on new and unshakable foundations. The time went out of joint for 
Pierre-Tolstoy, Shestov says, drawing a parallel between Tolstoy's deepest thoughts and the 
line of Shakespeare, whom Tolstoy, despite the fact that he did not like the latter, was 
inadvertently repeating, as Shestov stresses.
H o w  can  o n e  reg a in  b e l ie f  in  life  and  G od, h o w  can  o n e  re su rrec t fa ith?  S hestov  asks 
rh e to rica lly . W h a t is to  b e  done? T h is sac ram en ta l R u ssian  q u es tio n  S hestov  p u ts  in to  
T o ls to y 's  m ou th . ‘B o n p o c  “ h t o  flejiaTb?” HeoTCTynHO c t o h j i  n p e #  T o j i c t b im  b  TeneHHe 
Bceft e ro  3 c m h o h  j k h 3 h h ,  h  h m , t o j i b k o  h m , o n p eaeju u io cb  n  HanpaBJWJiocb Bee e ro  
TBopnecTBo’,239 S h esto v  claim s. H e repeats  th e  id ea  from  h is  ea rly  w o rk s o n  T o ls to y  that 
fo r th e  la tte r h is  lite ra ry  ac tiv ity  w as n ev e r art fo r a r t’s sake , b u t in s tead  w as a re su lt o f  
‘HanpaaceHHeHHieH, n o n ra  6e3yMHOH GopbGbi c KaKHM-TO CTpauiHbiM h  GecnomaflHbiM 
BparoM, BJiacTb h  npncyrcTBHe KOToporo o h  n o n y a ji n o #  j i h h h h o h  xcn3HeHHbix 
co6jia3HOB’.240 B eh in d  T o ls to y 's  p a rad is iaca l so ngs th e re  w as co n cea led  a titan ic  and 
d esp e ra te  stru g g le  ‘c Besaecym uM  npoTHBHHKOM, KOToporo He t o j i b k o  noGe^HTb, h o  h  
yBHfleTb Hejib3fl’,241 S h esto v  asserts. T o ls to y 's  co n s tan t and  p ass io n a te  an g st tau g h t h im  to
238 See Shestov, Henan nojinna u Acmanoeo in YM03penue u omKpoeenue (Paris: YMCA-Press, 
1964), p. 157.
239 Shestov, Henan nonnna u Acmanoeo, p. 159.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid, pp. 160-161.
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pose questions when no-one else did, and moreover when all were convinced that no 
answer was in principle possible, Shestov says. In this struggle Shestov saw the great 
enigma of Tolstoy's creativity and at the same time the clue to understanding Tolstoy. 
Shestov again, as he did in ‘The Last Judgement’, compares Tolstoy to Plotinus. He quotes 
Plotinus's phrase that ‘Bejimcaa h nocjie/jHjra 6op6a npe^CTOHT HejioBenecKHM jxyinaM’ 
and claims that Tolstoy could have used it as a motto for his literary activity.
Shestov then presents the gist of Tolstoy's own struggle, to a more detailed description of 
which he had already dedicated his previous works on Tolstoy. War and Peace is not a 
theodicy, not a justification of God in the eyes of man, but a justification of man in his own 
eyes, Shestov claims. The writer had to convince himself and others that our world and our 
life are wonderful, that man is omnipotent. In doing so he forced any doubts into the 
domain of the subconscious, Shestov says. And to do it Tolstoy had to revert to the crude 
physical force of the Arakcheev-Rostov type in order to extinguish any subversive 
questions of Pierre and such like. However, this could not last -  crude force was not able to 
sustain the equilibrium, hence Tolstoy's subsequent works, his ‘Confession’ and his 
religious-philosophical writings. His spiritual angst overturned his previous values and 
convictions, and he turned away from crude force which now seemed repulsive to him, 
towards the Scripture. In his search for faith Tolstoy was ready to embrace any faith as long 
as it would not demand from him the impossible -  to abandon his reason, Shestov states, 
thus summarising his earlier observations on Tolstoy. Having arrived at his fundamental 
question -  of reason and faith -  Shestov transfers the conflict between crude force and 
genuine attempts to find the truth to the religious plane. How can one justify the teaching of 
Christ in the eyes of reason? How can one reconcile these irreconcilable entities? Shestov 
asks again.
Shestov repeats the story of Tolstoy's efforts to reconcile faith with reason, to explain the 
Scripture by rational means, which, as Shestov asserts, led Tolstoy to total disillusionment 
and tearing the Scripture apart. Shestov quotes again the memorable conversation of 
Nikolai Ivanovich and the priest that he quoted in 1920 when writing his ‘At the Last
242 Ibid, p . 16 0 .
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Judgement’. Reason is the same for everyone and is based on crude force. It cannot explain 
the mystery of faith. ‘Do not resist evil’ cannot be reconciled with our rational convictions, 
norms and beliefs. Tolstoy, Shestov claims, found in himself the audacity to realise this and 
fled from reason to the mystery o f the divine, to the irrational. ‘T o j i c t o h  Bceiyja KaK 6 m  
flepacaji cTopoHy pa3yMa c ero “pydHTt” h  oTpeKajica o t  “Bepti”, KOTopaa He pacnojiaraeT 
npHHyaHTejiBHtiMH cnocodaMH ybeayjeHHa, h h h c m  He 3ain,Hii];eHa h  3aiHHiiiaTi>ca He 
xoneT’,243 Shestov says.
On the other hand all Tolstoy's life tells us otherwise -  that nothing was as hateful to him as 
those ‘proved truths’ of reason with their compulsion. ‘Bee ziyxoBHoe cymecTBO ero 
pBajiocb k  H e;to K a3aHHOH HCTHHe, k  HenpoTHBjieHHio’,244 Shestov claims, and recalls the 
Biblical story of two sons. One said that he would go, but did not go; the other said that he 
would not go, but went. It is with the latter that Shestov compares Tolstoy in his struggle 
against God, Scripture, and the irrationalism of faith. Tolstoy's flight from Yasnaia Poliana 
to Astapovo Shestov compares to the writer's ultimate flight from reason to faith. In 
Astapovo the main struggle of Tolstoy's life, which took place in Yasnaia Poliana, came to 
a close: the struggle between the subjugating truth of reason and the free truth of revelation 
of man, who was created in the image of God. This struggle ended with the victory of the 
latter truth. This was the main message of Shestov's 1935 paper on Tolstoy.
Thus in 1935 Shestov presented a glorified and holistic vision of Tolstoy as struggling all 
his life against reason, and having finally defeated it at the threshold of death when he fled 
from it to the ultimate faith. Shestov's usual scepticism is almost entirely absent from this 
paper thus prompting a return to Shestov's idealistic youthful phase and at the same time 
signifying the apotheosis of Shestov's constructive phase. In other words, one can argue 
that in this last period the two have become linked. Thus, in a sense, Shestov's idealism, 
colloquially understood, can be viewed as victorious since it seems to have survived his 
entire career despite the violent war on it waged by Shestov. In the sense of Isaiah Berlin's 
definition of foxes and hedgehogs given in Berlin's famous essay on Tolstoy, Shestov and
243 Shestov, H c h o r  nomma u  Acmanoeo, pp. 168-169.
244 Ibid, p. 169.
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Tolstoy were of an opposite nature, which may to some extent shed light on Shestov's 
interpretation of the writer. Tolstoy, according to Berlin, was a fox who desperately wanted 
to be and often pretended to be a hedgehog, while Shestov, who desperately wanted to be a 
fox -  to grasp details and show disdain for holistic systems, was in fact a distinct hedgehog, 
not only able, but compelled to put the diversity of his subtle and penetrating observations 
in the service to just one vision and an idee fixe  -  fighting against rationalism and the self- 
evidence of mind in favour of the irrational revelations of faith.
278
Chapter 6. Shestov and Dostoevsky. Between faith and faithlessness
Continuing Mikhail Bakhtin's statement that Dostoevsky has not yet become Dostoevsky, 
but is becoming one (Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book, 1961), Robert L. 
Jackson wrote in his book Dialogues with Dostoevsky that ‘it is doubtful whether there is 
another writer in the past one hundred years who has “grown” more dramatically than did 
Dostoevsky’.1 Jackson’s remark that Dostoevsky's ‘becoming is, of course, our own 
growth; the release of his potential -  our own’ is an apt reflection of Shestov's relationship 
with Dostoevsky, for the figure of the novelist that stands out from Shestov's numerous 
works on him reflects above all Shestov's own growth, and releases Shestov's own 
potential. As Blagova and Emelianov point out ‘LLIecTOB Hcnojn>30Baji npoH3Be^eHiw 
/JocToeBCKoro b nepByio onepe^B KaK MaTepnaji, Ha kotopom oh BtiCTpaHBaeT cboio 
napa/mrMy’. He regarded Dostoevsky as his principal teacher and it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that for Shestov Dostoevsky's presence was both permanent and 
tangible, as Shestov had been, figuratively speaking, living and writing ‘in Dostoevsky's 
company’ throughout his entire creative career. It appears that of all Russian classics 
Dostoevsky was the one whose influence on Shestov was the most profound, for 
Dostoevsky had largely shaped Shestov's thought and, together with Nietzsche, set Shestov 
off on the route which turned him into the thinker that we now know.
Apart from constant turning to Dostoevsky in virtually all his major works, Shestov 
dedicated to the latter four significant writings. His first book on Dostoevsky was published 
in 1903 under the title ffocmoeecKUU u Huifiue. 0m oco(pm  mpaeeduu [Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche. The Philosophy o f Tragedy]. Then, for the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Dostoevsky's death, Shestov wrote an article IIpopoHecKUu dap [The Gift o f  Prophecy] 
which was published in January 1906 in the journal TIojihphoh 3ee3da and later became part 
of his book Hancuia u kohi^u  [Beginnings and Endings] (1908). His major work
1 Robert Louis Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky. The Overwhelming Questions (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 114.
279
IJpeodojienue caMooHeeudnocmeu [Overcoming the Self-Evdient] appeared in 1921 and 
was published in the special issue of Nouvelle Revue Frangaise to commemorate 
Dostoevsky's centenary. This publication rapidly made Shestov's name known to the 
French intellectual elite and gained him wide respect and acknowledgement. The work later 
became part of Shestov's book Ha eecax Hoea [On Job's Scales] (1929). In 1937 Shestov 
was invited to give a series of radio talks on Dostoevsky. They were eventually published 
as an article in Cahiers de Radio-Paris and in Pyccme 3anucKu, No 2, under the title O 
‘nepepoofcdenuu ydeDtcdenuu' y  flocmoeecKoeo [On Dostoevsky's ‘Transformation o f  
Convictions’], and later became part of the book YM03peHue u omKpoeenue [Speculation 
and Revelation] (published posthumously in 1964). In this chapter, which consists of two 
major sections, we shall provide a detailed analysis of Shestov's treatment of Dostoevsky in 
its evolution, and demonstrate how it fits in with Shestov's existential paradigm and how 
Dostoevsky helped to shape the latter.
Section I. Reading Dostoevsky in the Nietzschean key
6.1.1. Seeking the answers to tragic questions.
Amongst all Shestov's books his flocmoeecKuu u Huijiue. &wioco(puR mpaeeduu was the 
one republished most often and was translated into eight languages. It first appeared in an 
article form in the journal Mup ucnyccmea (Nos 2-9/10, 1902) whose editor then was S. P. 
Diagilev. He invited Shestov's contribution to the journal after reading his Toncmou u 
Huifuie. The manuscript of JfocmoeecKuu u Hutjiue which Shestov sent him in response to 
the invitation was met with enthusiasm. In general this work was sympathetically received 
and afterwards Shestov for a long while had no difficulty in finding a publisher for his 
works. One of the most significant responses to Shestov's JfocmoeecKuu u Huijuie was 
Nikolai Berdiaev's article ‘Tpare^na h o6i>meHHOCTi>’, mentioned in previous chapters, in 
which Berdiaev acknowledged the philosophy of tragedy as inseparable from contemporary 
cultural currents and welcomed its attack on positivism, idealism and philistine principles 
of existence. At the same time Berdiaev insisted on having a constructive and creative 
approach to surviving a tragic experience. Shestov, while remaining very good friends with 
Berdiaev, never really agreed with the latter's constructive criticism.
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More precisely, Shestov regarded Berdiaev as lacking in penetrative vision. One of the 
most famous aphorisms that Shestov used in respect of Dostoevsky, based on the Biblical 
image, was to endow the writer with a second sight (with spare eyes that the Angel of 
Death, who is covered in eyes throughout, gave Dostoevsky after having visited him too 
early, before his time on earth had come to an end). This second sight does not agree with 
the rest of our senses, Shestov says, and thus produces most peculiar, fantastic visions that 
seem to border on insanity. Viktor Erofeev argues that this second sight was inherent in 
Shestov himself,4 and it is exactly this vision that Shestov denied Berdiaev, thus explaining 
the latter's misunderstanding of Shestov's ideas.
However, it is certainly true, and not surprising, that in his book Shestov attacked any kind 
of positivism and idealism, for such was his philosophical credo, which by that time had 
taken shape more firmly than at the time of Toncmou u Huijiue. Indeed, unlike then, 
Shestov no longer attempted any writings reminiscent of his idealistic IJytuKun. In fact, his 
first book on Dostoevsky was marked by the same approach and technique as his first book 
on Tolstoy, and it is only natural that the two (together with Shestov's subsequent work on 
Chekhov) were united under the same title in their English translations. As in the case of 
Tojicmou u Huijiue, Shestov's paradigm remained largely unchanged. However, it seems as 
if when writing on Dostoevsky Shestov's philosophical outlook was still exploratory; 
Shestov was still, and perhaps with an increased fervour, seeking a way to cope with the 
tragedy of existence, to understand the meaning of life, the way to reconcile, or at least to 
learn to live, with horrors. Having ‘unmasked’ Tolstoy in the latter's struggle while on the 
same route, Shestov called upon Dostoevsky for the same purpose -  to assist in resolving 
Shestov's own quest.
This time the material was much more fertile, for instead of promoting the mediocre and 
mundane (as in the case of Tolstoy), it openly showed the way to the tragic underground 
kingdom of Dostoevsky's idiosyncratic characters with the hellish abyss of their ‘exposed’, 
fragmented psychology. In other words, while Tolstoy strives for the world of sanity, if not
4 Erofeev, p. 153.
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beauty, to escape from the tragic to the ordinary, Dostoevsky leaves the impression of 
moving in the opposite direction: from mundane to tragic, plunging straight into the world 
of insanity, able to find a dead-end in any consciousness, to the extent of opening up 
‘subconscious wells of darkness within his readers themselves’,5 using the words of 
Richard Peace. It is exactly because tragedy constitutes the metaphysical space of 
Dostoevsky's novels that it allowed Shestov, who was by that time overwhelmed by the 
horrors of existence and unable to cope with them by rational means, to enter the realm of 
tragedy openly, and to start writing its philosophy. Speaking more technically, the self- 
justification of Dostoevsky, as Berdiaev branded this type of ‘unmasking’ on Shestov's 
part,6 in a certain way, more obviously lent itself to interpretation than the self-denial of 
Tolstoy. It is Dostoevsky's most notorious characters that Shestov selected for this 
interpretation and for identification with the author.
6.1.2. Dostoevsky’s resistance to Shestov’s methodology. Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: an 
existential perspective. Critical opinions.
On the other hand, the problems that arise when interpreting Dostoevsky exceeded by far 
the solutions that Shestov seemed to find. Given the time of writing his first book on the 
novelist -  in the very early days of Dostoevsky criticism -  Shestov had little in the way of 
secondary sources to rely on, not to mention a lack of developed methodology. The impact 
of Mikhailovsky, who called Dostoevsky a cruel talent, is clearly felt in Shestov's writing; 
yet the cruelty of the Dostoevskian world, which Shestov recognised in his first book on the 
writer (even though he was later to change this perspective somewhat) became an 
underlying, though not primary, feature of Shestov's analysis, which otherwise remained 
original. However, it is in the case of Dostoevsky, of all writers, that Shestov's approach 
suffers most notably. Or, in other words, Dostoevsky, more than any other writer, resists 
any static or tendentious reading and thus reveals the shortcomings of Shestov's method.
5 Richard Peace, ‘Introduction’ to Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 'Crime and Punishment’. A Casebook, ed. 
Richard Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 16.
6 See Berdiaev, ‘Tparenna h  obbifleHHOCTb’, p. 471.
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The resistance of the Dostoevskian world lies above all in its extreme dynamism. Tolstoy 
described Dostoevsky as ‘a man who was in his entirety struggle’ (eecb 6opb6a),7 Berdiaev 
echoed this by saying that ‘everything in him is fiery and dynamic, everything is in 
movement’.8 Philip Rahv, too, spoke of Dostoevsky as ‘the first novelist to have fully 
accepted and dramatized the principle of uncertainty or indeterminacy in the presentation of 
character’.9 Indeed, if in Tolstoy we find the fluidity of life in tune with his own 
comparison of the latter to the floating water or clouds that constantly reshape themselves,10 
there is still a great deal of stability in the inner worlds of his characters, their sets of 
values, and it is an outrage, an event in itself when these norms and stable worlds are 
transgressed and violated. This is where the story may start, or more often, culminate, 
whereas in Dostoevsky this is the background, the medium in which the story unfolds. In 
Dostoevsky the fluidity of Tolstoy penetrates the universe as a whole, residing both within 
and outside his characters. It is as if this fluidity is inherent in the moral categories 
themselves. Thus, in fact, it represents more than fluidity and movement- it gives rise to 
relativity. As such, Dostoevsky's cosmos brings itself extremely close to post-modernism 
where ‘Bee tohkh 3pemni paBHonpaBHti’11 -  a subject for our detailed analysis below.
On the other hand, Shestov's approach which suffers from the one-sidedness of his 
philosophical paradigm, or in simpler, and possibly more precise terms, from a certain 
dogmatism of his adogmatic philosophy, as Erofeev describes it, is defied by Dostoevsky's 
polyphony. This assertion of Shestov's dogmatism resonates with Berdiaev's criticisms of 
Shestov's ‘psychological schematism’, his imposition of just one type of emotional
7 Lev Tolstoi, Jlojinoe co6pmue conmeHuu e 90 moMax (K)6wieuHoe wdanue) (Moscow- 
Leningrad, 1928-1958), vol. 63, p. 142. Cited (in his transl.) in Jackson, p. 113.
8 Nikolai Berdiaev, Mupoco3epijaHue JfocmoeecKozo (Paris, 1968), p. 8. Cited (from the English 
translation: N. Berdyaev, Dostoievsky, transl. D. Attwater (London, 1934), p. 12) in Malcolm V. 
Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord (London: Paul Elek, 1976), p. 18.
9 Philip Rahv, ‘Dostoevsky in Crime and Punishment’ in Dostoevsky. A Collection o f Critical 
Essays, ed. Rene Wellek (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1962), pp. 16-38 (p. 
21).
10 See, for example, V. Linkov and A. Saakyants, Jlee Toncmoii. )Ku3Hb u meopnecmeo (Moscow: 
Russkii Iazyk, 1979), p. 34.
11 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 116.
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experience and thus his dependance on the — for him — hateful tendency to monism. Thus 
commenting on Shestov's Apotheosis o f Groundlessness Berdiaev wrote: ‘MHe 5Kajn>, hto 
“SecnoHBeHHOCTb” Hanana nncaTb cboh “Ano(j)eo3”, Tyr OHa aeJiaeTca aorMaTHHecKOH [...] 
noTepBBmaa BCBKyio Ha,zje>K£y SecnoHBeHHocTb npeBpamaeTca b CBoeo6pa3Hyio cucieMy 
ycnoKoeHHa, Be^b aficojnoTHbift cKerrnmH3M Tax Bee mobcct y6im> TpeBoacHbie HCKamia, 
KaK h aScojnoTHbiH aomaTH3M’.13 In a similar way, as we saw earlier, Igor Balakhovsky -  
Shestov's descendant -  suggests that Shestov's existentialism is close to bolshevism (or 
communism) in its extremism which stems from their common characteristic of 
revolutionary thinking.14 Contemplating the roots of a certain truth contained in such claims 
evokes associations with Shestov's Jewish childhood in the atmosphere o f Talmudic studies 
with their high degree of scholasticism and dogma, as well as the atmosphere of  
merchandising and accountancy, so hateful for Shestov and yet which provided his constant 
background and preoccupation for most of his life.
Yet, in the same philosophical terms, despite his own concealed dogmatism, Shestov 
matches Dostoevsky's philosophical discoveries in various respects because Shestov's 
existential approach also belongs in many of its aspects to the post-modernist space, as will 
be demonstrated below. On the other hand, ignoring the aesthetic implications of 
Dostoevsky's polyphony, Shestov bars for himself entrance to the complex world of 
Dostoevsky's heroes; and yet, it is, as usual, through them that he aspires to interpret the 
author. Therefore in the case of Dostoevsky Shestov's interpretation is particularly doomed 
from the outset. However, perhaps due to the manifold nature of Dostoevsky's narrative 
there is still a number of ways in which Shestov's analysis provides invaluable insights into 
Dostoevsky's literary world. It is precisely in the case of Dostoevsky that Shestov declared, 
as will be elucidated below, his own method as arbitrary (possibly sensing in the case of 
Dostoevsky's works the particular complexity of the analytical task). And, as we shall see, 
he stayed faithful to this claim of the arbitrariness of his method, most notably in his first 
book on Dostoevsky.
12 Berdiaev, ‘Tpare^HB h oSbmeHHocTb’, p. 475.
13 Ibid, p . 469.
14 Balakhovskii, p. 68.
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However, literature is only a reflection of life, through a complex structure of mirrors and 
magnifying glasses which grasp first and foremost the metaphysical features of objective 
reality, and single out its most significant properties -  significant for the sake of literary 
purposes, which are always aesthetic as well as ethical. In this vein Bakhtin's discovery of 
Dostoevsky's polyphonic poetics can be viewed at the level of ethics and psychology in a 
variety of essentially equivalent ways. For example, Seeley suggests an interpretation of 
Dostoevsky's characters as being overwhelmingly split personalities with conflicting sides 
constantly fighting each other. Shestov's neglect of the aesthetic violates the laws of 
literature, or rather his attempt to penetrate the literary space only by the means of his 
predominantly interpretative method (a blend of philosophical and psychological 
approaches) runs into a serious contradiction with the polyphonic reality that Dostoevsky 
recreated in his novels. Bakhtin characterised Shestov's approach as distinctly monological 
and pointed to its failure to provide an adequate reading of Dostoevsky's art. ‘IIyn>
(J)HJ10C0(J)CK0H MOHOJlOnmiJHH -  OCHOBHOH nyTb KpHTHHeCKOH jiHTepaTypti o 
^octocbckom’,15 he wrote, ‘no  3T0My nyra uijih Po3aHOB, Bojibihckhh, Mepe>KKOBCKHH, 
IIIeCTOB H flp. [...] M3T>aTaH H3 CObblTHHHOrO B3aHMO,ZieHCTBH5I C03HaHHH H BTHCHyTafl B 
CHCTeMHO-MOHOJIOrHHeCKHH KOHTeKCT, XOTfl 6bl H CaMBIH flHaJieKTHHeCKHH, H/iea 
HeH36e5KHO yrpauHBaeT 3to CBoe CBoeo6pa3He h npeBpamaeTca b mioxoe (j)HJioco(j)CKoe 
yTBep5K^eHHe’,16 Bakhtin asserted.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding Bakhtin's observations, it has to be noted that Shestov made 
a significant contribution to critical studies of Dostoevsky, which involved in particular, if 
not predominantly, his philosophical, even if mixed with existential, perspective on the 
writer. His first book on Dostoevsky laid a foundation for it. What Shestov set out to 
demonstrate in his book was Dostoevsky's total transformation of convictions, as Shestov 
saw it, from idealistic beliefs to their complete renunciation, to profound disillusionment 
with lofty humanistic principles and ideas. As in the case of Tolstoy, Shestov reconstructed 
the familiar pattern of a life-path that inevitably runs into a breaking point. The
15 Bakhtin, IlpodjieMbi meopnecmea flocmoeecKoeo (Moscow: Alkonost, 1994), p. 10.
16 Ibid.
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manifestation of it, which signified a complete turn in Dostoevsky's convictions, Shestov 
saw in Notes from Underground. Before that Dostoevsky fervently proclaimed brotherly 
love and compassion for the fallen. He participated enthusiastically in Belinsky's circle and 
shared with the latter their aspirations towards social justice and belief in the general moral 
good. His prosecution, neardeath experience, prison and exile only strengthened him on this 
path, Shestov claims, even though they opened his eyes to reality viewed at close hand, and 
rendered his vision more shrewd and precise. Yet, with the abolition of serfdom, when 
Russia saw the beginning of social improvement, Dostoevsky finally realised that he was 
indifferent to it, that the inner desires of his own soul were completely orthogonal to any 
social progress. He came to see that nothing can save an individual from his personal 
tragedy, and least of all love and compassion which are helpless to bring any real 
consolation and to show any way out of tragic reality. Thus, Shestov asserts, Dostoevsky 
turned his back on noble principles, on scientific progress, on any kind of positivism and 
idealism, which turned out to be vacuous, and proclaimed instead the declaration of rights 
of an underground man, a tragic individual irreversibly severed from society.
In the opening pages Shestov quotes Dostoevsky's own phrase from his Diary o f a Writer 
of 1873, from the article ‘One of the modem falseties’: ‘MHe oneHb TpyaHO 6buio 6bi 
paccKa3aTt ncTopmo nepepo^qeHHH cbohx yfieacfleHHH, TeM 6ojiee, hto oto, 6bm> mohcct,
1 7h He Tax Jiio6om>iTHo\ Yet, Shestov argues, there cannot be in literary history a more 
fascinating story than the story of the transformation of convictions, and assigns 
Dostoevsky's dismissive words to the latter's tribute to propriety and modesty. On the other 
hand, as Blagova and Emelianov point out, Shestov's treatment conceals an accusatory 
element hinting at Dostoevsky's unwillingness to speak his mind, to be sincere. They 
overturn this accusation by quoting the rest of Dostoevsky's phrase: ‘..jja h He H^eT xax-TO 
k <j)ejibeTOHHOH CTaTbe’18 and argue that Dostoevsky openly explained and acknowledged 
changes in his world-view and his convictions, especially concerning his political and
17 F. M. Dostoevskii, ‘O/ma H3 coB peM eH H bix (j)ajn>meH’, f f n e e n u K  n u c a m e m  in J J o j i n o e  c o 6 p a n u e  
c o H u n e n u u  e 3 0  m o M a x  (Leningrad, 1972-1986), vol. 21, p. 134. Cited in Shestov, J d o c m o e e c K u u  u  
H u i j u i e ,  p. 329.
18 Ibid. Cited in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 92.
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social views.19 Indeed, Shestov, as was usual with his technique, gave only that part of the 
quotation which fitted in with his own intentions. On the other hand, Blagova and 
Emelianov, in their turn, in some way deliberately misinterpret Shestov who planned no 
less than to penetrate into Dostoevsky's soul to unravel, in a rather psychoanalytical way, 
the existential changes in Dostoevsky's consciousness and even sub-conscious which could 
not in principle be adequately documented simply in the writer's own public confessions, 
but could only be guessed at through analysis of his literary works, letters, diaries and real 
deeds, in their entirety. Moreover, Shestov’s treatment of literary works in comparison to 
such self-narratives as diaries and correspondence in a sense takes the upper hand in that he 
treats the former as ‘disguised’ self-narratives too, but more sincere and revealing than 
those which are defined as such. And Shestov’s method then becomes reminiscent of the 
‘narrative psychology’ approach, described in the previous chapter. Thus Shestov again, as 
in the case of Tolstoy, made it his project to recreate Dostoevsky's philosophical 
psychobiography, as we have decided to call it.
Shestov begins by dividing Dostoevsky's literary activity into two periods: the first runs
from Poor Folk, 1845, to Notes from the House o f the Dead, 1862; the second ranges from
0(\Notes from Underground, 1864, to D ostoevsky's fam ous ‘Pushkin sp eech ’, 1880. S hestov  
asserts that idealism  perm eated D ostoevsky's work throughout the first period includ ing the  
House o f the Dead w hich  bears signs o f  the sam e hum anistic outlook. H ow ever, S hestov  
suggests that D ostoevsk y  never really fitted in to B elinsky's circle, even  w hen  he jo in ed  it 
as a young man. T he ev idence o f  this S hestov finds in the novelist's stifled  annoyance w ith  
his master docum ented in the Diary o f  a Writer and later in som e sarcastic remarks about 
B elinsk y  published after the latter's death. A s a sen sitive  youth, D ostoevsk y  suffered from  
resentm ent w h ile  in  B elinsky's circle, S hestov claim s. For he w as too faithful and dedicated  
a pupil, too keen  to be taught about the rights o f  the fallen and wretched and our duty o f  
brotherly love, w h ile  B elinsky, Shestov im plies, w as already a tired, cyn ical, m an, w ho  
knew  on ly  too w e ll ‘ckojilko onacHOCTH KpoeTca bo bchkom upe3MepHO CTpacTHOM
19 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 92.
20 Shestov, JdocmoeecKUU uHui^iue, p. 332.
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yBJieneHHH H/teen’ .21 H e knew , Shestov continues, ‘hto b rjiy6 HHe Hflen tbhtcb
99Hepa3peniHMoe npoTHBopenne, n noTOMy CTapajica aep^caTtca ee noBepxHOCTH’. The 
next phrase that Shestov utters expresses his conviction and the main idea of his 
philosophical views, which he assigns to Dostoevsky. Moreover, implicitly it is from the 
latter that Shestov had learned this truth, and, as Shestov then demonstrates, the novelist 
himself was to arrive at this conclusion after his life had passed its breaking point. This 
idea, Shestov asserts, describes Belinsky's inner feeling which he could not dare to 
acknowledge openly: ‘ecTecTBeHHbift nopjmoK Bemeft cMeeTca najx ryMaHHOCTbio, 
KOTopaa, b cbok) OHepe,m>, MoaceT jihuib noxopHO onycTHTt ronoBy npefl HenofieflHMbiM
9*^
BparoM’. In other words, hum anity, m orality, ideals are equally u seless and help less in the 
face o f  bare necessity . T he private has to subm it to the general, and this revelation is 
im possib le to bear, let alone to accept.
Thus, Shestov concludes, it is not surprising that Dostoevsky's path soon parted with that of 
Belinsky and his circle. However, as Shestov points out, the writer persevered on his route 
of idealistic faith and never betrayed it -  not when he was condemned to death, and not 
during his Siberian exile. However, after he became a free man again, his only desire was 
to forget those horrible years. A sweet fantasy of crying over the destiny of Makar 
Devushkin is one thing,24 but real penal servitude and its memories are quite another. From 
the latter Dostoevsky wants only to escape. And the only hope that sustained his existence 
and his faith while in the penal colony was not in his brotherly love towards his fellow- 
prisoners, but in his understanding that this was temporary and he would still have a normal
9 ^life. Dostoevsky's philosophy at that time Shestov calls the philosophy of hope. But this 
hope, as one can see, has a distinctly individualistic flavour.
In contrast to Tolstoy's more or less steady view that Dostoevsky was a great thinker, but a 
lesser artist, Shestov quotes what he calls a common saying, that Dostoevsky is on the
21 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huifiue, p. 337.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid, pp. 337-338.
24 The hero of Dostoevsky’s first novel Eednue Jiiodu.
25 Shestov,flocmoeecKUU uHuifme, p. 344.
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contrary great as an artist, but weak as a thinker. This was designed, Shestov believes, to 
invalidate the truth discovered by Dostoevsky in his Notes from Underground. This book, 
Shestov writes,
3 t o  -  pa3AnpaiomHH nyuiy Boruib yxcaca, BbipBaBuiHnca y neAOBeica, BHe3anH0 ybeAHBiuerocfl, hto  
o h  b c k) c bo k ) >KH3Hb Aran, npHTBopHjiCH, KorAa yBepan ce6a h  Apyrnx, h to  Bbicmaa uejib 
cymecTBOBaHHa, 3 to  -  cjiyaceHHe “nocjie^HeMy nejiOBeKy”. J\o c h x  nop o h  cHHTan ce6a 
OTMeneHHbiM cyAbGoii, npeAHa3HaHeHHbiM ajih BejiHKoro AeJia. Tenepb ace o h  BHe3anHO 
nonyBCTBOBan, h to  o h  HHHyrb He Jiynuie, neM Apyrne a io a h , h to  eMy TaK ace Mano Aejia a o  b c b k h x  
HAefi, KaK h  caMOMy o6biKHOBeHHOMy CMepraoMy. IlycTb h a s h  xoTb Tbicany pa3 TopxcecTByiOT: 
nycTb ocBoboxgraioT KpecTbHH, nycTb 3Ab o a ^t  npaBbie h  MHJiocTHBbie cyAbi, nycTb yHHHToacaiOT 
peKpyTHHHy -  y Hero Ha Ayuie o t  3Toro He CTaHOBHTca h h  jierne, h h  Becejiee.26
From then on, according to Shestov, D ostoevsk y  w aged  a war on ideas and ideals, because  
they, w hich  he had served d evotedly  all h is life , had d eceived  him . ‘B ero Aynie 
npocHynocb hchto cthxhhhoc, 6e3o6pa3Hoe h cTpanmoe -  ho Taxoe, c neM coBAaAaTb
9 9
6 biao eMy He no chaum’, Shestov claim s. D ostoevsk y  did everything he could, Shestov  
m aintains, to preserve h is old  faith, but this w as no longer possib le. H is doubts, despite all 
his hopes, did not vanish. Instead, the sen selessn ess o f  ex istence o f  the ‘last’ man cam e to  
the fore in the personal experience o f  the n ovelist h im self. A s V iktor E rofeev writes 
explaining S hestov’s stance, ‘M bicab 0 6  3toh “HeAenocTH”, cepBe3HO obecueHHBaiomaa 
3HaneHHe coijHaABHOH cyAtfiBi yHHxeeHHOH ahhhocth npHBOAHT /JocToeBCKoro k TOMy, 
hto oh “npeAnoHHTaeT ao H3HeMoxceHHA koaothtbca toaoboh 0 6  CTeHy, neM ycnoKOHTBca 
Ha ryMaHHOM HAeaAe’” ,28 E rofeev quptes Shestov. Such an inhum an revolt, E rofeev  
continues, requires a remarkable strength. T he real tragedy o f  R askolnikov, according to 
Shestov, is not in having com m itted the murder, but in h is inability to start a new  life, free 
from the m orality o f  the mundane. Shestov regards the murder as a secondary, alm ost a
90fictitious, issue. He refers to it as being an ‘invention, calumny and slander’. Shestov then 
accuses Dostoevsky, whom he identifies fully with Raskolnikov, of the inability to sustain 
this new truth, this freedom from the mundane morality and the power of ideals. Unable to
26 Shestov, flocmoeecKUU u Hutfiue, p. 348.
27 Ibid, p. 350.
28 Erofeev, p. 168.
29 In the Russian original: ‘BbiAyMKa, noioien, HanpacAHHa’. Shestov, /focmoeecKuu u Huifiue, p. 
382.
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acknowledge and proclaim this new vision, Dostoevsky returned to the common world with 
its idealism, and continued to proclaim his old beliefs which were no longer genuine for 
him. ‘IlHcaTejiB, MeuymnHCJi Me>K£y “npaB^on” Tpare^HH h “jiohcbio” ofibmeHHOCTH, 
CKptiBaiomHH cboh npo3peHHfl KaK ^ypHyio 6ojie3Hb, 3aHCKHBaiomHH nepea 
odmecTBeHHbiM mhchhcm, -  xeyneHH , TparanecKHH o6pa3. TaKHM yBH^eji IIIecTOB 
XlocToeBCKoro’, writes Viktor Erofeev.
Ivanov-Razum nik's account o f  Shestov's reading o f  D ostoevsk y  has the em phases slightly  
shifted. In h is analysis o f  Shestov's early w orks h e sees in  the latter's book  on the writer 
essentially  the reform ulation o f  the thoughts expressed  in Shestov's previous book  (on  
T olstoy). Ivanov-R azum nik equates the philosophy o f  tragedy, that S hestov advances 
h im se lf and ascribes to D ostoevsky, w ith the N ietzschean  form ula o f  ‘amor fatV. He quotes 
Shestov's w ords that D ostoevsky's new  conviction  w as in see in g  the task o f  m an not in the 
high ideals o f  the good  and hum anism , but instead in the acceptance o f  reality w ith  all its 
horrors: ‘B 3aKOHax npnpo^bi, b nopaztfce, b Hayice, b no3HTHBH3Me n rweajiH3Me -  3ajior 
HecuacTba, b y^cacax >kh3hh -  3ajior 6 yaym ero. B ot ocHOBa 4)hjioco(})hh Tpareann: k 
3TOMy npHBOzurr cKenTHUH3M h neccHMH3M.. . ’ .31 Thus having rejected a sensible, that is to 
say rationalised reality, Shestov cam e back to it v ia  a different route -  that o f  
acknow ledging ‘amor fa t i \  Ivanov-R azum nik claim s. On the other hand, he adds, this 
acknow ledgm ent is accom panied b y  a refusal to rationalise this sensib le reality. Instead o f  
asking questions about causal connections S hestov replaces them  b y  faith: amor fati, 
Ivanov-Razum nik asserts, thus labelling the lo v e  o f  fate, o f  the inevitable, as faith. This 
observation is a significant one since it fix es the direction o f  Shestov's inner m otion  from  
reason to pure belief.
However, Ivanov-Razumnik also points out that Shestov's amor fa ti coexists with his hatred 
of the role of the accidental in human life, and thus Shestov's perception of amor fati 
represents love which is very much mixed with hatred: while loving necessity Shestov
30 Erofeev, p. 169.31 Shestov, JJocmoeecKuii u Hmfiue, pp. 454-455. Cited in Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 214.
32 See Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 216.
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never stops hating it at the same time, because it is this very necessity that is represented by 
the laws of nature which constitute the accidental in human destiny. From this perspective 
the irreconcilable struggle that the philosophy of tragedy wages on the laws of nature is a 
continuation of the struggle against the accidental in Shestov's first book (on Shakespeare), 
Ivanov-Razumnik concludes. He stresses that this philosophy of tragedy sees its main 
enemy in these natural laws, and only turns against human convictions insofar as they 
reinforce the power of those laws. That is why such a philosophy is intolerant to any 
ideology, norm or generalising idea.
The illustration that Shestov g ives in connection  w ith D ostoevsk y  is v ia  a quotation from  
King Lear. ‘“Ot Me^Be^a tbi n o 6 e>KHiin>, ho, BCTpeTHB Ha n yra  Sym yiom ee Mope, k nacTH 
3Beps nofrzreuiB Ha3aa.” ^ octocbckhh noSeacaji ot fleftcTBHTejiBHOCTH, ho, BCTpeTHB Ha 
n yra  H^eajiH3M - nom eji m a w .  Bee yacacBi 3kh3hh He TaK cipauiHBi, KaK BBmyMaHHBie 
coBecTBio h pa3yMOM H^en’, Shestov writes. Thus the p h ilosophy o f  tragedy fights 
against the stone w all o f  m undane m orality represented b y  general ideas. In this struggle 
Ivanov-R azum nik sees the em otional intensity ( ‘natjjoc’) o f  Shestov's philosophy. A t the 
sam e tim e he notes its rom antic flavour in its striving beyond the extrem es. Ivanov- 
Razum nik also notices the special sign ificance o f  solitude w hich  according to Shestov  
serves as the ultim ate condition and source o f  the philosophy o f  tragedy.
Andreas Valevicius's analysis of Shestov's perception of Dostoevsky and his works opens 
on a surprising note, implying that Shestov sees Dostoevsky in the early phase of the latter's 
career as a mediocre writer. What Valevicius means is that while Dostoevsky in the eyes of 
Shestov was fooling himself, he was not striking for originality, as Shestov asserts. 
Valevicius then assigns to Shestov the view of Dostoevsky becoming, with the publication 
of the Notes from Underground, a ‘good writer, i.e. an honest writer’.34 While it is certainly 
true that Shestov in his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche perceives Dostoevsky as undergoing a 
struggle of awakening to the truth within himself and in the world, nowhere does he 
explicitly assess the writer's literary gift in terms of being mediocre or, by contrast, good. In
33 Shestov, JfocmoeecKuu u Huvpue, p. 375.
34 Valevicius, p. 37.
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fact, at this stage, it seems that Dostoevsky's literary gift as such does not constitute 
Shestov's concern. His interest is first and foremost philosophical and existential.
Afterwards Valevicius focuses on Shestov's central point -  of Dostoevsky's abandonment 
of ideologies. ‘The essence of Dostoevsky's disgust’, Valevicius writes explaining 
Shestov's views, -  ‘is his limitless hatred for the “idea” -  the “idea” being all that which 
claims any kind of authority over life, that pretends to be able to predict the outcome given 
the circumstances. [...] Shestov claims that Raskolnikov's crime was not that he broke the 
law, but that he was incapable of breaking the law -  he broke down and confessed’.35 
Valevicius emphasises the originality of Shestov's interpretation by juxtaposing it to the 
more conventional one presented by a contemporary Russian (former Soviet) scholar G. K. 
Shchenikov, who makes the point that it is through their obsessive ideas that Dostoevsky's 
heroes come to a state of self-awareness. ‘Shestov would argue that Dostoevsky meant 
exactly the opposite’, Valevicius writes, ‘only after having abandoned all ideas (and ideals) 
can one come to any kind of true self-awareness’. Moreover, as Valevicius argues, 
‘according to Shestov, Dostoevsky despised humanism once he had freed himself from it.
'xnHe despised the “good and the just’” . In the case of Crime and Punishment, Valevicius 
describes Shestov's interpretation in similar terms to Erofeev, stressing that in Shestov's 
opinion the murder is secondary and unimportant. Raskolnikov's real crime ‘lies not so 
much in the fact that he has murdered, but rather in his inability to abandon idealism and
o o
begin a new and different life’. Thus for Shestov the main message of the novel is not 
‘thou shall not kill’, but ‘thou shall not be an idealist’, Valevicius concludes. This theme 
of idealism distinguished by Shestov in Crime and Punihment curiously borders on a 
related one -  that of rationalism -  which is amongst Shestov’s central themes. While, as we 
shall see, Shestov singles it out explicitly in Notes from Underground, he never puts quite 
the same slant on Crime and Punishment. The impression is, rather, that he senses it, and is 
circling around it, without yet being able to crystalise it in his mind as such. Yet, it is a
35 Valevicius, p. 37.
36 Ibid, p. 38.
37 Ibid, p. 39.
38 Ibid, p. 38.
39 Ibid.
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crucial motif of the novel, for, as Richard Peace writes, Raskolnikov ‘tries to believe that 
[...] he is capable of acting solely according to the dictates of reason’, while Dostoevsky 
reveals ‘something else in Raskolnikov’s make-up which runs contrary to his rationalism 
and which gravely undermines it’.40
6.1.3. Modelling an archetype of the Dostoevskian hero. Shestov’s reading of Crime 
and Punishment: existentialism versus idealism.
Since Crime and Punishment plays a significant part in Shestov's analysis of Dostoevsky's 
ostensible transformation of convictions, his interpretation of the novel merits closer 
examination which should help us to assess Shestov's main claims on the writer, outlined 
above. In order to do this, we need to single out some general characteristics of a certain 
archetype of a Dostoevskian hero.
In doing so we shall abide by the strategy outlined in the introduction, refraining from 
theoretical approaches which for our purposes may become counter-productive by 
obscuring rather than elucidating the issue. Instead, we shall try to adopt what Malcolm 
Jones has described (in relation to Joseph Frank) as a ‘refreshingly common-sense view’ in 
order to derive a coherent working model -  even if over-generalised and thus inevitably 
over-simplified - from the ‘bewildering critical keleidoscope’.41
As Malcolm Jones points out, the much explored psychology of Dostoevsky's characters 
has usually concentrated upon divided individuals 42 In particular, ‘with Raskolnikov we 
have an excellent example of the compulsive emotional oscillation between two extremes 
which we have noted before in Dostoevsky's characters as well as the attempt of the 
character to distance himself from it’.43 This idea of a split personality forms the basis for 
Frank Seeley's insights into Dostoevsky's heroes. The ‘saviour’ complex, which is one of 
the manifestations of a superiority complex, is inherent in Raskolnikov, as Seeley points
40 Peace, Dostoyevsky. An Examination of the Major Novels (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971), p. 34.
41 Malcolm V. Jones, Dostoyevsky after Bakhtin. Readings in Dostoyevsky's Fantastic Realism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. xv.
42 Ibid, p. 78.
43 Ibid.
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out. But the inferiority complex represents the other side of the same coin, and, therefore, 
the two urges in Raskolnikov's soul are ‘excessive pride’ and ‘excessive humility’, as 
Seeley writes.44 This is a recurrent pattern of a Dostoevskian character, with an endless 
fluctuation within it between the two poles. Thus in Makar Devushkin humility exceeds 
and suppresses pride, while in Raskolnikov the latter is stronger, but exists under a constant 
threat of crumbling, thus developing in response a distinct urge to re-establish, intensify 
and strengthen itself. Normally, in Dostoevsky's universe, a personality split of this kind (as 
a superiority/inferiority complex) has its roots in constant and over-intense introspection. It 
is this introspection that facilitates the splitting of a personality into two conflicting sides, 
thus, in a sense, exposing the demonic power of reason. Moreover, this very conflict, which 
Richard Peace formulates as that between self-assertion and self-effacement, can be viewed 
as rational versus irrational,45 which brings it directly to the heart of Shestov’s 
problematics.
In this process of destructive over-reasoning a vital role belongs to the degree of what can 
be called the intelligence of the soul and what is related to Seeley's description of Christian 
love in Dostoevsky -  a phenomenon that comprises three vital ingredients: what Aglaia 
referred to as the ‘primary intelligence’ [TjiaBHbiH yM’], as well as true compassion and the 
absence of egoism.46 In our terms the intelligence of the soul is predominantly reflected in 
compassion from which the other elements follow. The level of it differs significantly from 
character to character. Thus, for example, in Ivan Karamazov we witness a distinct 
instability in his ‘compassion levels’, in his underlying instinctive morality; however, his 
imagination reveals to him the immense destructive consequences of a real crime for the 
inner integrity of his personality, for his very sanity. That is when he stops cooperating with 
Smerdiakov and turns back. Raskolnikov does not possess the required degree of 
imagination of this kind (or self-awareness) to foresee sufficiently the devastating 
psychological consequence of his crime of murder. This is directly related to his 
overwhelming confusion, his volatile personality marked, as Dostoevsky himself wrote in a
44 See Frank Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p. 99.
45 See Peace, Dostoyevsky. An Examination of the Major Novels, p. 35.
46 See Ibid, p. 91.
294
letter to Katkov, by an ‘inability to concentrate on day-to-day problems and a lack of 
intellectual stability’.47 In other words, as Malcolm Jones comments, ‘Raskolnikov is by no 
means a resolute character. [...] More often than not he simply cannot make up his mind’.
However, Raskolnikov's inadequate moral sense remains central to the issue of the 
murders, and in this sense his encounter with Sonia is highly significant. For Sonia 
complements Raskolnikov in that her compassion and selflessness free her from (or are 
incompatible with) the above complexes and excessive reflection. Bringing them together 
illuminates the (given earlier, in Part I) laconic formula pronounced by Fazil Iskander: ‘Y m  
6e3 HpaBCTBeHHocTH H epa3yM eH , h o  HpaBCTBeHHOCTB pa3yM H a h  6e3 yMa’.49 Thus, in our 
view, amidst the most sophisticated interpretations of the novel and the abundance of 
methodological approaches, its basic message, which remains in essence deeply 
humanistic, is encapsulated in the above formula. The fact that Soviet critics persistently 
saw the novel in this light as opposed to the Western more philosophically or 
psychologically oriented approaches does not in itself deny its humanistic core. For 
example, Anna Akhmatova, who can be opposed to the mainstream of the Soviet literary 
establishment, commented:
JJoCTOeBCKHH 3HaJI, HTO ybHHUa TepaeT CnOCObHOCTb HCHTb. PaCKOJIbHHKOB, OTHtfB >KH3Hb y 
CTapyxH h JlH3aBeTbi, caM jihiuhjich cnocobHOCTH mm.. Oh He jkhbct, oh jisokq He ecT, oh TOJibKO 
HHorzja SpocaeTca Ha KpoBaTb h cnHT oneTbiH. A HauiH coBpeMeHHHKH? YbHBajiH -  h hchjih 
BcnacTb. Hm 3to 6bmo HHnoneM. BepHyrca aomoh yrpoM -  cjiyncba-To HOHHaa, yTOMHTeabHaa -  
bot h xoneTca, HTobbi aceHa b hobom xanaTe, flonica c baHTOM b BOJiocax... Ohh Moryr xcHTb.50
Now we need to ask how, and why, Shestov refuses to see this. Indeed, he actively denies 
the novel its humanistic message and reduces the entire work to Dostoevsky's attempts to 
attack and destroy his own idealism. In particular, as was mentioned above, Shestov views
47 Draft letter of Dostoevskii to M. N. Katkov from Wiesbaden, September 1865: IIojiHoe co6pmue 
coHmenuu e 30 moMax. JTucbMa, I, pp. 418-419. Cited in Jones (his transl.), Dostoyevsky. The 
Novel o f Discord (London: Paul Elek, 1976), p. 68.
48 Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 70.
49 Fazil’ Iskander, ‘IJoHeMHory o mhotom’, HoeuuMup, No 10, 2000, pp. 116 -  148 (p. 122).
50 Chukovskaia, II, p. 335.
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the murder as a figure o f  speech. There w as no crim e, no b lood , he in sists .51 Shestov  
im plies that the murder v ictim  is thus deliberately presented as repugnant and receives no  
sym pathy from the author, readers or other characters o f  the novel. A lso , D ostoevsky's  
depiction o f  the crim e is dry and detached. A ll o f  it is invented on ly  to prove a particular 
ideo log ica l point, Shestov  basica lly  asserts. T his m eans that he deliberately looks aw ay  
from the obviousness o f  this choice o f  a v ictim  w hich  is clearly destined to sharpen the 
central question: can the life  o f  a supposedly w orthless creature be sacrificed for the sake o f  
universal happiness? Furthermore, the fact o f  the second, unintended, murder w here the 
victim  is accidental and totally  innocent even  in Raskolnikov's eyes S hestov takes entirely  
in  h is stride and assigns to it no special m eaning w hatsoever. Thus again Shestov turns 
aw ay from the obvious moral im plications w hich  this elem ent o f  chance, introduced b y  
D ostoevsky , entails. T his refusal to see  the obvious on Shestov's part is particularly  
significant g iven  h is central claim  that ‘KOHHaeTca aaa  nejiOBeica TbicauejieTHee uapcTBO 
“pa3yMa h cobccth” ; HaHHHaeTca HOBaa opa -  “ncH xojiorm i”, KOTopyio y  Hac b Pocchh 
BnepBtie OTKptm /Joctocbckhh’.52 Y et, this p sych o logy  em bedded in the very core o f  
D ostoevsky's n ovels  for S hestov clearly excludes the em otional m ake up o f  the heroes. 
Thus R askolnikov's personality in its inner evoluton is not granted Shestov's attention. Such  
a crucial aspect o f  R askoln ikov’s character as instability is ignored and the vital question o f  
the hero's m orality rem ains outside the scope o f  Shestov's concerns. A s a result, 
Raskolnikov's inner torment is v iew ed  as entirely detached from m orality and the character 
is thus reduced for Shestov's purposes to the level o f  an abstraction.
This is particularly interesting given that Shestov's dismissal normally applies to ‘positive’ 
rather than ‘negative’ characters. Thus he refers to Myshkin as a ‘pitiful shadow’ and ‘cold, 
anaemic spectre’, as ‘nothing but idea, i.e., a void’.53 However, Shestov's narrowed and 
restricted perception of Raskolnikov also turns him into an approximation of a pitiful 
shadow, of ‘nothing but idea’. It is particularly evident in the way Shestov turns away from 
the obvious clues concerning Raskolnikov's personal history and inner development,
51 See Shestov,RocmoeecKuu u Hutfiue, p. 386.
52 Ibid, p . 3 5 2 .
53 In th e  R u s s ia n  o r ig in a l:  ‘acajncaa TeH b’, ‘xojio/jHoe, S ecK p o B H o e  n p H B H a ero ie ’ , ‘o a H a  n a e a ,  T.e. 
nycT O T a’ -  in  S h e s t o v ,  J^ocmoeecKuu u Huiftue, p . 3 8 3 .
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ignoring the question of why such an educated young man has an underdeveloped moral 
sense and suppressed compassion.
In the case of Raskolnikov we, as readers, are left to reconstruct his past via multiple clues 
that are scattered throughout the novel pointing to the history of Raskolnikov's atrophy of 
compassion, or moral sense. They conceal in particular the emotional nucleus of both 
Raskolnikov's premonitions of the crime as well as his attempts to cope with its 
consequences, which are projected into the future. These clues are so obvious that Shestov's 
obliviousness to them reinforces our point above about his deliberate refusal to pay 
attention, especially given his extreme perceptiveness and sensitivity to subtle 
psychological subtexts, as we saw in the example of his treatment of Tolstoy. Indeed, the 
same Shestov, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, had skillfully decoded the hidden 
politics of War and Peace, adjusting the moral to his own ends. Failing to do so in the case 
of Raskolnikov can only mean that Shestov prefers the hero to be no more than the bearer 
of a particular idea (or ideas) to be assigned to Dostoevsky himself. Ironically, the central 
idea is ‘do not be an idealist’.
Amongst the clues pointing to Raskolnikov's past, one of the most important is, of course, 
his dream of the old nag which has received a large variety of interpretations. 
Multifunctional in terms of the narrative, it gives the reader, in particular, a clear glimpse 
into Raskolnikov's emotional history, which Shestov refuses to incorporate into his analysis 
of the hero. Yet, if Shestov, as he claims, is directly concerned with the writer’s 
transformation of convictions and chooses to identify Dostoevsky with Raskolnikov, the 
formation of the latter's convictions should be of particular interest to him. In this respect 
the dream is particularly revealing, but Shestov still opts to ignore it. This points to a more 
general pattern inherent in Shestov -  namely that his perception of characters is 
predominantly static. Indeed, if we look back to Shestov's treatment of Tolstoy, this pattern 
reveals itself more clearly in that Shestov may follow the emotional evolution of the hero 
only in those cases when it has explicitly been done by the author, and, more importantly, 
when this suits Shestov's purposes. Thus in Tolstoy's Master and Man Shestov uses the 
dynamics of the master's character, as depicted by Tolstoy, because it serves Shestov's
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ends, as we saw in the previous chapter. Similarly, his analysis of Tolstoy's Ivan Ilich is 
modelled on Tolstoy's portrayal of this character in evolution which again suits Shestov's 
philosophical aims. However, if the development of a character is such that it goes against 
Shestov's ideological purposes, as in the case of Raskolnikov, he prefers to view the 
character as devoid of inner dynamics.
Curiously, in the case of Raskolnikov, the particular aspect of the aforementioned dream 
which seems crucial in elucidating Raskolnikov's ‘formation of convictions’ has been 
overlooked by more than Shestov alone. On the other hand, as Jones writes, ‘the main point 
must not be clouded by excessive ingenuity: all the attitudes and emotions experienced by 
the characters in the dream are operative within Raskolnikov himself and [...] come into 
direct conflict with each other’.54 Still, in many of these interpretations excessive ingenuity 
clouds more than the underlying principle. Thus, for example, Philip Rahv identifies the old 
mare with all life's victims of cruelty, in particular Sonia and Lizaveta, as well as with 
Raskolnikov himself, seen both as a perpetrator and victim,55 but overlooks what seems 
vital when reading the dream as a recollection of a real incident. Namely, it is the fact that 
evil triumphed having met no serious resistance.
No-one, and most notably Raskolnikov's father, tried to fight against the cruel deed, and it 
was only the boy Rodion himself who actively attempted to protect the victim of insensate 
cruelty. The passivity of the crowd and more crucially of Rodion's father demonstrated to 
the boy, who was at the time still so obviously endowed with a very strong moral sense, the 
invincibility of evil and strongly violated his sense of justice. This incident, given the 
passive behaviour of Raskolnikov's father, conceals a hint as to the probable multiplicity of 
such occasions, each one of which would have done an irrevocable damage to 
Raskolnikov's sense of compassion, stifling and undermining it. It may be suggested that in 
Dunia, who had a stronger character, similar occasions set off a feeling of concealed, but 
firm resistance, while Rodion with his oversensitivity, which is rarely the basis for a strong 
personality, was defeated. Thus it can be argued that the dream points us to the beginning
54 Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel o f Discord, p. 73.
55 See Rahv, p. 18.
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of a slow process that activated defence mechanisms in the child Raskolnikov through the 
atrophy of compassion in him, and thus explains the shaken foundations of his moral sense 
and his overall volatile personality.
This theory may be disputable, but the emotional charge of the dream and its bearing on the 
narrative refute Shestov's claim that the dry, mechanistic means, devoid of compassion, by 
which Dostoevsky depicts the murder are designed to turn it into a secondary issue. What 
we witness instead is that in his subconscious Raskolnikov is still capable of genuine pity 
and retains a vivid memory of it, but in his conscious state of mind the remnants of his 
damaged moral sense are being constantly and consciously suppressed by his over-active 
mind. This conflict is portrayed as a complex conglomerate of emotions that torment 
Raskolnikov both before, but especially after the murder. Thus there could be no doubts as 
to the human and realistic nature of Raskolnikov as depicted by Dostoevsky. Yet, in 
Shestov's eyes his only function is to portray Dostoevsky's own wanderings in the ‘deserts 
of his own soul’.56 For Shestov the only emotional content of the figure of Raskolnikov is 
in the latter's relationships with his central obsessive idea encompassed in his own 
Napoleonic theory.
As Malcolm Jones argues, ‘Raskolnikov exhibits many signs of being a disillusioned 
idealist’ and proceeds to quote from Dostoevsky's notebooks that nihilism is [...] the last 
stage of idealism’.57 This in turn resonates with the famous expression that an unsurpassed 
cynic is bom from a disenchanted idealist. However, cynicism, rephrasing Brodsky, is only 
a form of despair. In our view Shestov's steadfast denial of the real crime in Crime and 
Punishment should be explained by his need to come to terms with his own existential 
crisis and with his own disillusionment with his previous ideals. By the time of writing 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche his life had become stable and reasonably happy. Yet, at the 
spiritual level Shestov, clearly, is still looking for answers, and this search for the routes to 
salvation still remains the central motive of his quest. Interestingly, in this essential
56 In the original Russian: ‘ero Mbicjib Spo/uuia no nycTbiHHM coSctbchhoh Ayrnn’ -  in Shestov, 
flocmoeecKuu u Hutftue, p. 382.
57 Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 83.
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segregation between the external existential experience of the day and abstract thought 
Shestov himself resembles a hero of Dostoevsky. Figuratively speaking, Shestov fights on 
the side of all the disillusioned idealists who, having devotedly served their moral ideals, 
had eventually come to realise the impotence of the latter. Having experienced tragedy they 
feel severed from the rest of humanity, and their ability to make their way back is doubtful. 
However, as in Iskander's description of first love -  a dramatic experience which suddenly 
overwhelms an unprepared soul -  it can be compared to the experience of being thrown 
into water without knowing how to swim. One is then either destroyed or comes on top and 
learns to swim and to survive. The same Iskander describes the birth of real humour, which, 
in his view, can only be bom from utter despair. nojiaraio’, Iskander writes, ‘hto6bi 
oBJiajjeTt xopomHM lOMOpOM, Ha^o floiiTH ao Kpaimero neccHMH3Ma, 3arjMHyn> b nepHyio 
6e3AHy, yfieAHTBca, h to  h TaM HHHero HeT, h noraxoHBKy B03BpamaTbca ofipaTHO. CjieA,
58ocTaBjiaeMbm 3thm ofipaTHbiM nyreM, h fiy^eT HacTOJmjHM iomopom’.
Iskander's model is useful here because, although Shestov's stance and message seem 
entirely different, they can be mapped onto this model. Shestov seems in his philosophy of 
tragedy to stick to those who are drowning, who refuse to learn to swim and essentially 
prefer to cherish their tragic and severed state, largely because (despite their declarations to 
the contrary) they do not have enough strength and courage to regain their human face, to 
search for the road to resurrection. For Shestov the tragedy starts when the old humanistic 
ideals have proved unable to deliver any help or consolation to the suffering individual. He 
refuses to see that such a stage of personal development only serves as the inception of a 
tragic consciousness and, in certain cases at least, prompts the birth of a personality. On the 
other hand, ideas which are immoral, which are divorced from morality, mark the tragic 
end of personality and may provoke a real tragedy -  not only in personal terms, but, as 
history had shown, in much wider contexts.
It is the modem world especially that distances itself from the zeal for high ideals, and 
sobriety and irony take over modem cultural discourse. However, it is the abuse and 
corruption of these ideals which defiled them in the twentieth century. Yet, moral laws, just
58 Fazil’ Iskander, Hmcmo in CiODtcem cyufecmeoeanwi (Moscow: Podkova, 1999), p. 27.
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like the laws of nature, continue to govern human life regardless of any abstract thoughts 
that submit them to doubt. Notably, at the core of Shestov's rebellion is the very necessity 
of these laws, meaning that human nature as such with its capacity for pity and compassion 
is rejected. Shestov makes no distinction between the ideals of good on one hand and 
malicious theories and individuals that disguise themselves behind these ideals. Thus, 
speaking more generally, by blaming idealism for every sin Shestov fails to notice that it 
courts danger exactly when it is devoid of morality, and the case of Raskolnikov's idealism 
only confirms that.
6.1.4. Dostoevsky-Raskolnikov-Nietzsche as a reflection of Shestov’s paradigm. 
Shestov’s perspective in contrast to Robert L. Jackson's on Dostoevsky versus 
Nietzsche.
In this context the conjecture made by Blagova and Emelianov seems particularly relevant. 
They draw a parallel between Raskolnikov's theory and that of Nietzsche and conclude that 
Nietzsche and Raskolnikov had some ideological kinship and that *MHpoB033peHnecKHH 
KpH3Hc Hmjine b  K a x o H -T O  cTeneHH c o o T B e T C T B y e T  / j y x o B H O M y  KpH3ncy Pacxoj itH U K O B a , a 
He /focToeBCKoro’,59 as Shestov tries to convince us. Indeed Raskolnikov's theory divides 
people into the ordinary, who should be aquiescent to norms, and the extraordinary, who 
are their own law and should rule over the ordinary, thus precipitating the Nietzschean 
Superman. It is worth adding, however, that the above analogy between Raskolnikov and 
Nietzsche is based on a canonical perception of Nietzsche's Superman as an immoralist. On 
the other hand, because the interpretation of Nietzsche and his works varies, this issue 
deserves a further discussion which we shall provide shortly in order to map Shestov's 
perception of the German thinker more precisely.
The fact that Dostoevsky invented Nietzschean theory before Nietzsche is regarded by 
Shestov as highly significant and serves to prove that Dostoevsky drew it from his own soul 
telling us about his own ideas. Here some comments are necessary which both show the 
insubstantiality of such claims, but also point again to Shestov's desire to squeeze 
Dostoevsky into Shestov's own paradigm, eliminating all the aspects that would not fit.
59 Blagova and Emelianov, pp. 47-48.
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David Magarshack in the introduction to his translation of Crime and Punishment asserts 
that the theme in the novel which might be called the ‘Napoleonic complex’ of 
Raskolnikov, Dostoevsky obtained from Pushkin's The Queen o f Spades which ‘exercised a 
strange fascination on him all through his life’.60 He quotes the letter Dostoevsky wrote to a 
friend as late as 1880: ‘In it Pushkin, by a most subtle analysis, has explored the 
movements of Hermann's soul, all his torments and all his hopes, and, last, but not least, his 
sudden terrible defeat, as though he had been Hermann him self.61 Magarshack then 
observes that ‘the same is true of Dostoevsky and Raskolnikov’ and notes that ‘the theme 
of Pushkin's story and Dostoevsky's novel in its final form are practically identical. Both 
Hermann and Raskolnikov imagine themselves Napoleons, both kill old women for money 
[...] and in the end both are defeated’.62 Thus Magarshack traces the roots of Raskolnikov's 
theory to Pushkin's Hermann. Of course the latter did not attempt to generalise his own 
actions and aspirations to endow them on half of mankind, but the distance from imagining 
oneself Napoleon, with the licence to rule over others, to equipping such an aspiration with 
an underlying ideology is marginal. Similarly, Viacheslav Ivanov suggests in The Revolt 
Against Mother Earth a close relationship between Pushkin's story and Dostoevsky's novel 
on various counts, including plot lines and ‘shared mythical conceptions’ that involve ‘the
f\*Kguilt of killing the Parca’ as well as suffering ‘her posthumous revenge’.
Shestov, on the other hand, does not want to see any genealogy in Dostoevsky's artistic 
endeavours. Literary work for him at this stage is no more than a convenient (in terms of 
being able to hide one’s personal feelings under a literary guise) form of a writer's open 
diary. ‘CaMtie cjioBa “ / t o 6 p o ”  h  “ 3 jio ”  yxce He cymecTByioT’, Shestov says:
60 David Magarshack, ‘Introduction’ to Fiodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, transl. David 
Magarshack (England: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 14.
61 Dostoevskii’s letter of 15 June 1880 to Iu. F. Abaza (see F. M. Dostoevsky, IIojiHoe codpanue 
conuHenuu e 30 moMax, vol. 30, p. 192). Cited in David Magarshack, ‘Introduction’ to Fiodor 
Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 14.
62 David Magarshack, ‘Introduction’ to Fiodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, pp. 14-15.
63 Viacheslav Ivanov, Dostoevsky (1932), p. 76. See more on this in Robert Louis Jackson, 
Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 263, where the above quotations are cited.
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Hx 3aMeHHJIH BbipaHCeHHB “o6bIKHOBeHHOCTb” H “HeoSblKHOBeHHOCTb”, npHHeM C nepBbIM 
coeAHHaeTCH ripeflCTaBjieHHe o nomnocTH, HeroAHocTH, HeHyacHOCTH; BTopoe tkq hb jihc tcb  
chho h h m o m  BejiHHHH. HHane roBopa, PacKOjibHHKOB CTaHOBHTCB “no Ty CTopoHy ,ao6pa H 3Jia”, H 
3 to  yace 35 neT TOMy Ha3aa, Koraa Hnmiie eme 6biji ciy/jeHTOM h  MeHTan o bm cokhx  naeajiax. [...] 
B  6 0 -x  ro /ja x  HHKOMy He TOJibKO b P o c c h h , h o  h  b EBpone HHnero noflobHoro h  He CHmiocb.64
T h is  leads S h esto v  to  th e  co n c lu sio n  th a t D o sto ev sk y  is fig h tin g  ex c lu siv e ly  w ith  h is  ow n  
self, b ec au se  ‘mbicjib Pacico jiBHHKOBa ctojib opHnm ajiBHa, hto peuiHTejibHo HHKOMy, 
KpoMe e ro  TBOpija, He npnxoflHJia b roJiOBy’ and  th u s D o sto ev sk y  h as  n o  reaso n  to  p u t up  a 
s tru g g le  ag a in st an y o n e  b u t h im se lf.65
This claim is equally unsubstantiated. A draft of the famous letter that Dostoevsky wrote to 
Katkov in September 1865 outlining the plot of the forthcoming novel points 
unambiguously to the contemporary climate which facilitated Dostoevsky's conception of 
the work. The future hero is described in the letter as ‘a young man, a former student of 
Petersburg University who is very hard up [...] obsessed with the “half-baked” ideas that 
are in the air just now because of his general instability’.66 Further, when Dostoevsky 
comments on the nature of Raskolnikov's psychological torment after the murder, he 
explicitly states that contemporary events demonstrate the clear plausibility of his idea. 
‘Certain recent cases have convinced me that my idea is not at alt as eccentric as it may 
sound. It is particularly true in the case of an educated man and even of one who possesses 
many admirable qualities. [...] In short, I am quite sure that the subject of my novel is
67justified, to some extent at any rate, by the events that are happening in life today’. 
However, the theme referred to in the letter concerned Raskolnikov's emotions of fear and 
repentance, caused by the crime itself, but did not yet involve the theme of his Napoleonic 
theory which Dostoevsky introduced at a later stage. Yet, as Magarshack writes, ‘about 
three days before the description of Raskolnikov's murder was published, the Russian 
papers carried a news item with the description of an identical murder committed in 
Moscow by a young student “from nihilist motives”. Dostoevsky was quick to notice this.
64 Shestov, JfocmoeecKuu u Huijiue, p. 381.
65 See Ibid.
66 David Magarshack, ‘Introduction’ to Fiodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 12.
67 From Dostoevskii’s letter of September 1865 to M. N. Katkov (see IJojinoe codpanue conuHenuu 
e 30 moMax, vol. 28, pp. 136-137). Cited in Ibid, p. 13.
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His friend Strakhov records that he often talked about it, and “was proud of this
zro
achievement of his artistic insight’” .
These accounts show the flimsy nature of Shestov’s claims to identify Dostoevsky with 
Raskolnikov in their mental state and inner discoveries. Below we shall return to a 
discussion on the problem of such identifications within the framework of Shestov's 
declared ‘method of arbitrariness’. However, the identification of Dostoevsky with 
Raskolnikov is for Shestov only one link in the long chain of similar examples that are 
summoned to illustrate the writer's transformation of convictions. The nature of this 
transformation is identical to that of Nietzsche, Shestov asserts, thus drawing together the 
names of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche in the most decisive and pioneering fashion. He writes 
in the preface to the book:
/ f o c T o e B C K H H  a c e  H e  t o  h t o  cacer -  o h  B T o n r a j i  b  r p u 3 b  B e e ,  H e M y  K o r a a - T o  n o K J io H H J ic a .  C b o i o  
n p e a c m o i o  B e p y  o h  y a c e  H e  T O JibK O  H e H a B H A e n  -  o h  n p e 3 H p a n  ee. T a i c n x  n p H M e p o B  b  h c t o p h h  
j i H T e p a T y p w  H e M H o r o .  H o B e f t m e e  B p e M H , K p o M e  ^ o c T o e B C K o r o ,  M o a c e T  H a 3 B a T b  T O JibK O  H H i i u i e .  C 
H H i i r n e  6 b u i a  t o h h o  T a x a a  a c e  h c t o p h h .  E r o  p a 3 p b i B  c u a e a j i a M H  h  y H H T e jiH M H  m o j i o a o c t h  6 b u i  H e  
M e H e e  p e 3 K H M  h  b y p H b i M ,  a B M e c T e  c T e M  h  6 o ; i e 3 H e H H O  M y n H T e j ib H b iM . / J o c t o c b c k h h  r o B o p H T  o 
n e p e p o > K j i e H H H  c b o h x  y b e H C A e H H H , y  HHiirne h a c t  p e n b  o n e p e o u e H K e  B c e x  u e H H O C T e n .  B 
c y m H o c T H ,  0 6 a B b ip a a c e H H H  -  j i n n i b  p a 3 H b i e  c j i o B a  ju w  o b o 3 H a n e H H H  o a h o t o  h  T o r o  a c e  n p o u e c c a .  
E c J I H  B 3H T b  B O  B H H M B H H e 3 T O  ob C T O H T C JIb C T B O , T O , n O H C a J iy f i , T e n e p b  H e n O K a n c e T C H  C T p a H H b I M , H TO  
H n u m e  h m c j i  T a K o e  B b i c o x o e  M H e H H e  o / J o c t o c b c k o m .  B o t  e r o  n o / u i H H H b i e  c j i o B a :  “ / J o c t o c b c k h h ,  
3 t o  -  e A H H C T B e H H b iH  n c H x o j i o r ,  y  K O T O p o r o  a  m o t  K o e - n e M y  H a y n H T b c a ;  s h b k o m c t b o  c  h h m  h  
n p H H H C J iH io  k  n p e K p a c H e i m i H M  y a a n a M  M o e n  5 k h 3 h h ” . H n u r n e  n p H 3 H a j i  b  / f o c T o e B C K O M  C B o e r o  
p o A H o r o  H e j i O B e x a .6
Com m enting on the parallel Shestov draws betw een  the tw o, B lagova and E m elianov  
em phasise Shestov's apparently deliberate om ission  o f  N ie tzsch e’s m ain paradigm -  the 
w ill for power. T hey stress Shestov's lack o f  attention to N ietzsche's ethical program me 
w hich  w as so  ob v iou sly  different from that o f  D ostoevsky, and explain  the selective  
‘forgetfu lness’ on Shestov's part b y  h is urge to demonstrate the spiritual kinship o f  
D ostoevsk y  and N ietzsch e. ‘H oa nepOM paHHeft paboTti UlecTOBa ^ o c t o c b c k h h  npeACTaeT 
Kax HejiOBex, KOTof>biH caM 6 b i  xoTeji c b o 6 o a h o  nepecTynaTb 3aKOHbi, 6 b i t s  “no Ty
68 David Magarshack, ‘Introduction’ to Fiodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 15.
69 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huijiue, p. 331.
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CTopoHy ao 6 pa h 3Jia”, ho “bojih k BJiacTH” b hcm He xBaTHJio’. W hile the latter statement 
is certainly true, w e w ould  question the former: w hether Shestov w ould  so ob v iou sly  see  a 
distinct ethical d ifference betw een  N ietzsch e and D ostoevsky. B lagova and Em elianov  
them selves w rite further that although ‘Bpa5x a e6 HOCTt ySox^eHHH H nijm e xpHCTnaHCKOH 
Bepe /IpcToeBCKoro He noflJiexcHT comhchhio [...] Bee oto 6 luio He Tax hcho h nomiTHO b 
Hanajie Bexa’ .71 The point is, to our m ind, that Shestov's w h ole  em phasis w as on the 
existential suffering o f  the German philosopher w hich  S hestov perceived, alm ost despite  
him self, as d eep ly  moral and ethical even  though he h im se lf chose to reason on this subject 
outside the fram ework o f  moral concerns. In a sense this is what h is philosophy o f  tragedy  
w as for -  to rise together w ith  N ietzsch e and other tragic figures o f  the d isillusioned  idealist 
variety above ethical categories w hich  to S hestov appeared poisoned  at their very roots. 
Shestov w as fascinated by the open acknow ledgm ent that m orality its e lf  can ju stify  evil, 
that it is a clear con scien ce that now  took on the business o f  the latter. Shestov found this 
in D ostoevsk y  (confusing him  w ith h is heroes) as w ell as in  N ietzsch e, and suggested  that 
D ostoevsk y  m ade N ietzsche's daring task o f  proclaim ing these subversive ideas m uch  
easier.
In fact, Shestov, in his perception of Dostoevsky as a theoretical apostate of the good, 
singled out not so much the writer's cruel talent (as did Mikhailovsky), but his ability to 
penetrate and depict evil with force and verisimilitude. Still, for Shestov, rather than the 
world of cruelty it is the world of inner solitude, we think, that emerges from Dostoevsky's 
focus on existential tragedy. As Richard Peace sees it in connection to Dostoevsky’s Notes 
from Underground, ‘Shestov in rejecting Mikhailovsky’s concept of the “cruel talent” 
merely argued the reverse: Notes from Underground marked new awareness in Dostoevsky
70
of the problem of suffering’. For Peace Nietzschean themes in Dostoevsky’s work as
70 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 48.
71 Ibid, p. 50.
72 See Shestov, ffocmoeecmu u Huifiue, p. 381.
73 Richard Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground (Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1993), pp. 
91-92.
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perceived by Shestov were in ‘a search for God beyond pity and beyond goodness, a 
rebellion against the received views of the “herd”’.74
In our view, Shestov’s implication is that the emerging existential solitude of Dostoevsky’s 
fictional world erases the boundaries between good and evil, between moral norms and the 
unacceptable. ‘Bopacb co 3jiom , oh  [Dostoevsky] BtmBnraji b ero 3aimrry Taxne 
apryMeHTM, o KOTOpbix oho  h  MenTaTb HHKor a^ He CMeno. CaMa coBecTb B3juia Ha ce6a
7c
/jejio 3Jia!..’ , Shestov wrote in support of his claim that this struggle is only a pretence, 
that Dostoevsky is in fact on the other side of the barricades: ‘...ero cohhhchhji 
HanoMHHaioT penn Tex nponoBe^HHKOB, KOTopbie, no,zt npe^noroM 6opb6bi c
7 c
6e3HpaBCTBeHHocTbio, pncyiOT 3aBJieKaTejibHbie KapTHHbi co6jia3Ha...’. Of course, he w as  
neither the first nor far from  the last in spotting in  D ostoevsk y  the ability to be persuasive  
in  the portrayal, o f  ev il (m uch m ore so than in portraying good). H ow ever, Shestov's 
perception o f  D ostoevsk y  borders on that o f  a secret advocate o f  evil. Sim ilar arguments in  
other sources lead, as a rule, to a different im plication.
Thus, for example, the following lines by Brodsky on the same theme have a distinctly 
different ring to them:
Of course, he was a great defender of the “good cause", the cause of Christianity. But come to think 
of it, there hardly ever was a better devil's advocate. From classicism, he took the principle that 
before you come forth with your argument, however right or righteous you may feel, you have to 
list all the arguments of the opposite side. And it is not that in the process of listing them one is 
being swayed by the opposite side; it is simply that the listing itself is a mightily absorbing process. 
One may not in the end drift away from one's original stance, but after having exhausted all the 
arguments on behalf of evil, one utters the creed's dictums with nostalgia rather than with fervor.77
Thus a similar verdict when pronounced by Brodsky does not sound as categorical. 
Moreover, Brodsky connects the above ability of Dostoevsky with the latter's aesthetic
74 Shestov, ffocmoeecKuu u Huifiue, p. 92.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, p. 351.
77 Brodsky, ‘The Power of the Elements’, p. 162.
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choice and implies the writer's propensity for depth and objectivity rather than a somewhat 
perverse inclination to evil. Equally interesting is Fazil Iskander’s perception:
Hejib3fl He 3aMeTHTb, hto JJoctocbckhh c ocodeHHbiM B/joxHOBeHHeM h flaace jihhhmm 
cjiaaocTpacTHeM onucbiBaeT HejiOBenecKyio HH30CTb. B cymHOcra, oh nojieMH3HpyeT co Been 
MHpoBoft ryMaHHCTHHecKOH Mbicjibio: moji, nejioBeK caM no cede xopoui, ho ero nopTHT njioxne 
couHajibHbie ycjiOBHa. Ee3 Bora, roBopHT JJoctocbckhh, nejioBeK rmox hjih yacaceH. Oh 
noKopneTca BOJie Bora hjih jkhbct no jiHHHOMy, name Bcero nojxnoMy, cbocbojihio.78
Iskander’s conclusion then is that ‘XIpcToeBCKHH xoponio 3Han cedii, doajica codcTBeHHoro 
CBoeBOJina h bck) acH3Hb nocBamn doptde c HejioBenecKHM cBoeBOJineM’.79 The first part 
of this conclusion, in our opinion, resonates highly with Shestov’s views on the writer. 
However, as to Shestov’s stand on the final part: that Dostoevsky consciously fought 
against human ‘cBoeBOJine’ (which is, o f course, an essentially humanistic claim), this is a 
much more open-ended question and goes to the heart o f Shestov’s views on Dostoevsky to 
be considered in evolution, as this chapter aims to do.
For Blagova and Emelianov, as we noted above, Shestov in his first book failed to grasp the 
sharp ethical difference between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky (or, at any rate, did not point to 
it). Interestingly, Nietzsche himself provided his own comments in relation to Dostoevsky. 
As was mentioned, Blagova and Emelianov, speaking within the framework of what has 
become a dominant perception on the German philosopher, emphasise a radical difference 
between the two and refer to Nietzsche's multiple statements that ‘H/jen )3,ocToeBCKoro, KaK
on
h Boodme HfleH ryMaHHCTOB, hbjhuotcji npoTHBonojimKHOCTbio ero yHemno’. While 
Nietzsche famously acknowledged that the Russian novelist had taught him something as a 
psychologist, he confessed at the same time that Dostoevsky went against his deepest
o 1
instincts. Robert Louis Jackson, whose vision of Nietzsche seems more sympathetic (or 
less radical), interprets these words as Nietzsche's essential refusal of man's submission to
78 Iskander, ‘IloHeMHory o MHoroM’, p. 119.
79 Ibid.
80 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 50.
81 See, for example, Nietzsche’s letter to Georg Brandes of November 20, 1888 in Selected Letters 
of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and transl. Christopher Middleton (Chicago, 1969), p. 327. Cited in 
Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 20.
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any necessity, above all that of his own ineradicable idealism, as opposed to Dostoevsky's 
humanistic beliefs. Jackson characterises Dostoevsky by ‘his profound humanism, his 
realism, and his craving for an all-reconciling moment in which anguish and anxiety would 
find some grand resolution and transfiguration’.82 Jackson then affirms, while referring 
more particularly toVersilov's paradisiacal vision, that it is precisely this ‘concept of an 
harmonious, all-reconciling end, this plunging of man back into the womb of dependence 
and illusion’ that ‘was repugnant to Nietzsche’.83
In fact, Jackson's perception of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky deserves more attention as a 
point of reference against which Shestov's interpretation of the two thinkers stand out more 
clearly. The special importance of understanding Shestov's interpretation of Nietzsche 
versus Dostoevsky should not be underestimated, because Shestov was one of the first to 
draw these two names together. Moreover, at the time Dostoevsky's writings were only 
beginning to make their way to the West and thus a Western reader was not unlikely to 
perceive him through the eyes of the author of Philosophy o f Tragedy: Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche which had been translated into major European languages. Thus, when Jackson 
writes, ‘the names of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky have constantly been linked in modem 
European literature and thought’,84 we should recall that it was Shestov who played a 
pioneering role in this linkage. A brief comparative analysis that is offered below between 
Jackson's and Shestov's views on this subject, makes particular sense because of the 
peculiarity of Jackson's perspective. Indeed, he concentrates on the philosophical aspects of 
Nietzsche's works, disregarding their socio-political implications. This approach puts both 
him and Shestov on similar, if not equal, terms, by erasing Jackson's purely chronological 
advantages over Shestov, who did not live to see Nietzsche's ideas being catastrophically 
implemented (as a result of being, arguably, misinterpreted).
Jackson states that the central issue that unites Dostoevsky and Nietzsche is the focus of 
both thinkers on the crisis of nihilism, ‘a moral and spiritual crisis in European civilization:
82 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 249.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, p. 20.
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the devaluation o f the highest values'. Yet, Nietzsche's way out was through ‘the creation 
of new values’ and the acceptance of the world ‘as it is -  that is, as indifferent to values’, 
Jackson asserts, while Dostoevsky chose ‘traditional Christian values’. He observes that 
the tradition of translating Nietzsche's philosophical insights into concrete social-historical 
and even political terms clouds ‘his fundamental philosophical concerns’ and obscures ‘the 
very real kinship that exists between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky as artist-philosophers and 
philosopher-artists’.88 At the same time he does not deny that Nietzsche himself is to blame
QQ
for ‘neglecting the social and political implications of his thought’. Of course, for Shestov 
with his existential perspective and a total lack of concern for social and political issues (in 
his philosophy, not in his life), this kinship was not obscured. Shestov's personal crisis 
clearly led him to the urgent need to re-evaluate all values and to dispense with his own 
idealism. Yet, the latter ultimately proved indispensable despite Shestov's best efforts.
In Nietzsche Shestov must have identified a native soul tormented by very similar concerns. 
It took him time, though, to peel off the layer of Nietzsche's extravagant and provocative 
ideas, his explicit affinity for cruelty, in order to see beneath them total despair struggling 
to overcome existential tragedy. In the same vein Shestov read Dostoevsky, completely 
distrusting the latter's refuge in humanism and Christian faith. This uncompromising 
reading of the novelist was soon to change in the wake (or in the process) of Shestov's own 
shift towards religious faith. However, at the time of Philosophy o f Tragedy Shestov 
cherished above all the tragic vision of life by both thinkers as well as their revolt against 
the established laws and norms which suffocate an individual existence. Thus, Shestov's 
concerns at the time were least of all aesthetic. Jackson, on the other hand, views both 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche as different in form rather than in content, ‘the shape they give 
as artist-philosophers to the dialectic of life as they know it’.90 He asserts that ‘the secret of 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche is that both desperately wanted to create truth: the one in the
85 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 20.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid, p. 21.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, p. 237.
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affirmation of an unattainable ideal of love and self-sacrifice; the other in the affirmation of 
a heroic, Promethean conception of human potential’.91
Already here a sharp contrast can be observed with the perception of Shestov, who refused 
to take the two figures at a face value and fought against the widely accepted interpretation. 
For him the above claims represented exactly the common misconception of both thinkers. 
He would argue that these were the impressions Dostoevsky and Nietzsche wanted to give, 
false declarations to hide behind, and to be thrown like a bone to a public hungry for 
expected consolations. Indeed, for Shestov of that period all Dostoevsky really wanted was 
to tread into the mud his past and his former ideals, especially those of love and self- 
sacrifice (in fact to do away with ideals altogether) and to rehabilitate the rights of the 
underground man (which for Shestov was Dostoevsky himself). Shestov liked to repeat the 
words from Dostoevsky’s Diary o f a Writer that helpless love for humanity can easily turn
• 09into hatred towards it. The same for Shestov was true o f Nietzsche, who just like the 
Underground Man if  faced with the dilemma ‘h to  coxpaHHTb, BocneTtie jih hm nyzjeca 
HejiOBenecKOH KyjibTypbi hjih ero o^HHOKyio, cjiyHaimyio xcH3Hb, [...] npHHyxqjeH 6yzi;eT 
0TKa3aTbca o t  3aBeTHeHinHX H^ eajiOB cbohx h npH3HaTb, h to  Bca KyjibTypa, Becb MHp 
HHHero He c to a t , ecjin Hejib3fl cnacTH o^Horo Hnume’.93
Jackson implies that at the foundation of Dostoevsky's humanism there lies a poetic 
perception of reality.94 Interestingly Jackson too, like Shestov, at some point substitutes for 
both Nietzsche and Dostoevsky their respective narrators (Zarathustra and the narrator of 
The Peasant Marei) to say that both ‘recoil from direct contact with the people; each seeks 
refuge in poetry: Nietzsche in a poetry of transcendence, an ecstatic ideal of aesthetic 
individualism; Dostoevsky in a poetics of insight and transfiguration and a poetry of an 
ecstatic populism’.95 Both recoil from man as they find him in everyday reality, Jackson
91 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 237.
92 See, for example, Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huvpue, pp. 387-388. The quotation in question is 
from TojiocjiOBHbie yTBepxcjieHHJi’ in JJneeHUK nucamem of November-December 1876 in F. M. 
Dostoevskii, IIojiHoe co6panue conumHuu e 30 moMax, vol. 24, p. 49.
93 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu uHuyme, p. 417.
94 See Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 240.
95 Ibid, p. 241.
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asserts, and are thus respectively sent: Dostoevsky to ‘redemption through illusion’ and 
striving for higher spiritual beauty, Nietzsche to create ‘man-in-transition’ and to make of 
man and his life ‘in the face of an indifferent universe [...] a living art form’.96 If in the 
case of Dostoevsky the ‘idea of aesthetic self-creation is a strong, though ultimately
07ambivalent m otif and Dostoevsky's quest for form is ultimately brewed on both good and 
evil in man, Nietzsche's case in this respect Jackson presents as more unambiguous. He 
focuses on Nietzsche's idea of art being the only thing that can give meaning to existence
no
‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world [...] eternally justified’, and 
then traces its development to Nietzsche's later writings. ‘The core of Nietzsche's aesthetic 
individualism’, he writes, ‘rests, perhaps on this belief in self-creation, a belief not in 
contemporary man but in the greatness of human resources’.99
Surely, for Shestov nothing could be m ore distant from N ietzsche's true nature, as Shestov  
saw  it, than the above claim s. For him  N ietzsch e w as an individual tragic m an destroyed by  
cruel fate and desperately trying to resist the insuperable. In all N ietzsche's words Shestov  
w ould  alw ays discern the underlying and w e ll hidden m o tif  o f  total despair. Indeed, 
N ie tz sc h e ,. Shestov writes, ‘noAKanbmajica, [ . . . ]  no^Bepran comhchhio Bee Bejimcoe, 
BbicoKoe h boraToe, h e/mHCTBeHHO 3aTeM, hto6 bi onpaB/jaTb cboio acajncyio h be^Hyio 
5KH3HB -  XOTfl 3TOT MOTHB BCerfla y  HerO HeobblKHOBeHHO TmaTeJlbHO H nOCJieflOBaTeJIbHO 
cKpbmaeTCfl’ . 100 A nd D ostoevsk y  for S hestov is sim p ly  a spiritual twin-brother o f  
N ietzsch e, a man w ith  the alm ost identical inner experiences.
Thus, the fundamental difference in approach between Jackson and Shestov lies in that the 
former (even though by taking a purely philosophical and artistic perspective rather than a 
social or political one he differs from a more canonical perception) takes the words of both 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky as direct evidence of their thoughts and does not show any
96 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 241.
97 Ibid, p. 242.
98 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, transl. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967), p. 15. Cited in 
Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 241.
99 See Ibid, pp. 241-242.
100 Shestov, JfocmoeecKUU u Huifme, p. 418.
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mistrust. In contrast to that Shestov insists that both thinkers, and Nietzsche especially, 
should be read first and foremost between the lines. Valevicius in his detailed study of 
Nietzsche's influence on Shestov, emphasises an important lesson that Shestov learned 
from the German philosopher: ‘that one is not necessarily that which one writes about, or in 
other words, that an author's words may only be written to mask his inner experiences and 
have little to do with what he really believes’.101 Thus, Valevicius traces Shestov's general 
tendency to ‘unmask’ writers to Nietzsche's influence. He notes further, explaining 
Shestov's interpretation of Nietzsche, that ‘if Nietzsche is not direct and open, it is because 
he is afraid’.102
Ironically, it is also fear of failure that Bertrand Russell has identified in Nietzsche while 
taking a much more conventional approach to him which essentially puts his philosophy in 
a historical context. Russell's observation where both characteristics are most visibly 
present stems from a more narrow theme -  of Nietzsche's attitude to women -  and is thus 
also of an existential nature. ‘His opinion of women’, Russell writes about Nietzsche, ‘[...] 
is an objectivation of his own emotion towards them, which is obviously one of fear. 
“Forget not thy whip” -  but nine women out of ten would get the whip away from him, and 
he knew it, so he kept away from women, and soothed his wounded vanity with unkind 
remarks’.103 More generally, Russell asserts that what Nietzsche stated about Spinoza is 
applicable with the same force to Nietzsche himself: ‘How much of personal timidity and 
vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray!’.104 In his turn Valevicius 
points out that ‘too much of Nietzsche's philosophy is a “tug of war” between his idealistic 
past, his religious upbringing and the “new truths of life” which were being revealed to him 
in his suffering’.105 Dostoevsky for Shestov is also profoundly characterised, as we shall 
have more chances to see later, by his oscillation between different extremes, basically 
between the urge for faith and the despair of disbelief. Despite the proclaimed amor fati 
Nietzsche in Shestov's eyes accomplished a tour de force of putting up a struggle against
101 Valevicius, p. 74.
102 Ibid, p . 7 8 .
103 Russell, p. 734.
104 Ibid.
105 Valevicius, p. 78.
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the unsurmountable obstacles, against necessity and the whole world with its morality and 
values. In Shestov's own words: ‘Beet MHp n oahh nejiOBeK CTOJiKHyjinct mok co6oh h 
OKa3ajioci>, h to  3to jxbq chjibi paBHOH BejiHHHHbi. [. . . ] T^e B3HJI oh [Nietzsche] OTBary He 
to  h to  SopoTBca, a xotb Ha MHHyry npaMO B3rjiaHyTb b rjia3a TaKOMy Bpary?’.106 He 
rejected illusions, just as Dostoevsky did, and faced the horrors of life, head on. This 
courage is the most precious thing that Shestov found in both thinkers. It should be noted in 
this connection that, as a rule, when characters do not display enough courage to fight 
against tragedy (as often happens in Chekhov, for example), Shestov, because of his 
identification of characters with the author, does not normally notice that the latter by 
contrast does have enough courage to describe horrors and thus to confront tragedy directly.
The above elucidates the difference between Shestov's existential approach to Nietzsche on 
the one hand and Jackson's, as it were, artistic one on the other. Jackson's focus is different, 
it is on the form, on the aesthetic expression; yet, the central point in it is directly connected 
with Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's dealings with the same concept -  that of illusion. Thus 
in Jackson's eyes Nietzsche emerges as a seeker of new forms and his attitude to illusion is 
ambivalent and ultimately hostile, while Dostoevsky on the contrary is hinged on illusion 
which he perceives both as reality and inner necessity and which is inseparable from his 
search for form as religious beatitude, as highest unattainable ideal, and yet which stems 
from man's intrinsically fallible and wicked nature. According to Jackson, if Nietzsche, 
who asserted that ‘the secret motif of artistry is that “the character of existence is to be 
misunderstood’” , ultimately rejected illusion, not willing personally to misunderstand the
107character of existence, Dostoevsky essentially went the opposite way. ‘In contrast to 
Nietzsche, yet with the same tragic vision of life, Dostoevsky the artist did not want to 
remain with earthly truth’, and, rather paradoxically, embraced the triumph of illusion in 
the face and in full recognition of ‘opposite proofs’, Jackson affirms.108
106 Shestov, ffocmoeecKUU u Huifuie, p. 423.
107 See Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 245.
108 Ibid, pp. 245-246.
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Shestov's conclusion about Dostoevsky at that stage is the opposite -  that Dostoevsky ever 
since Notes from Underground had decisively parted with illusions. To both Shestov and 
Jackson the issue of illusion is central, but, in contrast to Jackson, the very concept of 
illusion for Shestov at the time was ideological rather than pertaining to aesthetics. Perhaps 
if Shestov had paid any attention to Dostoevsky's aesthetics he would have changed his 
conclusions somewhat. This did happen, as we shall see, but only years later, already in 
emigration, when Shestov's own outlook evolved to the phase of Biblical existentialism. 
However, in 1900 Shestov with his already distinctly existential perspective regarded the 
works of both thinkers as cryptic texts and engaged with their indirect mode of discourse by 
deciphering the ideological message which in his eyes grew from the existential experience 
of the authors. Jackson in his analysis, on the contrary, treats the word of both Dostoevsky 
and Nietzsche as essentially direct and approaches their writings predominantly via the 
route of art, linking form to content.
As Blagova and Emelianov note, at the time of his Philosophy o f Tragedy Shestov ‘wraeT 
,H|ocToeBCKoro uepe3 npH3My H/jen Hmjnie’.109 They observe that Shestov's thesis of the 
strong spiritual kinship between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche in such a categorical form was 
never repeated by Shestov in his later writings.110 In their analysis of Shestov's study into 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche they refute Shestov's thesis of Dostoevsky's ostensible 
idealisation of criminals by discerning between Dostoevsky's vision of the latter in his 
Notes from the House o f the Dead and Nietzsche's vision, and emphasising that the idea of 
idealising criminals belongs to the latter and not to the former. However, Shestov, in 
equating the two assigns this idea to Dostoevsky.111 Indeed, Shestov makes such claims by 
putting words into Dostoevsky's mouth and making the latter seem to have proclaimed that
119‘Jlyumne pyccxne jik m jh  m m y r  b  xaTopre’ and to have worshipped the criminals, at the 
same time being despised by them. This also correlates with Shestov's perception of 
Dostoevsky-Raskolnikov, especially the latter's self-torment caused by his discovery that he 
is not of a ‘Napoleonic design’, he is not a real criminal who has the guts to kill in a self­
109 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 49.
110 Ibid, p. 51.
111 See Ibid, p. 48.
112 Shestov, JdocmoeecKUU u Huifiue, p. 378.
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possessed cold-blooded fashion and the strength to live with the consequences. This vision 
of an extraordinary man as being allowed to commit crime, but more importantly as being 
capable of it, that Shestov transfers from Raskolnikov to Dostoevsky himself is 
perceptively commented upon by Frank Seeley. When contemplating Raskolnikov's theory 
he notes that according to its author extraordinary people always have something new to 
say and are entitled to transgress the laws ‘if their “new word” -  i.e. the realisation of their 
new idea -  should require such transgression’.113 ‘This is surely a completely illegitimate 
correlation’, Seeley continues rather wittily: ‘in reality most of the lawbreaking and 
specifically most of the blood-shedding in the world is perpetrated by perfectly ordinary 
people, who not only have no new word to say but don't even imagine that they have’.114
6.1.5. Notes from Underground and its central place in Shestov's hierarchy. Dostoevsky 
as the Underground Man.
However important Shestov's perspective on Crime and Punishment may be, especially for 
informing critical opinion on the originality of his approach, for Shestov himself the most 
significant of Dostoevsky's works was Notes from Underground (to which Crime and 
Punishment along with all the other major subsequent novels was regarded by Shestov only 
as a commentary). As Milosz points out, Shestov was not the first to single out Notes from  
Underground as Dostoevsky's most important work -  Rozanov had done it earlier; and, of 
course, later on the significance of this work was given its due appreciation. Thus 
nowadays, as Richard Peace points out, ‘Notes from Underground is established in the 
critical literature as a key work in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre'.115 Moreover, Peace talks of ‘its 
acclaimed role as a prelude to the major novels’, not only thematically, but also 
structurally,116 thus expanding Shestov’s evaluation further.
Shestov treated Dostoevsky's Notes as a crucial landmark which reflected a drastic turn in 
the writer's world-view, the outburst of a spiritual abscess long awaiting to explode. 
Interpreting the narrator's confession as that of Dostoevsky himself was, of course, the
113 Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p. 98.
;;4ibid.
115 Peace, Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, p. v.
1,6 Ibid.
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usual approach on Shestov's part, the deployment of his standard technique. However, this 
time, perhaps somewhat in contrast to the case with Raskolnikov, Shestov had a point. For, 
as Malcolm Jones writes ‘the man from underground expresses in primitive and 
concentrated form some of Dostoevsky's most important problems and psychological 
insights. There is no doubt that the author was profoundly familiar with them in his own
11 n
experience’. Yet, Jones, rather naturally, emphasizes also the due distance between 
Dostoevsky and his hero, by going along with Nietzsche's words that ‘Homer would not 
have created Achilles, nor Goethe Faust, if Homer had been an Achilles or Goethe a 
Faust’.118
However, Shestov, with his decisive rejection of any ‘na<j)oc flucTamjHiT towards the 
writers under study (a peculiarity which Erofeev emphasizes),119 has completely merged the 
Underground Man with his creator. On the other hand Shestov was only interested in the 
metaphysical dimension of this work, even if  from an existential perspective. Indeed, as 
Valevicius writes explaining Shestov's reading of the novel, ‘the disturbing reality for 
Dostoevsky in Notes from Underground is not a question of morals, a play-off between 
egoism and altruism. The essence of Dostoevsky's disgust is his limitless hatered for the 
“idea” -  the “idea” being all that which claims any kind of authority over life that pretends 
to be able to predict outcome given the circumstances’.120 In existential terms Shestov 
declared that ‘3anucxu U 3  nodnonbx ecTb nyGjiHHHoe - x o t h  h  He OTKptiToe - OTpeneHHe 
[by Dostoevsky] o t  CBoero nponuioro’.121 The fact of writing The Insulted and the Injured 
[yuuofceHHbie u ocKopdnenHbie] at that time does not refute this new vision, Shestov says, 
and then implies that it was the last leap of faith before the final fall into the abyss -  a 
description we quoted earlier when referring to Shestov's own transformation of 
convictions. In fact, the very words Shestov uses for describing Dostoevsky are very self- 
revealing:
117 Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 55.
118 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, transl. Francis Goffling (New 
York, 1956), p. 235. Cited in Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 55.
119 See Erofeev, p. 171.
120 Valevicius, p. 37.
121 Shesto\ , JjocmoeecKuu u Huiime, p. 349.
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/JocToeBCKHH nb rraeT ca  npoAOJDKaTb roBopH Tb no-C T apoM y; i i o h t h  oAHOBpeMeHHO c  “ 3an n cx a M H  
H3 IKOTIOJIbfl”  OH nHUieT CBOHX “ YHPDXeHHblX H OCXOp6neHHbIx” , B KOTOpbIX yCHJieHHO 
HaTacKHBaeT Ha c e 6 a  H A eio caM OOTpeneHHa, H ecM O ipa Ha t o ,  h t o  BanH Tca n o #  e e  T aacecT bio. H o  
r ^ e  B3HTb c h ji a a a  T aK oro cHCTeM aTHHecKoro o6M aH a h  caM O oSM aH a? O h  y x ce  c  T pyqoM
BblAep^CHBaeT TOH B “ YHHACeHHblX H OCKOpSjieHHblx” . H  TaM eCTb CTpaHHLlbl, B KOTOpbIX
122
n p o p b m a e T c a  3AOBemHH c b c t  h o b o t o  O T xpoB eH H a.
We find essentially the same thoughts about Dostoevsky settling scores with his own past 
in his Notes from Underground and humiliating his former beliefs together with his former 
teacher, Belinsky, in an article written almost a hundred years after Shestov's book on 
Dostoevsky. Although D. Kopeliovich explains that one cannot identify the Underground 
Man completely with his creator, as some of Dostoevsky's contemporaries had done, 
because there always exists an artistic distance, he then affirms that separating them would 
also be wrong. He then points, in a remarkably analogous way to Shestov, to the technique, 
inherent in footnotes and prefaces, of declared detachment, which in fact reveals the 
opposite -  an extreme closeness. ‘Abtop OTflejineTCH o t repo a, yKa3biBaeT Ha cboio c hhm
HeT05KHeCTBeHH0CTb, HO B p e 3y jIL T a T e  CBOHM H eC K p b lB a eM B IM  H H T ep eC O M  H H BH blM
n o H H M a H H e M  H a T y p b i  o n n c b i B a e M o r o  n a p a A O K c a n H C T a  j i h h i b  n o A H e p K H B a e T
1 0*7
cymecTBeHHyio 6jih30Ctb ero k ce6e, rpaHHnamyio c abohhhhcctbom’.
Equally, what Shestov had to say about ‘remarks in footnotes’ as well as ‘prefaces’ is that 
they were invented to conceal the truth, to mislead the reader. Thus he claims that 
Dostoevsky felt obliged
roBopHTb nepe3 c b o h x  repoeB Taxne BeujH, KOTopbie h  b  ero co3HaHHH, 6biTb MoaceT, He o t a h a h c b  
6bi b cTOJib pe3K0H h  onpeAeneHHofi (])opMe, e c j iH  6bi o h h  He aBnanHCb eMy b  odMaHHHBOM BHAe 
cyxcAeHHH h  c^enaHHH He coScTBeHHoro a, a HecymecTByjomero repoa poMaHa. B npHMenaHHH k 
“3anncKaM H3 noAnoAba” Bbi 3t o  nyBCTByeTe ocodeHHO c h a b h o . TaM /focToeBCKHH HacTaHBaeT Ha 
t o m , h t o  “aBTop 3anHC0K, xax h  caMH 3anHCKH, BbiMbiniAeHbi”, h  h t o  o h  AHUib nocTaBHA ce6e 
3aAaneH H3o6pa3HTb “ o a h o t o  H3 npeACTaBHTeAeft AO>XHBaiomero noKOAeHHa”. Taxoro poAa
122 Shestov, jjocmoeecKuu u Huv^me, p. 349.
123 D. Kopeliovich, ‘06 eme o a h o m  b o 3m o3k h o m  npoTorane noAnoAbHoro n eA O B exa ( E c a h h c x m h  h  
/focToeBCXHii)’ in Dostoevsky and the Twentieth Century. The Ljubljana Papers, ed. Malcolm V. 
Jones (Nottingham: Astra Press, 1993), pp. 101-118 (p. 102).
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npneMbi, kohchho, ziocTnraioT npHMO npoTHBonojioxcHbix uejieH. HwraTejib c nepBbix ace cipamm  
y6e>K^aeTca, hto BbiMbiuuieHbi He 3armcKn h hx aBTop, a o6t.acHHTejibHoe k hhm npHMenaHHe.124
Similarly, Shestov commented on Lermontov's preface to the second edition o f his Hero o f  
Our Time'. “TjiaBHoe, h to6 m  6ojie3Hb 6buia yKa3aHa, a Kaic JieHHTb ee -  Bor 3HaeT”. 3Ta 
ManeHbKaa Jiom*, 3aKjnoHaiomaa co6 o k > KopOTKoe npe^ncjiOBHe k j^iHHHOMy poMaHy, 
Hpe3BbiHaHH0 xapaKTepHa. B bi ee He y oflHoro JlepMOHTOBa HafifleTe’.125
K o p e lio v ic h  th e n  c o n t in u e s  th e  l in e  o f  th e  U n d e r g r o u n d  M a n  b e in g  D o s to e v s k y 's  tw in , and  
o b s e r v e s  th a t th e  h e r o  is  p erm e a te d  b y  ‘m o t h b  “p a cn eT a  c  nponuiB iM ” . A  hto  T axoe  
n p o m n o e  /JocToeBC K oro, KOTOpoe o h , n o  e r o  >Ke npH3HaHHio, A ojirn e  ro flb i He M or 
n peo^ojieT L  b  c e 6 e ?  3 t o , k o hchh o , n p e ^ m e B cero  B cjih h ck hh . a  CTpacTHO npHHJiJi Bee 
yneH H e e r o ” . )KejiaHHe pa3^ejraTbca c  st h m  yneH neM  -  c  e r o  aTeH3MOM, paixHOHajiH3MOM, 
COIIHaJIH3MOM -  BOT HTO BBMBJWeTCJI B 3 a n U C K O X  U3 n o d n O J lb R  npH BHHMaTeJlbHOM
1 OfsnpoHTeHHH’. Kopeliovich also supports his claims by the chronology, observing that this 
work had been started much before Chemyshevsky's What is  to Be Done? [*/mo denamb?] 
appeared, and thus it could not have been simply a response to the latter. Thus Kopeliovich, 
through identification of the Underground Man with Dostoevsky himself, then arrives at the 
conclusion that it largely conceals the image of Belinsky, metaphysically identified with 
Dostoevsky's former beliefs, embodying his own past. In particular Kopeliovich quotes the 
footnote on the first page o f the Notes where Dostoevsky speaks of his hero as being a 
representative of the recent past and of the aging generation. In general the whole article is 
dedicated to providing documentary evidence which allows us to trace in the Notes ‘Hexyio
127noneMHHecKyio h  napozjHHHyio jihhhio  pacneTa c npomjibm’.
Curiously, Shestov's name is nowhere mentioned by Kopeliovich, although his reading is 
extremely close to that o f Shestov. Indeed, the line o f exterminating his own past by 
Dostoevsky is for Shestov the leading aim of the Notes, and the leading theme o f Shestov's
124 Shestov, ffocmoeecKuit u Huijme, p. 330.
125 Ibid, p. 325.
126 D. Kopeliovich, p. 102 (the phrase he quotes is from F. M. Dostoevskii, JTojinoe co6panue 
coHuneHuu e 30 moMax, vol. 21, p. 12).
127 Ibid.
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book on the writer. Describing Dostoevsky's growing sceptisim, Shestov affirms that 
serving the Good and ideas is no longer a source of inspiration for Dostoevsky. ‘“He Mory, 
He Mory 6ojibme npHTBop^Tbca, He Mory x c h t b  b  o t o h  j d k h  imeS, a flpyron npaBflbi HeT y 
MeHB; 6yzu>, h t o  f i y z j e T ”  -  b o t  h t o  roBopaT o t h  3anncKH, c k o j i b k o  6 m  ^ o c t o c b c k h h  h h  
OTKpemHBaJica o t  h h x  b  npHMenaHHH’,128 Shestov writes.
The pattern here is reminiscent o f that in the case of Crime and Punishment. There Shestov 
denied the fact o f murder, translating it to the plane of abstraction. The same is true of 
Notes from Underground, where he interprets the narrator's conduct with Liza as 
Dostoevsky's own conduct towards a now hateful ‘idea’ (mentioned by Valevicius above), 
the very idea that he had devoted his previous life to. He writes: ‘He JlH3y o h  3#ecb Bbiraaji 
o t  ce6a. [...] EMy HyxceH 6bui o6pa3 JIH3M j i h h i b  3aTeM, h t o 6 b i  onjieBaTb h  BTomraTb b  
rpa3b “H/jeio” [...]. . ..Haa CBBTbmeH Tex jno^eH, o t  KOTopbix o h  Kor^a-To “cTpacrao
190npHHBji” HOBoe yneHHe, Tax 6e3yMH0 h  KomyHCTBeHHO pyraeTca Tenepb ^ o c t o c b c k h h ’ . 
This was, according to Shestov, the first stage o f Dostoevsky's transformation of 
convictions: ‘Hcne3Jia Haaexyja Ha HOByio xcH3Hb, o  KOTopoii c t o j i b k o  MeHTajiocb b  
xaTopre, h  BMecTe c TeM norafijia Bepa b  yneHHe, Ka3aBmeecfl aocejie He3bi6jieMbiM h  
BeHHo HCTHHHbiM. CoMHeHHfl 6biTb He moxcct: He Haaexma aepxcajiacb yneHHeM, a 
HaofiopoT, -  yneHHe aepxcanocb Ha^exc^oH’. From now on, Shestov asserts, Dostoevsky 
is poisoned by duality -  he does not dare to present his new vision openly to the public, so 
he has lofty ideals in store to feed the readers with, while his true self is tormented by the 
new and horrible truth, by the truth of the ‘underground’. As we saw above, Shestov 
describes the Notes as a desparate scream of horror by the writer who suddenly realised that 
all his idealistic past was one big lie; that he is in fact indifferent to lofty ideals and social 
improvements.
O h  n p H H y » < A e H  c x a 3 a T b  c e 6 e ,  h t o  e c j i H  6 b i  B 3 a M e H  B c e x  s t h x  b c j i h k h x  h  c n a c T J i H B b ix  c o S b i t h h  H a  
P o c c h k )  o S p y u i H J i o c b  H e c n a c T H e ,  o h  n y B C T B O B a j i  6 b i  c e 6 a  H e  x y a c e ,  -  M o a c e T  6 b r n > ,  f l a a c e  j i y n m e . . .  
H t o  f l e n a T b ,  c ic a > K H T e , h t o  ACJiaTb n e jio B e K y , K O T o p b iH  o T K p b u i  b  c e 6 e  c a M O M  T a x y i o  6 e 3 o 6 p a 3 H y i o  
h  O T B p a T H T e j ib H y io  M b ic j ib ?  O c o b e H H O  n w c a T e j i K ) ,  n p H B b i x m e M y  j j y iv ia T b ,  h t o  o h  o 6 a 3 a H  A e J iH T b c a
128 Shestov, JdocmoeecKuu u Huv^me, p. 349.
129 Ibid, p. 350.
130 Ibid, p. 352.
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c  HHTaTejiHMH B ceM , h t o  n p o H c x o n H T  b e r o  a y u i e ?  P a c c K a 3aT b n p a B ^ y ?  B m h t h  H a r u i o u w t b  h  
O TKpbiTo, B ceH apoflH O  n p H 3 H aT b ca , h t o  b c h  npe^cH BH  m n H b ,  B ee  n p encH H e c jio B a  6buiH  J io acb io , 
npH TB opcTB O M , jiH u eM ep H eM , h t o  b t o  BpeM fl, K o r a a  o h  n j ia K a n  H an  M a x a p o M  JJeB yuiK H H biM , o h  
H H M ano H e fly M a n  06  3 to m  HecHacTHOM  h  TOJibKo p H c o B a n  KapTHHbi H a y re i i ie H H e  c e 6e  h  n y ^ J iH K e ?  
H  3TO B COpOK JieT , KOITja HaHHHaTb HOByiO HCH3Hb HeB03M 05KH0, K O rfla pa3 p b IB aT b  C npOIIJJIbIM - 
3HaHHT 3a5KHBO nOXOpOHHTb C e6 f l . . .13'
This is, in a condensed form, the gist of Shestov’s interpretation of Dostoevsky's new 
image as it ostensibly emerges from the Notes.
The most important message of this work for Shestov, the message that for him outstrips all 
the other implications of it, is the revolt of the Underground Man against rationalism, 
idealism and positivism, against the stone wall of the laws of nature, against Necessity. The 
following words of Jones about the Underground Man not only coincide with Shestov's 
existentialist perspective on the latter (and consequently on Dostoevsky himself), but also 
point to the Romantic roots of the Underground Man's perception of the universe. This is 
significant because in turn it points to the idealistic origins of such a revolt, in which we 
can easily recognise Shestov's own struggle against his own innate idealism and rationalism 
(a struggle that he surely identified with in the case of the conglomerate Dostoevsky- 
Underground Man). Jones writes: ‘His rejection of mathematical models of reality is part of 
the very life-blood of Romanticism, as is also his tendency to assert or assume that the 
nature of his own personality must be a truer reflection of ultimate reality than any 
“scientific law”. So too is his cult of passion and irrationalism: the revolt against 
Reason’.132
Of course, for Shestov the struggle against reason had become the main struggle of his life, 
yet he was never able to achieve the full victory within himself, and found endless 
examples of the same failure in other thinkers who, he claimed, in the end compromised 
their convictions and ultimately surrendered to reason. In this connection the insight of 
Joseph Frank seems particularly relevant. ‘The tragedy of the underground man does not 
arise, as is popularly supposed, because of his rejection of reason. It derives from his
131 Shestov, JjocmoeecKuu uHuifiue, p. 348.
132 Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 60.
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acceptance of all the implications of “reason” in its then-current Russian incarnation -  and 
particularly those implications which the advocates of reason like Chemyshevsky blithely
1 o l
preferred to overlook or deny’. Another reference from Frank that is given in Jones's 
later book on Dostoevsky continues the same argument: ‘As Frank argues -  and at first 
sight this seemed perverse to many who had seen the Underground Man as the spokesman 
for existentialist values -  the hero is the prisoner of the rationalism and utilitarianism of the 
60s. What we actually witness in the course of Part I is a breakdown and reversal of 
priorities in favour of will and passion’.134 This resonates with Shestov's claims, already 
mentioned above, that after a thousand year reign of reason and conscience a new era had
i
begun (first discovered in Russia by Dostoevsky) -  that of psychology.
Blagova and Emelianov note that after Shestov's analysis of Notes from Underground ‘yace 
HCB03M05KH0 6bIJIO He 3aMCHaTB (})HJI0C0(j)CK0-3K3HCTeHIJHaJII>H0r0 3HaneHHB
“no/jnoHBa”’136 They single out the merits of Shestov's interpretation in his grasp of 
Dostoevsky's philosophical discoveries such as the novelist's distrust of the Crystal Palace, 
his doubts about the tree of knowledge being the same as the tree of life, his creation of a 
philosophy of penal servitude.137 Indeed, Shestov had a say on all the above counts. Thus 
he wrote:
IIpeK pacH oe h  BbicoKoe b KaBbinicax - He m ob BbmyMKa. 3 t o  a Harneji b “3anHCKax H3 n o /jn o jib a” . 
TaM Bee “ u aeajib i” b tb k o m  BHfle npeflCTaBJieHbi. TaM h  IIlHJUiep, TaM h  ryMaHHOCTb, h  no33Ha 
H exp acoB a , h  xpycT ajibH oe 3/jaHHe, c jio b o m  B ee, h t o  Kor^a-To H anojim uio yMHJieHHeM h  
BocToproM  ayiuy JJocT oeB cxoro, - Bee ocb in aeT ca  rpanoM  jm oBH Teninnx h  coScTBeH Heim iHx  
capxa3MOB. H aeajib i h  yMHjieHne n o  n oB on y  h x  Bbi3biBaioT b h cm  nyBCTBo OTBpameHna h  yacaca .138
133 Joseph Frank, ‘Nihilism and Notes from Underground’, Sewanee Review, 69 (1961) 1-33, p. 4. 
Cited in Jones, Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p. 61.
134 Joseph Frank, ‘Nihilism and Notes from Underground’, p. 1. Cited in Jones, Dostoyevsky after 
Bakhtin, p. 64.
135 See earlier in the chapter for the original Russian quotation (section ‘Modelling an archetype of 
Dostoevskyan hero. Shestov's reading of Crime and Punishment: existentialism versus idealism’); 
or see directly: Shestov, /JocmoeecKuu u Huifme, p. 352.
136 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 53.
137 See Ibid.
138 Shestov, flocmoeecKUU u Huipue, p. 351.
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A lon g  the sam e lines he raised the question: ‘Hto, ecjin CTapoe npeflnojioaceHHe, hto
.zjepeBO no3HaHna He ecTb AepeBo a c h 3 h h  -  a o a c h o ?  C t o h t  npoBepHTb 3 t o t  npeApaccyAox,
H apa^y c  o6ycn oB jiH B aiom eH  e r o  T eo p n efi ecTecTBeH H oro pa3BHTH«! O cK op6jieH H aa bo
110BceM c b h t o m  rjiz  Hee Ayma, 6bm> m o a c c t ,  Han^eT b  ce6e c h j i b i  a j w  h o b o h  6opb6bi...\
S h e s to v  ju x ta p o s e d  o rd in a ry  p h ilo s o p h y  to  th e  n e w  p h ilo s o p h y  -  o f  p e n a l se r v itu d e ,  
a s s ig n in g  th e  la tter  to  D o s to e v s k y :  ‘ H  b o t  b  3 t h - t o  MHHyTbi, K or^a o h  nyBCTBOBaji c e b a  
aencT B H T ejitH o HaBeKH, H aB cer^a cpaBHeHHbiM c  nocjie^HH M  H enoB exoM , b  h c m  
3apo3imajiHCb Te HOBtie h  cTpam H bie ^ym eB H bie 3JieMeHTbi, KOTopbiM cyac^eHO 6 b u io  
Bnocjie^CTBHH pa3BHTbca coB ceM  b  HHyio (j)Hnoco(j>Hio, B H acT oam yio  (J)HJioco(})mo 
K aToprn, 6e3Ha£e)KHOCTH, b  (] )h a o c o <])h k )  no,anoJibH oro neA O Bexa’ ;140 an d  la ter  on: ‘M oaceT  
6biTb, h t o 6  odpecT H  HCTHHy, Hy^cHO npeacA e B cero  ocB oboA H T bca o t  b c a x o h  
odbm eHH ocTH ? Tax h t o  xaTOpra He t o j i b k o  He on p o B ep ra eT  “y6e)XAeHHH” , h o  
onpaB^biBaeT h x ; h  H acT oam aa, HCTHHHaa (})HJioco(J)Ha ecTb (j)HA0C0({)Ha x a T o p r a .,.’ . 141
What needs to be added to the above, in our view, is that Shestov clearly sensed the truth of 
Dostoevsky's forebodings as being extremely relevant to both modernity and the future, 
and, following Dostoevsky, placed his focus on the aesthetics and discourse of the ‘new 
era’ (even if inadvertently, while thinking that he was pursuing his own philosophical 
ends). In this context Viktor Erofeev's words about Shestov's acute presentiment of the 
aesthetics of existentialism, the predicament of an alienated, disillusioned and tormented 
individualist,142 have to be taken, in our opinion, in close connection with Shestov's 
interpretation and exaltation of Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground:
B ApaMe byaymero obcTaHOBxa byaeT co bc cm  HHaa, neM b  coBpeMeHHon ApaMe. ripeacAe Bcero 
byaeT ycTpaHeHa Bca cjiohchoctb nepnneTHH. y  repoa ecTb npoixmoe -  BocnoMHHamra, h o  h c t  
HacToamero: h h  aceHbi, h h  HeBecTbi, h h  Apy3en, h h  AeJia. Oh o a h h  h pa3roBapHBaeT TOAbxo c 
caMHM cobon h a h  c BoobpaacaeMbiMH CAymaTeAaMH. DKh b c t  b a a a h  o t  a io a c h . Tax h to  cueHa 
byAeT H3obpaacaTb AHbo HeobHTaeMbiH o c t p o b , Anbo KOMHaTy b  boAbuiOM m h o f o a io a h o m  ropOAe, 
rAe cpeAH m h a a h o h o b  obbiBaTeAefi moacho ACHTb Tax >xe, xax Ha HeobHTaeMOM ocTpoBe.
139 Shestov, JdocmoeecKUU uHuipue, p. 352.
140 Ibid, p. 345.
141 Ibid, p. 372.
142 See Erofeev, p. 181.
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O rcT ynH T b Ha3a,zj k a io a h m  h  obw ecT B eH H biM  H ^eajiaM  r e p o io  Henb3H. 3HaHHT, h >okho h a t h  B n ep eA  
k oA H H onecT B y, aScom oT H O M y oA H H onecT B y. 143
These premonitions strike us first of all by their aesthetic aspect, even more surprising 
given the secondary role of aesthetics in Shestov’s discourse of the time. Yet, the aphoristic 
style of his Apotheosis, largely modelled on Nietzsche, has at its core the ironic discourse 
which for Shestov was a new landmark signifying his further departure from the much 
more didactic, if not openly dictatorial, ethos of his previous books. In our view it is also 
the echo of the Underground Man which is quite audible stylistically in Shestov's 
Apotheosis and which marks his kinship to Dostoevsky in the latter's forebodings of both 
the ethics and aesthetics of the future. Indeed, the Underground Man's disdain for ‘all the 
sublime and the beautiful’ was a shrewd prediction by Dostoevsky of the new epoch, 
introduced by the twentieth century, where these concepts were subjected to such an 
irrevocable discreditation and profanation, especially in totalitarian political systems, that it 
provoked a major shift in consciousness towards cynicism ‘as a form of despair’, and 
caused the subsequent shift of discourse into all-pervasive irony, marginalising pathos to 
the point of total oblivion.
Another important aspect in Shestov's treatment o f the Notes, which in particular constructs 
his self-defence with respect to the identification of the narrator with the author, is 
Shestov's conviction of the essential irrelevance of the actual image of the Underground 
Man, of all his personal characteristics (furthermore, Shestov perceives them as being 
conceived by Dostoevsky to be deliberately misleading). Indeed, Shestov first stresses the 
role of a writer’s own existential experience as the only possible source o f cognition. 
‘CucTeMa npHTBopcTBa moacct b nyumeM cnynae npHAaTb BHenrae 6naroo6pa3Hbm bha 
COHHHeHHAM nHCaTejIA, HO OTHIOAB HHKOrAU He AaCT eMy HeoSxOAHMOrO COAepJKaHHA’,144 
he writes. But this only serves as a prelude to stating that Dostoevsky's thought is disguised 
in the image o f his Underground Man, deliberately made such an unattractive individual. 
‘Tax y JfocToeBCKoro mbicab noAnoABHoro qeAOBexa npaneTCA noA (jjopMoft 
obAHHHTeABHOH nOBCCTH: “CMOTpHTe, AeCKaTB, KaKHe 6BIBaiOT AypHBie H Ce6flAK)6HBBie
143 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoHeeHHOcmu, p. 65.
144 Shestov, ftocmoeecKUU u Huifuie, p. 420.
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nioflH, KaK OBJia^eBaeT HHor^a oroH3M ^ByHorHM jkhbothbim” ’, 145 Shestov
insinuates. Thus for Shestov it makes no difference which precise artistic image is 
constructed, because for him the only purpose of this construction is to smuggle in the 
subversive ideas of the author. Also, by pointing to the deliberate dressing up of the hero in 
clothes alien to the author as a device by the latter to detach himself from the former, 
Shestov basically forestalls and refutes any arguments that can be put forward against his 
identification of the two.
6.1.6. The case of intertextuality in Shestov, Dostoevsky and Pushkin. The 
achievements of Shestov’s early work on Dostoevsky.
Thus various personal characteristics of the Underground Man remain completely outside 
Shestov’s concerns, even though, as we have just seen, he clearly notices some of the most 
obvious of them, at least in order to deploy them in his counter-arguments against possible 
attacks on his method and conclusions. Interestingly, one of the most important features of 
the Underground Man -  his striving to take refuge in intertextuality, as explained by 
Jones,146 is completely ignored by Shestov. Yet, it has a particular relevance to Shestov 
himself, as it does to Dostoevsky for that matter. Indeed, Jones implies that the 
Underground Man cannot distinguish between literature and lived experience, moreover 
literary reality for him has priority over ‘real’ life. While Jones's implications take their 
specific route in line with his general purpose of redefining Dostoevsky’s fantastic realism, 
we would like to view this phenomenon from a different perspective. Namely, we should 
recall at this point the Russian phenomenon, understood broadly, of the ‘fictionalization of 
life’, as Richard Peace labeled it, which was touched upon in Chapter 3. We mentioned 
there Tsvetaeva’s claim made in a private letter that life for her began to gain meaning and 
value only when transformed into art,147 thus effectively asserting that the echo was more 
precious for her than the sound that caused it. This feature, which to an extent is true of any 
creative genius, ultimately originates in extreme idealism and refers to the romantic 
tradition. The same was the case for Shestov and for Dostoevsky alike. For both, literary
145 Shestov, ffocmoeecKUU u Huijiue, p. 420.
146 See Jones, Dostoyevsky after Bakhtin, p. 62.
147 M. Tsvetaeva, from a letter of 30 December 1925 to A. Teskova in Tsvetaeva. A Pictorial 
Biography. Ifeemaeea. &omo-6uoepa(puR, ed. Ellendea Proffer (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1980), p. 31.
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reality was in a sense more real than actual existence, because it allowed them to attain 
what remained elusive and unattainable in real life. For Shestov it was precisely literary 
reality, rather than real life per se, that led him to his main activity - philosophising. Also, 
both might have fought their idealism and their romantic literary roots, but they had never 
really succeeded, for their very obsession with the eternal questions, with the idea of 
salvation and truth, placed them in the idealist and romantic camp regardless of the 
conclusions they might have reached.
Cases of ‘intertextuality’ understood as the aforementioned ‘fictionalization of life’ in the 
sense of a psychological confusion between literature and real life, with attempts to impose 
the former on the latter, are quite common in fictional works of the nineteenth century, and 
are permeated with ambivalence. One of the most notable examples, as was noted in 
Chapter 3, is Pushkin's Tatiana, who, of course, cannot be further away from the 
Underground Man. Yet, notwithstanding the difference in their existential baggage with 
Tatiana's consequent liberty from introspection and resentment, with her outward-directed 
personality, the main distinguishing feature is her ability to forget herself for the sake of the 
other which the Underground Man does not possess because of his underlying cowardice.
Also, if we define intertextuality as escaping from one discourse to another, from one 
‘genre of life’ into another, from reality to fantasies and dreams, and then back again, 
eventually losing track of your immediate location, then we have to conclude that to some 
degree almost all Dostoevsky's characters display this characteristic. The Underground Man 
intrinsically fails not because he is trapped in intertextuality, but because he is weak, 
selfishly fainthearted. Tatiana at some point is equally trapped, but finds her way out 
because she is selflessly strong. At least this is what the canonical view suggests.
However, the dialectic of life is subtler, and (the mature) Shestov would certainly look 
beyond the self-evident. It is interesting that having parted with his idealism, Shestov 
allowed himself several almost cynical remarks with respect to Tatiana, but never engaged 
in a coherent critique. We can use this absence of direct evidence from him as a perfect 
situation that invites a ‘workshop’, as it were, for demonstrating Shestov's reasoning in
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challenging the canonical. Tatiana's position is stoic, and thus questionable, Shestov's 
stance would have been, if he had looked at Tatiana again in his mature philosophical 
period. Milosz's words about Shestov's attitude to stoicism are very revealing in this 
respect. Indeed, let us recall what he had to say:
the “I” must accept the inevitable order of the world. The wisdom of centuries consists precisely in 
advising acquiescence and resignation. In simple language, “Grin and bear it”; in more 
sophisticated language, “Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt”—“The Fates lead the willing 
man, they drag the unwilling”. Stoicism, whose very essence is to curb the pretence of transitory 
individual existence in the name of universal order [...], was the final word of Graeco-Roman 
civilization. But, says Shestov, stoicism has survived under many disguises and is still with us. 
Shestov simply refuses to play this game of chess, however, and overturns the table with a kick.148
Indeed, the private should not be put as a defenceless sacrificial donation on to the altar of 
the general, was Shestov's appeal to mankind. This is not to say that people should live by 
their caprices (as the Underground Man does), but rather that, in particular, we should not 
betray our heart's desires in favour of our mind's dictate which is validated by the existing, 
and often hypocritical morality. Thus, reasoning a la Shestov, Tatiana should be viewed as 
a heroic soldier whose life is wasted by being sacrificed to the general cause in a war which 
is unjust. Perhaps this is what Shestov meant by his metaphor on idealism comparing it to 
an oriental despotic state where ‘cHapyacH Bee bnecTame, KpacHBO, BeuHo; BHyrpn ace -  
yacacbi’.149 This is intensified by an observation that even from the rationalistic perspective 
of Chemyshevsky's ‘rational egoism’ [pa3yMHbm 3 i d h 3 m ]  and utilitarian ethics the only 
person who may benefit from Tatiana's behaviour is her husband, to whom Shestov referred 
in an unambiguously sarcastic way saying that ‘npHJiHHHaa nopnna “cxpa/iamm” 6buia 6bi 
coBceM H e  6ecnojie3Ha 3TOMy rocno^HHy, TaK b b i c o k o  n o ^ H H M a B i i i e M y  h  h o c ,  h  njienH’.150 
Tatiana's integrity and pride might be in tact, but her long-term future is reminiscent at best 
of Olga's in Oblomov in that exemplary, but lifeless Shtolz household. This would be, in 
our view, Shestov's verdict, especially given (up to the reversal of gender roles) Evgeniia 
Gertsyk's observation about how enthusiastically Shestov was singling out Ibsen's most 
intimate theme in that ‘cTpaniHee Bcero, rnbejiBHeH nejiOBeica 0TKa3aTbca o t  j i i o 6 h m o h
148 Milosz, pp. 104-105.
149 Shestov, ffocmoeecKUU u Huifuie, p. 369.
150 Ibid, p. 396.
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>KeHmHHBi, npe^aTb ee pa^H flOJira, imen. O t aceHmnHbi, T.e. o t  x c h 3h h ,  h t o  niydxce 
CMblCJia ) k h 3 h h ’ . 151
In the context of intertextuality the conclusions are similar. Indeed, it may be thanks to her 
inner strength, to her selflessness that Tatiana learned to discern literature from reality, but 
the consequences are still tragic. Resisting her heart's inclinations and opting for the stoic 
solution advocated by the philistine morality (the type that Shestov rebelled against) she is 
destined for a gradual descent into total gloom (while, if she continued to dream, perhaps 
she would never have married her husband whom she did not really love, or maybe she 
would never have rejected Onegin whom she did love; the latter is, of .course, a dangerous 
‘Anna Karenina's route’, but which at least allows one to live by one's heart). In fact, a 
suggestion can be made here that unless Tatiana learns to escape into an alternative reality 
again (for example resorts to writing!), her fate might be that of a ‘suppressed’ Anna 
Karenina if we imagine the latter as opting for sustaining her stable and quite successful 
marriage by rejecting Vronsky. Soon enough then she will join the underground, the living 
dead, as Shestov calls them. So, Tatiana's situation is a deadlock, because if she does not 
end up ‘under a train’ she will find herself in the ‘underground’. Her imposition of literary 
conventions upon reality may bear some responsibility for this, because it may have made 
her more prone to mistakes in real life. But equally this intertextuality may have nothing to 
do with her tragic predicament, as in the case of Anna Karenina, who does not seem to 
display any signs of it (and her unhappy marriage could have stemmed from the sheer 
inexperience of youth). On the other hand, escaping into a dream world may be very 
constructive, if, for example, it forces one along a creative route and makes one write down 
one’s experiences. Thus ‘intertextuality’ as such is rather ambivalent, and may be neither a 
blessing, nor a curse.
This is not to justify the inability to discern between literature and real life, but rather to 
point to the validity of one reality being informed by the other, and ultimately to the 
validity of the creative imagination, and, perhaps even more importantly, to the fact that our
151 Gertsyk, pp. 109-110. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 119.
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dreams and fantasies are in a sense of equal emotional validity with our real experiences 
(and in some ways are even more precious).
However, an apologist of the stoic stance could argue, on the other hand, that Tatiana's 
choice is at least responsible -  she consciously opts for personal suffering in order to keep 
her promise and thus her integrity. This goes back again to Tatiana's boldness and maturity, 
and points to the Underground Man's cowardice and immaturity. Indeed, his general 
emotional and mental make-up, with his self-destructively vicious and intense 
introspection, his inability to cope with the world that overwhelms him, trying and failing 
constantly to come to terms with himself, mapping his ego in the world and every time 
ending up in alienation -  are distinct characteristics of adolescence. Thus, in a way, the 
paradoxalist with all his escape into vice and forty years of life experience behind him, 
seems to be trapped in the emotional and mental make-up of a teenager. He is frozen at that 
particular age and incapable of escaping the trap of perceiving the world as centred 
exclusively around his personality. If only the Underground Man was capable of 
renouncing his insatiable ego (for the sake of any other creature or cause) his whole world 
would have opened up and changed completely, even if it was a transient self-discovery. 
This is, in fact somewhat reminiscent of Seeley’s interpretation of Karenin who, as Seeley
152points out, was unable to abandon the narrow ‘framework of habits and conventions’ 
which saved him from his emotional haemophilia, as Seeley puts it. However, only at what 
was perceived as Anna’s deathbed, ‘did he yield to the temptation to rise above empty 
gestures -  the temptation to experience, however fleetingly, the fullness of his humanity by 
taking on himself real suffering and real love’.153 This, as Seeley observes, was a ‘surrender 
from weakness, not from strength’.154 Still, like the Underground Man had he abandoned 
the shell of his ego, Karenin ‘might have treasured for the rest of his life the memory of that 
finest hour’.155
152 Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p. 59.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
,5^  Ibid.
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Thus Dostoevsky’s underground hero needs a complete leap to another soul, to break out of 
himself, but he cannot complete this leap due to his pusillanimity. In drawing this image 
Dostoevsky, in fact, offered an alternative model of a superfluous man. Indeed, while 
Pechorin was bold and daring, but incapable of love, a kind of emotional invalid, the 
Underground Man is, at least potentially, capable of love (even if his perception of it is 
distorted by the master-slave model), he is in a way yearning for it, but he is afraid to break 
away from the shell of his ego, and thus, like Pechorin, he is also doomed.
Interestingly, while claiming that Dostoevsky created a bad, selfish character to conceal his 
own thoughts, Shestov ignores some signs of a special discourse of this character -  a 
discourse which traditionally in Russian culture served as a self-defensive disguise while 
carrying with it a license to speak the truth. The discourse in question is that of ‘holy 
foolishness’ (lopOACTBo/myroBCTBo), or ‘folly in Christ’, and in a sense provides a bridge 
between the Underground Man's aesthetic and ethical facets. However, as we shall see, in 
his later work on Dostoevsky written in 1921, Shestov, to all intents and purposes, discerns 
this discourse (even though he never uses the relevant terminology and does not recognise 
it as such) in a way that others have largely missed.
In this connection it seems relevant to recall that Dostoevsky allegedly had some intentions 
o f  leading the Underground M an to a Christian conclusion. ‘ Y a c  6 b i j i o  6 b i  jiynrne c o b c c m  
He nenaTaTb npeanocnexmeH raaBBi (caMOH rjiaBHOH, rjxe caMaa-TO m b i c j i b  h  
BBiCKa3BiBaeTca), neM nenaTaTB ee TaK, icax o h o  ecTB, t o  ecTB c HanepraHHBiMH <j>pa3aMH h  
npoTHBopena caMOH ce6 e. Ho h t o  ^ejiaTb! C b h h b h  ueroopa, TaM, r^e a rjiyMHjica Ha# 
BceM h  HHor,n;a SoroxyjiBCTBOBaji dun eudy -  t o  nponymeHO, a rjxe H3 Bcero s t o t o  a b b i b c j i  
noTpedHOCTB BepBi h  XpncTa -  t o  3anpemeHo’, 156 he wrote to his brother. Yet, this 
intention is met with scepticism by some critics, who question its plausibility in terms o f 
inner artistic logic. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored. Neither can Dostoevsky's perception 
o f  the underground as having nothing holy, i.e. being void o f  any real moral or spiritual 
values be ignored. This leads one to conclude that what we are facing here is another
156 Dostoevskii, IJojiHoe codpanue conmeHuu e 30 moMax, vol. 5, p. 375.
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reflection of Dostoevsky's own oscillations between good and evil, between the sacred and 
the blasphemous, between faith and faithlessness.
One of the great achievements of Shestov in his first book on Dostoevsky is that he sensed 
this duality. As Michel Aucouturier writes, ‘Shestov sees the essence of Dostoevsky's 
philosophy in the tormented “transformation of convictions” to which Notes from  
Underground testifies. But the horrible truth discovered through this experience, cannot 
become the object of cognition. Hence Dostoevsky's duality, whereby “philosophy” shifts 
into “preaching”’.157 Moreover, Aucouturier asserts that it is this duality revealed by 
Shestov that is responsible for the polyphony of Dostoevsky's novels.158 We shall yet return 
to this claim when discussing Shestov's philosophical views as informed by Dostoevsky. 
Here, however, it is worth noting that while polyphony in Bakhtin's sense, i.e. at the level 
of aesthetics, from the point of view of artistic creation, remained practically unnoticed by 
Shestov, there were still signs of his dim awareness of the deliberate and magic complexity 
of Dostoevsky's creative world. Only Shestov translated this rather subconscious awareness 
of his into a conscious interpretation of Dostoevsky in terms of the writer's conspiracy to 
conceal his horrible discoveries from others. Thus, for example, he wrote that Dostoevsky’s 
thought ‘noHTH HeB03M05KH0 <J)HKCHpOBaTt; 3a Hen , a a » c e  ycjieflHTb ipyflHo; oHa c k o j i l 3 h t  
h  BbeTCfl t o h h o  yropi* h  no,a, KOHeij, c j i o b h o  yMbimjieHHO, npona^aeT b  rycTOM TyMaHe 
HenpHMHpHMbix npoTHBopeHHH ’,159 At the same time when Dostoevsky's positive heroes 
were involved, Shestov's distrust towards them was so strong that it overshadowed any 
other feelings. Thus, as we saw, Shestov dismissed Myshkin as being ‘^ cajiKaa TeHb”, 
‘xojio/moe SecKpoBHoe npHBH^emie ’ and instead of seeing in the latter's ambivalence in 
love the manifestation of the same duality of Dostoevsky, Shestov saw in it just another 
piece of evidence against the plausibility of the prince as a ‘holy’ character. He wrote: ‘^ a  
h  pojib-TO ero KaxoBa! Oh c t o h t  M e a c ^ y  flByx ) K e H m n H  h ,  t o h h o  K H T a H C K H H  OojiBaHHHK, 
KjiaHBeTca t o  b  OflHy, t o  b  flpyryio CTopoHy’.160 However, as Seeley points out ‘it is short­
sighted or superficial to equate such multiple involvements with the “triangles” of Western
157 See Aucouturier, p. 86.
158 Ibid.
159 Shestov, ffocmoeecKuu u Hutfiue, p. 420.
160 Ibid, p. 383.
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literature’.161 Instead they reflect the deep inner conflict of Dostoevsky’s characters, their 
perpetual existential split.
Yet, the issue of Myshkin’s plausibility, above all as a ‘saintly’ character, a ‘Christ figure’, 
proved to be a focal point for continuing criticism and debate. Thus Harriet Murav singles 
out a group of critics which finds ‘the topic of Prince Myshkin’s “sanctity” [...] unsuitable 
for the novel’.162 She quotes Konstantin Mochulsky’s words that ‘sanctity is not a literary 
theme’ and that ‘a novel about Christ is impossible’,163 as well as Michael Holquist’s 
similar ideas that ‘Myshkin, as a Christ figure, is a failure’ and more generally that ‘the 
genre of the novel cannot accommodate the category of the holy’.164 A somewhat 
complementary approach to this one is in asserting that Dostoevsky, having started with an 
aspiration to create a ‘noJioHarrejibHO npeicpacHbiH nejioBeK’ as his main hero, ultimately 
realised the impossibility of such a task and, as the novel progressed, got ‘disappointed’ in 
the hero (as reflected, for example, through an increasingly sceptical narrator’s voice). In 
other words, having started with the ambition to depict Christ-like figure, he ended up 
producing a parody of Christ.165 However, there exists also a somewhat different approach 
which views the image of Myshkin as Dostoevsky’s triumph, both ethically and 
aesthetically. Thus Fazil Iskander writes
B 5KH3HH SbiBaioT ocobbie jiioah — npeKpacHaa Ayuia h noBpejKAeHHbin M03r. B JiHTepaType ohh 
OTpaaceHbi b TaKHx BejiHKHX npoH3Be^emiax, Rax “,ZfoH Khxot” CepBaHTeca, “HanoT” 
/JocToeBCKoro [...]. B mhpoboh JiHTepaType, kohchho, HeMano o6pa30B jiiofleH HpaBCTBeHHbix h 
yMHbix. Ho ohh He npoH3BOAHT Taxoro CHJibHoro BnenaTJieHHfl. Eojiee Bcero noTpacaiOT hmchho
161 Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p. 89.
162 Harriet Murav, Holy Foolishness. Dostoevsky’s Novels and the Poetics o f Cultural Critique, 
(Stanford, California: Standford University Press, 1992), p. 74.
163 Konstantin Mochulskii, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, transl. Michael A. Minichan (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 346. Cited in Murav, p. 74.
164 Michael Holquist, Dostoevsky and the Novel (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 
1986), p. 109. Cited in Murav, p. 74.
165 See, for example, Derek Brower (‘The Bible in the Major Novels of Dostoevskii’, BASEES 
Conference, April 2005), who substantiates such a claim by writing that the reading of Myshkin as 
Christ ‘has been undermined by the narrative itself, ‘the Christ-likeness has been diluted by 
alternative readings of him’ and ‘an image -  the Holbein -  has emerged that directly challenges his 
claims to Christlikeness’.
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TaKHe jikdah —  c  npeicpacH O H  A yrnoii h noBpexcAeHHbiM H M03raM H, H ecnocodH biM H  jionreH pcm aT b  
jiHHHbie H H T epecbi’ .166
Interestingly Iskander’s conclusion then is ‘Orciofla CTpaiiraafl Aoramca: H e TopM03HT jih
1 A7
yM, jiorH3Hpya Haiim codcTBeHHbie HHTepecbi, HpaBCTBeHHoe pa3BHTHe AyiHH?’.
This observation of the hero’s idiocy as providing the grounds for his plausibility as a 
selfless and utterly moral being is, of course, not a new one. For example, Richard Peace 
classified ‘the prince’s “idiocy”’ as being, amongst other things, ‘a novelistic device which 
renders virtue more convincing’.168 Yet, Shestov clearly was not convinced -  although had 
he followed Iskander’s route he could have come to the same (for him highly desirable) 
conclusion of the malicious and self-serving role of human mind. Reading the novel at the 
time in the Nietzschean key, Shestov focused instead almost entirely on the treacherous 
nature of idealism in the tragedy of existence.
Yet, with all the tendentiousness of Shestov's treatment of Dostoevsky in his first book on 
the writer, his insights are undeniable. Apart from spotting Dostoevsky's duality, Shestov 
rather prophetically drew together the names of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, and 
perceptively singled out their similarities, their existential concerns, their preoccupation 
with the concept of the undergound in a metaphysical sense. As Blagova and Emelianov 
write,
paHHH H IIIeCTOB BHeC 3HaHHTeJIbHbIH BKJiafl B 3K3HCTeHU,HaJlbHOe npO H TeH H e /(OCTOeBCKOrO. 
“ H M eiO T jih H a A e ay jb i jhoah, ocT aB JieH H bie  HayKOH h M o p a j ib io ? ”  - 3T a nocT aH O B K a B o n p o c a  
HBjiaeTCH odmeH h j j j i a  ^ o c T o e B C K o ro , h / y ia  I f r m i i i e .  Otbct IIIec T O B a  H a AaHHbiH B o n p o c  
npejmojiaraeT BbiacHeHHe MHp0B033peHHecK0H no3HUHH /JocToeBCKoro b othouichmh tbkhx 
K aT eropH H  3thkh, KaK cmwcji 5KH3HH, H A eajib i ryM aH H 3M a, c o c ip a A a H H e , M o p a a b  K ax  p e r y j i a T o p
166 Iskander, ‘IIoHeM Hory o mhotom’, p. 133. Notice that another example of this kind -  of a 
‘positively beautiful hero’, an individual incapable of sharing an immoral or insensitive perspective 
on the world (and as such making the reader question his sanity) -  is, in fact, provided in the literary 
interpretation of precisely the figure of Christ in the direct sense: Ieshua Ha-Notsri from Mikhail 
Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita.
167 Ibid.
168 Peace, Dostoevsky, An Examination of the Major Novels, p. 67.
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noBefleHHA h  T .n. -  B n ep B b iii n e p H o a  T B opnecT B a U lecT O B  CHHTan, hto  /J oc to c bc k h h  h  HHume 
o^HHaKOBo O TBenaioT Ha otot B o n p o c .169
Blagova and Emelianov also point out that Shestov's emphasis on the spiritual closeness 
between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche ‘cocjiy^cnji HeManyio cjiy»c6y ^ajibHenmero 
pa3BHTna HayKH o ^ o c t o c b c k o m . riocne pa6oTti IUecTOBa CTano o h c b h ^ h o ,  h t o  aejio He b  
“ j i i o 6 b h ”  ^ocToeBCKoro k  “ b o j i h b h m  nyBCTBaM”.170 /Ijejio b  t o m ,  h t o  h  ^ocToeBCKOMy, h  
Hnmne 6 h j i o  c b o h c t b c h h o  TparHnecKoe BKmeHne nejiOBeKa’.171 Blagova and Emelianov 
then make a valid claim, which we shall examine in due course, that Shestov's works on 
Dostoevsky of the later period written in emigration demonstrate a considerable change of 
Shestov's views on the writer. It is particularly interesting given that Shestov's approach of 
reading any writer off his heroes, as we shall see, remained largely intact. Accordingly, 
Shestov's fundamental concerns sustained themselves throughout his writing career, as did 
his subjective method. On the other hand due to this extreme subjectivity these were always 
subject to Shestov's own inner development. Thus, it is his method of deciphering and 
interpretation that underwent some evolution.
Shestov's own declaration of arbitrariness as the basis of his method at the time was very 
honest, even if deliberately provocative. Erofeev in his article extends this arbitrariness to 
Shestov's approach in general, regardless of the chronology. As we shall explain below, 
Erofeev puts authenticity outside Shestov's concerns. This is to say that Shestov's treatment 
of writers was dependent chiefly on his own existential paradigm at the time of conducting 
his analysis. With age, not surprisingly, his own conception of the world developed in a 
direction opposite to radicalism, and this, rather than some essential conceptual changes or 
alteration in techniques, is in our view responsible for the evolution of his interpretations.
169 Blagova and Emelianov, pp. 53-54.
170 This is a reference to (and a quotation from) Mikhailovskii's book on Dostoevskii -  A Cruel 
Talent QKecmoKUU majiawn).
171 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 51.
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6.1.7. ‘Arbitrariness’ as a method. The limitations of creative freedom. The role of 
ideas in Dostoevsky from Shestov's perspective.
When writing his Philosophy o f Tragedy Shestov's main conclusions in his treatment of 
Dostoevsky, as we have seen, were derived through a rather indiscriminate and 
uncompromising identification of the writer with his ‘underground heroes’, tragically 
severed from the world. Shestov simply substituted a hero for the author in the course of 
writing, in an unnoticed way, without explanation. The only explanation he would 
occasionally provide (which is not altogether without validity) is that such a degree of 
penetration into a distorted psyche can only be achieved through the author’s direct 
personal experience, and that a sharp dissociation from a hero is suspicious and counter­
productive. On the other hand, already in the introduction to the book, Shestov, as it were, 
has given himself license to behave in an arbitrary way, when he declared arbitrariness as 
his method.
I n d e e d ,  i n  t h i s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  S h e s t o v  f i r s t  a s s e r t s  i n  h i s  b o o k  t h a t  D o s t o e v s k y  h a s  t o  s a y  
‘nepe3 c b o h x  repoeB T a x n e  BenjH, KOTopbie h  b  ero C 03H aH H H , 6 b i t b  MoaceT, He o t j i h j i h c b  
6 b i  b  c t o j i b  pe3K O H  h  o n p e a e j ie H H O H  (jjo p M e, e c j r n  6 b i  o h h  H e h b j w j i h c b  eM y  b  ofiMaHHHBOM
179
B H ^ e  c y ^ a e H H H  h  ^cenaH H H  H e c o f ic T B e H H o ro  a ,  a  H e c y m e c T B y io m e r o  r e p o a  p o M a H a ’ . 
S h e s t o v  i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  c o m m e n t s  t o  Notes from Underground w h e r e  
D o s t o e v s k y  d e l i b e r a t e l y  d i s s o c i a t e s  h i m s e l f  f r o m  t h e  h e r o  o f  t h e  Notes. M o r e o v e r ,  S h e s t o v  
c l a i m s  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  h i m s e l f  f r o m  t h e  h o r r i b l e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  u n d e r g r o u n d  w h i c h  
D o s t o e v s k y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  f e l t  i n  h i s  o w n  s o u l ,  h e  i n v e n t e d ,  a s  a  s h i e l d  o f  s o r t s ,  h i s  ‘p o s i t i v e ’ 
c h a r a c t e r s  s u c h  a s  P r i n c e  M y s h k i n  a n d  A l e s h a  K a r a m a z o v .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  f o r  S h e s t o v
1 71Dostoevsky's ‘HencTOBbie nponoBe^H’ from his Diary o f a Writer have the same root -  
the writer's desire to isolate himself from his Raskolnikovs, Ivans Karamazovs, Kirillovs 
and other such characters of his novels. ‘Bee 3 t o  jiHHib HOBaa (})opMa npHMeuaHHJi k  
3anucKOM U3 nodnojibn\m  Shestov insists. He points, however, to the difficulty of peeling 
the real feelings of Dostoevsky off his invented ‘ideas’, because, as Shestov says,
172 Shestov, JJocmoeecKUU u Huy we, p. 330.
173 Ibid, p. 330.
174 Ibid, p. 331.
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c o m m e n t a r y  i s  t o o  c l o s e l y  i n t e r w o v e n  w i t h  t h e  a c t u a l  t e x t .  Y e t ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  p o i n t  a t  
l e a s t  t o  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  w h i c h  s u c h  a  s e p a r a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d ,  S h e s t o v  t e l l s  u s .  A n d  
h e  a l s o  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  a l l  t h e  c o m m o n p l a c e s  a s  w e l l  a s  t o o  h i g h l y  p i t c h e d  n o t e s  a r e  s i g n s  o f  
i n a u t h e n t i c i t y  i n  D o s t o e v s k y 's  w o r d s .  ‘Bo3mo)khi>i, kohchho, oihh6kh b HCTOJiKOBaHHH 
O T flejiB H bix M ecT  coH H H eH H H  /J o c T o e B C K o ro , # m K e  i j e j ib ix  poM aH O B . Ha h to  ace  H a ^ e a T t c a  
b TaKOM c j i y n a e ?  Ha K pH T H necK oe  n y T b e ? ! Ho H H T aT ejib  H e^oB O JieH  TaKHM otbctom. O t  
He r o  O T ^aeT  M H ^ o j io r n e H ,  C T a p o c T b io , n j i e c e H b io ,  jiohcbio -  ^ a ^ c e  yMbiuuieHuou jiohcbio. 
H y ,  h to  )k? T o r ^ a  o c T a e i c a  o^ho: n p 0 H 3 B 0 J i’ . 175
Viktor Erofeev observes perspicaciously that ‘TaKaa MeTOflOJioirui KpHTHHecKoro 
HccjieaoBaHHa, He jinmeHHaa 3JieMeHTa anaTa^ca, 3aHHMaeT b TBopnecTBe IIIecTOBa 
ueHTpajibHoe mccto, noBTopaacb H3 khhth b KHHry, pacnpocTpaHiracb Ha nncaTejieH, 
6H6jieHCKHx npopoKOB, otijob E[epKBH h (J)hjioco(J)ob, KOTopbie nona^aioT b none 3peHHn 
IIIecTOBa’. He then asks i f  Shestov him self believed in the authenticity o f the images o f 
writers that he created. ‘OneBHnHO, Bonpoc o nocTOBepHOCTH npocTO 6bui jnmieH rjul Hero 
BCflKoro CMbicna’, Erofeev continues and supports his claim by a quotation from Shestov: 
‘noTOMy hto , no ero mhchhio, “nocTOBepHOCTb BOBce h He ecTb npeflHKaT hcthhbi hjih, 
jiynme cxa3aTb, hto  aocTOBepHOCTb HHKaKoro oTHomeHHn k hcthhc He HMeeT’” .177
However, it is evident that when deciphering the writer via his heroes Shestov every time 
was labouring under the delusion of having penetrated to the writer's very soul, having 
heard his unspoken words which the latter could only utter under the disguise of the 
characters that he created. As we mentioned in the previous chapters, this somewhat 
precarious position raises a number of issues and concerns. The main ones lie not only in 
the problems of this very approach, including the type of methodology appropriate for 
analysing the characters, but also in the question of correlation between the writer's creative 
free will on one hand and objective artistic constraints on the other.
175 Shestov, JJocmoeecKUU u Huifuie, p. 331.
176 Erofeev, p. 172.
177 Ibid. The quotation from Shestov is taken from Ha eecax Hoea, p. 29.
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In the previous chapter we discussed the nature and legitimacy of a psychoanalytical 
approach to literary characters. This was connected to Rancour-Lafferiere’s and others’ 
theories of our perception of literary heroes as real people — often more real to us, he 
suggests, than our friends and colleagues, because the former are more ‘open’ to us, the 
readers, in the course of the narrative than the latter in the course of real life. The most 
substantial problem in this perception seems to lie in the fact that literary heroes rely for the 
integrity of their image, or for their credibility, on the genius of the author. Indeed, for a 
mediocre writer a character can be schematised, contradictory and simply implausible, 
while for a real master a hero, even a secondary one, is conceived as a holistic image, 
endowed with the tiniest features appropriate to his human character. In fact, once 
conceived the hero grows in his own right, acquiring those features and becoming as it were 
independent of his creator, for the inner logic of the character under creation takes over, 
dictating its own rules and imposing its own demands. Such a process, which in a sense is 
that of Galateia created by Pygmalion and then stepping out of the stone and beyond his 
control, was described by Mikhail Bulgakov in his TeampcuibHbiu poM m  (even though 
there it relates to turning a novel into a play):
...M H e H anajio  xa3aT bca n o  B enepaM , h to  H3 b e /io f t cTpaHHUbi BbiCTynaeT h t o -to  uBeTH oe. 
IIpHCM aTpHBaacb, m y p a c b , a  ybeA H jica b t o m , h to  s t o  KapTHHKa. H  6 o jie e  T o ro , hto  KapTHHKa 3Ta 
He iu io cK aa , a  T pexM epH aa. K a x  bb i x o p o b o n x a , h  b  Heft cKB03b c t p o h k h  b h a h o : ropH T  CBeT h 
flBroKyrcfl b Heft Te caM bie cjm rypxH , hto  o n n caH b i b  poM aH e. [ . . . ]  C TeneHHeM  BpeMeHH K aM epa b 
KHJDKKe 3a3B ynajia . R  o th ctjih bo  c jib iin a n  3ByKH p o a jm . [ . . . ]  3 aneM  nee racH eT  KOMHaTKa, 3aneM  Ha 
CTpaH H uax H acT ynaeT  3h m h h h  HOHb H aa  Jf tie n p o M , 3aneM  BbicTynaiOT jiom aaw H bie  M opflbi, a  Haa 
h h m h  jiH u a  jn o a e f t  b n a n a x a x .  [ . . . ]  B o h  b e x a r r ,  3 a a b ix a a c b , H eaoB eneK . C k b o 3b T abanH bift a u M  a 
cjieacy  3a  h h m , h H a n p a ra io  3peH He h  Bn»cy: CBepKHyao c3aaH  n e n o B e x a , BbiCTpea, o h * oxH yB, 
n a a a e T  HaB3HHHb, x a x  byaTO  ocTpbiM  hohcom e r o  c n e p e a n  y a a p n a n  b  c e p a u e .  O h  H eno/jBinxHO 
aeacHT, h  o t  ro ao B b i p acT ex aeT ca  n ep H aa  ayacH ua . A  b  B bicoTe a y H a , a  B a a a n  uenoH K oft rpycT H bie , 
KpacHOBaTbie oroH bXH  b  ceaeH H H . [ . . . ]  ...A  x a x  bb i (J)HKCHpoBaTb 3t h  (fjHrypKH? T a x , HTobbi o h h  He 
y in a H  y3xe b o a e e  H H xyaa?  H  HOHbio o aH aag rb i a  p e u irn i  3 i y  B o am eb H y io  xaM epy  o n n c a T b . K a x  ace 
e e  o n n c a T b ?  A  oneH b n p o cT o . H to  BHaH uib, t o  h  n n u iH , a  n e r o  He BHaH uib, n n caT b  He c a e a y e T .178
This allows us to conclude that a writer, in a certain sense which may seem paradoxical to 
some, has only a partial power over his creations. Because once conceived and thought 
through as a human type, turning into a particular character in the literary piece, the heroes
178 M. A. Bulgakov, 3anucKU yiokouhukci (TeampcuibHbiu poMan) in Co6panue conumHuu e 5 
moMax (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1990), vol. 4, pp. 434-435.
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gain their independent rights which only the writer's intuition can sense to the full and 
develop, or rather reflect, on paper. In other words, the process becomes reverse -  the 
writer now follows the hero, who has ‘stepped out of stone’, in order to describe him most 
adequately. Again, here the words of Brodsky are to be recollected that the true poet is 
characterized by his ability to single out and depict the main metaphysical features of the 
object, in an unconscious camera-like fashion, almost despite himself.179
The same must be true of the prose writer creating a character and giving him life: the 
author feels the metaphysics of the created image in both his external and internal features 
as well as his reactions to various life situations and interactions with other characters. 
Metaphorically speaking, the difference between brilliant and lesser writers in terms of 
character creation is akin to the difference between people who are innate spies and those 
who are trained, but without having any natural predisposition to it. The former, having 
learned the main story behind their false persona, start living it out in the full sense, i.e. 
‘become’ those invented personalities having completed the schematised image with details 
at the subconscious level, to the extent of total inner identification with the fictitious 
individual. Thus their reactions are immediate and natural. Others approach the task 
logically and can figure out the answers in any given situation, but their reactions are 
delayed and often unnatural because forced. They act at the level of rationality rather than 
intuition. Thus a great writer is led by the intuitive insight into the character being created, 
which runs deeper than the rational construction of such a character.
In this sense the writer's freedom of creation is never limitless, as was discussed in Chapter 
3 in connection to Yves Bonnefoy’s (a contemporary French poet) essay on Shestov A 
I'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de Vecrivain dans la pensee de Chestov . As 
was explained, Bonnefoy considers one of Shestov’s central concepts -  that of freedom -  
and raises the question if the latter was seeking in literature this boundless self-willed
179 The precise quotation reads: ‘A good poem, in a sense, is like a photograph that puts its objects' 
metaphysical features into sharp focus. Accordingly, a good poet is one who does this sort of thing 
in a camera-like fashion: quite unwittingly, almost in spite of himself (Joseph Brodsky, from the 
foreword to An Age Ago, p. xvi).
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divine freedom of the writer which exceeds even the freedom of the Creator. This question 
for Bonnefoy stems from the main aspect of Shestov's philosophy -  his search for the 
omnipotent God -  God who can not only compose the future, but also mend the past, as 
Shestov explains in his book Potestas Clavium. However, Bonnefoy’s implicaton is that 
Shestov effectively mistook an aesthetically flawed imposition of self-will for a writer's 
creative freedom, and transferred this onto the plane of the Divine.
In the same vein (of the demands of an aesthetic, if not ethical, diktat) ‘coexistence and 
interaction’ which are normally characterised as the basis of action of Dostoevsky's
1 SOcharacters need no longer be opposed to ‘becoming’, because the former are rooted in the 
latter and the relationship between them is that of the visible tip of the iceberg to its 
invisible foundation. In other words the diktat of the inner logic of a character provides for 
the extension of its ‘visible’, i.e. literally presented parts, to the ‘invisible’ ones that may be 
only hinted at in the narrative. Such understanding may add to the interpretation of 
Chekhov's famous phrase that if there is a gun on the wall in the first act it should be shot in 
the last. In other words, the inner logic of the literary hero, his ‘human’ unity and integrity, 
should be consistent and inescapable. Resorting to metaphor again, if two pieces of line on 
a graph are not visibly joined, the joining line of the readers' imagination within the 
margins of the accidental, undetermined and left to chance, should nevertheless add up to a 
continuous draft, not distorting the natural smoothness of forms of the resulting picture.
The relevance of all the above to our main theme is direct. Indeed it goes straight to the 
heart of Shestov's fundamental misconceptions in approaching literature. In particular it 
undermines considerably the unconditional identification of the writer with his characters, 
exactly for the reasons outlined above. The author may indeed inhabit one character or 
another, as well as project his general world view onto his perception of his heroes, but his 
inner duty to stay truthful to the reality of life prevents him (and the greater he is, the more 
so) from bending the characters, who gained their independent existence, to his intellectual 
will. Thus judging their human merits does not equate to judging his.
180 See, for example, Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p. 127.
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In this sense, if  we accept the full reality of Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's characters, Frank 
Seeley's treatment of them provides an example of an immaculate psychological assessment 
and penetrating analysis. On the other hand, exactly because Seeley’s treatment is based 
entirely on taking the heroes as fully real human beings it is totally reliant on the 
impeccability of the literary works, for any fault such as inconsistency or randomness that 
may have occurred therein would have had immediate bearings on Seeley's whole 
construction derived on the basis of complete genuineness of the relevant characters. Thus 
even in the case of such supreme masters as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky one will do best by 
proceeding with caution, taking into account both the fictional literary reality and the 
author's actual reality.
Indeed, it is hardly arguable that in one way or another the writer's inner world undoubtedly 
does appear in his creative work, but the degree of this differs significantly from writer to 
writer (and even from book to book), therefore the traces of such an appearance are to be 
read off the narrative with extreme care, and never with the definite conviction of ultimate 
validity. The author may emerge deliberately in a character, or be scattered across a number 
of them; the writing may be distinctly autobiographical or nothing of the sort; the writer can 
toy with the idea and then test it against other ideas by investing different characters with 
these. The ideas may be his own, artificially invented or obsessive, as well as those flying 
in the air at the time, going into fashion or out of it. In this sense the writer does have the 
powers of the creator, but in a somewhat restricted and non-arbitrary way, because, as we 
argued above, these characters soon acquire an independent existence, and even if driven 
and determined by particular ideas they grow into a complex, but holistic unity.
Related questions were addressed by Bakhtin from the point of view of the poetics of the 
underlying text and the type of discourse used by the author. Dostoevsky's discourse, he 
claims, is distinctly non-monological. Therefore, although his characters are often 
characterised as possessed by an idea, this idea is activated and gains meaning only in 
dialogue with other ideas and can only be considered within the separate holistic
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consciousness of a given hero. ‘Mnp /JocToeBCKoro rjiy6oKo nepcoHajiHCTHHeH’, Bakhtin 
writes;
B cn icy io  M bicjib o h  BocnpHHHM aeT h  H 3o6paacaeT  KaK no3HUHio jih h h o c t h . Ilo3TO M y aax ce  b 
n p e ^ e j ia x  o x ae jib H b ix  co3HaHHH /majieKTHHecKHH h jih  aHTHHOMHHecKHH p a a  -  JiHinb aScrpaK TH biH  
MOMeHT, H epa3pbiB H 0 cruieTeHHbiH c /ipyrH M H  MOMeHTaMH u e jib H o ro  KOHKpeTHoro co3HaHHa. 
H ep e3  3to  B on jiom eH H oe KOHKpeTHoe C 03H am ie, b  hchbom  r o j io c e  u e jib H o ro  nejiOBeKa jiorHHecKHH 
p ha  npHoGmaeTCH ej^HHCTBy H 3o6paacaeM oro  c o6 w t h h . M m c jib , BOBjieneHHaH b  c o S b rra e , 
CTaHOBHTCH caM a coSbiTHHHOH h  n p u o S p e T a e T  t o t  ocoS b iH  xapaK T ep  “ HAen-HyBCTBa” , “ n a e H - 
CHJibi” , KOTopbiii co 3 aaeT  H enoBTopH M oe C B oeo6pa3H e “ n a e H ”  b TBopnecKOM M upe 
,H ocToeB C K oro.181
These suggestions by Bakhtin naturally lead to the more general issue of the perception or 
definition of ideas in Dostoevsky’s works as seen through his characters. In this connection 
Seeley argues that the ‘idea’ of Dostoevsky’s heroes is ‘a conceptual formulation of a 
complex of desires or passions which are unacceptable to the dominant self and so are 
repressed and banished to the unconscious where they form “the nucleus of a second 
personality’” .182 In addition Seeley makes an interesting remark that ‘the “idea” of the 
heroes has been misconceived hitherto as essentially intellectual’. However, perhaps in 
contrast to the main critical body that Seeley implies, Bakhtin in the above observations 
does not by any means restrict the ideas of Dostoevsky’s heroes to the domain of the 
intellectual. One of Seeley’s most captivating examples where, as he shows, the idea spills 
far beyond the domain of the intellectual and reflects the profound psychological conflict of 
two sides of a split personality is that of Nastasia Fillipovna in The Idiot. ‘Nastasia’s 
“idea”’, Seeley writes, ‘differs from those of the heroes in remaining only partly conscious 
and partly verbalised’.184 However, Seeley deems this difference as one of form rather than 
function and thus of secondary importance. He maintains that, as in the case of 
Dostoevsky’s male heroes, Nastasia’s primary question is ‘Who am I?’ and argues that to 
say that she is ‘devoured by her “idea” is to say that she is tom apart by the claims of two 
alternative personalities’.
181 Bakhtin, p. 10.
182 Seeley, Saviour or Superman?, p.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid, p. 89.
185 Ibid
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The full stop is, perhaps, put by Richard Peace who summarises the rich variety of critical 
interpretations of ‘the constructional principles which shape and direct the typical 
Dostoevskian novel’ by saying that ‘it is important to recognize that ideas are the basic 
material of Dostoevsky’s art, but not ideas that are static, not tenets of received wisdom, 
nor even challenging ideas inscribed in tablets of stone, as might be the case with a Tolstoy, 
they are dynamic concepts, constantly shifting, turning into their opposites, subverting 
received wisdom, and surging ahead in a turbulent process that can have no conclusion’.186
For Shestov, on the other hand, both ‘ideas’ and ‘ideals’ constitute something that
Dostoevsky allegedly is fighting against. It is a hostile entity which he is trying to force out
of the door, having invested with it a particular character. Thus, as was partially quoted
above, Shestov writes with respect to Liza from the Notes from Underground: ‘ncTopna c
J I h 3 0 h ,  KOHeHHO, BbmyMaHa. Ho b  t o m - t o  h  Becb yxcac 3anncoK, h t o  ^ocToeBCKOMy
noHaaofimiocb x o t b  m b i c j i c h h o ,  x o t b  b  (J)aHTa3HH npoflejiaTt Taxoe 6e3o6pa3ne. He J lH 3 y
o h  3^ecb Bbiraaji o t  ce6a. [...] EMy HyxceH fibui o6pa3 JlH3bi jramb 3aTeM, h t o 6 b i  onjieBaTb
h  B T o n T a T b  b  r p « 3 b  “ n ^ e i o ” , T y  c a M y i o  H ^ e i o ,  K O T o p o f t  o h  c j i y x c H J i  b  T e n e H n e  B e e n  c B o e f t
x c h 3 h h ’ . 187 Therefore Shestov allows himself to interpret characters as ideas, as well as to
see in them the author himself. For Bakhtin this way of interpreting Dostoevsky has a very
restricted validity: ‘H3 KOHKperabix h  nejibHbix co3HaHHH repoeB ( h  caMoro aBTopa)
BbuiymHBajiHCb H^eojiorHHecKHe Te3HCbi’, and this can only result, according to Bakhtin, in
188
‘a  b a d  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s t a t e m e n t ’ ( ‘n n o x o e  ( jm j io c o ^ C K o e  y T B e p x y je H H e ’) .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  i t  i s  n o t  u n u s u a l  t o  c o n s i d e r  i d e a s  a s  a c t i n g  h e r o e s  o f  D o s t o e v s k y ’s  w o r k s ,  o p e r a t i n g  
o n  t h e  s a m e  p l a n e  a s  t h e  ‘p r o p e r ’ c h a r a c t e r s .  A s  B a k h t i n  s a y s ,  i n  D o s t o e v s k y ’s  n o v e l s
189‘hflea [...] aeHCTBHTejibHO CTaHOBHTca noHTH repoHHen npoH3BeaeHHa’. However, 
Shestov seems to be doing the reverse in considering characters as ideas incarnate rather 
th^n ideas as acting characters. This said, he does sometimes make a distinction between a 
fully-blown character, masterfully depicted (for him, as a rule, such characters are to be
186 Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from, Underground, p. v.
187 Shestov, JdocmoeecKuu uHutfuce, p. 350.
188 Bakhtin, p. 10.
189 Ibid, p. 52.
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found amongst Dostoevsky’s ‘negative’ ones) and a walking idea, a pale shadow -  
characteristics he sarcastically endows, for example, Myshkin with, as we saw above.
The meeting point of the above interpretations of ideas and their role and depiction in 
Dostoevsky appears to be in the implied understanding that almost every hero of 
Dostoevsky is the bearer of an idea. While Bakhtin speaks of an ‘idea involved in an event’, 
an ‘idea-feeling’, an ‘idea-force’,190 Seeley views ideas as intellectual and emotional 
constructs which reflect the deep inner conflict of a split personality. At the same time 
Peace emphasises ‘the multiplicity of secondary characters in the novels’ being part of the 
turbulent process described above -  of constant transformation and motion of ideas in 
Dostoevsky’s works.191 For Shestov, on the other hand, ideas are embedded in characters to 
be disposed of, as it were for an execution, for expulsion from the writer’s psyche; in other 
words with the purpose for the writer of settling scores with his own self. Thus again 
Shestov conducts a psychoanalysis of the writer using his work as evidence (or, in other 
words, reading it as a self-narrative within the framework of ‘narrative psychology’, as 
discussed earlier), while others analyse the work as such, perceiving it first and foremost as 
a literary creation in its own right.
6.1.8. The Gift of Prophecy: the two-level structure (f lB y x u p y c H O C T b )  of Shestov’s 
thought as a manifestation of his inner struggle.
Curiously perhaps, Dostoevsky's heroes did not play any role in Shestov's next separate 
work dedicated to the writer, which was written in 1906 for the occasion of the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of Dostoevsky's death. This work, entitled The Gift o f Prophecy [IJpoponecKuu 
dap], is invariably referred to as weird, because in it Shestov seems to do little else than 
criticise Dostoevsky's political vision and denounce his claim of prophecy. Blagova and 
Emelianov go as far as labelling it a lampoon. They assert that in this work Shestov 
‘o n H C tm a e T  /J o c T o e B C K o ro  x a x  H e y z ia B in e r o c a  n p o p o x a ,  K O T o p tm  j i r a j i ,  h t o 6 l i  y ro ,zu m >
1 Q9
uapcKOMy flBopy’. For our purposes this w ork, despite its relatively  short length, is o f
190 Bakhtin, p. 10.
191 Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, p. v.
192 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 51.
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substantial importance, because it is explicitly directed at the schism between Dostoevsky 
the novelist on the one hand and Dostoevsky, the public figure on the other. Shestov reveals 
this schism by considering a correlation between the two and providing a severe critique of 
the latter. As for the reasons underlying this critique, different perspectives can be taken. 
Thus, Blagova and Emelianov point out that the article is written by Shestov as if in a state 
of extreme anger, which is responsible in particular for twisting historical facts in order to 
create out of Dostoevsky an image of a failure who imagined himself a prophet. The cause 
of this attitude they see in Shestov’s inability to forgive Dostoevsky for ‘betraying the 
underground’ through maintaining high ideals of the good and of brotherly love while 
knowing perfectly that the latter is quite impossible.193 Indeed, Shestov described 
Dostoevsky in this work in the following way:
b xaTopre h noAnonbe, poflHJiacb h aoato >xHJia BenHxaa >xa9XAa Bora, TaM 6buia BenHxaa 6opb6a, 
dopbda He Ha acH3Hb, a Ha CMepTb, TaM BnepBbie npoH3BOAHJiHCb Te HOBbie h CTpaniHbie onbiTbi, 
KOTOpbie cpoAHHJiH /JocToeBCXoro co BceM, hto ecTb Ha 3eMjie MHTymerocH h HecnoxofiHoro. To, 
hto nHiueT /JocToeBCKHH b nocneAHHe roflbi CBoen >kh3hh (He TOJibKO neeuuK nucamem, ho h 
EpambR KapaMa306bi), HMeeT ueHHOCTb jiHuib nocmnbxy, nocxonbxy TaM OTpaacaeTca npouuioe 
JfocToeBCKoro. Hoboto AanbHenmero rnara oh yace He cAejian. Kax 6 bui, Tax h ocTanca HaKanyne 
BejiHxoii HCTHHbi. Ho npeacAe 3Toro dbino eMy Mano, oh McaacAan AaAbHeHinero, a Tenepb oh He 
xoneT bopoTbca h He yMeeT 06 'bacHHTb hh cede, hh ApyrHM, hto co6 ctbchho c hhm nponcxoAHT. 
Oh npoAOAacaeT cHMyjinpoBaTb 6 opb6y — Aa, CBepx Toro, oh xax dyzrro dbi oxoHHaTeAbHo 
nodeAHJi h TpedyeT, HTod nodeAa dbina npH3HaHa odmecTBeHHbiM mhchhcm. EMy xoneTca AyMaTb,194
h to  xaH yH  yace n p o rn eA , h to  H acT y n w i H a cT o am n n  ACHb.
Blagova's and Emelianov's thoughts on this matter are reminiscent of Viktor Erofeev's 
analysis of Shestov's work on Tolstoy (Creating and Destroying Worlds) that we addressed 
in the previous chapter. Erofeev quotes Shestov's lines on the revelations that the proximity 
of death brings and on the human inability to remain at the level of those revelations, that is 
to say to sustain the level of tragedy. ‘Ha MrHOBeHHe neAOBex, xax xy3HeHHX, B3AeTHT b  
BbicoTy -  h  b o t  o h  y)xe CHOBa Ha C B oeM  npemieM MecTe...’,195 Erofeev quotes Shestov. In 
The Gift o f Prophecy Shestov clearly implicates Dostoevsky in the same behaviour pattern, 
by accusing the writer of opting for Russian Orthodox rhetoric as a shield from tragedy and
193 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 52.
194 Shestov, IJpopoMecKuu dap, p. 221.
195 Shestov, Pa3pyiuaiouiuu u co3udajoufuu Mupu, pp. 346-347. Cited in Erofeev, p. 178.
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a comfortable platform for a successful (in the common world sense of the word) existence 
which Dostoevsky was at last enjoying.
OSpamaio eme pa3 BHHMaHHe Ha to  flajieico He cjiynaHHoe odcTOjrrejibCTBo, h to  nponoBeat 
coBnaua c caMbiM “cBeTjibiM nepHOAOM” ero hch3h h . npem m ii 6e3AOMHbiH k o h c b h h k , 6eAH3K, He 
3HaBiiiHH, r^e npemioHHTb rojiOBy, o63aBejica ceMben, codcTBeHHbiM a o m o m , Aaace AenbraMH 
(aceHa npHKanjiHBana). HeyAanHHK CTan 3HaMeHHTocTbio. KaTopacHHK —  nojiHonpaBHbiM 
rpaacAaHHHOM. FIoAnojibe, Kyzja eme HeAaBHo h  HaBcerAa, KaK m ojkho 6biJio AyMaTb, 3arHana ero 
cyAbda, KaaceTca cTapoft (fmHTacMaropHeft, HHKorAa He dbiBuien AencTBHTejibHOCTbio,196 Shestov 
writes.
However, in connection with The Gift o f  Prophecy Erofeev makes a more subtle 
observation. He claims that ‘UlecTOBCKaa mbicab cymecTByeT OAHOBpeMeHHo Ha AByx
1 Q7ypoBHHx: o6liachhocth h TpareAHH5. At ‘day time’ Shestov reasons from a humanistic 
stance which for him is equivalent to the position of the mundane, while ‘at night’ he 
exercises a different -  tragic -  sight, Erofeev essentially asserts. Moreover he claims that 
despite diligent attempts by Shestov to segregate these layers of his thought, they 
inadvertently start to interact. Erofeev does not develop this interesting idea in full detail, 
but to us it seems to resonate with his assertion at the beginning of his article (shared by 
various Shestov scholars) that Shestov himself possessed the second sight with which by 
Shestov's own metaphor the angel of death endowed Dostoevsky. This additional 
extraordinary sight in contrast to the ordinary one which agrees with all other senses as well 
as with the mind, is prone to fantastic, unlawful, hallucinating visions which are in total 
disaccord with the voice of reason. ‘H TorAa HauHHaeTca 6opb6a MeacAy AByMfl 3peHHAMH 
-  ecTecTBeHHMM h HeecTecTBeHHMM -  6opt6a, hcxoa KOTOpOH Tax ace KaaceTca
1 QfinpodAeMaTHHeH h TanHCTBeHeH, Kax h ee HauaAO...’, Shestov wrote. Thus, Shestov's 
own struggle to overcome his innate idealism and rationalism for the sake of the irrational 
and tragic, to get to the truth, to the roots of things can be regarded as the struggle between 
his second -  tragic -  sight, and his first -  ordinary one. It is this struggle that must be 
responsible for the constant intervention of the ‘day’ truths into the ‘night’ truths that 
Erofeev observes. It is also this struggle that Shestov traces in Dostoevsky in an accusatory
196 Shestov, TIpopoHecKUu dap, p. 221.
197 Erofeev, p. 173.
198 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 29.
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fashion, blaming the writer for the regular concessions of the fantastic sight to the ordinary 
one.
Zenkovsky's words that we have quoted earlier capture the same phenomenon of 
rationalism's tenacity for life in Shestov: ‘...nocjie Top c^ecTBeHHbix “noxopoH” 
panHOHajiH3Ma b  o j j h o h  KHHre, o h  cHOBa B03BpamaeTca b  cjieayiomeH KHure k  KpHTHKe 
paixHOHanH3Ma, KaK 6 b i o>KHBmero 3a 3 t o  BpeMa. ... pa3pymHB b  c e d e  o / j h h  “ c j i o h ”  
paLtHOHajiHCTHHecKHx nojio c^eHHH, IIIecTOB HaTBiKaeTcn b  cede )Ke Ha h o b b i h ,  6ojiee 
rjiydoKHH c j io h  Toro ace paijHOHajiH3Ma’.199 Thus Shestov consciously chose for himself the 
route of spiritual to u r  d e  f o r c e  -  to eradicate from his very being those aspects of himself 
that constitute human nature. In a sense he was ruthlessly applying to himself Chekhov's 
famous words about ‘squeezing the slave out o f oneself, only with a different 
interpretation of what constitutes inner slavery. While Chekhov was referring to the 
intrinsic vices o f human nature causing a loss o f dignity and self-respect, for Shestov it was 
reason, rationalist philosophy and ethics that enslaved mankind. By constructing his 
philosophy o f tragedy, by choosing this gloomy route, Shestov was waging war on his own 
deepest instincts and emotional attachments, on his comfortable spiritual existence amongst 
the ‘self-evident’ truths. As in the case o f Lev Tolstoy, who for that reason was dear and 
close to Shestov, the latter was also caught between his instincts and his convictions, and 
had resolved to kill his instincts in favour of his convictions.
It is because of this struggle that David Gascoyne insisted on distinguishing between 
existentialism of the Sartrean variety, understood as ‘the post-experimental intellectual 
exploitation of the experience of existing’ and Shestov’s existential philosophy -  the ‘actual 
spiritual activity’ that the latter ‘believed to consist in absolutely undivided truth- 
seeking’.200 Also, that is why Berdiaev could state that ‘JleB IIIecTOB 6biji 4>hjioco(J)om, 
KOTOpBIH (j)HJIOCO(])CTBOBaJI BCCM CBOHM CyHjeCTBOM, JXJW KOTOporO (j)HJIOCO(l)Hfl 6buia He
Of) 1 ,aicafleMHHecKOH cneHHajibHOCTtio, a flenoM >k h 3 h h  h  CMepra’. In this context
199 Zenkovskii, n, p. 367.
200 Gascoyne, pp. 128 and 131.
201 Berdiaev, ‘OcHOBHaa H,aea (Jjhjioco^ h h  JIbBa IIIecTOBa’, p. 5.
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Zenkovsky's words that Shestov can be understood only in connection with his constant 
submission of himself to an inner crucifixion,202 seem particularly relevant.
Thus Erofeev's observation o f the ‘double-layemess’ of Shestov's thought in some sense 
can be considered as guidance through Shestov's lampoon on Dostoevsky of 1906. Indeed, 
in it Shestov openly regards Dostoevsky from the mundane, ‘day time’ position, and thus 
criticises him for the reactionary nature o f his political stance and predictions. Having first 
explained the difference between the two approaches in the case of Tolstoy, Shestov thus 
clears the way to laying blame on Dostoevsky. Indeed, he asks with respect to Tolstoy if  the 
latter’s political short-sightedness (Shestov refers to Tolstoy’s views concerning revolution 
and specifically on a Moscow armed rebellion) was not in fact a manifestation of the 
novelist’s spiritual grandeur whereby he saw instead what other mortals were unable to see. 
‘H t o  ecjm, cnpaniHBaenib ce6a, T o jic t o h  h  TeTe orroro He b h ^ c jih  peBOJiiOHHH h  He 
fiojiejiH ee MyicaMH, h t o  o h h  b h ^ c jih  h c h t o  HHoe, M05KeT 6b i t b , fiojree HyacHoe h  BaacHoe? 
Beat 3 t o  —  moan BejiHHanmero ,n;yxa! Mo>KeT 6b i t b , h  b  caMOM aejie Ha He6e h  3eMjie 
ecTB Bemn, KOToptie He c h h j ih c b  Hameii yneHOCTH?..’,203 Shestov writes. The implication 
is: Dostoevsky despite all his mistakes regarded as such from the ordinary ‘day-time’ 
position, might have perceived through all these something ‘necessary and important’, 
invisible to other mortals -  as the night-time vision suggests. This ‘night-time’ possibility 
justifies the due criticism that his political utopianism (labelled as such from the day-time 
position) deserves. Shestov thus as it were gives himself a licence to provide all this 
criticism with vigorous force.
Of course, Blagova’s and Emelianov’s interpretation of the article as Shestov's revenge, as 
his unwillingness to forgive Dostoevsky his betrayal of the underground, also has its clear 
validity. Moreover, the continuation of the same line is clearly present in Shestov's next 
work on Dostoevsky, written fifteen years later:
202 See Zenkovskii, II, p. 369.
203 Shestov, JJpoponecKuu dap, p. 220.
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^OCTOeBCKOMy, HToSbl “AeHCTBOBaTb” , npHIIIJlOCb nOAHHHHTb CBOe BTOpoe 3peH H e o6bIHHOMy 
H ejioB enecK O M y 3peH H io, rapM O H H 3H pyiom eM y h  c o  b c c m h  ocTanbHbiM H HeAOBenecKHMH  
nyBCTBaMH h  c  HauiHM pa3yMOM. Oh 3a x o T eji HayHHTb j h o a c h ,  Kax hm  HyjKHO >KHTb h jih ,  
ynoT pe6jiH H  e r o  BbipaaceH H e, “ ycT poH T bca c  E o ro M ” . Ho c  E oroM  “y cT p oH T b ca” e m e  M eH ee  
bo3m o> kh o, neM  “ycTpoH TbCfl”  6 e 3  B o r a . CaM  ^ o c t o c b c k h h  p accK a 3 a n  HaM 3 t o  b " B cjih k o m  
HHKBH3HTOpe" [ . . . ]  CaM OH B "BeJlHKOM HHKBH3HTOpe" TaK BAOXHOBCHHO paCCKa3aJl HaM, HTO JIIOAH 
OTToro h  y u u iH  o t  B o r a , h t o  O h He 3 a x o T eji 03a6oT H T bca h x  3eMHbiM ycT poeH H eM , He 3a x o T eji 
"rapaHTHpoBaTb" KanpH3. H  Bce-TaKH npoAOJiacaA nponoB eA O B aT b - npeBpam aTb noT ycT opoH H H e  
HCTHHbi b o 6 m e o 6 a 3 a T ejib H b ie  cyacAeHHA. [ . . . ]  P e3yjibT aT bi nonynaiOTCH H ecjib ixaH H bie. 3a^caTbie b 
THCKH BCeMCTBa, “ HCCTyiUieHHfl” /JOCTOeBCKOTC) CTaHOBHTCH “ npHCJiy^KHHKaMH” o6bIAeHHOCTH,204
maintained Shestov.
Even in his first book on Dostoevsky we find the beginning o f the same bitterness with 
respect to Dostoevsky's attempts at prophecy:
flocToeBCK H H , Kax H3BecTHO, jh o 6 h j i  npopoH ecT B O B aT b. O x o T H ee  B c e r o  o h  npeA CK a3biBan, h t o  
P o c c h h  cy>KAeHo BepH yTb E B p o n e  3 a 6 b iT y io  TaM H A eio B ceH ejiO B en ecK oro  bpaTCTBa. O a h h m  H3 
n e p B b ix  p y ccK H x  jiio A efi, n p n o b p e T iiiH x  b j ih u h h c  Ha e B p o n e ih je B , 6biJi caM  ^ o c t o c b c k h h .  H h t o  
vke, npHBHJiacb e r o  n p o n o B e A t?  O  Heft n o r o B o p n jiH , eft Aaace yAHBjiajiHCb -  h o  e e  3a6biJiu. nep B b iH  
A ap, KOTOpbiH E B p o n a  c  S jia roA ap H ocT b io  npHHHJia o t  P o c c h h ,  6 b u ia  “ n c n x o j io r m i”  /JocT oeB C K oro, 
t .  e .  noA nojibH bift H ejio B ex , c  e r o  pa3HOBHAHOCTHMH, PacKOjibHHKOBbiMH, KapaM a30BbiM H, 
KHpnjiJiOBbiMH. He np aB A a j ih ,  K axaa r j iy b o x a a  npoH H a cy A b b b i? ,205 w r o t e  S h e s t o v  in  h is  
Dostoevsky and N ietzsche.
On the other hand, we wish to suggest further interpretations o f Shestov's lampoon, which 
in a sense complement those of Erofeev and Blagova with Emelianov. For us a hint is 
evident in this article -  especially in view o f Shestov's declaration made there that the final 
truth eludes everyone, no matter what geniuses they are, and even the eternal underground 
is powerless to open one's eyes to it -  that the vital ingredient in Shestov's incentive for his 
severe criticism might have been his genuine annoyance with the discrepancy between 
Dostoevsky's power as a writer and his utter powerlessness, to the extent of playing a pitiful 
reactionary role, as a public figure (or ‘prophet’ in Shestov's terminology). After all, 
Shestov was forever preoccupied, by his own acknowledgement, by the enigma of human 
genius: ‘H acK ontico h  b  KaKHx ofiAacTax reHHH 3HaeT h  MO>KeT fioAbine, neM 
ofibiKHOBeHHBie ak)ah ? \ 206 he wrote in the same G ift o f  P ro p h ecy . In other words, Shestov 
suddenly gave way to his ‘day-time’ vision, and a catalyst for this bursting through was his
204 Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, pp. 107-108.
205 Shestov, flocmoeecKUU u Hutfiue, p. 332.
206 Shestov, npoponecKuu dap, p. 220.
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being overwhelmed by the first Russian revolution. ‘Oh nyraji Hac, h t o  b  EBpone 
npojibioTCfl peKH k p o b h  H3-3a KjiaccoBOH 6opb6bi, a y Hac, 6naroAapa Hameft pyccKOH 
BcenejTOBeHecKOH H^ee, He t o j i h k o  m h p h o  pa3pemaTCJi HauiH BHyTpeHHHe Bonpocbi, h o  
eme HaimeTCfl HOBoe, HecjibixaHHoe aocejie c j i o b o ,  k o t o p b i m  m m  cnaceM HecnacTHyio 
EBpony’, wrote Shestov about Dostoevsky’s predictions and continued:
Ilpomjio neTBepTb Beica. B EBpone noxa Hnnero He cjiyHHJiocb. Mbi nee 3axjie6biBaeMca, 
6yKBajibHO 3axne6biBaeMCH b kpobh. Y Hac AymaT He TOJibKO HHOpOAueB, cjiaBHH h He cnaBHH, y 
Hac Tep3aioT CBoero »ce 6paTa, HecnacTHoro, H3rojiOAaBineroca, HHnero He noHHMaiomero 
pyccKoro MyxcHKa. B Mockbc, b cep/me Pocchh, paccTpenHBajiH >KeHiAHH, AeTen h ctbphkob. r^e 
ace pyccKHH BcenejiOBeK, o kotopom npoponecTBOBaji JfocToeBCKHH b nyuiKHHCKOH peHH? T^e 
jnoboBb, me xpncTHaHCKHe 3anoBeAH? Mbi bhahm OAHy “rocyAapcTBeHHOCTb”, H3-3a KOTopon 
SopoAHCb h 3anaAHbie HapoAbi — ho Gopojincb MeHee xccctokhmh h aHTHKyjibTypHbiMH 
cpeACTBaMH. Pocchh onaTb npHAerca ynHTbca y 3anaAa, KaK yxce He pa3 npHXOAHAOcb yHHTbca... 
H /focToeBCKHH ropa3AO Jiynme CAenan 6bi, ecjiH 6bi He nbiTanca npoponecTBOBaTb,207 Shestov 
concludes.
Thus, while Dostoevsky the writer served, in Erofeev's apt remark, as Shestov's Virgil to 
lead him through the tragic underground kingdom, he was no pastor for him in the bloody 
jungle o f Russian reality. One can feel Shestov's bitter, almost childish resentment that 
Dostoevsky's utopian visions o f Russians showing Europeans a bloodless way to universal 
harmony remained utopian, and life, instead, humiliated these predictions by its 
retrogressive motion. In other words, Shestov's bitterness about the chaos of life, about the 
lack o f orientation in it, is a hidden complaint about Dostoevsky's inability to provide civil 
guidance, as opposed to the artistic guidance given by his unrivalled literary and 
philosophical genius. Moreover, while Shestov perceived Dostoevsky's political sentiments 
as retrograde, his artistic predictions, which turned out to be prophetic, were interpreted by 
Shestov, as we shall see, in too narrowly a metaphysical sense to be able to help him 
through the political destinies of Russia and the world. Thus, the incompatibility of 
Dostoevsky's artistic and political predictions was the most hurtful thing to Shestov, 
perhaps especially so, because it painfully engaged his two sights (the ‘tragic’ and the 
‘ordinary’) simultaneously and the resulting conflict could not be resolved. Indeed, 
Dostoevsky's reactionary thrusts seem to Shestov's common sense (which normally could
207 Shestov, TIpopoMecKUU dap, pp. 223-224.
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be suppressed in favour o f his ‘apotheosis o f groundlessness’, in his attempts to defeat 
reason) insulting by the way of contrast with the novelist's extreme intelligence. To put it 
differently, Shestov was suffering on Dostoevsky’s behalf (IIIecTOBy 6buio o6h£ho 3a 
^ocToeBCKoro), he felt resentful, his heart bled because o f this discrepancy, virtually a 
disharmony, on the part o f his main teacher, and especially in view of Shestov's genuine 
love for him. In a way this points to what can be labelled as political or social moralism of 
Shestov. Below we shall discuss the absence in him of ‘private’ or ‘personal’ moralism, of 
the kind that was probably inherent in Strakhov, as Jackson argues.
Part of the above disharmony was also concealed in the implication o f the utter 
powerlessness o f literature to influence contemporary reality -  another encoded message to 
be found at the heart o f Shestov's satire. This theme o f the role o f literature in the political 
life of a state, or a play-off between literary and socio-political forces, goes back to the 
famous ‘poet and tsar’ line in the creativity o f virtually all major artists. Moreover during 
the Silver Age the relationship between an individual and society, which opens up in 
particular to the relationship between an artist and the state, was at the forefront. ‘. . .BjiacTb, 
Kax H3BecTHo’, Shestov wrote in this connection,
H H K oraa c ep b e 3 H 0  He paccH H TbreaeT Ha n o /w e p a o c y  jiH T epaT ypbi. O H a, M e^cay npoHHM , T p eb yeT , 
h t o 6  h  My3bi npHHOCHjiH eft AaHb, b jia ro p o a H O  4)opM yjiH pya c b o h  T peboB aH H a cuoBaM H: 
6 jia ro c jio B e H  cok>3 M ena h  jiH p w . E braajio , h t o  M y3bi h  He OTica3biBajin eft — H H or/ja HCKpeHHe, 
H H oraa  noTO M y, h t o ,  Kax n n c a j i  T eftH e, b P o c c h h  3Kejie3Hbie Kanzjajibi ocobeH H O  H enpm iT H o  
HOCHTb BBHay 60JTbUIHX M 0p030B . Ho, BO BCHKOM CJiyHae, My3aM npeaOCTaBJIHJIOCb TOJlbKO
BocneBaTb M en, a OTHio/jb He HanpaBjurrb ero [...1 h b o t  JfocToeBCKHft, npn Bceft He3aBHCHMOCTH
208CBoen HaTypbi, Bee ace OKa3ajica b pojin neBua pyccKoro npaBHTejibCTBa.
Joseph Brodsky said in his Nobel lecture: ‘The philosophy o f the state, its ethics -  not to 
mention its aethetics -  are always “yesterday”. Language and literature are always “today”, 
and often -  particularly in the case where a political system is orthodox -  they may even 
constitute “tomorrow”’.209 Thus Shestov's association o f Dostoevsky with the totalitarian 
state makes the latter belong to ‘yesterday’, but as far as Dostoevsky-the novelist is
208 Shestov, IJpopoHecKuu dap, pp. 217-218.
209 Joseph Brodsky, ‘Uncommon Visage. The Nobel Lecture’ (transl. Barry Rubin) in On G rie f and  
Reason, p. 48.
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concerned, he is ‘today’ and to a large extent ‘tomorrow’. It is this duality, which was 
different from the schism between the morality of the author as a man and his achievements 
as an artist that was for Shestov apparently hard to bear. While he could easily enough 
reconcile himself to the segregated nature of the personal and artistic categories of a writer, 
he must have felt that political blindness or unscrupulousness (or possibly even worse: 
insincerity for the sake o f personal dividends), which in the end had its cumulative effect in 
the devastating destinies of nations, was strange and hardly forgivable.
On the other hand, Shestov denied, at any rate in writing, any direct connection between 
literature and politics in terms of influence o f the former on the latter, and thus at least 
partly rehabilitated Dostoevsky at least in his own (Shestov's, that is) eyes. Indeed, in the 
end Shestov gives the final say to Dostoevsky the novelist, stating that ‘Bee, h t o  6 b i j i o  y 
Hero paccKa3aTi>, / J o c t o c b c k h h  paccica3aji HaM b  c b o h x  pOMaHax, KOTopbie h  Tenepb, nepe3 
ABa i^ a^Tt miTt jieT nocne ero CMepra, npHTarHBaioT k  cede Bcex Tex, KOMy HyacHO 
BbinBiTMBaTL o t  5KH3HH ee TaiiHbi. A h h h  npopoxa, 3a KOTOpbiM o h  Tax rHajicfl, nojiaraa, 
h t o  HMen Ha Hero npaBO, dbui eMy c o b c c m  He k  mmy’.210 Thus he acknowledged the 
decisive primacy o f Dostoevsky's role as a writer rather than a ‘politician’.
Still, the situation reflected in The G ift o f  P ro p h ec y  remains quite reminiscent o f that 
described by Shestov himself in his P h ilo so p h y  o f  T ragedy  with respect to the humanist 
critic Mikhailovsky (who must have to a large extent informed Shestov's literary taste). 
There Shestov contemplated the critic's words on the painful schism between Proudhon's 
high moral ideals and his, as it turned out to be, rather dishonest behaviour in daily life. By 
putting together these somewhat sad facts o f Proudhon's existence Mikhailovsky, by his
O i lown words, had to tear something precious out o f his heart. ‘This is not just a phrase’, 
the critic then added, which caused Shestov to express his great suspicion with respect to 
the authenticity of Mikhailovsky's sadness. The discovered discrepancy did not sadden 
Mikhailovsky, Shestov asserts, and therefore he, ashamed of his own calm, hurried to 
assure us all that it did sadden him. In fact, Shestov claims, the critic was indifferent to
210 Shestov, IJpoponecKuu dap , p. 224.
211 See Shestov, JJocmoeecKuu u Huifiue, p. 370.
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Proudhon, because no poor behaviour of Proudhon the man could undermine in 
Mikhailovsky's heart the great idea that Proudhon the thinker was promoting. Proudhon 
himself does not matter in the view of the great and unshakable idea that lives in 
Mikhailovsky's heart, Shestov asserts.
However, when writing The G ift o f  P ro p h ec y , distraught and overthrown by the events of 
1905, Shestov suddenly finds himself in the same emotional situation, the authenticity of 
which he denied in the case o f Mikhailovsky. It is thus a very rare case o f Shestov openly 
crying for that lost illusion. Normally his cry is deeply suppressed, and, as Zenkovsky says, 
we only hear a distant echo of his inner crucifixion. In other words, in this strange article 
Shestov revealed his day-time face, without a tragic mask which became his second skin. 
His convictions openly faced his instincts, that were felt acutely in the face o f real human 
agony. Thus, Shestov's attacks on Dostoevsky (and in part on Tolstoy) made in The G ift o f  
P ro p h ecy  and, even if  to a much lesser extent, in his next work on Dostoevsky, show 
unequivocally Shestov's deep involvement in the political and social life o f his country and 
the world, even if  the foundations of his philosophy were purely abstract and metaphysical. 
Thus to speak of Shestov's total lack o f concern for political or social issues as does, for 
instance, Zakydalsky, is not quite right. It can only be done, if  at all, in terms of Shestov's 
philosophical constructions as derived from his writings, and in a sense detached from 
them, because these writings themselves, when read attentively, constantly show Shestov's 
deep personal involvement into the historical process. However, this layer o f Shestov's 
thought is normally concealed quite profoundly under the surface.
Later on, o f course, after the first Russian revolution, the agony and human suffering 
‘outside’ only intensified, but Shestov did not again allow himself to succumb to his day­
time vision so openly and self-indulgently as in The G ift o f  P ro p h ec y , he persevered instead 
on his chosen path o f the philosophy of tragedy, o f underground, which led him eventually 
to the route o f biblical existentialism, to the construction o f faith. However, The G ift o f  
P ro p h ecy  was written in the aftermath of his A p th eo s is  o f  G ro u n d lessn ess , where he 
consciously tried to destroy all foundations o f the accepted systems and beliefs. A ‘healing’
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process o f constructing on the open ground cleared by his previous nihilism was yet to 
begin.
In the same light Shestov's somewhat non-standard interpretation of the term ‘prophet’ 
given in this article, can be viewed. Indeed, he wrote that ‘...TaM h m c h h o ,  t r q  b o 3 m o ) k h o  
n p e f lC K a 3 a H n e ,  n y ^ a  H eT? H6 0  b o 3m o ) k h o c t b  n p e a c K a 3a H H a , n p e a y r a f lB m a H H f l  
npe^nojiaraeT cTporyio 3aKOHOMepHOCTB’.212 Thus, Shestov concludes, a prophet is not 
someone who is more spiritually gifted, but someone who has subdued himself to the 
power and laws o f necessity, and condemned himself to a mechanical labour of 
calculations. He gives the example o f Bismarck whose predictions came true, as opposed to 
those o f Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. So, Shestov finishes his article by saying that unlike 
Bismarcks -  the prophets -  Dostoevskys are condemned to an eternal state o f ‘the day 
before’ (or ‘on the eve’), i.e. that o f being on the verge o f the truth, but never reaching it. 
Thus, we are led again to the same conclusion that this short article is in many ways 
significant in revealing, against the background of the first Russian revolution, Shestov's 
inner bitterness and doubts, which are normally concealed,- in particular his pessimistic 
view of the final outcome o f his own searchings due to the elusive and relative nature of 
truth (it is significant that in the preceding A p o th eo s is  o f  G rou n d lessn ess  Shestov already 
acknowledged the multiplicity o f truths). But most o f all, as we pointed out at the beginning 
o f our analysis, this work exposes the schism, as seen by Shestov, between Dostoevsky's 
pen and his soul, the schism that Shestov admitted here in a direct and conscious fashion, 
but also portrayed in an unusually negative light.
Shestov's tense attention to and steadfast focus on this schism in the case of Dostoevsky 
were especially evident. Indeed, in the complexity of the character he had very rich material 
to go by, and, interestingly, as we noted above, some inner contradictions o f Dostoevsky 
were met by Shestov almost with enthusiasm, while others were severely criticised. We 
have just analysed the latter case (of social or political moralism on Shestov's part) with all 
its objective and subjective peculiarities, where the conflict was between Dostoevsky's 
socio-political views and his artistic gift. However, another dimension of Dostoevsky's soul
212 Shestov, TlpopoHecKuu dap, p. 216.
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-  the purely moral one -  in its alleged inferiority to the achievements o f his pen seems to 
have fascinated Shestov and to have been fully accepted by him. In our view, this goes back 
to Pushkin's lines embraced and ‘edited’ by Shestov about a human weakness being almost 
a necessary attribute o f a great artistic gift. While according to Pushkin this weakness was 
in the pettiness, the insignificance o f a poet when outside his poetic duty, for Shestov this 
became transformed into vice and almost depravity. Also, this vision of the invariable inner 
conflict inherent in a creative soul agreed, as time went by, with Shestov's understanding o f 
the tormented personality of any thinker who, as Pascal described it, ‘screams, while 
searching’. Thus Shestov's vision of Dostoevsky which was informed by this schism went 
from the figure tom between ‘“npaBflon” Tpare^HH h “jioxcbio” odtmeHHOCTH’,213 using 
Erofeev's words, to the great writer endowed by the heavens with second sight and at the 
same time the deeply depraved man described by Strakhov in his letter to Tolstoy. The 
latter vision we find reflected in Shestov's mature work. Namely, in his article on Tolstoy 
(‘Ha CTpaiimoM cyzje. nocjieznme npon3Be,aeHHfl TojiCToro’ [‘At the Last Judgement. The 
latest works by Tolstoy’]) which we discussed in the previous chapter and which was 
followed just a year later by Shestov's major work on Dostoevsky p e r  se , written already in 
emigration, in 1921, and entitled ‘npeoaojiemie caMooHeBH^HOCTeH. K c to j ic th io  co  /jha  
poxyremm O. M. JJpCToeBCKoro’ [‘Overcoming the Self-evident. For the one hundredth 
anniversary o f F. M. Dostoevsky's birth’].
6.1.9. Emigration: A shift of attitude. Shestov's article on Dostoevsky for Nouvelle 
Revue Frangaise. Strakhov's letter as a litmus paper for personal beliefs.
This article was Shestov's pass to the world o f the French intellectual elite. At the time he 
had only just settled in Paris, and was virtually unknown to the French writers. Jacques 
Riviere, who was then the editor-in-chief o f the influential N o u ve lle  R ev u e  F ra n g a ise , was 
preparing an issue dedicated to Dostoevsky's anniversary and asked Boris de Schloezer for 
advice as to a possible Russian contributor. Schloezer pointed to Shestov thus giving the 
latter an excellent opportunity to make his name known in his new country of residence. 
Shestov accepted the offer and produced the article during the four months of 1921 -  from 
June to September. It was published in Russian in C oepeM ennbie 3anucKU (Nos 8-10, 1921-
213 Erofeev, p. 169.
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1922), and appeared (although in a much contracted form), with Schloezer's preface and in 
his as ever immaculate translation, on 1 February 1922 in N o u ve lle  R ev iew  F rangaise . In 
the same issue there were articles on Dostoevsky by Jacques Riviere and Andre Gide who 
were o f course well established figures on the French literary scene.
This publication was met with great enthusiasm not only by Gide himself, who sent 
Shestov an invitation to his own course o f lectures on Dostoevsky to be given to a restricted 
circle, but by various other critics. Sympathetic reviews followed in various newspapers, 
especially the one by Louis Raymond Lefevre, ‘L'individualisme de Dostoevsky’ which 
appeared in L e  R a d ica l on 27 February 1922, where the critic called Shestov's article a 
‘chef d'oeuvre’. Shestov himself wrote about this success in a private letter: ‘CraTba o 
/(o c t. 3/jecb b IIapH)Ke bo (j)paHij. jiHTepaTypmax Kpyrax HMejia onem* fiojitmoii ycnex. 
Y tk q  6e3 o6hhhkob npH3HaioT MeHfl TaKHM ace remarquable, xax h A. Gide’a (a Gide 3/jecb 
KpynHaa BejiHHHHa). CaM Gide flaji MHe CTaTbio C larte  (sto  acypHaji Bapfiioca), r#e mchh 
cpaBHHBaioT c hhm’.214 Also, importantly, this publication initiated some offers to Shestov 
from French publishing houses which at the time o f him trying to settle in Paris as a new 
emigre and to provide for his family was very significant.
Although in 1922 it was too early to speak of canonical criticism on Dostoevsky, the 
principal divides and clashes o f opinions in Dostoevsky studies had been to a large extent 
already formed, both in Russia and in the West. There were distinct divides in perceiving 
the novelist as a mystical prophet of a new religion on the one hand or, on the other, a 
reactionary pillar of the Russian monarchy warning against the danger o f revolutionary 
socialism. A particular trend concentrated on his unique degree o f psychological 
penetration and insight, yet with an all-pervasive and almost depraved focus on suffering. A 
majority of Western critics classified him with distaste as too Russian, singling out the 
idiosyncratically chaotic and irrationalist nature o f his literary world. Still, the mainstream 
of Dostoevsky studies was nevertheless developing in a humanistic direction, emphasisng
214 From Shestov’s letter of 22 March 1922 to his sister Fania Lovtskii and her husband German. 
Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 233. The article in question is ‘Parijanine. Les abimes de la 
pensee russe’, Clarte, 15 March 1922, No 9.
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his humanistic and futuristic tendencies and aspirations. Certainly Gide's views on the 
Russian novelist were of a distinctly humanistic nature. In this respect Shestov provided a 
clear contrast in perspective, and the title o f the aforementioned laudatory review 
(D o sto evsky 's  in d iv id u a lism ) exemplifies it. In the view o f these rather diverging 
perceptions o f Dostoevsky it seems productive to consider them in contrast to each other, 
because it largely reflects (and in a way it gave rise to) two opposing trends in Dostoevsky 
studies in the West. Therefore below we shall compare and contrast Gide's and Shestov's 
interpretation o f Dostoevsky.
In his article on Tolstoy Shestov quotes Strakhov's unflattering letter on Dostoevsky sent to 
Tolstoy which was secret at the time, but came into the public domain in 1913. This 
quotation together with Shestov's commentary serves to illustrate our point made above 
concerning his rapt attention to the schism between Dostoevsky's writings and his inner 
world. As Milosz wrote, Shestov ‘admired Dostoevsky's philosophical genius without 
reservation— and accepted as true the disparaging rumors about his personal life, rumors 
spread mostly by Strakhov’.215 In fact, we would go even further and say that Shestov 
embraced and celebrated this alleged discrepancy. To understand this it is helpful to look at 
the opposite (and much more common) perception of this particular theme, as found for 
instance in Robert Louis Jackson. The latter, without dismissing Strakhov's letter as
worthless, nevertheless clearly does not want to believe his allegations and challenges
216them. He acknowledges Dostoevsky's undoubtedly ‘difficult, irascible and tortured’ 
character. Moreover, he provides evidence that Dostoevsky himself was aware and 
ashamed of it. Yet, this evidence is given only to strengthen the case in defence of 
Dostoevsky. Indeed, by acknowledging small vices Jackson as it were wins the right to 
dismiss the central and horrible accusations (like the rape of a child). ‘Certainly Strakhov's 
letter as a whole is marked by deep malice and a desire to strike a wounding blow at 
Dostoevsky. A personal motive, revenge, cannot be excluded in explaining the particularly 
vicious character of Strakhov's comments and his peculiarly smug moral posture’, Jackson
215 Milosz, p. 105.
216 Jackson, Dialogues with D ostoevsky, p. 108.
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writes and explains that Strakhov, in all probability, had found in Dostoevsky's archives 
‘the novelist's devastating portrait o f Strakhov as a man and type’.217
Shestov, on the other hand, exclaim s: ‘He 3Haio, MHoro jih Han/jeTCfl b jiHTepaType 
aoicyMeHTOB, no CBoen h ch h o c th  paBHbix npHBe^eHHOMy nncbMy’ .218 He singles out 
Strakhov's concluding phrase w here he provides a justification  for h is decision  to conceal 
the ‘horrible truth’ about D ostoevsk y  from the public and to produce a clean and exam plary  
biography o f  the writer: ‘ho nycmt 3ma npaeda noau6nem; 6ydeM meaoJinmb odnou
91 Q
n uifeeou  cm opoH oii otcw uu, kclk m u  3m o denaeM  ee3de u eo  eceM ...\ Shestov picks up 
these words without a trace o f doubt in their validity and elaborates on their extreme 
significance.
He yBepeH aaxce, noHHMan j ih  OrpaxoB c m w cji h  3HaneHHe Toro, b neM o h  npH3HaBajica ToacTOMy. 
B HOBoe BpeMfl MHorne yrBepHyjanH, h t o  jioacb ueHHee h c t h h l i .  06 3 to m  roBopHji O. YaHJibfl, 
HHurne, aaace nyuiKHH BocmiHKHyji: “TbMbi h h 3 k h x  h c t h h  HaM aopoace Hac B03BbiuiaiomHH 
o6MaH”. Ho B ee  o h h  o6pamajincb k  HHTaTeaio, noynajiH. A CTpaxoB npocTO h  HcxpeHHe kslqtcsi, h  
3 t o  npnaaeT ero caoBaM ocobyio cmiy h  3HaHHTejibHOCTb.220
Jackson emphasises the caution o f Tolstoy's response to Strakhov's letter, and the writer's
attempt to transfer the focus from Dostoevsky the man to Dostoevsky the novelist.
Interestingly, Shestov also transfers the focus here, but in his own way: from the image of
Dostoevsky as such to the philosophical and literary question of truth and lies, o f the
corrupt conventions of utilitarian ethics and morality: ‘Bepojrrao, nncbMO npoH3Bejio
orpoM H oe BnenaTjieHHe Ha T o a c T o r o , KOTopbra x a x  pa3 b 3to BpeMH ocoGchho
MyHHTejibHO nyBCTBOBaji fipeMfl ycjioBHOH jokh h Becb 6 biji oxBaneH acaacaoii onnmaiomeH  
991HcnoBe^H ’, Shestov writes.
217 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 107.
218 Shestov, H a eecax H oea , p. 117.
219 From Strakhov’s letter to Lev Tolstoi of 28 November 1883 (see n e p e n u c m  JI. H. Toncmoeo c 
H. H. CmpaxoebiM, 1870 -  1894, vol. 2 of TojicmoecKuu My3eu, ed. B. L. Modzalevskii (St. 
Petersburg, 1914), p. 308. Cited in Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, p. 117.
220 Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, p. 117.
221 Ibid.
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Thus Shestov accepts Strakhov's revelations about Dostoevsky as indisputable truth and 
welcomes them as an illustration of the accepted literary and existential hypocrisy, while 
Jackson is preoccupied by disavowing them. Jackson sees in Strakhov's sentiments 
expressed in the letter to Tolstoy a manifestation of the former's strict moralism. It is 
because of this that ‘any disjunction between man and his muse is intolerable and above all 
reprehensible and unforgivable’222 for Strakhov, Jackson writes. Jackson thus implies that a 
moralistic stance does not want to acknowledge or to allow any schism between pen and 
soul. The moral and aesthetic unity of Dostoevsky the man and his muse proclaimed by 
Strakhov in his memoir receives in his letter to Tolstoy an explanation of being simply a 
psychological device deployed by Dostoevsky in his writings to provide himself with a 
self-justification, Jackson explains. In this respect the case o f Mikhailovsky described 
above demonstrates essentially the same phenomenon -  o f the critic's resistance to accept 
the discrepancy between the man and his writings in the case o f Proudhon. As we saw then, 
Mikhailovsky's moralism is condemned by Shestov, rather expectedly, even though he 
himself later gives way to his own suppressed moralism, his, as it were, moralistic desire, 
by wanting to unite ‘the man with his muse’ in the case of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky in The  
G ift o f  P ro p h ec y .
Jackson observes that Strakhov carries his moralistic perspective into the realm of 
aesthetics. This agrees with and may largely be responsible for Strakhov's identification of 
Dostoevsky with the novelist's ‘worst’ characters. For Jackson such identification reflects a
223‘simplistic view of the creative process, o f the relation of an author to his creation’. 
Equally, such an identification in Shestov's case (which is consistent with his focus on the 
philosophical rather than the aesthetic) may also be due to his ‘undestroyed’ moralism and 
is an indirect manifestation of it, or more precisely of the play-off between this moralism 
and Shestov's resistance to it. Furthermore, it may reflect Shestov's desire to kill this very 
moralism by celebrating the schism between the man and his muse, and thus reading the 
writer off his negative heroes. This would also explain the difference between Strakhov and 
Shestov in that for the former the identification o f Dostoevsky with his characters carries a
222 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 109.
223 Ibid, p. 108.
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negative sign and serves to condemn the writer, while for the latter it has an opposite 
colouring by being a device to join Dostoevsky to Shestov's own fight against common 
morality and autonomous ethics. But in both cases it serves to demonstrate the hidden and 
‘demonic’ depths of Dostoevsky's soul.
It must be due to Strakhov's attempt to identify Dostoevsky with his negative characters 
that his testimony serves for Shestov not only as a welcome revelation of the all-pervasive 
hypocrisy o f literary and social conventions, but also as a confirmation that Shestov is right 
in his approach, as an approval of his own technique and an acknowledgment of the validity 
o f his own assumptions. In fact, Shestov's unreserved trust in Strakhov's accusations brings 
to mind the incident, mentioned earlier, o f the imprecision of Shestov's quote, pointed out 
by Blagova and Emelianov. The point there concerned Dostoevsky's phrase from his diary, 
from the article ‘OflHa H3 coBpeMeHHwx (j>ajn>meH’, of 1873: ‘MHe onem* Tpyzmo 6 l i j i o  6 b i  
paccKa3aTB HCTopmo nepepojK^eHHH c b o h x  yfiexmeHHH, m  o t o  MoxceT 6bm> h  He Tax 
jno6om>iTHo...\ Shestov truncated it in the middle, having omitted the end o f the phrase: 
‘a a h  He HfleT KaK-To k  (J)eJibeTOHHOH cTaTte’, thus creating a somewhat misleading 
impression of Dostoevsky's actual words, as Blagova and Emelianov proceed to explain. A 
similar phenomenon can be observed here, in Shestov's treatment o f Strakhov's letter. 
Shestov interprets this case to his own ends. Analogously, Jackson chooses to believe 
essentially what he wants to believe, even though, unlike Shestov, he does bother to 
substantiate his claim, but his grounds are shaky p a r  excellence . Indeed, in cases like these 
one can go on speculation alone, for, although it can be argued in a more or less persuasive 
way, it can never have a hard and fast proof and is ultimately a question of one's personal 
faith -  whether Dostoevsky was capable of raping a child, and to what extent in general his 
vices spread. Any thoughts on the subject constitute at best a well-informed guess, but the 
issue remains open-ended. Thus both Jackson and Shestov simply see what they want to 
see, and draw on sources that facilitate their belief.
Indeed, at the time of Shestov, not to mention Jackson's times, there was enough evidence 
for speculation in both directions, and Shestov was familiar with all sorts of sources about 
Dostoevsky -  definitely with Dostoevsky's correspondence and various biographical
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material written about him. Thus, if  he wanted to, he could have chosen to take ‘Jackson's 
side’ against Strakhov, but he clearly did not. Equally, we note that Jackson chooses to trust 
a Soviet scholar, V. N. Zakharov,224 who defends Dostoevsky against the sinister rumours. 
His research was published in 1978 and was therefore incapable for ideological reasons of 
promoting any other point o f view except the one that rehabilitates the writer's humanistic 
image appropriated by the late Soviet power, which inscribed Dostoevsky (alongside other 
classical Russian writers) into the canon of socialist realism. Similarly, Jackson quotes the 
indignant words of Anna Snitkina, Dostoevsky's wife, concerning the libel contained in 
Strakhov's letter. O f course, she may well be right in her outrage, but why is she to be 
trusted more than Strakhov? Is it because she has more integrity and nobility o f spirit as a 
person? But this depends entirely on the point o f view. For example, Akhmatova's 
judgement on Snitkina is extremely negative: ‘...H3 o t h x  nuceM acHO, h t o  Aima 
TpHropbeBHa 6i>uia CTpanraa’225 she says to Chukovskaia on having read Dostoevsky’s 
correspondence. ‘51 Bcer^a HeHaBH^ejia aceH b c j i h k h x  moflefi h  ayMajia: oHa jiynuie. HeT, 
aaace Co(j)i>a AimpeeBHa Jiynine. Amra TpHropbeBHa aca^Ha h cicyna. EojibHoro HenoBeica, 
c acTMoii, c na/jyuen, 3acTaBjwjia paSoTaTb £ h h  h  h o h h ,  h t o S b i  “ocTaBHTb HTO-HH6ym> 
fleTaM”. Taxaa no/yiocTb! Oh nnmeT eft: “Iloode^aji 3a pydjib”. 3apa6aTbmaji ^ecaTKH 
Tbican h He Mor noo6e^aTb 3a asa  pybna!’,226 Akhmatova elaborated.
On the other hand, Strakhov is held in very high regard not only by Rozanov, whose own 
moral outlook may be regarded as ambivalent, but also by Vasilii Zenkovsky. ‘Kax h
TOJICTOH, CTpaXOB 6e3 KOHI^ a flOpmKHJI CBOfiOflOH MbICJIH, nO-BHflHMOMy, pa3fleji5ui c 
ToncTbiM ero cBoboflHoe oTHomeHHe k  L(epKBH, h o  BMecTe c TeM rjiydoxo h o c h j i  b  c e p a n i e  
cBoeM nyBCTBO Bora’,227 Zenkovsky wrote about Strakhov. He then proceeds to defend 
Strakhov from various misapprehensions and misunderstandings that surrounded his work, 
and assigns them to a certain lack o f such characteristics as ‘nejibHOCTb’ and 
‘3aBepmeHHOCTb’ in Strakhov’s writings. Notably, Zenkovsky also insists on Strakhov’s 
‘romanticism’ which maintains human primacy over dubious scientific achievements, and
224 see Note 9 in Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 312.
225 Chukovskaia, II, p. 267.
226 Ibid.
227 Zenkovskii, I, p. 471.
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which unites him with Dostoevsky in this respect, as Zenkovsky does not fail to notice. 
Rozanov in his turn asserts that much in Strakhov’s work remained unspoken, unexpressed, 
but that the nucleus of his ponderings lay in the religious problem.228 Importantly, 
statements on Strakhov by both Zenkovsky and Rozanov are steeped in deep respect (and, 
in Rozanov’s case, even in admiration). Their words, if  Jackson chose to trust them, show 
Strakhov in a light that is quite incompatible with the expression of any slander (certainly 
incompatible with the accusation that Jackson issues against Strakhov -  o f being ‘a kind of 
a moral Tartuffe’).229
Therefore if Jackson argues that Strakhov's letter casts an aspersion on Dostoevsky, it is 
because he wants this to be the case. Shestov does the same, only from the opposite point of 
view and without bothering with evidence to support his claim. He wants to believe 
Strakhov, not only because it endorses his own vision o f Dostoevsky through the latter's 
heroes, and (even more importantly) reveals the hypocrisy o f any official literary mission 
and its underlying philosophical foundations, but also because for Shestov, as we observed 
above, it fits in with and endorses his philosophical paradigm, his vision of the great 
thinkers.
Thus, to be a great writer you almost have to be a bad, debauched man, -  this seems to be 
the picture that Shestov wanted to be true. The explanation for this strange desire may lie in 
the fact that Shestov, following Dostoevsky, hated equilibrium, hated any completion, and 
strove instead for conflict and contradiction. It is with deep admiration that he wrote about 
Dostoevsky’s propensity to go against the ‘obvious’ and the commonly accepted, and 
believed that it is only such a rebellion that may lead us to the truth:
/JocToeBCKHH 3Haji, h t o  Bbi MoaceTe Tax /jpa3HHTb ero h byaeTe apa3HHTb, byaeTe CMeaTbca h He 
3axoTHTe ero aaace cyMacmeauiHM npH3HaTb -  HHHa noacajieeTe. H Bce-TaKH npoaoJDKaji paccica3, 
HarpoMOtfcaaa beccMbicjimjy Ha beccMbicjimjy, npoTHBopenne Ha npoTHBopeHHe, KOTopwe bbi 
CTOHJIH Toro, HTOb HX UeJTHKOM npHBeCTH, eCJIH bbi n03B0 JHIJI0  MeCTO. KtO XOHeT nOaOHTH bjIIDKe
228 See V. Rozanov, ‘O bopbbe c 3anaaoM b cbjoh c jiH T epaT ypH O H  aeflTejibHocTbio o a H o r o  H3 
cjiaBHHO(J)HjiOB’, Bonpocu (punoco(puu u ncuxonoeuu, 1890, No 4, pp. 27-61 (p. 31). Cited in 
Zenkovskii, I, pp. 470-471.
229 Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, p. 108.
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k (ZJocToeBCKOMy, t o t  AOJDKeH npoH3BOAHTb ocoSoro poAa exercitia spiritualia: npoBOAHTb nacbi, 
A h h , roAbi b aTMoc(J)epe B3aHMHo Apyr Apyra HCKAioHaiomHx caMooneBHAHOCTeH -  Apyroro 
cnoco6a h c t .  TaKHM, TOJibKo t a k h m  o6pa30M m ohcho “yBHAeTb” , h t o  BpeMa HMeeT He o a h o ,  a Afia h  
6oAee H3MepeHHH, h t o  “3aKOHbi” He cymecTByiOT o t  b c h h o c t h ,  a “AaHbi”, h  AaHbi t o j ib k o  3aTeM, 
h t o 6 h  npOHBHJica “rpex”, h t o  cnacaioT He rgjia, a Bepa, h t o  CMepTb CoxpaTa m o> k ct pa36yAHTb 
OKaMeHeAoe ABaacAM Asa neTbipe, h t o  Bor BcerAa TpeSyeT HeB03Mo>KHoro, h t o  raAKHH yreHOK 
MOAceT npeBpaTHTbCH b KpacaBAa Jie6eAfl, h t o  3Aecb Bee HaHHHaeTca h  Hunero He KOHnaeTca, h t o  
KanpH3 HMeeT npaBo Ha rapaHTHH, h t o  ^aH TacT H H ecK oe peanbHee ecTecTBeHHoro, h t o  >kh3hb ecTb 
CMepTb, a CMepTb ecTb 3KH3Hb h  Bee npoHHe “ h c t h h w ” , KOTopbie rjiaA^T Ha Hac c b o h m h  
CTpaHHblMH H CTpaiHHblMH TAa3aMH CO CTpaHHIJ COHHHCHHH ^OCTOeBCKOrO...230
In the same vein, like Dostoevsky according even to Strakhov, Shestov wanted to prove 
that vice and virtue go hand in hand, and all is entangled in a human soul, good is 
inseparable from evil and thus reinforces the mystery of the soul. For Shestov the conflict 
inherent in any great thinker, and especially in Dostoevsky, serves as a guarantee o f their 
second sight which forces them to escape the self-evident and enter into a struggle for the 
new reality and true freedom.
We conclude this comparison with a metaphor of sorts. Indeed, to us the metaphysical 
nucleus o f the situation with Jackson's and Shestov's opposite reactions to Strakhov's letter 
is captured in Jackson's description of two different perceptions o f capital punishment (and 
specifically o f public execution) -  by Turgenev and by Dostoevsky.231 Jackson, when 
analysing Turgenev's and Dostoevsky's response to it, stresses that the former turns away 
from the sight o f execution with disgust and shame, while the latter on the contrary looks 
right at it. Neither approves o f it in any way, but for Turgenev the whole thing, including 
his own involvement as a witness, is unbearable and unacceptable, while for Dostoevsky it 
contains something vital, something central for human nature and its complexity. In exactly 
the same way, it appears, for Jackson (and those whose treatment o f Strakhov's letter is 
similar to his) the thought of these accusations being the truth, is unacceptable, while for 
Shestov it is, on the contrary, necessary, central and vital.
230 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, pp. 89-90.
231 See Jackson, Dialogues with Dostoevsky, Chapter 1, pp. 29-55.
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6.1.10. Underground as a metaphysical concept. The evolution of Shestov’s views on 
Dostoevsky.
In his article on Dostoevsky of 1921 Shestov, although he changed his perspective 
somewhat and no longer accuses Dostoevsky of insincerity, still maintains that a significant 
transformation of convictions took place. He uses, as we mentioned above, the image of 
Dostoevsky being endowed with second sight, and the focus shifts to the struggle between 
the two sights -  the ordinary and extraordinary. It is this struggle which now stands at the 
centre o f Shestov's reflections and replaces the conflict between Dostoevsky's discovered 
truth on the one hand and the lies intended for the public on the other. There are various 
ways in which Shestov's perception as reflected in this article differs from that o f his 
P h ilo so p h y  o f  T ra g ed y  written almost twenty years earlier.
An important part in Shestov's analysis o f  D ostoevsk y  in 1921 is p layed by his c h ie f idea in  
interpreting N o tes  f r o m  U n d erg ro u n d , that the ‘underground’ is a m etaphysical concept, 
and is inherent in any active consciousness. A lready in P h ilo so p h y  o f  T ragedy  the concept 
o f  the underground pertains to psychology , sign ifies an inner depth, but in 1921 it becom es  
conceptually  formed. “ TkwiojiLe” -  3t o  BOBce He Ta MH3epHaa KOHypa, xyzja 
iZfocToeBCKHH noMecTHji cBoero repoa, h He ero oflHHonecTBo, nojiHee KOToporo He 
fltmaeT h h  n o #  3eMJien, h h  Ha flHe m o p c k o m ,  Bbipa^aacb « 3 b ik o m  TojiCToro’, Shestov  
affirms. On the contrary for h im  the underground is P lato’s fam ous cave w hich  distorts our 
vision  o f  the universe, but where w e all are condem ned to liv e  and to see  in it the on ly  real 
and the on ly  p ossib le  w orld, that is the world justified  b y  reason. S ignificantly, Shestov  
em phasises that the underground for D ostoevsk y  is not solitude in the sen se o f  iso lation  and 
suffering. H e stresses that on the contrary D ostoevsk y  escapes into solitude in order to 
contem plate, to seek  answers, to seek  salvation: ‘HaofiopOT, -  3 t o  H ym io ce6 e  Bcer^a 
noBTOpsiTb -  ^ocToeBCKHH yuien b  oflHHouecTBo, h t o 6  cnacracb , no KpaHHen Mepe 
nonbiTaTbca cnacracb , o t  Toro no/jnojibji (no-nnaTOHOBCKH -  nem epbi), b  k o t o p o m  
ofipeneHbi h c h t b  “Bee”’.
232 Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, p. 39.
233 Ibid.
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Shestov's article o f 1921 contains alongside the powerful image of the Angel of Death 
covered in eyes who brought Dostoevsky his ‘second sight’, a no less powerful image o f an 
‘edge of the blue sky behind the fence of a penal colony’ [‘Kpaii He6a, b h ^ h b ih  a a a c e  H3-3a 
b b i c o k o h  o c T p o K H o i i  orpatfBi’, ‘KpaemeK rojiy6oro He6a’].234 While serving his 
punishment, Dostoevsky lived by hope, Shestov asserts, and was sustained by this small 
piece of sky which soon enough promised to open up to the full freedom o f life outside the 
colony that was awaiting Dostoevsky. The true and horrible discovery came to the writer, 
according to Shestov, when he realised, quite a while after his release, that the long-craved 
freedom did not bring any inner spiritual liberation, that he was still a prisoner, an eternal 
prisoner of the underground of his own soul, o f the ‘omnitude’ ( ‘b c c m c t b o ’)  with its 
oppression in the form of self-evident truths.
JfocToeBCKHH Bapyr “yBHfleji”, h t o  He6o h  xaTopacHbie cTem»i, Hfleanbi h  xanaanbi BOBce He 
npoTHBonojioacHoe, Kan xoTejiocb eMy, KaK ayManocb eMy npexyje, xor/ja o h  x o t c j i  h  ayMaji, xak 
Bee HopMajibHbie jh o ^ h . He npoTHBonojioxcHoe, a oaHHaxoBoe. HeT He6a, HHrae HeT He6a, ecTb 
TOJlbXO HH3XHH, AaBHIUHH ‘TopH30HT”, HeT UZjeaJIOB, B03H0C5HIJHX TOpe, eCTb TOJlbXO UenH, XOTfl H 
HeBHaHMbie, h o  cBH3biBaiomHe eme 6ojiee npoHHO, neM TiopeMHbie xaHAanbi. H h h x b x h m h  
noABHraMH, h h x b x h m h  “aoSpbiMH aeJiaMH” He aaHO nejioBexy cnacTHCb H3 MecTa cBoero 
“6eccpoHHoro 3axjiioHeHHa”. ObeTbi “wcnpaBHTbca”, xoTopbie o h  aaBajr b xaTopre, CTanH xa3aTbca 
eMy xomyHCTBeHHbiMH,235 Shestov writes.
This vision that Shestov assigns to Dostoevsky is strangely reminiscent of Sergei 
Dovlatov's perception of life conveyed in his Z o n a  [P rison C a m p ] collection. Indeed, when 
reflecting upon the nature o f imprisonment Dovlatov writes, ‘IIo CojmeHHm>my Jiarepb -  
3 t o  a/j. 5{ )xe ayMaio, h t o  a a  -  3 t o  m b i caMn’.236 Dovlatov talks further o f the features of
237‘no,ao3pHTejiBHoro cxo^cTBa Mexcfly oxpaHHHxaMH h 3aKjnoHeHHBiMn ’. Put more
broadly, he says, there is a similarity between a prison camp and the free world. ‘IIo o6e 
CTopoHBi 3anpeTKH paccrajiajica e^HHBm h 6 e3ayiiiHBm MHp’ ,238 Dovlatov writes. Thus 
Shestov's assertion that commonly perceived opposites are in fact just the same things 
coincides with Dovlatov's thoughts on human nature and the human predicament. The
234 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, pp. 30, 32, etc.
235 Ibid, p. 34.
236 Dovlatov, I, p. 28.
237 Ibid, p. 62.
238 Dovlatov, I, p. 63.
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ideals o f the free world are equal to prison chains, and there is no escape because the world 
is uniformly indifferent, and hell is contained within ourselves -  such is the message that 
can be found in both Dovlatov and Shestov (who reads them off Dostoevsky). Dovlatov 
claims that in his Z o n a  only one ‘banal’ idea is declared -  that the world is absurd.239 
Shestov, on the other hand, begins his article by quoting Euripides’ rhetorical question: who 
knows, maybe life is death, and death is life.240 In other words, Shestov too is trying to 
point to the absurdity o f our common existence, to raise the question of the universal 
slumber that mankind has fallen prey to, in his firmest opinion. O f course, such a wake-up 
call is the fundamental task o f literature, especially Russian literature, always existentially 
oriented, but also of art in general. Nevertheless, paradoxically, Shestov's reading of 
Dostoevsky reveals the proximity of the latter's world to Dovlatov's vision, while Dovlatov 
himself perceived Dostoevsky's perspective on prison as adhering to a humanistic point of 
view, where a prisoner is invariably regarded as a victim, and a prison guard as an 
oppressor.
Furthermore, as Valevicius writes, Shestov saw in the N o tes  f r o m  U n d erg ro u n d  
Dostoevsky's confession that ‘there is no progress in the world. Neither is there anything 
that one can do any more to save the world’.241 In his turn Dovlatov writes as a result of his 
prison camp observations, ‘Co BpeMeH ApHCTOTejui HejiOBenecKHH M03r He hsmchhjicji. 
TeM 6oJiee He H3MeHHJiocb nejiOBenecKoe co3HaHHe. A 3H aw r, HeT nporpecca. E ctl -  
B^H5KeHHe, b ochobc KOToporo jiokht HeycTOHHHBOCTb’.242 Valevicius then concludes 
following Shestov that ‘all we can do is to look out for ourselves’243 and quotes the famous 
words o f the Underground Man preferring his cup of tea to universal happiness. However, 
Shestov's message is not that o f egoism, it is that of the oppressive power of ‘bccmctbo’, of 
the ready and prescribed solutions by which mankind lives, having turned them into dead 
dogmas. He too, like Dovlatov, starts counting from Aristotle, but perceives the latter as
239 Dovlatov, I, p. 28.
240 Shestov, H a eecax H oea , p. 26.
241 Valevicius, p. 37.
242 Dovlatov, I, p. 58.
243 Valevicius, p. 37.
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one o f the foundation pillars o f speculative philosophy which Shestov holds responsible for 
validating man's tragic destiny.
Shestov's observation over the fate of mankind is essentially the same as Dovlatov's who 
said that ‘koh(J)jihkt mchtbi c /jeHCTBHTejiBHocTtio He yraxaeT TBicauejicthhmh’.244 For 
both this conflict takes place first and foremost in our consciousness. ‘Bmccto xcenaeMOH 
rapMOHHH Ha 3eMJie ijapuT xaoc h decnopimoK. Bojiee Toro, hchto noaodHoe mbi 
oSHapyxcHjiH b co6ctbchhoh ayme. Mbi aca^eM coBepmeHCTBa, a BOKpyr TopxcecTByeT 
nomjiocTB’,245 Dovlatov states. For Shestov this is the vision of Dostoevsky through his 
Underground Man, which manifests the novelist's desire to break away from the triviality 
of the mundane, from the suffocating necessity and to make a daring leap into the abyss of 
new truths. However, Dovlatov and Shestov then diverge in their philosophical 
conclusions. While for Dovlatov our predicament points to the arbitrary nature of evil246 
and generally o f moral categories (a view to which we shall return later on), Shestov is 
convinced that the core o f our fundamental conflict lies in the poison of reason, of 
rationalist thought which hypnotised humanity and tied it down with the chains o f the self- 
evident. On the other hand, Shestov too acknowledges the relativism of morality and 
condemns autonomous ethics, but only insofar as they are products of reason created to 
facilitate its needs.
It is the above chains o f the self-evident that characterise the underground for Shestov. 
Blagova and Emelianov, while observing that Shestov identifies the underground with 
‘BceMCTBo’, which in turn they explain as conformism, a lack of independent outlook, 
inscribe the concept o f the underground with a different meaning. In their understanding, it 
is ‘cocTOBHne OAHHonecTBa nejiOBeica, HecnocobHocTB npeoaojieTB HH^ HBHayajiH3M, CBoe 
OTHyjK^ eHHe ot apyrnx, HecnocodHocTB k ^najiory’.249 Their claim is that Shestov neglects
244 Dovlatov, I, p. 56.
245 Ibid.
246 See Ibid, p. 87.
247 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 77.
248 Ibid, p. 65.
249 Ibid, p. 74.
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the aspect o f the Undeground Man’s inferiority complex and hence misinterprets the 
underground as the shackles o f eternal truths and lofty ideals,250 as the world justified by
o r  1
reason. They insist that, had Shestov recognised Dostoevsky's concept o f ‘living life’ 
(3KHBaa 5KH3Hb) and the importance of it for the writer, he would not be able to interpret the 
underground in the above light. “Tloflnojibe” -  He “ b c c m c t b o ” , He “ k o h < })o p m h 3 m ”  h  He
9 5 9“BjiacTB H^eH’” , they write decisively. ‘IIo /IpcToeBCKOMy, “no/jnojibe” -  s t o  
3K 3H C T eH H H ajibH aa C H T yau H a o ^ H H o n e c T B a , O T u y ^ e H H a ,  caM 0H 30Jism H H  h
9 C0
3roueHTpH3Ma’, Blagova and Emelianov conclude, and stress that for Dostoevsky the 
‘underground’ was not a desirable state o f mind for a human being.
Shestov’s refusal to recognise and accept the above perspective is, in our view, by no 
means accidental. It is simply a manifestation of his general outlook and is inseparable 
from his principal philosophical paradigm of individualism rooted in the tragic human 
predicament o f existential solitude. Numerous scholarly works on Shestov contain this 
implicit reproach, incriminating him for a lack o f collective spirit, as if  not realising that 
this was a direct consequence of Shestov’s central stance. Thus Sidney Monas writes that 
Shestov lacks ‘some articulate notion of awareness o f the importance in R u ssia n  literature 
at least o f spiritual community among men’.254 Monas observes, that ‘if  the traditional 
social community fails in Russian literature, the quest for spiritual community, for the 
single body o f mankind, is one of its most powerfully expressed themes’. Such 
sentiments, o f course, are not to be restricted to Russian culture alone. Thus the words of 
John Donne, used by Hemingway as an epigraph to his novel F o r  W hom  The B e ll T o lls , 
express this striving for human unity and mutual responsibility. Similarly, Anton Chekhov 
constantly revisits this m otif by stressing famously that behind the door o f every happy 
individual there should stand a man with a little hummer to remind him by knocking o f the 
existence of all the miserable souls. Also, for that matter, Dostoevsky can be viewed in the
250 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 74.
251 Ibid, p . 79.
252 Ibid, p. 77.
253 Ibid.
254 Monas, p. xxii.
255 Ibid, p. xxiii
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same light. For instance, as Rene Wellek points out, Dostoevsky’s ‘tremendous stress on 
the substantial unity of mankind is a version o f Franciscan Christianity that conceives of 
man and nature -  and even animals and birds -  as ultimately united in love and universal 
forgiveness’.256
However, Shestov with his focus on the strictly individual nature of suffering represents a 
trend of thought which was to evolve rapidly in the twentieth century and which is 
diametrically opposed to the above fundamental approach. The origins o f this trend in a 
very broad sense are attributed to Nietzsche, and, as Erofeev suggests, for Shestov too 
‘h flea peniHTejitHoro pa3pi>iBa nejiOBeica c “apyrHMn”, norpy^Kemui ero b  o ^ h h o h c c t b o  
KaK b  e^ HHCTBeHHO no j^iHHHyio cpeay a j ib  HccjieflOBamui ero cymHocTH h  noncKOB nyren
ncn
k  “cnaceHHio”’ was a fatal step prompted by Nietzsche. The echo of Shestov’s 
‘Nietzschean’ premonitions can be heard throughout the literature of the twentieth century. 
The theme of ultimate existential solitude as the inescapable human predicament has 
become a commonplace in our age. During Shestov’s lifetime, however, it was far from 
being so widespread, and the fact that it lies at the core o f Shestov’s philosophical 
ponderings can be viewed as a mark o f his originality.
Consequently, the idea of individualism in Shestov's mind constantly pertains to 
Dostoevsky's world outlook. Although in 1921 he no longer explicitly links Dostoevsky 
with Nietzsche, ideologically they still remain united in Shestov's interpretation, to the 
extent of largely influencing Western perceptions o f the Russian novelist. Also, viewing 
Dostoevsky as a fighter against positivism, rationalism and idealism remains at the core of 
Shestov's interpretation. However, a close reading o f O verco m in g  the S e lf-e v id en t reveals a 
variety o f changes in Shestov's treatment o f the writer. To see the evolution in Shestov's 
attitudes to Dostoevsky it is instructive to compare his analysis o f the same episodes which 
he used both in O verco m in g  the S e lf-E v id en t and twenty years earlier in D o sto ev sky  a n d  
N ie tzsch e . O f course, such recycling o f the same themes points to their significance in 
Shestov's eyes. Thus, in D o sto ev sky  a n d  N ie tzsch e  Shestov describes the scene o f Ippolit
256 Rene Wellek, ‘Introduction’ to Dostoevsky. A Collection o f Critical Essays, p. 7.
257 Erofeev, p. 187.
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asking Myshkin a fundamental question: ‘What in your opinion is the most virtuous way 
for me to die?’. To which Myshkin says in a quiet voice: ‘Go past us and forgive us our 
happiness’. For Shestov this episode is an abomination, and clearly touches upon his most 
painful spots. In 1901 Shestov sees in it Dostoevsky's inability (especially in contrast to 
Tolstoy) to gloss over the ‘accursed’ questions of existence, to calm down the readers, but 
first and foremost Dostoevsky's own disquiet and anxiety. Shestov believes that 
Dostoevsky truly wants to find an answer to the horrifying questions, while Tolstoy is 
simply convinced that the answer does not exist and hence separates himself from reality by 
a fence o f fiction. Dostoevsky, on the contrary, in his existential quest, challenges his own 
convictions: ‘Ka^ceTca, 6yzjT0 JfocToeBCKOMy, no CTapon npHBBrace noanojiBHoro 
HejioBeica, B^pyr Heyztep5KHM0 3axoTejioci> noica3aTi> b3bik CBoefi co6ctbchhoh
9 CO
MyztpocTH’, Shestov writes. He claims that Dostoevsky, by arranging this encounter
CQ
between Myshkin and Ippolit simply wanted to mock his hero (the prince, that is). Also, 
this episode fits very well with the epigraph by Baudelaire chosen by Shestov to his 
D o sto ev sky  a n d  N ie tz sc h e : ‘...Aimes-tu les damnes? Dis moi, connais-tu Tirremissible?’ 
This points to Shestov's main preoccupation at the time -  the question of salvation, of the 
meaning o f life, o f the fate o f all those forsaken by God, in short, -  the problematic of 
existential tragedy.
In 1921 Shestov again describes this encounter, but now his whole discourse is different, it 
has acquired new features that reflect Shestov's own inner development as well as his much 
perfected literary skill. The impression created is that Shestov is now speaking from the 
same point, but elevated to a significantly higher coil o f the spiral. Indeed, this time he 
draws an explicit parallel between Ippolit's confession and the Book o f Job which, Shestov 
claims, served as the model for the former. Shestov now reproduces fully the description of 
Holbein's painting o f the dead Christ that Ippolit talks about. This description acquires a 
great philosophical significance in Dostoevsky's text that Shestov now eagerly focuses on 
and interprets in the Biblical context of Job's scales. ‘B sth x  cjioBax’, Shestov writes,
258 Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Hutfuie, p. 360.
259 Ibid.
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BbiJiHJiacb caM aa rjiyb oxafl, caM aa 3aBeTHaa h  BMecTe c  TeM caM aa TpeneTHaa h  TpeBoxcHaa Mbicjib 
/^ocToeBCKoro. B KOTopbiH yxce pa3 c t o h t  o h ,  3a6biB h  c e 6 a , h  B ee Ha CBeTe, n p en  narnaMH 
crpau iH b ix  BecoB: Ha o a h o h  orpoM Haa, 6e3M epH0 THxcejiaa n p n p o a a  c  e e  npHHinmaMH h  3aKOHaMH, 
m y x a a , c jien a a , HeMaa; Ha n p y r y io  o h  6 p ocaeT  CBoe H eBecoM oe, h h h c m  He 3am nm eH H oe h  He 
oxpaH eH H oe t o  T ipubxaxov260 h  c  3aTaeHHbiM AtixaHHeM xc^eT: Kaxaa nepeTHHeT.261
In this opposition between the general, impartial, soulless on the one hand and the private, 
individual, volatile on the other, which essentially is a precursor of Shestov's chief 
juxtaposition of speculation and revelation, o f reason and faith, Shestov stresses 
Dostoevsky's preference, or trust, being with Ippolit rather than Myshkin, even though it is 
the latter, not the former, whom Dostoevsky invests with a positive mission. Shestov's 
dismissal o f Myshkin is now more sophisticated than it was in 1901. This time he does not 
call him names (like a ‘pale shadow’) or questions his plausibility. Instead Shestov points 
to Myshkin's lack o f daring, consistent with his humility and, interestingly, he also points to 
his recognition of his own value and virtue, thus suggesting that those are not entirely 
selfless. On the contrary, Shestov asserts, for Ippolit, as a true underground character, all is 
lost and hence there are no restraints -  a situation that allows him a subversive doubt about 
the laws o f the common world as well as the laws o f nature. ‘KaKOMy cy/jy TyT aejio?’, 
Shestov quotes Ippolit’s questions, ‘KoMy HyacHO, h t o 6  b 6biJi He t o j ib k o  npnroBopeH, h o  h  
SjiaroHpaBHO Bbmepacaji cpoK npnroBopa? Heyacejin, b  caMOM flejie, KOMy-HH6ym> Hy>KHO? 
[...] Jin uero noTpeboBajiocb CMHpeHHe Moe? HeyacTO Hejib3« MeHa npocTo ctecTb, He 
Tpebya o t  Memi noxBan TOMy, h t o  m c h h  ci>ejio?’.262 Shestov insists that these daring 
questions are o f the kind that even Kant did not dare to ask, and which were posed in the 
whole history of human thought by extremely few individuals, such as Nietzsche, and 
before him Luther, St. Augustine and apostle Paul who drew them from the teaching o f the
Ofs'Xprophet Isaiah and from the Biblical original sin.
Myshkin's answer to Ippolit's desperate and daring question on the most virtuous way to die 
(‘go past us and forgive us our happiness’) Shestov still describes as totally inadequate and 
still sees in it a proof of the basic artificiality of this character and the underlying
260 ‘C aM oe BaxcHoe’ (fro m  P lo t in u s ’s d e fin it io n  o f  p h ilo so p h y , a n c ien t G reek )
261 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, pp. 81-82.
262 Ibid, p. 83.
263 Ibid.
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compromise with popular opinion and common morality on the part o f Dostoevsky. All that 
Myshkin achieves is to stay within the law o f the commonly accepted truth, to preserve the 
equilibrium that in Shestov's view simply takes the side o f indifferent natural forces and 
validates human suffering. Moreover, Shestov accuses Myshkin o f expecting, in exchange 
for his obedience to the ‘universal law’, some moral reward, some divine right to kill not 
just the human body (as Raskolnikov permitted himself to do following Napoleon), but also 
the human soul. The fact that this is Dostoevsky's much adored positive hero who displays 
such behaviour points for Shestov to the prevalence in the writer of that extraordinary 
second sight that forced him to speak the truth even at the expense o f polluting the virtuous 
image o f this hero.
Shestov's discourse in O verco m in g  the S e lf-e v id en t is also changed with respect to the other 
claim that he made already in 1901. He still asserts that Raskolnikov's crime is purely 
fictitious, but this time the assertion is posed as a question, thus losing its sharp, dictatorial 
tone, loosening the categorical diction. ‘Oh [Pacico jibhhkob] BnpaBe 3aaaTB ce6e Bonpoc, 
a  a to h h o  jih oh y6nji CTapyxy h EjiH3aBeTy?’, Shestov writes, ‘H a He ayMaio, hto6bi k to - 
HH6ym> H3 BHHMaTejibHtix HHTaTejien ,0pcToeBCKoro h MeHee Bcero caM ^octocbckhh Mor 
6bi oTBeraTB Ha 3 to t  Bonpoc yTBep^ HTejiBHO. MoaceT 6bitb -  y6nji, a m ojkct 6bitb, He 
y6Hji’.264 Shestov then proceeds to state, as in his D o sto ev sky  a n d  N ie tz sc h e , that murder 
itself is unimportant, and Raskolnikov is ‘in all probability’ as innocent as Dmitrii 
Karamazov.265 In D o sto ev sky  a n d  N ie tz sch e , as we saw above, this ‘probability’ does not 
enter the discussion -  ‘HHKaicoro npecTynjieHHH 3a hhm He 6bijio’, Shestov insists there, the 
story with the victims is ‘BBmyMKa, noioien, HanpacHHHa’. Also, in D o sto ev sky  a n d  
N ie tzsch e  he brings up the name of Ivan rather than Dmitrii, to say that Dostoevsky 
slandered the former who was not involved in Smerdyakov's business. Thus the subtlety of 
the case (of ‘nepexo^a MeTa<j>H3HHecKoro pacKpenomeHna HBaHa b peaJiBHoe, “^HeBHoe” 
npecTynjieHHe CMep a^KOBa’, as Erofeev puts it),267 eludes Shestov here, or rather lies 
outside his concerns. Although the argument in O verco m in g  the S e lf-e v id en t is slightly
264 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, pp. 71-72.
265 See Ibid, p. 72.
266 Shestov, ffocmoeecKUU uHuvfiue, p. 382.
267 See Erofeev, p. 174.
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different, especially in that Shestov stresses the importance o f punishment being real in 
contrast to the murder that cannot be regarded as such, his conclusion twenty years on 
remains essentially the same. ‘Bee oth “repon” -  njioTB o t  njiora caMoro ^ocToeBCKoro’, 
he writes in 1 9 0 1 ;  ‘HHKaicoro PacKOJiBHHKOBa h HHKaKoro KapaMa30Ba Hmcor/na Ha CBeTe 
He 6bijio [...] ^ocToeBCKHH paccKa3tiBaji Bcer^a tojibko o ce6e’, is Shestov's conclusion 
in 1 9 2 1 .
However, Shestov's interpretation in 1 9 2 1  has a different, more solemn, ring to it. Shestov 
speaks of Dostoevsky's divine caprice, or in other words o f the human right for 
individuality even if  it goes against everybody's interests, including his own. This is 
Shestov's understanding o f the Underground Man's comparison between the individual’s 
demand for tea and self-sacrifice for the world’s interests. The right to privacy of a human 
ego that rebels against the dictatorial voice o f science, the idea o f the private that refuses to 
submit to the general is referred to by Shestov as the ugly duckling o f Dostoevsky's 
thought. But it is only perceived as such by Dostoevsky's first sight, whereas his second, 
transcendent sight regards it as a beautiful swan, Shestov claims. ‘Mhoix) no3Hce, yace 
He3a,nojiro jjo CMepra, Kor,zja ^octocbckhh nncaji b “^HeBHHKe micaTejni”, hto  y 
HejioBenecTBa 6buia tojibko o^Ha “n^ea” - hflea SeccMepTHB jjyuiH, oh noBTopjui tojibko 
cjioBa CBoero noanojiBHoro repoa’,269 Shestov writes. The same ugly duckling is evident 
here, he insists, and the beautiful swan is still far away, despite all the major novels having 
been written. ‘BepHee, Tyr no-npemieMy npoaojraaeTCJi jjBOHHoe BHflemie ztsyx opraHOB 
3peHHH. CobcTBeHHBiMH rjia3aMH ^octocbckhh bhjjht rajjKoro yreHKa, “Hy c^ne” rjia3a 
CBH^ eTejiBCTByioT o npeKpacHOM Jiefie^e’,270 Shestov comments. From this he builds a 
bridge again to Dostoevsky's struggle to reconcile both sights, to justify faith in the eyes of  
reason, and regrets the novelist's concessions and defeats within this struggle which on the 
other hand, as Shestov observes, reconciled Dostoevsky with the public opinion, with his 
readers. Thus, what humanist critics interpret as Dostoevsky's Christian values and
268 Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, p. 72.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid, p. 73.
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idealistic aspirations, Shestov regards simply as concessions made to the ‘enemy’ in the 
brutal struggle between Dostoevsky's two types o f sight.
6.1.11. Shestov’s recognition of the ‘holy foolishness’ discourse in the Underground 
Man.
This struggle which is for Shestov best illustrated in N o te s  fr o m  U n d erg ro u n d  occupies the 
central place in Shestov's analysis o f Dostoevsky. Interestingly, Shestov notes the 
difference in what can be regarded as the aesthetics o f the private and the general which 
becomes evident in the course o f this struggle and which has deeper -  ethical -  
implications. Thus in O verco m in g  the S e lf-E v id e n t he turns again to the implicit 
incompatibility o f the Underground Man's discourse with that of his ‘offenders’: the ‘stone 
wall’ of necessity, ‘mathematics’ understood as the positivist and rationalist trend in 
philosophical thought in its encroachment into the world o f human spirituality, the world of 
‘omnitude’ ( ‘ b c c m c t b o ’)  with its ‘self-evident’ laws. The Underground Man does not use 
their logic and has no intention of complying with it. His arguments, as Shestov stresses, 
are ‘to stick his tongue out, to cock a snook’.271 As Blagova and Emelianov observed in 
this connection, Shestov discerns ‘b  apryMeHTaijHH noflnojiBHoro nejiOBeica ^cecTbi 
iopo/tHBoro’.272 However, they do not take this idea further thus leaving it at the level of a 
superficial analogy. Even more peculiar is the fact that in her book H o ly  F oo lishness. 
D o sto evsky 's  N o ve ls  a n d  the P o e tics  o f  C u ltu ra l C ritique  Harriet Murav concentrates 
mostly on Dostoevsky's major novels and only mentions N o tes  f r o m  U n d erg ro u n d  once and 
in passing. Her representation of the holy fools as far as the characters go (rather than the 
narrative itself) does not include the Underground Man.
To our mind, this parallel -  o f the Underground Man and the holy fool tradition -  has deep 
roots, and it is Shestov, we suggest, who amongst the complexity o f discourses o f the 
Underground Man that reflect the complexity o f the character, singled out the discourse of 
a holy fool, even though the terminology was never used. While Blagova and Emelianov 
picked up the similarity pointed by Shestov as captured mainly in the Underground Man's
271 ‘H3MK BMCTaBHT, KyKHUi noica)KeT’: Ibid, p. 67.
272 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 80.
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self-expression, Shestov in fact noticed a more substantial underlying proximity: that 
between the Underground Man's self-denunciation and the self-abasement of the greatest 
saints. He noted that all these saints ‘ cH H T a jiH  ce6a “caMBiMH” - HenpeMeHHO com um u  -  
6e3o6pa3HtiMH, raycHBiMH, nouuibiMH, cjia6biMH, 6e3flapHbiMH cymecTBaMH Ha cBeTe’, 
they were all ‘/to KOHija CBoen 5KH3HH [...] b  6e3yMHOM yacace o t  cBoen h h h t o j k h o c t h  h
271rpexoBHOCTu’. In this respect Murav's definition of holy foolishness highly resonates 
with the above. Indeed, she states that ‘holy foolishness [...] can be stated provisionally as 
the assumption of madness or folly as an ascetic feat of self-humiliation’, and further on: 
‘what distinguishes the holy fool, from the hagiographer's point o f view, is his acceptance 
of suffering and humiliation, which he deliberately provokes by his (seeming) acts of 
folly’.274
Shestov states further that ‘Beci> c m b i c j i  xpHcraaHCTBa h  b c a  Ta Bejraicaa 5Ka)K£a 
HcxynjieHHa, KOTopaa fiBUia rnaBHBiM ^BHraTejieM ayxoBHofi 5KH3HH paHHero h j i h
'y n c
no3AHero cpe^HeBeKOBBa, p o ^ h j i h c b  H3 Taxoro po^a npo3peHHH\ Thus Shestov claims 
that N o te s  f r o m  U n d e r g r o u n d  can be viewed as a commentary to the writings of famous 
saints who knew that God's sacrifice o f his son was the only way to redeem all the 
loathsomeness and paltriness o f man. As Valevicius observes in a related context,
Shestov interprets Notes from Underground as an outcry against a communal conscience. In 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche brutal reason was at stake. Here, in Job's Balances [the book into which 
Shestov's article of 1921 was eventually included], Shestov refined his interpretation. Shestov now 
sees Dostoevsky attacking the communal conscience, the so-called “omnitude” (vsemstvo), the 
existence of judgements which are universally admitted. The ascetism of medieval monks, for 
example, was not primarily directed against the flesh as is normally thought, rather, what the monks 
sought to attack was a spiritual equilibrium that reason considered to be the supreme goal of earthly 
life. The monks wanted, by their extreme acts, to escape omnitude. It was their way of going against 
the flow.276
This issue of revolt, o f going against the flow is what Shestov treasures most in the 
Underground Man, and generally in Dostoevsky as a philosophical writer (as Shestov
273 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 41.
274 Murav, p. 2.
275 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 41.
276 Valevicius, p. 40.
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perceives him). This revolt in Dostoevsky's narrative is normally embedded into the 
discourse of holy foolishness, and the Underground Man is another distinct example o f this.
Indeed, As Murav writes, in Karamzin's perception, ‘protected by their folly, they 
[canonized holy fools] appeared briefly on the scene in order to denounce the tyranny and 
evil o f the tsars’.277 Similarly, for Shestov the Underground Man in his folly-like behaviour 
denounces Reason and Necessity, manifested in the laws o f nature, depicted as the ‘stone 
wall’ and ‘mathematics’, and embraced by ‘omnitude’ ( ‘b ccm ctbo’). In Murav's definition 
‘the holy fool is a site o f resistance to the “age o f positivism and science” (words that 
Dostoevsky used to characterise his time); the holy fool serves as a sign of humanity's 
debased state and need for redemption’. All this is present in the Underground Man's 
image, and even if  it is difficult to argue that he complies with Murav's other (simplified) 
description -  namely, that ‘according to the hagiographer, the business of the holy fool, and
77Q
that o f all the other saints, is to imitate Christ’, this objection is invalidated by her other 
remark that ‘some of Dostoevsky's holy fools [...] seem not wholly Christian. But all of
nOA
this is part o f the territory o f holy foolishness’. Also, important in the context of N o tes  
f r o m  U n d erg ro u n d  and its main hero is the fact that ‘the boundaries between demonic and
AQ1
divine folly were never clearly drawn’. In this respect the Underground Man's ambiguous 
moral image, his strivings upwards that are invariably followed by irredeemable falls, and 
finally his potential appeal to the Christian doctrine in the last chapter that was, by 
Dostoevsky's own account, removed by the censors, are highly significant.
No less important is the role played by Dostoevsky's text as such, creating the impression 
that holy foolishness resides in the very foundations o f the narrative o f the N o tes  fr o m  
U nderground . Murav talks of ‘a specific literary procedure that is itself “holy foolish”,282 
and in this respect N o tes  fr o m  U n d erground  represents a distinct example o f such a
277 Murav, p. 2.
278 Murav, p. 8.
279 Ibid, p. 2.
280 Ibid, p. 15.
281 Ibid, p. 171.
282 Ibid.
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tradition. Indeed, this work fits perfectly into the following description: ‘the discourse of 
the holy fool makes the categories and models of the dominant culture problematic and 
points beyond what is immediately given. [...] The constant shifting o f boundaries and 
violations of expectation make for a text that masks its own meaning and leaves much 
unsaid, thereby confounding the reader, much like the spectacle performed by the holy fool, 
which leads his audience astray -  hence, the novel as scandal, tempting and misleading’.283
Thus, the reference to a holy fool in connection to the Underground Man is of undoubted 
relevance. Although formally the link was named by Blagova and Emelianov rather than 
Shestov, in fact it was he, not they, who recognised in this character, even if without 
understanding it himself, the essence of the relevant discourse and its functionality, as well 
as its aesthetics. This is reminiscent o f the situation with Dostoevsky and formal 
philosophy, as perceived by Shestov: ‘riopa3HTejibHO, hto , He HMea HHKaicoH HayHHO- 
(J)hjioco(J)ckoh noflroTOBKH, oh Tax BepHo pa3nifl;teji, b neM ocHOBHaa, BeKOBenHaa 
npofijieMa (Jjhjioco^hh’.284 Similarly Shestov, being unfamiliar with the appropriate terms 
nevertheless shrewdly felt the essence of the Underground Man's proximity to the holy fool 
tradition. In the same way, as we shall soon see, Shestov foresaw the essence of 
postmodernism through Dostoevsky's works, without, again, using its terminology.
B lagova  and E m elianov em phasise the shift o f  accents in  Shestov's interpretation o f  
D o stoevsk y  in 1921 in  com parison w ith h is book  o f  1901 on  D ostoevsky  and N ietzsche. 
N o w , they write, ‘IUecTOB He ofiBHHaeT nncaTejia b 3 aBeaoMOH jdkh, Kan aejian oto b 
paHHHx pafioTax [ . . . ] ,  ho oh no-npeacHeMy OTpnitaeT Bepy /JocToeBCKoro b “BeHHbie
HCTHHbi” h “flofipofleTejiH”’.285 T hey make the important observation that ‘paHee IUecTOB
286ofijiHHaji /focToeBCKoro, Tenepb BbicTynaeT KaK 3amHTHHK\
In our view, the shift in Shestov's discourse that had happened by 1921 was towards a 
substantial softening o f his accusatory tone and towards an overall tolerance that came with
283 Murav, pp. 13-14.
284 Shestov, H a eecax Hoea, p. 45.
285 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 75.
286 Ibid, p. 79.
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increased maturity and greater theoretical knowledge. The very register of Shestov's writing 
has changed, having acquired more epic, sacramental features. It is certainly a loftier style 
than it was in D o sto ev sky  a n d  N ie tzsch e  in 1901. It is also a more diverse discourse. As 
Blagova and Emelianov observe, ‘IUecTOB npeno^HocHT (J)HJioco(J)CKHe paccyxcaemia [...], 
CMemnBaa h x  c  xyzjojKecTBemibiMH o6pa3aMH, nepepafioTaHHbiMH H3 aHTHHHbix m h(])ob , 
E h O jih h , nonyjiapHoro (JjojibKjiopa h  oflHOBpeMeimo c BocnoMHHamiaMH, nponoBeflbio,
HayHHBIMH KOMMeHTapHHMH, nCHXOJIOrHHeCKHMH HadjnoaeHHBMH, (J)H3HOrHOMHHeCKHMH
287xapaKTepHCTHKaMH’.
However, the assessment of the shift that took place in Shestov's outlook in emigration is 
not uniform. Although in technical terms Shestov's transition from scepticism to religiosity 
is not questionable, the nature of these two modes is understood in two opposite ways 
which are best illustrated by the words of Georgii Fedotov on the one hand and by Viktor 
Erofeev on the other. The former commented on the change in Shestov's thought from 
scepticism ‘pacmaTbroaiomero ycTOH HfleajibHoro MHpa pazm h h c t o h  pajjocTH 
pa3pymeHiw’ to ‘TpeBora h  ^axce Myna’ that started to burst from under Shestov's 
‘ocTpoyMHoe nepo’.288 Erofeev too observes that Shestov's emigration ‘npHMepHO 
coBnaaaeT c nepexoaoM MbicjiHTejia o t  CKenTHijH3Ma k  pejiHrH03H0H (J)h jio c o (}>h h ’ and 
speaks of the emergence o f first testimonies by Shestov in his writings about his faith 
which were absent from his earlier works.289 However, his perception o f the underlying 
inner evolution is entirely different.
Indeed, he regards Shestov's path as going from a collapse to the tragic consciousness 
(starting from T o lsto y  a n d  N ie tzsch e ) to gradual resurrection through religious constructs 
into the realm of faith which, if  it did not extinguish his initial torment, at least gave it a 
constructive and optimistic frame (where the word optimism should be understood in terms 
of the sheer energy and strength of conviction on Shestov's part for springing to the defence 
of his faith). Thus, Erofeev claimed that initially ‘Bor, KOTopbm, roBopa cjioBaMH TeHHe,
287 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 80.
288 Georgii Fedotov, PeijeH3M Ha KHHry U lecT O B a H a eecax Hoea in Hucna (Paris), Sept-Dee. 
1930, pp. 259-263 (p. 260). Cited in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 296.
289 Erofeev, p. 182.
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“ M c m e T  noM O H B ”  6 b ij i  jjajieico, b  H e flo c a r a e M O H  a ajin. 3aTO “yacacBi” 6b ij ih  p aflO M , o h h  
o K p y ^ c a j in  LLIecTOBa, KaK 6 e3o6pa3HBie h o h h b ic  n r a u B i  T o h h ’ .290 They made Shestov 
scream from pain and despair. ‘O t  0njioco<puu mpaeeduu flo cTaTBH  o HexoBe
9Q 1npocTHpaeTca BpeMa caMBix 6ojie3HeHHBix h  rpOMKHx k p h k o b  UlecTOBa’, Erofeev points 
out. ‘3aTeM kphkh cnaSeiOT, yaapBi o CTeHy CTaHOB^Tca rjiyme no Mepe Toro, xax UlecTOB 
Bee 6ojiee HacTOHHHBO coMHeBaeTca b  npaBax pa3yMa Ha aocTOBepHoe c y ^ e H n e  o 
CMBicjie MHpo3^aHHa’.292
Thus, for all the difference with respect to the underlying causes, there seems to be 
agreement in acknowledging Shestov's shift, after emigrating from Russia, towards Biblical 
existentialism, towards seeking the ultimate truth in the Holy Writ. As for the above 
differences, in our opinion Erofeev is undoubtedly closer to the truth by pointing to the 
genuine torment at the root of Shestov's search which the wit of his pen only camouflages 
in the same way as a smile sometimes aspires to hide tears. In fact, this sarcastic discourse 
points to Shestov's inner courage akin to that of any tragic artistic vision, and most notably 
that of Joseph Brodsky, whose irony was designed to cover despair. The similarity between 
these two figures, in our view, runs deep, but lies outside the scope of this dissertation, and 
thus we allow only occasional remarks in this regard.
Summarising the evolution of Shestov's thought, in particular his view of Dostoevsky, we 
should emphasise that the philosophical dimension in Overcoming the Self-Evident is much 
more distinct and profound than it was twenty years earlier in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. In 
1921 Shestov's implications are much broader -  while remaining fundamentally of the 
same root, they have significantly evolved in nature. If in 1901 they showed an irrationalist 
approach and a tendency towards philopsophy per se, in 1921 this tendency turned into the 
foundation of a system and gained the grounding of broad philosophical knowledge. By 
then Shestov's systematic critique of the history of speculative philosophy had begun. 
While his work of 1901 displays Shestov as posing questions and being engaged in a
290 Erofeev, p. 167.
291 Ibid, p . 177.
292 Ibid.
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passionate search for answers, in his article of 1921 he appears to have found the route to 
the answers and is prepared to fight fiercely to defend his philosophical perspective. This 
time he analyses the poison of rationalist thought much more systematically than in 1901, 
and takes it much further -  to the central issue of original sin which he interprets in his own 
way, as we are about to see.
Also, Shestov assigns high significance to multiple diversions in Dostoevsky's novels, to 
the insertions which on the surface seem only to obscure the main flow of the narrative, but 
are in fact of the utmost importance. ‘IloBecTBOBaHHe Be3^e nepecbmaeTca
3nH30flHHeCKHMH BCTBBKaMH, CTOJIB 3HaHHTeJTLHI»IMH H TJiyfiOKHMH no TeMaM H
HcnojiHeHHio, hto hmh coBceM 3acjioHaeTCJi rnaBHaa <j)a6y jia ’,293 S h esto v  w rites. T his 
co rre la tes  w ith  h is  co n v ic tio n  abou t the  tru e  h e ro es  o f  D o sto ev sk y 's  novels . T hus fo r h im , 
as w e  saw , a  seco n d ary  fig u re  su ch  as Ip p o lit is m o re  sig n ifican t th an  M y sh k in  w h o  is 
co n v en tio n a lly  accep ted  as th e  c h ie f  charac ter. M o reo v er, as w e  n o ted  above , M y sh k in  fo r 
S h esto v  is n o t a  rea l ch arac ter, b u t s im p ly  D o sto ev sk y 's  co n cessio n  to  ‘o m n itu d e ’ 
( ‘BceMCTBo’). S im ilarly , ‘H acToam nH  repofi Eecoe - sto He BepxoBeHCKHH, He OraBporHH, 
a  BejiHKHH h 3ara£OHHBiH MOJinajiBHHK h ctojhihhk Khphjijiob’,294 S hestov  claim s, 
d esc rib in g  th e  la tte r as ‘“.ziyina” poMaHa’.295
While Shestov still maintains that Notes from Underground is a central work from which 
stemmed Dostoevsky's major novels, such as Crime and Punishment, The Idiot and The 
Devils (which Shestov addresses once again in 1921), he also introduces into his analysis 
some short stories which, although they generally escaped critical attention at the time, 
Shestov regards as no less fundamental than Notes from Underground. Indeed, he speaks of 
KpomKdR [The Meek One] and Con CMeumoeo uenoeeKa [the Dream o f a Ridiculous Man] 
as being two links in the same chain.
293 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 78.
294 Ibid, p. 85.
295 Ibid.
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However, before attempting to understand Shestov's logic here we wish to point out that, as 
should now be clear, from a structuralist perspective a change between two works is 
evident not only discursively, but also thematically, which is directly connected to the 
development of a philosophical dimension. Indeed, Shestov’s assignment of high 
significance to secondary characters and thematic diversions in Dostoevsky’s works can be 
viewed as evidence of his intuitive attention first and foremost to the sophistication of the 
writer’s philosophical world. For, as Peace writes, these secondary figures ‘embody ideas, 
present opposing philosophical positions to those of the central characters, and yet they 
themselves are not immune from [...] “double thoughts’” . Even more significantly, 
Shestov's focus on insertions seemingly superfluous to the main narrative, on secondary 
characters and finally on not so celebrated, less major writings of Dostoevsky signifies a 
certain reversal of the commonly accepted system in Dostoevsky criticism. This reversal is 
characteristic of Shestov in his striving to be original and paradoxical as a matter of 
conviction, to defeat logic. Indeed, he often quotes Pascal: ‘qu'on ne nous reproche done 
plus le manque de clarte, car nous en faisons profession’297 and Tertullian: ‘Crucifixus est 
Dei filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est Dei filius; prorsus credibile est,
298 ,i • •quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; cerium est quia impossibile est’. This affinity for 
originality and paradox was most probably not introduced for the sake of it, but rather it 
emerged within Shestov's main paradigm, out of his hatred for cliches, for commonly 
accepted major routes. For the latter contradict his fundamental worship of and belief in the 
private, in the individual revelation, and result in his attempt to distance himself from 
‘omnitude’ (from Dostoevsky’s ‘b c c m c t b o ’ ) .  His constant digging up of obscure names and 
quotations and bringing them to light, to centre stage, is another piece of evidence of the 
same pattern. This sailing against the flow and rejection of cliches is, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 3, another characteristic that signifies Shestov's proximity to the world of art where 
cliche is equal to artistic death.
296 Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, p. v.
297 B l a i s e  P a s c a l ,  Pensees. C ite d  in  S h e s t o v ,  Ha eecax Hoea, p . 287: ‘H  n y cT b  H ac He n o n p e ica io T  
HeacHOCTbio, h 6o  o  h c h - t o  Mbi h  p a n e e M ’.
298 Tertullian, De praescriptione hereticorum. Cited in S h e s t o v ,  Ha eecax Hoea, p . 322: ‘Pacrorr 
Cwh E o>khh; He CTbmHO, noTOM y h t o  ycTbDKaeT. H y M ep  Chh E oh ch h ; 3acjiy>KHBaeT B ep w  TeM 
6o j ie e ,  h t o  H ejien o . H  noxopoH eH H biH  BOCKpec; flocT O B epH o, noTOM y h t o  h cb o3m om ch o’ .
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Section II. Reappraisal. Reading Dostoevsky as a religious philosopher
6.II.1. Shestov's Biblical existentialism as prompted by Dostoevsky. Discovering 
Kierkegaard. The story of the Fall and its philosophical significance.
It is  in  th is  lig h t o f  flee in g  from  ‘o m n itu d e ’ ( ‘BceMCTBo’) th a t S h esto v  v iew s b o th  sto ries b y  
D o sto ev sk y  -  The Meek One and  th e  Dream o f a Ridiculous Man. F o r h im  th ese  tw o  stories 
c a rry  th e  u tm o s t p h ilo so p h ica l s ign ificance , th a t w e  are abou t to  d iscuss, and  allow  u s  to 
in sc rib e  h is  th o u g h t a t th e  tim e  in to  B ib lica l ex is ten tia lism . In Overcoming the Self-evident 
S h esto v  qu o tes  p assag es  from  The Meek One th a t h e  also  rep ea ts  in  th e  in troduction , 
en titled  Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, to  h is  b o o k  o n  th e  D an ish  p h ilo so p h er {Kierkegaard 
and Existential Philosophy). S hestov  w rites  there : ‘J J o c t o c b c k h h ,  xax h  K n p re rap fl, 
“B tm aji H3 o6mero” h j i h ,  Kaic o h  caM BBipa^caeTca, H3 “BceMCTBa” . H B ^pyr nonyBCTBOBaji, 
HTO K BCeMCTBy HCJIB3H H He Hy>KHO B03BpamaTBCfl, HTO BCCMCTBO - T. e. TO, HTO BCe, 
B cer^a  h  Be3^e cHHTaiOT 3a HCTHHy, ecTB obMaH, ecTB CTpamHoe HaBa^meHHe, h t o  o t  
BceMCTBa, k  KOTopoMy Hac npH3BiBaeT Ham pa3yM, npnm jiH  Ha 3eMjno Bee yacacBi 
6 b i t h b ’.299 T h e  p ro tag o n is t o f  The Meek One, s trick en  b y  h is  g rief, re fu ses  to  lis ten  to  the 
ju d g e , re jec ts  an y  au th o rity  o v e r h im se lf  and  sta tes  th e  fact o f  h u m an  b e in g s ’ ex trem e 
lo n e lin ess  in  th e  w orld . S im ilarly  th e  R id icu lo u s  M an  stands ou t o f  th e  cro w d  in  h is  -  for 
S h esto v  d is tin c tly  u n d erg ro u n d  -  ph ilo so p h y . ‘ B b i  b h ^ h t c ,  h t o  b  1877 rojxy, t .  e. n ep e3 
naTHa^uaTB neT n o cn e  “3anncoK  H3 nozuiojiBn” , ^ o c t o c b c k h h  Bee em e n p o ao jraaeT  
,zi;ocKa3BiBaTB He,n;ocKa3aHHyK) noBecTB 06 OTBeprHyroM b c c m c t b o m  nejiOBeKe’,300 S hestov  
says.
Notably, the ideas expressed in his piece on Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, which was 
started 12 years after Overcoming the Self-Evident, by and large are repetitions of the main 
ideas of the latter work, only enriched by the parallels with Kierkegaard's thought that 
Shestov was able to draw after having encountered Kierkegaard’s writings in 1929. He only 
discovered the Danish philosopher at the time, prompted by Husserl. Shestov was struck by
299 Lev Shestov, Kupsezapd u 9K3ucmeuv{uajibHaR (punococpw (Tjiac eomuoufeao e nycmbwe) 
(Moscow: Progress-Gnozis, 1992), p. 21.
300 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 88.
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the proximity of Kierkegaard’s ideas to his own (this kinship, acutely sensed by Husserl, 
was the reason the latter recommended Kierkegaard to Shestov). As Milosz wrote, ‘It must 
have been quite a surprise for him to learn that Kierkegaard saw the source of philosophy 
not in amazement, as did the ancients, but in despair, and that he too opposed Job to Plato 
and Hegel. Those were Shestov's own most cherished thoughts’.301 In Erofeev's words, ‘b  
K H p K e r o p e  IU ec T O B  y B H ^ e j i  c B o e r o  jjB o irn H K a , x o t h  6 o p i> 6 a  “ H O B o ro  3 p e m i f l”  c  
o6bm eH H O C TBK > OKOHHHJiacb y  K n p K e r o p a ,  ic a x  n o j ia r a e T  U le c T O B , TeM  K O M n p oM H ccoM , 
K O T O pbifi, n o  c y r n  f l e j ia ,  o s H a n a j i  n o p a jK e H n e  “ H O B o ro  3 p e H H n ’” .302
Thus, if  Kierkegaard in many ways became for Shestov his philosophical brother, then his 
own contemplation o f Kierkegaard's proximity to Dostoevsky in fact reveals (through this 
indirect connection) Shestov's perception of his own kinship to the Russian novelist. Hence, 
it is not unreasonable to view the aforementioned introduction as an implicit description of 
this kinship, since talking about Kierkegaard rather than himself frees Shestov from any 
ethical and moral obligations, such as considerations of modesty, that any autobiographical 
writing (in the sense o f self-portrayal) would impose. The struggle of faith is ‘6 e 3 y M n m  
6opb6a o 603MOJfcuocmu. H6o t o j i b k o  b o 3m o j k h o c t b  OTKpbmaeT nyn> k  cnacemno... B 
nocjieflHeM cneTe QCTaeTCji q r h o : dnn Eoza ece 603MOOfCHO, m  -  are Kierkegaard's words 
that Shestov quotes. In these words, in Kierkegaard's belief that ‘t o j i b k o  t o t ,  Hbe cymecTBO 
Tax noTpaceHO, h t o  o h  CTaHOBHTca ayxoM h  nocTHraeT, h t o  Bee b o 3 m o j k h o ,  t o j i b k o  t o t  
no/iomeji k  Eory’,304 Shestov sees Kierkegaard's (and hence his own) proximity to 
Dostoevsky. ‘ M o h c h o ,  He 6 o h c b  ynpexa b  npeyBejiHneHHH, Ha3BaTB ,I[ocToeBCKoro 
# b o h h h k o m  Knprerapfla’,305 Shestov writes in Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky.
Thus, if in 1902 Shestov saw Dostoevsky's spiritual twin in Nietzsche, three decades later it 
is Kierkegaard that replaces the latter. This is significant as it shows us the direction of 
Shestov's inner evolution. If in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche Shestov cherished Dostoevsky's
301 Milosz, pp. 108-109.
302 Erofeev, p. 183.
303 Shestov, Kupzezapd u 9K3ucmemfua/ibHaH (pwoco(pM , p. 21.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
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tragic vision and his revolt subversive of Hegelian philosophy, in the early 1930s he 
discerns in Dostoevsky, just as in Kierkegaard, a closeness to Job. ‘ O t  T erejra Knprerapfl 
ymeji k  uacraoMy MbicjiHTejno -  HoBy. To t k q  caejiaji h  ^ o c t o c b c k h h ’ , Shestov writes 
in Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. Shestov views Dostoevsky's creative writings as variations 
on the themes of the Book o f Job, and considers Kierkegaard's creativity in the same vein. 
Identifying, as we suggested, Kierkegaard with Shestov himself here, we can see that 
Shestov essentially declares the Book o f Job to be his own point of departure. Indeed, Job 
had played a crucial role in Shestov's philosophy, and his book On Job's Scales is 
testimony to it. In Milosz’s description, as we saw earlier, Shestov's rebellion against 
necessity is identical to Job's revolt against God, and if Spinoza’s advice to philosophers 
was ‘not to laugh, not to weep, not to hate, but to understand’, Job, on the contrary, to
^07Shestov’s sheer approval, ‘wailed and screamed to the indignation of his wise friends’. 
Erofeev, and after him Blagova and Emelianov link together Shestov's own personal 
experience of losing his only son in the First World War in 1917 and Job's tragedy of losing 
his children. Erofeev states that the echo of Shestov's tragedy is distinctly audible in his 
writings. ‘B cym>6e IlIecTOBa h HoBa ecTb poflCTBeHHbie nepTbi. Kpmc HecuacTHoro 
mTabc-KanHTaHa CHernpeBa, Tepmonjero cBoero HmomeuKy: “He xouy apyroro 
MajlbHHKa!” M03KH0 CHHTaTb JieHTMOTHBOM n03AHer0 meCTOBCKOrO TBOpueCTBa’,308 
Erofeev writes.
However, for Shestov himself this evolution may not have seemed so drastic, because he in 
many ways aligned together Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. It was their sheer significance -  in 
Shestov's life as well as for human thought in general -  that was one of the uniting factors. 
Erofeev regards the influence of Kierkegaard on Shestov comparable only to that made on 
him by Nietzsche, although in the latter case it was more a meeting of a pupil with a teacher 
than of kindred minds, as in the case of Kierkegaard. Another uniting factor is revealed in 
an important confession by Shestov to Fondane, which confirms our conjectures of the 
autobiographical nature of his writings about Kierkegaard and his previous books on
306 Shestov, Kupeezapd u 3K3ucmemfuajibHOH (pwiocofun, p. 21.
307 Milosz, p. 105.
308 Erofeev, p. 184.
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Nietzsche: ‘It seems to me that to speak truly about Kierkegaard and Nietzsche one should 
not really speak about them, but simply about oneself,309 Shestov reportedly said. 
Significantly, he recognised the limitations of both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard as stemming 
from their inferiority complex, their metaphysical impotence, lack of control over their own 
destinies. Thus in Nietzsche's case it was due to an incurable disease, while in 
Kierkegaard's case it was the loss of his fiancee Regina Olsen, also because of an illness -  
sexual impotence. What was important for Shestov, though, is effectively a metaphysical 
impotence that he saw in their respective tragedies.
What is the most underground about Kierkegaard, and yet something one always grasps about him 
in the end, is his impotence. Of course he speaks of himself as if he is a great writer. He assures his 
readers that he will be immortal, but he does this precisely because he feels impotent: otherwise 
why talk about this at all? [...] It is the same with Nietzsche. It is an impotent man who wrote ‘The 
will to power’, and who made the whole world believe -  as was his aim! -  that Nietzsche was a 
magnificent engine of power.310
But comparing their similar situations Shestov wittily notices the difference in their 
discourses: ‘Nietzsche was in the same situation as Kierkegaard. Nevertheless there were 
times when he burst into songs. Kierkegaard never sang’.311
Let us now return to our discussion of The Meek One and The Dream o f a Ridiculous Man 
in Shestov's interpretation, since it is in these stories as well as in other ostensibly minor 
episodes of major novels that Shestov sees the utmost philosophical significance of 
Dostoevsky and from which Shestov's own Biblical existentialism stems. In Dostoevsky's 
radical departure from the universally accepted truths that Shestov discovered in these 
works he reveals their continuity with the Notes from Underground. Thus, as we mentioned 
above, he effectively recognises the Underground Man in the hero of The Dream o f a 
Ridiculous Man. In fact, Shestov assigned to The Dream a profound, albeit concealed, 
religious meaning which we have already described in section 2.4 of Part I. It is connected 
first and foremost to the Biblical story of original sin which Shestov interprets as the 
poisoning by knowledge of human beings’ hitherto limitless divine freedom. It is clear that
309 Fondane, p. 76.
310 Ibid, p. 72.
311 Ibid, p. 71.
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Shestov views The Meek One as posing the question to which the subsequent The Dream o f  
a Ridiculous Man provides an answer. First Shestov emphasises in The Meek One the 
protagonist’s rejection of the authority of common rules embodied in the judge and his 
attempts to gain power over the protagonist's own will. The latter's grief which follows the 
suicide of the only creature he truly loved -  the Meek One -  serves as a catalyst to create 
and reveal the officer's revolt against necessity symbolised by death itself and the judge 
who is used almost as its validator. Thus the same familiar paradigm (which can be labelled 
as ‘the revelations of death’) which Shestov traces in Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, is actualised 
here: a human revolt initiated by extreme despair which opens one's eyes to the truths 
beyond those which are commonly accepted.
S ix teen  years  la te r in  h is  la s t w o rk  d ed ica ted  to  D o sto ev sk y , S hestov  q u o ted  aga in  th e  sam e 
w o rd s  o f  th e  o ffic e r illu s tra tin g  h is  revo lt: ‘3aneM MpauHaa kochoctb pa36njia  to , hto  
B cero flopo>Ke? ...Kochoctb! O  n p n p o n a! J lio n n  Ha 3eMJie ozjhh -  b ot 6ena. Ectb jih b no n e 
5KHB HejIOBeK? -  KpHHHT pyCCKHH fioraTBIpB. KpHHy H a  — He fioraTBipB, H HHKTO He 
oTKjiHKaeTca... Bee MepTBO h BCiony MepTBeijBi. OnHH tojibko jhoah, a  KpyroM hhx 
MOJinaHHe’.312 O n ly  in  1921 S h esto v  le ft th em  to  speak  fo r th em selv es , w h ile  in  1937 he 
p ro v id ed  an  ex p lic it co m m en ta ry  in  th e  fo rm  o f  an  ex c lam atio n  as i f  co n tin u in g  th e  
a fo rem en tio n ed  o ffice r 's  p lea: ‘O n cy n a  npHiHJia 3Ta kochoctb, 3Ta 6e3rpaHHHHaa BJiacTB 
CM epra Han 3KH3HBK), KaK fiopoTBCH c Hen h M05KH0 jih c Hen fiopoTBCH?’, and  con c lu d ed  b y  
ask in g  a lm o st rh e to rica lly : ‘KaK ^octocbckhh otbcthji Ha s t o t  B onpoc?’. T h u s the  
q u es tio n  is in d eed  p o sed  b y  The Meek One, an d  th en  answ ered  in  The Dream w hich , as 
S h esto v  w rites  in  1937, ‘n o  CBoen TeMe aBJiaeTca KaK 6bi nonojmeHHeM  k 3anncKaM, h b 
3HaHHTejiBHOH CTeneHH noacHaeT hx, pacKpBmaa hx BHyrpeHHHH cmbicji h hctohhhk’.314
The answer that The Dream provides is, according to Shestov, the story of the Fall 
disguised by Dostoevsky as a fantasy-novella. The hero encounters mankind before the
312 Fedor Dostoevskii, K p o m K a n  in F. M. Dostoevskii, T l o j i n o e  c o d p a n u e  c o H U H e n u u  e  30 m o M a x ,  
vol. 24, p. 35. Cited in Lev Shestov, 0  ‘n e p e p o D f c d e n u u  y 6 e o t c d e H u u '  y  f f o c m o e e c K o e o  in 
V M 0 3 p e H u e  u  o m K p o e e n u e ,  pp. 186-187.
313 Shestov, O 'nepepoofcdenuuydejfcdenuii ’y/JocmoeecKoeo, p. 187.
314 Ibid.
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original sin has taken place, and thus he sees people totally happy, uncontaminated by the 
fruit from the tree o f  knowledge. These people are free, living in love, in harmony and in 
unison with nature, and their knowledge is deeper and higher than that offered by our 
science. The reason for the latter is in that ‘Hayxa unjeT odbiiCHHTb, h to  Taicoe 5KH3Hb, caMa 
CTpeMHTca C03HaTb ee, HTodbi HayHHTb flpyrnx xcHTb’, while for these people -  c3HaHne hx 
Bocnojimuiocb h nHTajiocb hhmmh npoHHKHOBeHHJiMH, neM y Hac Ha 3eMJie, h [...] 
CTpeMJieHHa HX 6bUIH T0»ce HHbie. OHH He CTpeMHJIHCb K n03HaHHK> >KH3HH, KaK Mbi 
CTpeMHMca no3HaTb ee, noTOMy hto 5KH3Hb hx 6buia BocnojiHeHa’.315
T h ese  d esc rip tio n s  b y  D o sto ev sk y  o f  th e  p eo p le  from  th e  R id icu lo u s M an ’s d ream , illu stra te  
fo r S h esto v  th e  m etap h y sica l s ta te  o f  m an k in d  b e fo re  th e  Fall. It is th e  d iffe ren t n a tu re  o f  
th e ir  k n o w led g e  th a t a ttrac ts  S h esto v  m o st an d  w h ich  h e  d is tin g u ish es  fro m  th e  reaso n  that 
ru les  o n  E arth  and  w h ich , in  h is  v iew , k illed  h u m an  freedom  and  in v o k ed  dea th . ‘H h b 
0.2JH0H H3 COBpeMeHHbIX TCOpHH n03HaHHfl Bonpoc O CymHOCTH H Ha3HaneHHH HayHHOTO 
3HaHHJi He nocTaBjieH c Taxon niydHHOH h o c tp o to h ’,316 S h esto v  w rites  abou t 
D o sto ev sk y 's  Dream.
S h esto v  p u ts  th e  n o v e lis t a lo n g sid e  P la to  and  P lo tin u s  (o f  w h o m  D o sto ev sk y  k n ew  no th ing , 
S h esto v  rem ark s in  b rack e ts) w h o  ‘noAxoAHJin h, nocKOJibKy aaH o cMepTHbiM, 
ocymecTBJDiJiH nocTaBJieHHyio ced e  /Joctocbckhm 3a^any: OTKa3aTbca o t  HayHHoro 
3HaHHH, hto6bi nocn iH b  HcTHHy’.317 S h esto v  is  adam an t th a t ‘HcTHHa h HayHHoe 3HaHHe 
HenpHMHpHMbl. HcTHHa He BblHOCHT OKOB 3HaHHH, OHa 3aflbIXaeTCH B Tfl^CKHX 06bHTHHX 
“caMOOHeBH^HOCTen” , a a io m n x  flocTOBepHOCTb HameMy 3HaHHio’.318 H e q u o tes  the 
R id icu lo u s  M an  w h o  accuses sc ien ce  o f  d isco v e rin g  law s an d  p lac in g  th e  law s o f  h ap p in ess  
ab o v e  h ap p in ess , w h o  b lam es  sc ien ce  fo r b e in g  d id ac tic , fo r s triv in g  to  teach  p eo p le  h o w  to
315 Fedor Dostoevskii, C o h  c M e u m o e o  n e n o e e K a  in F. M. Dostoevskii, T l o n n o e  c o d p a n u e  c o H u n e n u u  
e  3 0  m o M a x ,  vol. 25, p. 113. Cited in Shestov, O ‘n e p e p o j t c d e m a t  y d e o t c d e n u u  ’ y  f l o c m o e e c K o a o ,  p. 
188.
316 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 91.
317 Ibid.
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live. W h ereas , ‘HcTHHa Ha# 3aK0HaMH, h 3aK0HBi #jw Hee to  3Ke, hto  ^ octocbckoto  
6bijih Kor#a-TO ctchbi nopbM Bi h KaTop^cHbie KaH#ajibi’,319 S hestov  claim s.
Thus Shestov gives The Dream o f a Ridiculous Man a distinctly Biblical philosophical 
interpretation and focuses above all on its gnoseological aspect. Interestingly, while 
Blagova and Emelianov point out that Dostoevsky implies in this story the reason for
0 9 A
corruption, which the hero brought to the described Golden Age, being in lies, Shestov 
insists that it was in the knowledge that the Ridiculous Man gave to that innocent humanity. 
In fact, the narrative of Dostoevsky is highly ambiguous in this respect and allows for 
multiple interpretations, almost as if the writer was indeed imitating the narration of the 
Biblical story with its ambiguous and multi-layered discourse.
Dostoevsky's implications afterwards lead more into the New Testament and refer to 
crucifixion and the atonement of sins. These are left unexplored by Shestov, which is by 
itself instructive as it points to a certain shift in his outlook from his previous search for 
salvation to his more theoretical preoccupations, where his struggle against gnosis, against 
reason, takes the upper hand. This shift, however, was temporary because the theme of 
salvation was never absent completely from Shestov's reflections and remained looming 
behind his fight with reason as an ultimate constructive resolution of this fight which 
Shestov eventually found in religious faith. Here, however, it is the corruption of mankind 
by knowledge which Shestov derives from Dostoevsky's Dream and on which Shestov's 
own philosophy rests. While literally Blagova and Emelianov are right in pointing to lies as 
laying the foundations of the above corruption, Shestov's alliance with Dostoevsky here 
stays on very firm ground, because this story is one of the most explicit examples of 
Dostoevsky's derogatory attitude to science and the kind of knowledge acquired through it.
319 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 91.
320 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 96.
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. .BMecTe c 3HaHHeM npniiiJiH Bee 3eMHbie y^Kacbi, npHuuia CMepTb’,321 Shestov comments 
on Dostoevsky's interpretation of the Fall, as he sees it depicted in the Dream. ‘Tyr Hayicn 
OflHon He^ ocTaTOHHO 6bijio’, Shestov continues:
BMecTe c HayKOH Bbipocjia -  o t  Toro ace Kopna -  h “arnica”; MHp npeBpamncfl b 3aBopo>KeHHoe 
“3aKOHaMH” UapCTBO, JIIO/JH -  H3 CBOSoflHbIX CymeCTB B 6e3BOJIbHbIX aBTOMBTOB... H TOJIbKO y  
HeKOTopbix H3 hhx b peflKHe MHHyrbi npocbinaeTca CTpauiHaa Tocxa no HacTOHinen 5kh3hh h 
BMecTe c 3toh tockoh CMyTHoe co3HaHne, hto Ta cnaa, KOTopaa BjiafleeT hmh h HanpaBjiaeT nx n 
KOTopyio ohh odoroTBopnjiH, ecTb cnna BeHHoro CHa, CMepTH, HedbiTHH. 3 to  h ecTb “aHaMHe3Hc” 
IlnaTOHa, npoGyac/temie FLnoTHHa. 3 to  to , hto jhoajim aaeTca, ho Hero jiioah He Moryr ^oGbirb 
cbohmh cRiiaMH, CBoeii 3acjiyroH, cbohmh “^enaMH”. HnTaTejib BHflHT, hto 3 i y  “npaB^y” 
XlocToeBCKHH He caM BbiAyMan, He Mor caM Bbi^yMaTb’.322
However, Shestov's conclusions derived from The Dream o f a Ridiculous Man are much 
less obvious than just pointing at gnosis as the fruit of the tree of knowledge being at the 
core of the fundamental and insoluble problems of the human predicament. While 
interpreting the story in the vein of Biblical existentialism Shestov at the same time returns 
to his most profound topic -  that of the incommunicability of truth. The whole spirit of his 
work Overcoming the Self-Evident lies in his conviction that Dostoevsky's central tragedy 
was in trying to adjust the discoveries which the novelist made to the ways of existence of 
the universe where ordinary vision reigns. Extra-ordinary experience collapses under any 
attempt to be translated into common formulae. As Michel Aucouturier writes, ‘the truth 
revealed by this experience cannot become the object of knowledge’.323 Shestov views the 
end of The Dream as a metaphorical illustration of the tragedy of its author. The Ridiculous 
Man rejects his previous suicidal ideas and decides instead to go and preach the truth that 
was revealed to him. This combination of words for Shestov is an oxymoron, because, as 
we explained in the previous chapter for Shestov ‘truth is lost in communication’.
‘BejiHKHe ApeBHHe Myapeijbi ocTaBHjiH HaM 3aBeT: npo Bora Henb3fl cKa3aTb, hto  oh
9^ AcymecTByeT. H6 0  CKa3aBiHHH: “Bor cymecTByeT” -  TepaeT Bora’ -  this is the most 
fundamental message that Shestov is trying to convey. ‘riponoBe^OBaTb HCTHHy! Hjxy
321 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 91.
322 Ibid, p. 92.
323 Aucouturier, p. 86.
324 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 105.
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nponoBe,zi;oBaTb HCTHHy -  t. e. oxzjaio ee “BceMCTBy”, KOTopoe, xohchho, npe)K£e HeM 
npHHBTt ee, noTpebyeT, HTob OHa noAHHHHAacb 3aKOHy. Bli noHHMaeTe, hto sto
3253HaHHT?’, Shestov exclaims and carries on to explain that Dostoevsky repeated the 
mistake of his hero when striving to ‘preach’ the discoveries obtained through his 
‘extraordinary’ vision to the kingdom of the ordinary vision.
‘Btopoh p a3, He bo CHe, a y>xe HaaBy, c ^ octocbckhm cjiyH H jioct to “yxcacH oe” , o HeM oh 
HaM tojibko hto p a c c x a s a a . Oh n p e^ a ji OTxpbiBinyiocA eM y BeHHyio HcTHHy e e  3Jieiim eM y  
B p ary. Bo CHe oh “p a3BpaTHJi” , n o  e r o  cjioBaM , 6e 3rpem H B ix oriHTaTeneH p aa . T e n e p b  oh 
cnem H T  k jhoajim, hto6bi HaaBy noBTopHTb to n p e c T y n jie m ie , KOTopoMy oh Tax 
y a ca cH y jica ! ’ , S h e s to v  w r ite s  em p h a tic a lly .
Thus Shestov once again recognises the deadlock which he acknowledged in Sola Fide of 
the truth being virtually impossible to achieve due to its intrinsic elusiveness. The nature of 
the revelation which brings truth is so intimate that no verbal means of communication are 
capable of capturing it. Only approximation is possible here, and, the implication remains, 
it seems, that only silence is close to bearing authentic truth, and only through the way of 
revelation (that is, either via poetry or via faith,) can one hope to approximate the great 
mysteries, because any speculative attempt, any rational investigation can only use rational 
means. This is the way Shestov himself put it in relation to the Fall:
Mbi c t o h m  npe,a BejiHHaftmeH TaiiHOH, k  KOTopoft xorAa-AHbo npnxoAHAOCb noAXOAHTb neAOBexy, 
-  n p e A  TaiiHOH rpexonafleroui... H, 6biTb MoaceT, HHTaTejib comacHTCH, h t o  Bee BHyrpeHHHe 
bopeHHa h  HanpaaceHHfl ^ocToeBCxoro HMejiH Tojibxo oflHH c m h c j i  h  eAHHoe 3HaneHHe: ecjiH He 
nOCTHHb, TO XOTH 6bl npHOblAHTbCH K 3T0H TaHHe... H6o nOCTHHb H OBJiafleTb eK) HaM He AaHO, KaK 
h  He AaHO OBAaACTb H c t h h o h .  Flo caMOH cBoefi npHpoAe TaftHa TaxoBa, h t o  OHa He MoaceT 6biTb 
OTKpbiTa, a HcTHHa nocTHraeTca h b m h  jiHuib nocTOAbxy, nocxoAbxy Mbi He >xeAaeM OBJiaAeTb eio, 
HcnoAb30BaTb ee a a h  “ h c t o p h h c c k h x ”  HyacA, t .  e. b  npeAeAax eAHHCTBeHHoro H3BecTHoro HaM 
H3MepeHHH BpeMeHH. KaK TOAbKO Mbi 3aXOTHM OTKpblTb TaHHy HAH HCn0Ab30BaTb HCTHHy, T. e. 
CAeAaTb TaiiHy h b h o h ,  a HcTHHy Bceobmeii h  h c o 6 x o a h m o h  -  x o t a  6 bi HaMH pyxoBOAHAO caMoe 
B03BbimeHHoe, caMoe bAaropoAHoe CTpeMAeHHe pa3AeAHTb cBoe 3HaHHe c 6 a h a c h h m ,  
obAaroAeTeAbCTBOBaTb HeAOBenecxHH poA h t .  n., -  Mbi MraoBeHHO 3a6biBaeM Bee, h t o  b h a c a h  b  
“BblXOACAeHHH”, B “HCCTynAeHHH”, HBHHHaeM BHACTb, “xax Bee”, H rOBOpHM TO, HTO HyACHO 
“ b c c m ” . T. e. Ta Aornxa, xoTopaa AeAaeT nyAO npeBpameHHa OTAeAbHbix "becnoAe3Hbix"
325 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 92.
326 Ibid.
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nepeacHBaH H H  b o 6 m e n o j ie 3 H b iii  “ o n b rr” h  tb k h m  o 6 p a 3 0 M  c o 3 /ia e T  H eobxoAH M biH  a jih  H a m ero  
cym ecT B O B aH H a npoH HbiH  h  Hen3MeHHbiH nopaflO K  Ha 3eM Jie, 3Ta jrorHKa -  OHa ace h  pa3yM  -  
ySH B aeT  T a im y  h  H cT H H y.327
Shestov turns again to the theme of the Fall in his work Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky 
(which serves as a foreword to his aforementioned Kierkegaard and Existential 
Philosophy), which is in fact centred around this theme. He discusses there the fundamental 
conflict between the private and the general in the way that we have already explained in 
Part I. This conflict for him is directly related to that between faith and reason, and reveals 
the striking opposition of opinions between ancient philosophy (notably not just Greek) on 
one hand and the Bible on the other. If the former considers private existence, in particular 
human, as a sinful daring which deserves to be punished by death, The Book of Books 
views God's act of creation as a source, moreover the only one, of the good, Shestov 
explains.328 Hegel for him embodies the glorification and validation of the general over the 
private, a celebration of sorts of the Fall through which knowledge was achieved at the 
expense of losing salvation. Equally Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky for Shestov symbolise 
the struggle of the private against the general, of faith against reason. In this respect the 
stance of art, and notably poetry, is particularly close to that which Shestov discovers in 
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. The best expression of this stance can be found in Joseph 
Brodsky's essay ‘In Praise of Boredom’.
Brodsky quotes the words of the German poet, Peter Huhel: ‘H o m h h  060  MHe, -  m en u eT  
ntuib’, and then explains to his young audiences:
H h h t o  He MOJKeT 6biTb f la jib iu e  o t  A y m eB H o ro  p a c n o p a zu ca  J iio b o r o  H3 B ac, lOHbie h  aep3K H e, HeM 
H acT poeH H e, BbipaaceH H oe b 3 to m  ABycTHiiiHH H eM eu K oro n o 3 T a  n H T e p a  X y x e n a ,  H bm e  
n o ico H H o ro . np ouH T H poB an e r o  He noTOM y, h t o  x o T e a  3apoHHTb b B ac BjreneHHe k  Bem aM  ManbiM  
-  ceM eH aM  h  p a cT em ia M , necHHHxaM  h j ih  MOCKHTaM -  MajibiM, h o  MHoroHHCJieHHbiM. A  npH B eji 3 t h  
c t p o h k h ,  noTOM y h t o  o h h  MHe HpaBHTCH, noTOM y h t o  a  y 3 H a io  b h h x  c e 6a  H KOJ1H Ha t o  n o iu n o ,  
JH060H aCHBOH OpraHH3M, KOTOpblH 6y fleT  CTepT C HaJlHHeCTByiOmeH nOBepXHOCTH. “ nO M H H  060 
MHe” , -  roB opH T  n b u ib . H  cjib iu iH T ca 3,ziecb HaMeic Ha t o ,  h t o ,  ecjiH  Mbi y3H aeM  o  caM H x c e 6e  o t  
BpeM eHH, BepoHTHO, BpeM a, b c b o io  o n e p e A b , M oaceT y3H aTb h t o - t o  o t  H ac. H t o  6bi 3 t o  M orjio  
SbiTb? Y c T y n a a  eM y n o  3HaHHMOCTH, mbi npeBocxoflHM e r o  b nyTKOCTH. B o t  h t o  03H anaeT  -  6biTb 
He3HaHHTejibHbiMH. E c j ih  T p eb y eT ca  n a p a jiH 3 y io m a a  b o j iio  c x y x a ,  HToSbi BHyuiHTb s t o ,  T o r^ a  m
327 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 93.
328 See Shestov, Kupeezapd u 3K3UcmeHtfuajibHOH (pwioco(pwi, pp. 7-9.
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3 p^aBCTByeT cKyica. Bbi He3HaHHTejibHbi, noTOMy h t o  bm  xoHenHbi. O/maxo, HeM Bemb xoHeHHeH, 
TeM 6 ojibiue OHa 3ap*DxeHa >xH3HbK>, smouhhmh, pa/jocTbio, cTpaxaMH, cocTpazjaHHeM. H6o 
6 ecKOHeHHOCTb He ocodeHHO oxcHBjieHHa, He ocobeHHO 3M0UH0HajibHa. Baiua CKyica, no xpaimeH 
Mepe, roBOpHT BaM 06  3 to m . IlocKOJibKy Baiua cxyxa ecTb cxyxa SecxoHenHOCTH.329
Brodsky then concludes that ‘cTpacTb ecTb npHBHjierna He3HaHHTejitHoro ’, hence his 
advice (very Shestovian in spirit) to his young listeners: ‘IloaTOMy CTapanTecb ocTaBaTbca 
CTpaCTHblMH, OCTaBBTe XJia^ HOKpOBHe C03Be3flHaM’.
Shestov's intensity in dealing with this topic is no lesser than that o f Brodsky. Shestov 
stresses that just like Belinsky with his demand for an account for every victim of history 
(this excerpt from Belinsky's famous letter to Gogol permeates many o f Shestov's writings), 
Dostoevsky also cannot be reconciled to the reign of universal necessity. He too, as Shestov 
writes, demands ‘o thct o xa>xaoH )xepTBe cjiynaHHOCTH h hctophh -  t. e. o tom, hto, b 
npHHijnne, rjw yM03pHTejn>H0H <J>hjioco<J)hh He 3acjiy>XHBaeT, xak coTBopeHHoe h 
XOHeHHOe, HHXaXOTO BHHMaHHJI H HeMy HHXTO B MHpe, xax 3TO T B e p ^ O  3HaeT 
yM03pHTeJIbHaH (|)HJI0C04)Hfl, nOMOHb He MOXCeT’.
These ideas of the eternal (and losing) battle of the private against the general as stemming 
from original sin, that Shestov derives in particular from Dostoevsky's Dream o f a 
Ridiculous Man as well as from Notes from Underground, he expresses more directly in 
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky than when discussing this topic in Overcoming the Self- 
Evident. Especially Shestov speaks more explicitly than anywhere else on the event of the 
Fall itself. Indeed, he asserts that in his Dream Dostoevsky
c HecTepnHMOH ajui HauiHx rjia3 oTneTjiHBocTbio, OTxpbiBaeT cm m cji Toro “SyaeTe 3HaioiiuiMH”, 
KOTopbiM 6 H6jreiicKHH 3Men co6jia3HHJi Harnero npaoTua h  npoaojuxaeT Bcex Hac co6jia3HHTb h  
AOHbiHe. Pa3yM Ham, xax roBOpHT KaHT, xcaaHO cTpeMHTca xo BceodumocTH h  HeodxoaHMocTH, - 
/focToeBcxHH, BfloxHOBJiaeMbifi IIncaHneM, HanparaeT Bee c b o h  ch jim , HTodbi BbipBaTbca H3 BjiacTH 
3HaHHH. Kax h  KHprerapA, o h  OTnaaHHO SopeTca c yM03pHTejibH0H h c t h h o h  h  c  HejiOBenecxoft 
AHaJieXTHXOH, CBO^ HmeH “OTXpOBeHHe” X n03HaHHK>.332
329 Iosif Brodskii, ‘IIoxBana cxyxe’, transl. E. Kasatkina, in CoHumnm Hocufya EpodcKoeo, vol. 6, 
pp. 90-91.
330 Brodskii, ‘noxBajia cxyxe’, pp. 90-91.
331 Shestov, Kupeeeapd u 9K3ucmemfua/ibHaH (puiiococpuH, p. 22.
332 Ibid, p. 21.
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Shestov then quotes again one of his favourite pieces from Dostoevsky’s Notes from  
Underground which illustrates for Shestov the writer's total resolution never to surrender to 
the omnipotent power of necessity, but even more importantly for Shestov -  it signifies that 
it is gnosis with its generalising powers, issuing validation to the general against the 
private, that lies at the roots of this necessity for Dostoevsky. Indeed, in the words of the 
Underground Man about the stone wall being ‘laws of nature, conclusions of natural 
science, mathematics’ Shestov sees Dostoevsky's understanding, which equals that of Kant 
and Hegel, of ‘cMbicn h  3HaneHHe Tex Bceofimux h  HeofixoanMHx cyxcfleHHH, t o h  
npHHyzmTejibHoft, npmiyxcflaiomeH h c t h h b i ,  k  KOTOpon 30BeT nejiOBeica ero pa3yM\ 
However, Shestov stresses, instead of submitting to this necessity Dostoevsky, just like 
Kierkegaard, becomes profoundly disturbed. He rejects the omnipotence of reason and 
rebels against its self-evident truths. The question thus raised by Dostoevsky about the 
origin of these truths and their unlimited power over mankind by far exceeds for Shestov 
Kant's critique of pure reason. The answer to this fundamental question cannot exist, 
Shestov says, or ‘more precisely’, as he corrects himself, ‘o t b c t  Ha Hero ecTb j ih ih b  o ^ h h :  
BJiaCTB, KaMeHHBIX CTeH, BJiaCTB £Ba5K£bI JXBSL HeTbipe HJIH, Bbipaxcaacb ( } )h j io c o ( |)c k h m  
B3bIKOM, BJiaCTb BCHHblX CaMOOHeBHflHbIX HCTHH Hafl HeJIOBeKOM, XOTH OHa npe/JCTaBJIBCTCJI 
HaM Jiexcameii b  caMOH o c h o b c  fibiraa h  noTOMy HenpeoflOJiHMoii, ecTb Bee ace BJiacTb 
npH3paHHafl’.334
This, in Shestov's opinion, returns us directly to the Biblical story of original sin, because,
“‘KaMeHHbie CTeHbi” h  “^Baxc^bi /jBa ueTbipe” -  ecTb tojibko KOHKpeTHoe BbipaxceHHe
335 *Toro, h t o  3aK jH O H anocb  b  cjiOBax HcxycHTejia: fiyaeTe 3 H a io m H M H ’ . Hence Milosz's 
summary of Shestov's understanding of the Fall, that we have already quoted in Section 2.2 
of Part I: ‘What, then, was the Fall? A choice of an inferior faculty with its passion for a 
distinguo and for general ideas, with pairs of opposites: good, evil; true, untrue; possible, 
impossible. Man renounced faith in order to gain knowledge. Shestov names his enemy:
333 Shestov, Kupeeeapd u 3K3ucmeHi}ucuibH(m (pwioco(puR, p. 22.
334 Ibid, p. 23.
335 Ibid.
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Reason. He even says the fruits o f the forbidden tree could just as well be called synthetic 
judgments a priori\ 336 Indeed, Shestov claims that Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard alike 
realised clearly that ‘3HaHHe He npHBeno HenoBeKa k  CBodoAe, KaK Mbi npHBbnora AyMaTb h  
KaK t o  npoB03rjiamaeT yM03pHTejibHaa (})h j io c o (J)H5i , 3HaHne 3aKpenocTHJio Hac, OTAano Ha 
“noTOK h  pa3rpa6jieHHe” b c h h l im  HCTHHaM’.337 This idea of lost freedom and acquired 
knowledge that did not save or liberate humanity, which is central for Shestov, he found in
both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. It is human fear o f God that throws us into the hands of
reason, Shestov claims, and it is this that constitutes our immense and horrible fall. In 
Shestov’s own words the fall is described as follows:
T p e x  He b  SbiTHH, He b  t o m , h to  bm iiijio  H3 pyK  T B o p u a , r p e x ,  n o p o K , HeflocTaTOK b  HarneM
“ 3HaHHH” . Ilep B b iH  H ejioB ex  H cn yran cH  h h h c m  He orpaH HH eHH oft b o j ih  T B o p u a , y B n n e ji b Heft 
CTO Jib CTpaniHblft ZUIH H ac “ npOH3BOJl” H CTaJI HCKaTb 3aiIIHTbI OT B o r a  B n03HaHHH, KOTOpOe, KaK 
eM y BHyuiHJi HCKycHTejib, paBHJLno e r o  c B o ro M , t .  e. CTaBHJio e r o  h  B o r a  b paB H yio  3aBHCHMOCTb 
OT BCHHblX, HeCOTBOpeHHbIX HCTHH, paCKpblBaB eAHHCTBO HeJIOBeHeCKOft H GoaceCTBeHHOft 
np H poA b i. H  3 t o  “ 3HaHHe”  p a c iu n o u iH J io , pa3AaBHJio e r o  co3H aH H e, bO hb e r o  b ruiocK ocT b  
orpaH H H eH H bix B03M05KH0CTeft, KOTopbiMH T e n e p b  jum H ero  o n p e A e jia e T c a  h  e r o  3eM H aa, h  e r o  
BeHHaa c y a b d a .  TaK  H 3odpaacaeT  n H c a m ie  “ n a A e m ie ” nejiO BeK a.338
We should stress here that such fundamental philosophical ideas are invariably linked in 
Shestov with profound psychological thoughts. Thus as early as Beginnings and Ends 
Shestov claimed that ‘caMoft xapaKTepHoft ajm HenoBeKa nepToft BBJiaeTca doji3Hb 
npaBAbi’,339 which resonates very closely with the aforementioned fear of God in the 
implied intrinsic human tendency to escape from freedom to slavery, as it were in man's 
sensing the limitations of his own psyche. Similarly, in Overcoming the Self-Evident 
Shestov, using Dostoevsky's Legend o f the Grand Inquisitor, elaborates on human striving 
to abandon freedom for the sake of communal worship. ‘J I i o a h  He t o  h t o  He c b o 6 o a h b i ,  
j h o a h  dojibme Bcero b  MHpe 6 o h t c h  c b o G o a b i ,  orroro o h h  h  nmyr “no3HaHHn”, o t t o t o  h m  
Hy^ ceH “HenorpeniHMbift”, deccnopHbift aBTopHTeT, t .  e. TaKoft, nepeA KOTOpbiM 6bi o h h  
MorjiH Bee BMecTe npeKjioHATbca’,340 Shestov writes. -  ‘CBodoAa h  ecTb b c a b  t o t
336 Milosz, pp. 106-107.
337 Shestov, Kupeeeapd u 3K3ucmenquanbHaH (pwioco<pm, p. 23.
338 Ibid, pp. 24-25.
339 Shestov, Hanajia u KOHifbi, p. 181.
340 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 102.
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“icanpH3”, o KOTopoM HaM paccKa3biBaji no/inojiBHBiH nejioBeK, ho  %ayKQ KanpH3 3^ecB, Ha 
3eMjie, x o n eT , m bi noMHHM, ce6e “rapaHTHH55, He noao3peBaa, hto BejiHHanmaji ero 
npeporaTHBa - 3to  bo3m o 5khoctb  oGo h th cb  6e3 rapaHTHH5.341
In the same vein Shestov finishes this essay by proclaiming that ‘Bora flOKa3BreaTB, HCKaTB 
Ero b “h c t o p h h 55 HejiB3H. Bor - BonjiomeHHBiH “KanpH355, OTBepraiomHH Bee rapaHTHH. O h  
BHe HCTOpHH, KaK H BCe TO, HTO mO^H CHHT3JIH CBOHM TO TipiWiaiOV [caMBIM TJiaBHBIM] ’ r342
Shestov emphasises once again that the main tragedy o f Dostoevsky was his attempt to 
reconcile that caprice, which his extraordinary vision revealed to him, to the laws and 
principles by which ‘omnitude5 ( ‘b c c m c tb o 5)  lives -  in other words, to start preaching, to 
convert the truth o f revelation into the truth o f speculation. As we have already quoted 
above, Shestov's conclusion is unequivocal: ‘Pe3yjiBTaTBi nojiynaioTCH HecnBixaHHBie. 
3aacaTBie b t h c k h  BceMCTBa, “HCCTynneHHa” ^ocToeBCKoro CTaHOBflTca “npncjiymiHKaMH55 
odBmeHHOCTH5.343 To exemplify this point Shestov returns again to the portrayal of  
Dostoevsky's false political prophecies, as he did fifteen years earlier in his essay The Gift 
o f Prophecy. However, in his last work on Dostoevsky -  On the “Regeneration o f  
Convictions ” in Dostoevsky -  written in 1937, Shestov never mentions this subject again, 
for the threatening political developments in Europe at the time must have brought home to 
him some fundamental truth of those o f Dostoevsky's political forebodings that were 
concealed in metaphorical form in his novels rather than stated explicitly in his Diary o f  a 
Writer.
6.II.2. Shestov’s last work on Dostoevsky as a simplification and a summary. The 
search for God.
In general Shestov's last work on Dostoevsky is marked by the mature and religious 
outlook continuing Shestov's elaborations on religious faith, but in a different spirit from 
his Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. Indeed, in contrast to the latter, the nature of this last 
work was largely determined by popular demand, because it was conceived as a course of
341 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 104.
342 Ibid, p. 109.
343 Ibid, p. 108.
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five short lectures on Dostoevsky to be given on the French radio by its request. These 
lectures were read by Shestov's oldest daughter Tatiana who also translated them into 
French. The excerpts from Dostoevsky were recited by Jacques Copeau who once played 
Ivan in a theatre performance of The Brothers Karamazov. As follows from Fondane's 
accounts,344 Shestov was rather sceptical about this whole enterprise because of the severe 
time constraints and due to its somewhat populist character. Nevertheless, he managed to 
compose, largely as a collage of his previous writings on Dostoevsky, a coherent and 
holistic piece giving an all-rounded impression of the writer. In it he summarised and in 
some ways revised all his previous views on the novelist. As Nikolai Losskii wrote about 
this article of Shestov, which later appeared in print in both Russian (Pyccme 3anucm , No 
2, 1937) and in French (‘L'oeuvre de Dostoievski’, Cahiers de Radio-Paris, 15 May 1937), 
in it ‘aBTop KaK 6 m  HcnpaBJHieT “ o u ih G k h ”  CBoen KHnrn JJocmoeecKUU u Huifiue, a TaK ace  
apyrnx pa6oT’.345
Probably due both to the broadcast nature of this piece as well as to Shestov's own maturity 
it is marked by a distinct shift toward tolerance in its discourse. In this work Shestov 
concentrated on Dostoevsky's religious transformation and demonstrated once again the 
Biblical nature of Dostoevsky's philosophical convictions. As Blagova and Emelianov 
write, Shestov considers as the main source of Dostoevsky's change of outlook his penal 
servitude experience superimposed with his study of the Bible. They summarise Shestov's 
‘new pro-Dostoevsky thesis’ as the writer's daring attempt to juxtapose the Bible to the 
achievements of European science which essentially revised the Bible and substituted for it 
‘religion in the framework of reason’.346 They see Shestov’s new approach to Dostoevsky 
in his perception of the novelist increasingly as an ideological ally rather than an object of 
criticism for not being fully true to their common cause, as Shestov saw it.
Indeed, in this work Shestov no longer reproaches Dostoevsky for compromising his 
second (extraordinary) sight by attempts to subjugate it to the ordinary one, to conform to
344 See Fondane, p. 133. See also Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 167.
345 Nikolai Losskii, ‘J leB  IIIecTOB: (K ero ceM uaecflT H JieT H io)’ , C o e p e M e n H b i e  3anucKU, vol. 61, 
1936, pp. 143-146 (p. 143). Cited in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 101.
346 See Blagova and Emelianov, p. 94.
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‘omnitude’ ( ‘b c c m c t b o ’ ) .  In this final work the struggle between the two visions is turned 
into Dostoevsky's inner religious quest. This shift in portrayal is also accompanied by 
suppressing the sophisticated and at times technical philosophical discourse of Shestov's 
previous two works on Dostoevsky in favour of a more simplified register and a focus on 
the religious rather than the philosophical dimension. On the other hand this again points to 
Shestov's having to target a broader audience. The illustration of the above shift can be 
seen, for instance, when comparing Shestov's descriptions of The Dream o f a Ridiculous 
Man in Overcoming the Self-Evident in 1921 with that in this latest article of 1937. The 
same words are used to tell the story, but the omissions characterise a distinct tendency for 
simplification and clarity. Also, a new name -  that of Pascal -  enters Shestov's narrative on 
Dostoevsky to replace his references to Plotinus and others, as we shall discuss below.
An interesting suggestion by Blagova and Emelianov is that Shestov's title for this work 
which has ‘regeneration of convictions’ (‘nepepojK^emie y6e>K^eHHH’) placed inside 
inverted commas thus implies some figurative rather than direct meaning. Indeed, they 
argue that Shestov means here not a transformation of convictions as such, but rather 
Dostoevsky’s ‘religious conversion’. In our opinion, this conjecture, even though it is 
indeed religious questions that form the underlying substance of the changes in 
Dostoevsky's world-view, reads too much into Shestov's intentions here. We think that the 
reason why Shestov used inverted commas in the title was not the indirect meaning of the 
phrase for him, but simply to emphasise that this was a quotation taken from Dostoevsky's 
own text. Indeed, we discussed at the beginning of this chapter Shestov's abbreviated 
quotation (used also in his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche), which, as Blagova and Emelianov 
aptly pointed out, he had taken out of context. In it Dostoevsky indeed refers to his 
‘transformation of convictions’, and Shestov takes it from there and fills it with his own 
meaning. We insist on our interpretation because, even though Shestov's last work on 
Dostoevsky makes up for all the extremes of his previous vision of the writer, it still by and 
large repeats and recycles Shestov's old ideas on his main teacher (as he called the Russian 
novelist). To a large extent this work is a compilation of his previous works on the latter, 
only processed and united in the light of the holistic and solemn image of the writer that 
Shestov had acquired by then. He renounced his old accusations and portrayed Dostoevsky
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as a martyr who was tormented all his life by the question of God. Shestov's overall 
conclusions are, however, largely reminiscent of his previous perception of the writer, and 
it is the general tonality of his reflections that is altered by Shestov's own shift towards a 
religious outlook. His vision of Dostoevsky in 1937 is the result of a life-long inner 
dialogue with the writer and displays a distinct continuity of his own thought.
Thus, in Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky Shestov wrote ‘Bepa ecTB HeH3BecTHoe h nyxcztoe 
yM03pHTeJIBH0H 4>HJIOCO(J)HH HOBOe H3MepeHHe MblUIJieHHfl, OTKpBIBaiOmee ny iB k  TBopuy 
Bcero, h t o  ecTt b  MHpe, k  HCTOHHHKy Bcex b o 3m o 5k h o c t c h ,  k  ToMy, j y ra k o t o  HeT 
npe^eJiOB Mexczzy b o 3m o > k h b im  h  h c b o s m o x c h b im ’.347 He then added along the lines of 
Overcoming the Self-Evident the implication of Dostoevsky's inner struggle, but focusing 
on its successes rather than its defeats and inner betrayals: ‘HeztapoM Knprerapzt CKa3an: 
BepHTb, BonpeKH pa3yMy, ecTb MyneHKHecTBO. HeztapoM coHHHemra JfocToeBCKoro nojiHti 
c t o j i b  CBepxHejiOBenecKoro Hanpaxcemifl’.348 Similarly, in his last work on the novelist 
Shestov placed the main emphasis on the writer's never-ending religious search, which is 
portrayed as the most painful and tormenting experience, and stems from distinctly 
existential questions.
Hence, Shestov retells the familiar story, but focuses on the ‘irremissible’, on all those who 
are lost for humanity, and drives it towards the distinctly religious conclusions. Thus we 
become witness again to Dostoevsky's life path described as a philosophical psycho­
biography. Having started with the humanistic ideals of his teachers, such as Belinsky, and 
having written the much celebrated Poor Folk and subsequent novels, having lived through 
a near-death experience and penal servitude, Dostoevsky then experienced a profound 
existential crisis marked by producing Notes from Underground, which demonstrated a 
deep disillusionment with common morality, ethics and positivist scientific trends in 
general. Dostoevsky is therefore tortured by the question of the impotence of these methods 
to change human life, to help those who are irredeemable, lost, cut off from humanity, he 
oscillates between faith and faithlessness, contemplating the eternal questions of the
347 Shestov, Kupeezapd u 3K3ucmemjuajibHOH <pwioco<pwi, p. 25.
348 Ibid.
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existence o f God and the immortality o f the soul. Shestov quotes Dostoevsky's writings 
from his Diary o f  a Writer -  which for Shestov continue the novelist's engagement with 
Belinsky's quests -  such as: ‘J I yTBepac^aio, h t o  co3HaHHe coBepmeHHoro CBoero GeccHJina 
noMOHt h j ih  npHHecTH x o t b  KaKyio-HHdyqb nojib3y h j ih  oGjierneHHe CTpa^aiomeMy 
HejiOBenecTBy, b  t o  tkq  BpeMJi npn HanieM nonHOM ydeac^eHHH b  3 t o m  CTpa a^HHH, m o j k c t  
.zjaace oSpaTHTt b  cepjme BameM j i i o 6 o b l  k  nejioBenecTBy b  HeHaBHCTb k  HeMy’.349 On the 
other hand Shestov's text implies that this remark has to be supplemented by another one: 
‘Bes Bticmeii Hflen He m o j k c t  cymecTBOBaib h h  h c j i o b c k ,  h h  HarjH*. A Bbicmaa h r q h  Ha 
3eMjie jinmb odua ( / J o c t o c b c k h h  noflnepKHBaeT c j io b o  o^Ha), h  h m c h h o  h flea o 
6eccMepTHH aynra HejioBenecKOH, h 6o  Bee ocTajibHbie Bbicuine H^en, KOTopbiMH m o j k c t  
6bITb JKHB HeJIOBeK, JlHHIb H3 O/IHOH ee BblTexaiOT’.350
Yet this idea is perceived by the writer as an elusive entity. In Dostoevsky's novels it is 
much more a source of inner conflict than of inner harmony. In Shestov's words, ‘Bee 
repoH “EecoB” -  h  He t o j ib k o  K h p h j ij io b  h  UlaTOB, h o  h  CTaBporHH -  b  KOHije k o h h o b  
t o j ib k o  noBecTByioT HaM o t o m , KaK ^ o c t o c b c k h h , noao6HO M h t c  KapaMa30By, b c io
i f  i
>KH3Hb MyHHjica Botom’. The religious conversion, implied by Blagova and Emelianov, 
emerges from Shestov's descriptions of Dostoevsky as a never fully completed and painful 
result o f the writer's nightmares in his passionate and intense strivings to find the living 
God -  the God o f Abraham and Jacob rather than the god o f philosophers. ‘Ot “pejimrra b 
npeaejiax pa3yMa”, noaMeHMBmen He3aMeTHO ajiji Bcex cjiOBa IlHcaHHJi “Bor ecTb 
JIK)6 0 Bb” CJIOBaMH “jHObOBb eCTb Bor”, OH pBCTCfl odpaTHO K HCTHHe OTKpOBeHHH O 5KHBOM 
Bore’, Shestov asserts and adds that ‘3TOMy Haynnjica oh o t nocjieAHHx, 3a6biTbix h 
OTBep5KeHHbix BceMH jno^en’,352 such as depicted in his own creations, for instance 
Raskolnikov and Sonia.
349 Dostoevskii, TojiocuoBHbie yTBepH^eHHH’, vol. 24, p. 49. Cited in Shestov, O ‘nepepoDtcdenuu 
ydeotcdeHuu ’ y flocmoeecKoeo, p. 181.
350 Ibid, p. 48. Cited in Shestov, O 'nepepoDtcdenuuydejtcdeHUu’y ffocmoeecKozo, p. 185.
351 Shestov, O 'nepepojtcdemiu ydeotcdemiu ’ y JjocmoeecKoeo, p. 192.
352 Ibid, p. 185.
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In fact, Shestov again, reproducing the lines of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, equates
Dostoevsky's own search with that of the above heroes by stating that ‘ySnmja h
pacnyTHHija ncxajiH  b bchhoh KHHre He to , h to  b Hen H m yr npocBemeHHbie jhojih Harnero
BpeMeHH, a  to , h to  b H en B cer^ a  HCKaji h HaxoflHJi h hto  n p eB b im e B c er o  ijeHHJi
^ocToeBCKHH’. By this Shestov means not morality with its lofty ideals, which
R a s k o l n i k o v  t e s t e d  a n d  r e j e c t e d  a s  b r i n g i n g  h i m  n o  r e l i e f ,  b u t  ‘to  n o H H M a m ie  E B a H r e jn u i ,
KOTopoe He OTBepraeT mojihtb h Ha^exyi ojjhhoxoto, 3ary6jreHHoro nejiOBeica, no a
npe^jioroM, hto jjyMaTb o CBoen jihhhoh 6e#e 3huhht npHjjaBaTb cjihhikom 6ojibmoe
> 3543HaneHHe 3eMHOMy, HH3MeHHOMy, npexo^meMy .
S u c h  a  m e a n in g  ca n  b e  in d e e d  fo u n d  in  th e  G o s p e l ,  S h e s to v  s ta te s , b u t o n ly  in  that G o s p e l  
‘KOTopoe HHTaeT Cohji, KOTopoe e m e  He nep eaejiaH O  HOBeiimeH npocB em eH H oft mbicjibio, 
npeB paT H B m en cjioB a OTxpoBeHHfl “Bor ecTb jn o 6 o B b ” b pa3yM H yio HCTHHy: “jhoSobb ecTb
ICC
Bor”’. S h e s to v  th u s  c o n c lu d e s  that ‘IIo^oSho TOMy, x a x  Cohh h PacxojibHHXOB, 
pacnyT H H na h y b n n ija , n m y r  cbohx Hajiqukm, Jinrnb b BOCXpeceHHH JIa3apa, Tax h 
^OCTOeBCXHH BHflejI B IlHCaHHH He npOnOBe^b TOH HJIH HHOH MOpaJIH, a  3aJIOr HOBOH 
XCH3HH’.356
This understanding of the divine and the same attitude to reason and morality as well as the 
same religious temperament Shestov found in the works of Pascal, on whom he wrote 
previously a separate profound piece -  re(pcuMaucKOH HOHb (The Night o f  Gethsemane) -  
which became part of Shestov's book On Job's Scales (the same one where Overcoming the 
Self-Evident appeared too). However, at that time Shestov did not compare Pascal with the 
Russian novelist, and it is only towards the end of his life that this idea emerged, possibly 
due in part to practical considerations. Indeed, it might have been prompted by the French 
cultural affiliations of the expected audience of Shestov's lectures. Yet, despite the possible 
pragmatic cause for making this association between Dostoevsky and Pascal, it was most 
convincingly justified by Shestov, who combined the pieces of his previous works on
353 Shestov, O ‘nepepootcdenuu ybeotcdeHuu ’ y/JocmoeecKoso, p. 184.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid, p. 185.
356 Ibid.
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Pascal and on Dostoevsky for his comparative characteristics of the two thinkers. Earlier in 
his career Shestov had made a variety of associations between Dostoevsky and other titans 
of philosophical thought. If in his youth he had drawn a parallel between Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche, and later compared the writer to Kierkegaard, as well as Plotinus, Luther and 
other ancient and medieval thinkers, in 1937 he asserted and argued for the kinship between 
Dostoevsky and Pascal, calling the latter ‘spiritually the closest man to Dostoevsky’.357 
Their passionate preoccupation with the tragic human predicament and profound 
disillusionment with ‘scientific’ paths to salvation makes them both particularly dear to 
Shestov. Indeed, he writes:
H  t o t  h  flpyroH, nwmH Ha yxcacbi MHpa, TepaiOT jjOBepHe k  TOMy, h t o  HaM npHHOCHT oSbeKTHBHoe 
3HaHHe. “Je n'approuve que ceux qui cherchent en gemissant”, says Pascal [“/  only approve of 
those who seek with lamentation”] roBopwi IlacKanb -  Bee pa3bicicaHHH h c t h h m  /JocToeBCKoro 
OTMeneHbi b c j ih k o h  CKopdbio nejiOBeica, npo3peBinero b c io  niydHHy cTpa^ aHHH, BbinaBuiHx Ha 
AOJiio m o /je w , npoMeHaBuiHx OTKpoBeHHyio HCTHHy Ha njioAbi c AepeBa no3HaHHa Aodpa h  3Jia. H 
Hama Hayna h  Hama BbicoKaa Mopanb -  t o ,  b HeM Mbi npHBbiioiH BuaeTb HaaeJKHeHiiiHH h  
BepHeHUIHH OIUIOT npOTHB Bcex COMHeHHH H HCKyilieHHH, BbI3bIBaeT B HHX JIHUIb OTHaUHHe. [...] 
IlacKajib, t o h h o  BnepeA OTBenaa HauieMy BpeMeHH, nHnieT: “Quand un homme serait persuade que 
les proportions des nombres sont des verites immaterielles, etemelles et dependantes d'une 
premiere verite en qui elles subsistent, et qu'on appelle Dieu, je  ne le trouverai pas beaucoup 
avance pour son salut\ ^‘Though a man might be persuaded that the proportions o f numbers are 
immaterial and eternal truths, dependent on a prime truth in which they have their being, and which 
is called God, yet I  think he would not greatly have advanced his salvation”].358
Thus, Shestov equates Dostoevsky's transformation of convictions to ‘essentially what 
Pascal called his conversion’,359 and it is this formula, it seems, that accounts for Blagova 
and Emelianov's suggestion, discussed above, to assign a deeper meaning to Shestov's 
quotation from Dostoevsky. Yet, as we pointed out above, Shestov speaks more of an inner 
struggle of Dostoevsky rather than his ultimate conversion. Indeed, the message of 
Dostoevsky's heroes, Shestov asserts, is that
PejiHrHu eme B03M0xcHa, h o  Bora HeT, Bor HeB03M0^ ceH h j ih , BepHee, HeB03M0xceH t o t  Bor 
ABpaaMa, Bor Hcaaica, Bor HaKOBa, o KOTopoM roBOpHTca b IlHcaHHH h  KOToporo npH3biBaji 
IlacKajib, a B03MoxceH jinuib 6or 4> h jioco(|)ob  -  T.e. HapaxceHHoe b nbiuiHbie h  TopacecTBeHHbie 
ofleacflbi nyAOBHiue, pa3,apo6juHomee h  norjiomaiomee Bee, h t o  ecTb b MHpe h  He ocTaHOBHBineeca
357 See Shestov, O 'nepepootcdenuuybeotcdenuu’y JJocmoeeacozo, p. 190.
358 Ibid, pp. 191-192.
359 See Ibid, p. 192
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npefl TeM, hto6 pa3Apo6HTb h npomoTHTb aaace to  cymecTBO, KOTopoe o/jho 6bmo 6ojiee ueHHO, 
neM Bee MHpo3AaHHe.360
S h e s t o v ’s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s ,  t h u s ,  t h a t  ‘I I p H  mbicjih o tom , h to  Ha n p e c T o n e  B o r a  B occ* m eT  3t o  
ny^OBHme h  6y^eT /yra Bcex, KaK B o r  -  o to , BeflB, ocHOBHaa mbicjib AnoK ajrancnca, 
OTKpoBeHHa C b . HoHHa, -  /Joctocbckhh  HcnBiTBreaeT Te npHna^KH 6e3Bicxo,zmoro, 
Hey^epxcHMoro OTHaaHHa, KOTopBie aBnaiOTca, no-BH^HMOMy, ycjiOBHeM poac^eHHa 
BejiHKHx, nocjie^HHX nocTHxeeHHH h Toro HeoSBinaHHoro ayuieBHoro no/jBeMa chji, 
KOTopBiH TaKHMH nocTHXceHHaMH npe^no  JiaraeTca ’.361
Thus, as we can see, the same ideas of the private versus the general, of faith versus reason 
are evoked by Shestov in his latest work on Dostoevsky with renewed force. However, his 
voice is no longer feverish from doubt and inner torment, in contrast it is full of profound 
and almost peaceful conviction, it follows Dostoevsky in his journey towards God with joy 
rather than fear and dismay. Shestov refers to the familiar excerpts from Dostoevsky's 
works: to Notes from Underground, to Ippolit's confession in The Idiot, to The Dream o f a 
Ridiculous Man and to The Meek One, only to reinforce the vision of Dostoevsky's struggle 
against universal necessity. He then turns to The Devils and to The Legend o f the Grand 
Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov to give the final message of human passions 
senselessly suffocating without any links to the living God, only to be overturned by the 
divine source of love and strength that the latter is still capable of providing. Thus, Shestov 
ascribes to Dostoevsky revelations of religious faith, even if fragmented or momentary, as 
the latter's ultimate answer to all the tormenting questions of existence.
S u m m a r i s i n g  The Legend o f the Grand Inquisitor, S h e s t o v  r e c o l l e c t s  t h e  w a y  i n  w h i c h  ‘B o r  
n n c a H H H  o T B e n a e T  H a  B e jiH H a fim y io  x y j i y  H a  H e r o ’ i n  o r d e r  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  s a y :
H bot, K orzja /JocToeBCKOM y OTKpbiBaeTCB 3Ta B ejim caa , HenocTPDKHMaa ana H arn ero  3BKjiH£OBa 
yM a HCTHHa, b HeM n p o n cx o A H T  to  3 a ra a o H H o e  n p e o 6p a aceH n e, K O Topoe oh Ha3Baji 
nepepoH caeH H eM  cbohx ybeaojeH H H . He jiio b o B b  ecT b B o r , a  B o r  ecT b m o b o B b . He H eM om H aa, 
SeccH JibH aa jhoOobb, KOTopaa mojkct jihihb objiH B aT bca cjie3aM H  H a# 3aTpaBJieHHbiM cobaxaM H
360 Shestov, O ‘nepepoofcdenuu ydeotcdeHuu ’ yHocmoeecKoeo, p. 193.
361 Ibid, p p . 193-194.
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MajibHHKOM, Ha,zj 6bK>meH ce6a KyjianeHKOM b rpyflb a c b o h k o h ,  3aMyneHHOH c b o h m h  
C0 6 CTBeHHbIMH pOAHTCJIflMH, Ha# HeCHaCTHbIM HnnOJIHTOM, OCyHCfleHHbIM 6e3 BHHbl Ha CMepTb, a 
JlK)6oBb Toro, KTO MHp COTBOpHJl H BOJie KOTOpOrO BCe nOKOpHbl. B TaKHe MHHyTbl JJOCTOCBCKHH 
npeo/jojieBaeT h  “ABa>KAbi ABa neTbipe” h  “KaMeHHbie cTeHbi”, h  “3aKOHbi npnpoflbi”, h  t o  
cipauiHoe nyAOBHme, KOTopoe nporjioTHJio Bee, h t o  6buio b MHpe caMoro ueHHoro -  b TaKHe 
MHHyTbi o h  nnuieT “ManbHHKa y XpncTa Ha ejiKe” -  ero o t b c t  Ha cTpaniHbiH h  KaK 6bi He 
AonycKaiomHH HHKaKoro OTBeTa Bonpoc BejiHHCKoro. JhodoBb, 3a k o t o p o h  c t o h t  BceMorymHH 
Bor, yace HHKor^a He oSpaTHTca b HeHaBHCTb. H6o Bor 3amHTHT h  ycnoKOHT Tex, k t o  He Hameji 
3amHTbi h  ycnoKoeHH^i h h  y j h o a c h ,  h h  y HejiOBenecKOH MyApocra. H t o 6  oSpecra 3Ty HCTHHy, 
jO[ocToeBCKHH npouieji caM h  npoBen Hac Bcex nepe3 Te yxcacw, KOTopbie H3o6pa>KeHbi b ero 
COHHHeHHHX.362
With these powerful accords supported by equally powerful fragments from Dostoevsky 
himself, whose writings are again compared with the Book o f Job in their elevated 
intensity, Shestov finishes his last work on the writer. In our view, Shestov's mature 
philosophical vision is accompanied in this work by a substantial evolution of his 
relationship with aesthetics which ultimately allowed him to create his image of  
Dostoevsky. Shestov with time came to appreciate the aesthetic aspect of Dostoevsky's 
writings. Having drawn the main ideas o f his religious philosophy from the writer, Shestov 
eventually acknowledged the force o f Dostoevsky's aesthetics too. Thus in 1937 he already 
speaks of Dostoevsky's voice which ‘Bee pacTeT h KpenHeT h AOcraraeT HecjibixaHHOH 
chjim. H hoh pa3 KaaceTCH,’ Shestov continues, ‘hto cjibimninb He cjioBa ^ocToeBCKoro, a 
oahh H3 HecpaBHeHHbix ncajiMOB uapfl ,Z[aBHAa\364
6.II.3. Two perspectives on Dostoevsky: Shestov and Gide.
The aesthetic aspect also plays a significant role in the analysis of Dostoevsky by Andre 
Gide who in some ways precipitated Bakhtin's, then forthcoming, ground-breaking insights 
into the artistic world of Dostoevsky. On the other hand, Gide's vision of the writer as first 
and foremost a humanist provides a certain counter-balance to Shestov's views and is thus 
particularly useful for our study. In a sense the principal differences of approach to 
Dostoevsky's works are captured in the statement of Joseph Brodsky which expresses the 
differences in the nature of Western (primarily Anglophone) and Russian poetry, or in an 
even broader sense -  culture. ‘3 t o ,  rpy6o roBopa, pa3Htie ran ti o th o h ich h a  k MHpy’,
362 Shestov, O ‘nepepoj/cdeHUU ydecHcdenuu’ y ffocmoeecKoao, p. 195.
363 See Ibid, p. 192.
364 Ibid, p. 196
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Brodsky notes,‘paunoHajibHbm h CHHTeTnnecKHH’. While Gide analyses specific aspects, 
Shestov displays a holistic approach, being interested in Dostoevsky's outlook on life in its 
entirety and thus reconstructing the story of the transformation of Dostoevsky's convictions. 
However, the reason for that does not necessarily stem from literary traditions, but rather 
from the fact that both thinkers found in Dostoevsky exactly what they were looking for. 
Although in this particular case what deserves attention above all is the fact that similar 
observations yield in Gide and Shestov, as a rule, quite unrelated conclusions.
As we mentioned before, Gide was one of the first Western critics to address the subject of 
Dostoevsky. He began his notes before the First World War, but was forced by 
circumstances to put them aside until 1922 -  the centenary of Dostoevsky's birth. He 
delivered his thoughts in the form of lectures in early 1922 and in February of that year, a 
special issue of La Nouvelle Revue Frangaise appeared, dedicated to Dostoevsky's jubilee, 
where Gide's article on Dostoevsky was published as well as Shestov's Overcoming the 
Self-Evident. Andre Gide, who was by then already one of the most influential figures in 
French literature, noticed and appreciated Shestov's contribution. The chronology itself 
frees us from assumptions of any mutual influences between Gide and Shestov in their 
views on Dostoevsky. Even though Shestov had by that time written his large monograph 
on Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, it was not yet translated from the original Russian, and one 
can be certain that Gide had not read it by 1922.
However, Gide had read a lot of Dostoevsky, as translations were emerging -  in all the 
Western European languages accessible to him -  German, English and French. And he was, 
without question, taken by it, to the extent that he started popularising the Russian novelist 
to an European readership, and laid the foundations of modem research on Dostoevsky. It is 
possible that a significant role in the high esteem in which Gide held Dostoevsky was 
played by Gide's intellectual tolerance.
What delighted Gide in Dostoevsky's writings above all, rather unexpectedly for the 
Western European mind, can be called irrationality, chaos and horror. However, Gide
365 Brodskii’s phrase reported in Volkov, flucwozu c Hocu(pOM EpodcxuM, p. 198.
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himself interpreted this as the full concentration of a human being on his inner life. 
According to Gide it is precisely the relationships of a human being with his or her self, and 
his or her God, rather than the more conventional, for Western literature, relationship with 
society, that present the quintessence of Dostoevsky's works. And, to his credit, he 
intuitively felt that anthropocentrism was the main principle of Russian philosophical 
thought, which using Zenkovsky's words, ‘cKa3tmaeTCH b  t o m ,  HacKOJibKO Bcio^y 
AOMHHHpyeT (aa)Ke b  OTBJieneHHbix npoftjieMax) Mopcuibnm ycm am eK a : 3^ecb j i o k h t  
OAHH H3 CaMbIX AeHCTBCHHblX H TBOpHeCKHX HCTOKOB pyCCKOTO (^ HJIOCO^ CTBOBaHHfl’.366
However, what for Gide came as a series of discoveries and revelations, was absent for 
Shestov, who, for all his Western European intellectual orientation, had nevertheless been 
brought up in Russian culture with its Judaeo-Christian baggage combined with Slavonic 
idiosyncrasy. Thus the irrationalism of Russian literature became for Shestov a somewhat 
intrinsic feature of his character which explains why what for Gide was the achievement of 
penetrating a foreign culture, for Shestov simply served as a point of departure.
Thus Gide wrote with surprise: ‘A certain category of problems -  heart-searchings, 
passions, and associations seems to be the province of the moralist and the theologian, and 
a novelist has no call to burden himself with them’.367 But clearly both Gide and Shestov in 
their own ways recognised Dostoevsky's philosophical gift interwoven into the craft of a 
writer -  the novelist for both disguised the philosopher. Rather anticipating Bakhtin's 
revolutionary study of Dostoevsky's poetics Gide recognised the deep personalisation of 
Dostoevsky's world 368 and emphasised the role of ideas presented through particular 
personalities. ‘The miracle Dostoevsky accomplished consists in this’, Gide wrote: ‘each of 
his characters [...] lives by virtue of his own personality, and these intimately personal 
beings [...] are introduced to us in all their puzzling complexity. The wonder of it is that the 
problems are lived over by each of his characters, or rather let us say the problems exist at 
the expense of his characters: problems which conflict, struggle, and assume human guise
366 Zenkovskii, p. 18.
367 Andre Gide, Dostoevsky (London: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 15-16.
368 A precise quote from Bakhtin was given earlier in the chapter, or see directly Bakhtin, p. 10.
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to perish or triumph before our eyes’.369 Gide also grasped the eternal, never-ending 
movement of Dostoevsky's world. ‘His principal characters are always in course of 
formation’, he wrote, ‘never quite emerging from the shadows [...] In Dostoevsky's books, 
as in a Rembrandt portrait, the shadows are the essential... With him there is no attempt to 
straighten or simplify lines; he is at his happiest in the complex; he fosters it’.370
This idea about a psychological complexity which covers up the abyss of human 
consciousness underlies Gide's whole analysis of Dostoevsky. For him Dostoevsky is a 
writer based on the contrasts of human nature. ‘So often in Dostoevsky one particular 
feeling is suddenly supplanted [...] by its direct opposite! We can find example after
'xn iexample of it’, writes Gide. And in developing this thought he comes a long way -  
reaching what essentially is his meeting point with Shestov: ‘Dostoevsky [...] lost himself 
in each of the characters of his books, and, for this reason, it is in them that he can be found 
again’, Gide asserts. ‘I know no writer richer in contradictions and inconsistencies than 
Dostoevsky’.373
For Shestov, of course, this conclusion that it is precisely through his characters that 
Dostoevsky continuously expresses himself and argues with himself is the central premise. 
Perhaps for Gide such an interpretation of Dostoevsky -  through his heroes -  was essential 
also for the reason that he appreciated this writer so much specifically in the artistic genre, 
but not through his journalistic work or correspondence. ‘The same man who is so 
uncompromising and so tenacious where his own work is concerned [...] writes his 
correspondence anyhow [...] Perhaps we have never yet had an example of a literary man's 
letters so badly written, by that I mean written with so little regard for style’,374 Gide says, 
not without surprise.
369 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 16.
370 Ibid, pp. 105-106
371 Ibid, p. 90.
372 Ibid, p. 55.
373 Ibid, p. 56.
374 Ibid, p. 22 and p. 21.
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However, this perception of Dostoevsky through his literary heroes serves as the first, but 
not the only, organising principle for both thinkers. Before they head off in their different 
directions, Shestov and Gide construct quite a consistent range of views on Dostoevsky 
which is best described by the following words of Andre Gide:
...if I seek to know what part mind plays in Dostoevsky's novels, I realize that its power is demonic. 
His most dangerous characters are the strongest intellectually, and not only do I maintain that the 
mind and the will of Dostoevsky's characters are active solely for evil, but that, when urged and 
guided towards good, the virtue to which they attain is rotten with pride and leads to destruction. 
Dostoevsky's heroes inherit the Kingdom of God only by the denial of mind and will and the 
surrender of personality’.375
This idea of the hostile role of reason in Dostoevsky is, obviously, native for Shestov, but 
beyond that his path parts from that of the Frenchman.
It is interesting that Shestov is not bested by Gide in terms of psychological shrewdness. 
Shestov's treatment of Dostoevsky exemplifies the uniqueness of his vision which lies in 
the fact that often using an artistic perspective he makes discoveries of a purely 
philosophical character. Indeed, Shestov's summary of Dostoevsky is, as we saw, that 
‘(J)aKTHHecKH o h  b o  BceM, h t o  nucaji, t o j i b k o  h  aejiaji, h t o  paccKa3biBaji o nepepo3K,zteHHH 
c b o h x  ySeac^eHHH. H  h m c h h o  b  o t o m  h  3aicrnoHaeTCfl Beet HHTepec ero nncaHHH -  h  pjut 
Hero h  zura  Hac’.376 As we have shown above, in unravelling this story of the transformation 
of Dostoevsky's convictions Shestov, using the roads of morality and psychology, comes to 
the sources of philosophical questions of the Biblical story of original sin, universal 
necessity and the commonplaces of reason.
In the case of Gide the situation is qualitatively different. For him the psychology and 
morality of Dostoevsky's heroes are not the method, as for Shestov, but the final destination 
of his research. ‘I can distinguish in the characters of Dostoevsky's novels three strata or 
regions’,377 Gide writes. -  ‘First the intellectual, remote from the soul and whence proceed 
the worst temptations. Therein dwells [...] the treacherous demonic element. [...] the second
375 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 95.
376 Shestov, O 'nepepooicdeHuuydeotcdemiu’y/focmoeecK020,p. 173.
377 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 120.
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region is the region of passion, ravaged and desolated by storms; but tragic though the 
happenings be that these storms determine, the very soul of Dostoevsky's characters is 
scarcely affected. There is a region deeper still, where passion exists not. This is the region 
that resurrection [...], re-birth, in Christ's words, enables us to reach 378 We recall that 
Gide finds the secret of true happiness as perceived by Dostoevsky in the full renunciation 
of self, of personal demands: ‘...the mysterious essence of Dostoevsky's philosophy and of 
Christian ethics too; the divine secret of happiness. The individual triumphs by renunciation 
of his individuality. He who lives his life, cherishing personality, shall lose it: but he who 
surrenders it shall gain the fullness of life eternal, not in the future, but in the present made 
one with eternity. Resurrection in the fullness of life, forgetful of all individual happiness. -  
Oh! perfect restoration! ’,379
Gide returns to this idea on numerous occasions, illustrating it by various extracts from 
Dostoevsky's works. The elder Zosima and young Alesha, Prince Myshkin and the 
wandering peasant Makar Dolgoruky -  they all serve as a confirmation for him that the 
highest happiness and virtue are in self-sacrifice and self-renunciation. ‘I repeat that even 
though he clearly formulates the problem of the superman which insidiously reappears in 
each of his works, we witness the glorious vindication of none but Gospel truths. 
Dostoevsky perceives and imagines salvation only in the individual renunciation of self. 
[...] it is not according to the positive or negative quality of their virtue that one can 
hierarchize his characters’, continues Gide,
not according to their goodness of heart, but by their degree of pride. [...] by an inversion which I 
make bold to describe as inspired by the New Testament, the most abject characters are nearer the 
Kingdom of Heaven than the noblest. To such a degree is Dostoevsky's work dominated by these 
profound truths. "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble." -  "For the Son of man is 
come to save that which was lost. On the one hand, denial and surrender of the self; on the other, 
affirmation of the personality, the will to power, an exaggerated loftiness of sentiment. And take 
due note of this fact; in Dostoevsky's novels, the will to power leads inevitably to ruin.380
378 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 120.
379 Ibid, pp. 137-138.
380 Ibid, pp. 92-93.
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Such are the conclusions of Gide which, as one can see, are quite opposite to those of 
Shestov, who perceived the above positive characters as artificial creations and pale 
shadows invented by Dostoevsky only as a concession to public opinion. In contrast, 
Shestov saw the true Dostoevsky in those heroes whom Gide castigated for their pride, 
demonic mind and will to power. One could say that Gide's are the predictable conclusions 
of a moralist and humanist. Possibly his Western upbringing plays a role in it too, for he 
never ceases to admire the humility of the Russian soul, invariably juxtaposing Russian 
irrationality to Western rationality and logic. Giving one of Dostoevsky's letters as an 
example Gide writes:
Towards the end -  drunk with the humility he used to intoxicate the heroes of his novels, that 
uncanny humility of the Russian, which may be Christ-like, [...] and which the Western mind will 
never fully understand since it reckons self-respect a virtue -  towards the end, he asks, “Why should 
they deny me? I make no demands. I am but a humble petitioner!..”. Western readers will protest in
*3 0  1
face of such humility and contrition’.
Gide comments, ‘Our literature, too often tinged with Castilian pride, has so thoroughly 
taught us to see nobility of character in the non-forgiveness of injury and insult’.382 Gide 
passionately defends Dostoevsky from the attacks of French conservatism:
Conservative and nationalist, deigning to see no more than what is chaotic in Dostoevsky, conclude 
he can be of no service whatsoever to us. To which my reply is that their opposition seems to do 
great hurt to the genius of France. By our unwillingness to accept anything foreign unless it reflects 
our system and logic, our whole likeness, in short, we err most grievously. [...] My opinion of 
intellectual protectionism I have often voiced. I believe it presents a great peril; on the other hand, 
any essay in intellectual denationalization involves a risk no less considerable. I am merely 
expressing what was Dostoevsky's finding likewise. There never was author more Russian in the 
strictest sense of the word and withal so universally European. Because it is essentially Russian, his 
humanity is all-embracing and touches each one of us personally.383
It is interesting, however, that talking about the religious roots of Dostoevsky, Gide, as well 
as Shestov for that matter, sees his deep connection with the Scriptures: ‘Dostoevsky 
abhors all churches, the Church of Rome in particular. He claims his right to accept Christ's
381 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 37.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid, pp. 170-171.
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teaching directly from the Scriptures, and from them alone’.384 Thus both Shestov and Gide 
coincide, so it seems, in their observations about the nature of the religious in Dostoevsky 
and the demonic role that he assigns to reason. In particular, Gide gives multiple examples 
of contradictions between mind and actions in Dostoevsky's heroes -  examples which, as in 
the case of Shestov that we discussed in the beginning of the chapter, resonate directly with 
Shakespeare’s words:
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
385Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.
Gide quotes Dostoevsky's correspondence where the writer attacks positivism: ‘In the new 
humanity, the aesthetic idea lacks clarity. The moral basis of society, held fast by 
positivism, not only gives no results, but cannot define itself, for it is lost in cloudy 
aspirations and ideals’.
And yet, there is a gulf between the conclusions of Shestov and Gide -  first and foremost in 
what concerns the role played by humility in Dostoevsky's novels: Gide sees in it the key to 
the hierarchy of all Dostoevsky's heroes without exception as well as the highest virtue, and 
observes that the most ‘saintly’ of Dostoevsky's characters have this feature. Shestov on the 
other hand regards them as lubok (cheap block prints), in particular because, quoting 
Milosz, ‘To Shestov peace of mind was suspect, for the earth we live on does not
387predispose us to it’. Shestov writes about Dostoevsky:
EMy caMOMy cTpauiHo 6bmo AyMaTb, hto “noAnojibe”, KOTopoe oh Tax apxo obpHCOBbiBan, 6buio 
He HeHTo eMy coBceM Hyacnoe, a CBoe cobcTBeHHoe, poflHoe. O h caM nyranca OTKpbiBiimxca eMy 
yacacoB h Hanparan Bee cnjibi Ayiim CBoen, hto6 3axpbiTbca o t  hhx xotb neM-HH6yzu>, xoTb
nepBbiMH nonaBiiiHMHca uaeanaMH. TaKHM obpa30M h C03AanHCb ^Hrypbi KHa3a MbiimcHHa h
388AjieuiH KapaMa30Ba’.
384 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 139.
385 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by George Rylands (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 
1967), p. 113.
386 Gide, Dostoevsky, p. 43.
387 Milosz, p. 105.
388 Shestov, fl'OcmoeecKUU u Huifiue, p. 330.
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Moreover, humility in principle is hateful for Shestov, and he is convinced that the mature 
Dostoevsky also repudiated humility with indignation and mocked it:
...CMHpeHHe, nponoBe^yeMoe TeM, ansi Koro Bee AencTBHTejibHoe pa3yMH0, h Bbi3Bajio to  
Aep3HOBeHHoe BocmiHuaHHe JfocToeBCKoro, KOTopoe a yace He pa3 npHBOAHJi: “nycTb Jiynrne 
npoBajiHTCH MHp, a hto6w MHe nan 6bui”. H6o Harne CMHpeHHe ecTb CMHpeHHe nepeA rjiyxofl h 
decnyBCTBeHHOH npnpoAOH: Mo^ ceT jih 6biTb HT0-HH6yab OTBpaTHTejibHen h no3opHeii 3Toro? Ho 
HaHdojibiiiHH THeB, pa3Apa>KeHne h npe3peHHe Bbi3biBaeT b ^octocbckom roTOBHOCTb BceMCTBa [...] 
npeKjioHHTbca nepeA chjtoh, nepeA “xaMeHHOH ctchoh”.389
‘For Shestov, universal Necessity was a scandal’,390 writes Milosz and quotes the words of 
Dostoevsky, that we gave above, from the ‘Confession’ by Ippolit in The Idiot which refer 
to the painting ‘Dead Christ’ by Holbein. Shestov particularly treasured these lines, for he 
heard in them an echo of his own indignation at the cruel and unbreakable world order. As 
Milosz puts it, in these words of Dostoevsky the horror of universal necessity is best 
illustrated.391
Now it becomes clear why Gide's admiration of Shestov's treatment of Dostoevsky was not 
reciprocal, but met with Shestov's scepticism with respect to Gide's thoughts on the writer. 
Shestov's disciple, the French poet Benjamin Fondane, recalls in his memoirs on Shestov 
how the latter described his conversation with Gide:
He’s one of the most intelligent men I’ve ever met; he is extremely perceptive; there is nothing you 
can hide from him. At the time his book on Dostoevsky had just come out. We were at Pontigny. 
One day he asked me what I thought of his book. So, I told him that it was very well written, etc. He 
understood at once, and changed the subject. Since then he never talked to me again.392
In this story, amongst other things, one can see clearly Shestov's tendency towards irony 
and subtext. Although in this case, as we are now able to deduce, any mutual understanding 
was in principle impossible -  as in a conversation of the deaf with the blind -  the 
approaches of Shestov and Gide to Dostoevsky were too different. For they belonged to 
two opposite camps: traditional Gide spoke on Dostoevsky's behalf from the side of
389 Shestov, O 'nepepootcdenuuyGeDtcdenuu’y flocmoeecKozo, p. 190.
390 Milosz, p. 115.
391 Ibid.
392 Fondane, p. 77.
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Christian morality, that very ‘religion framed by reason’ against which Shestov rebelled. 
Thus each of them had his own Dostoevsky.
6.II.4. Between faith and faithlessness. The fluidity of good and evil.
We shall conclude this chapter, using Shestov's words, ‘He noTOMy, hto TeMa HcnepnaHa, a
• JQ 'J
noTOMy, hto CTaTbfl pa3pocjiacb\ However, before closing we shall return to the 
question of Dostoevsky's religiosity. This will be followed by a discussion of both 
Shestov's and Dostoevsky's relevance to modernity. The former topic -  of Dostoevsky's 
relation to religion -  is indeed vast. All sorts o f theories have been assigned to Dostoevsky, 
almost all existing religions have been found in him. Shestov, as we saw, firmly connects 
him with the Gospels, but not with the product o f speculative philosophy, and remarks on 
‘icaKHMH MyHHTejibHbiMH comhchhjimh 6buia odypeBaeMa jx y m a  caMoro ^ocToeBCKoro ’394 
and how at times he was forced to acknowledge that ‘pejiHrna eme B03M05KHa, ho Bora 
HeT, Bor HeB03M0>KeH hjih, BepHee, HeB03M05KeH to t  Bor ABpaaMa, Bor Hcaaxa, Bor 
HaKOBa, o kotopom roBopHTca b IlHcaHHH’. Gide in turn sees in Dostoevsky an attempt 
to fill in the chasm between Christianity and Buddhism, Asian mentality. ‘I know no author 
at once more Christian and less Catholic in spirit’, Gide writes, ‘Dostoevsky leads us, we 
may take it, if  not to anarchy, to a sort o f Buddhism, or at least q u ie t i s m  [...] away from 
Rome’.396
In his article ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, 
Malcolm Jones attempts to gather together and reconcile diverse points of view on the 
religious in Dostoevsky. One of the conclusions that he reaches reflects in particular the 
points of contact of Gide and Shestov. While acknowledging that the reason for a vast 
diversity of existing interpretations of the religious in Dostoevsky lies in the fact that he 
indeed ‘gave a comprehensive picture of the varieties of religious experience in the Russia 
of his day’, Jones also asserts that ‘Dostoevsky's distinctiveness’ is not in that, but in the 
fact that ‘he personally experienced that perilous threshold between the most pious
393 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 105.
394 Shestov, O ‘nepepocucdemtu y6eotcdeHUu' y  flocmoeecKoeo, p. 193.
395 Ibid.
396 Gide, Dostoevsky, pp. 139-140.
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unquestioning faith and the bleakest unbelief and ‘repeatedly dramatised it in his 
fiction’.397
This in many ways reflects Shestov's perception of the writer, for Shestov's vision of 
Dostoevsky's oscillations between the truth of revelation delivered to him through his 
second -  extraordinary -  vision on one hand and the speculative thought of ‘omnitude’ 
(‘BceMCTBo’) consistent with Dostoevsky's first -  ordinary -  vision on the other hand, can 
be equated to Dostoevsky's tormenting suspension between religious belief and disbelief. 
Indeed, in Dostoevsky's works his struggle between faith and faithlessness persistently 
bursts out. In Shestov's book On Job's Scales we find a continuation of this idea where 
Shestov assigns to Dostoevsky himself what the writer famously expressed through the lips 
of Ivan Karamazov: ‘^ ocToeBCKHH [...] nojiaraji [...], h to  ecjin HeT 3arpobHOH 5KH3HH, to
•1Q O
HeB03M05KH0, flaace 6eccM bicneHH O 6bitb flobpoaeT ejibH biM ’. At the end of the day it is 
this struggle which is responsible for all the contradictions and antagonisms which Andre 
Gide finds everywhere in Dostoevsky. This captivating struggle between good and evil, 
Christ and Antichrist, which stem from the soul of the author himself, provides as it were 
such an intense pulse to Dostoevsky's novels.
However, perhaps the most striking idea (which did not escape the attention of either Gide 
or Shestov) is the idea of how volatile and fast-changing human emotions and concepts, if 
not the moral categories themselves, are. More precisely, Shestov, as we have seen, is 
distrustful of morality and ethics bom of reason, of speculative philosophy, to serve its 
needs. Thus Shestov's God, who as he himself thinks he took over from Dostoevsky, stands 
beyond good and evil. ‘The good is not God. We must seek that which is higher than the 
good. We must seek God’, - Milosz quotes from Shestov's early work and clarifies this 
point:
Which means that the despair that seizes us when we are faced with the Absurd leads us beyond 
good and evil to an act of faith. There is nothing impossible for God and for those who truly believe
397 Malcolm Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal, vol. 37, 2003, p. 52.
398 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 243.
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in Him. An absurd affirmation, for who ever saw a mountain moved by prayer? But do we have a 
choice? The fruits of the tree of knowledge bring only death. It should be noted that Shestov was 
not a preacher; he tried only to present a dilemma in all its acuteness. More definitely he was 
neither a moralist nor a theologian.399
Gide on the other hand talks directly about the interchange of opposite feelings in 
Dostoevsky's heroes, and of his tendency to rebel against his own theories as soon as they 
are formulated:
His ideas are practically never absolute, remaining relative always to the characters expressing 
them. I shall press the point even further and assert their relativity not merely to these characters, 
but to a specific moment in the lives of these characters. The ideas are, as it were, the product of a 
special and transitory state of his dramatis personnae, and relative they remain, subservient to and 
conditioned by the particular fact or action which determines them or by which they are 
determined.400
This echoes in a certain sense Richard Peace’s description of ‘that contradictory 
convertibility of conviction so typical of the thought processes of the underground man’ 
which is also inherent, as Peace notes, in many of Dostoevsky’s characters, especially 
secondary ones.401
Perhaps this unconsoling note can be viewed as, in its own way, a reconciling one for these 
two very different points of view on Dostoevsky (or, if you like, points of philosophical 
origin): humanist and moralizing, and irrationalist and existential. However, this rather sad 
note can be transformed into harmony by an unexpected aesthetic framing coming from our 
age. Indeed, it emerges from under the pen of Sergei Dovlatov as a certain (inadvertent) 
bow to Dostoevsky from the twentieth century -  to a former convict from a Soviet soldier 
who served as a guard in a prison camp. After all they are separated only by time and 
barbed wire -  concepts which are negligible in comparison with immortal thoughts on 
human nature. Dovlatov writes:
. ..M o a c eT  6 l i t l  a e j io  b tom, hto 3Jio npoH3BOJibHo, hto e r o  o n p en e jia iO T  mccto h  BpeMH. A e c j in  
r o B o p n T b  r n n p e  -  o b m n e  TeuaeHUHH  H CTopHHecKoro MOMeHTa. 3 j io  onp efle jiaeT C fl KOHbioHKTypoH,
399 Milosz, p. 109.
400 Gide, Dostoevsky, pp. 98-99.
401 Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, p. v.
412
c n p o c o M , (JjyHKijHeH e r o  HOCHTejia. K p oM e T o r o , 4)aKTopoM  cjiynaH H ocT H . H ey a a n H b iM  CTeneHweM  
o 6cTo«TejibCTB. W  Aaace -  iuioxhm acT eraH ecxH M  BKycoM . ...Pa3yM eeT C fl, 3Jio He mohcct 
cym ecT B O B aT b b x a n ecT B e H A efiH oro n p H H im n a . Ilp H p o A a  A o6p a  6o j ie e  T aroT eeT  k 
iunpoK O Bem aTejibH O H  o rjia cK e. TeM  He M eH ee b o6ohx c j iy n a a x  A encT B yioT  n p o H 3BOJibHbie 
(fm xTopbi. IIo3TO M y MeHa cmciuht jn o 6a a  x a T ero p H H ecx a a  HpaBCTBeHHaa ycTaH O Bxa. H e n o B e x  
A o6p ! . .  H e jio B e x  noA A !.. H ejiO B ex n e n o B e x y  -  A p y r , TO Bapm n h 6paT ... H e n o B e x  n e n o B e x y  -  bojik... 
M T ax f la n e e . H e n o B e x  n e n o B e x y ...  x a x  6bi 3to n o j iy n m e  Bbipa3HTbca -  T a S y jia  p a c a . H H a n e  r o B o p a  
-  B e e , hto yroAH O . B sbbhchmocth o t CTeneHHa oGcToaTejibCTB. H e a o B e x  c n o c o 6eH Ha B ee -  
ZtypHoe h x o p o m e e .  M H e rpycTHO , hto oto T ax. IIosT O M y a  aft HaM B o r  ctohxocth h M yacecTBa. A  
e m e  Jrynnie -  oScToaTejibCTB BpeMeHH h M ecT a, p a c n o j ia r a r o m n x  x  A o S p y ...402
6.II.5. Post-modernist discourse. Shestov’s and Dostoevsky’s relevance to modernity.
Our final discussion will be on Shestov's relevance to modernity which has a lot in common 
with that o f Dostoevsky and in many ways is inspired by the latter. Interestingly, it is 
precisely Shestov's concern with the individual rather than the social which allowed him to 
foresee the global cultural landscape o f the future and which captured a rather post­
modernist approach. As Blagova and Emelianov wrote, ‘IIIecTOB t o h k o  nponyBCTBOBaji 
npouecc xyAbTypHOH AHHaMHKH nepexoAa b  HOBoe c o c t o a h h c  anoxn, 6 a h 3 k o h  
nocTMOAepHH3My, rAe npHHunn p c a a t h b h o c t h  a b a a c t c a  o c h o b h l i m  h  Bee t o h k h  3peHHA 
paBHonpaBHti’.403 Similarly, Shestov's scepticism, adogmatism and his rather Nietzschean 
rejection o f the accepted hierarchy of values are also similar to post-modernist concepts. In 
the same vein the post-modernist tendency o f contemporary culture towards cynicism, if  
the latter is regarded as a form of despair, resonates with Shestov's forebodings.
It is then only natural that, as Viktor Erofeev observes, Shestov managed to foresee the 
aesthetics of existentialism and described a play of the future where the hero is completely 
alienated from others whether he is on a desert island or, which is the same thing, is trapped 
in his room in the middle of a multi-million megalopolis.404 The theme of alienation, which 
is very Dostoevskian by nature, has become dominant in contemporary literature and 
culture. In the late 1960s Sidney Monas wrote that Shestov's ‘emphasis on the severed state 
[...] brings him very close to the concerns of modem literature, to the Sartre of Nausea and
402 Dovlatov, 3ona in Co6panue npo3u e mpex moMax, vol. I, pp. 87-88.
403 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 116.
404 See Erofeev, pp. 180-181
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Huis clos, to Beckett, to the Camus of The Outsider\ 405 In a sense these can be viewed as 
precursors of post-modernism. It is in Dostoevsky as well as in Nietzsche that Shestov had 
ample material to build on with respect to the themes of individualism and alienation 
stretching into the future. The clearest manifestation can be found in Dostoevsky's gloomy 
predictions of the feverish, disoriented and destructive state of mankind depicted in 
Raskolnikov's dream:
nOHBHJlHCb KaKHe-TO HOBbie TpHXHHbl, CymeCTBa MHKpOCKOnHHeCKHe, BCeJlHBUIHeCH B Tejia 
juofleH. Ho 3t h  cymecTBa 6bum AyxH, oaapeHHbie yMOM h  BOJien. JIioah, npHHABiime nx b 
ce6a, CTaHOBHjincb TOTnac >xe 6ecHOBaTbiMH h cyMacmeauiHMH. Ho HHXoraa, HHKor^ a jiioah He 
cHHTajin ceba Tax yMHbiMH h  HenoxojiebHMbiMH b h c t h h c ,  KaK CHHTajm 3apa>xeHHbie. 
Hnxorfla He CHHTanH HenoxojiebHMee c b o h x  npwroBopoB, c b o h x  HayHHbix b b ib o a o b , c b o h x  
HpaBCTBeHHbix ybexyjeHHH h  BepoBaHHH. Lfejibie ceaeHHa, uejibie ropoaa h  Hapoabi 3apaxcajincb 
h  cyMacuiecTBOBajiH. Bee 6biJiH b TpeBore h  He noHHMajw apyr apyra, b c h k h h  ayMaa, h t o  b 
HeM b oaHOM h  3aKJiioHaeTCJi HCTHHa, h  MyHHjicH, niflaa Ha apyrnx, 6h ji cebn b rpyab, ruiaKaa h  
aoMaa cebe pyKH. He 3HaaH, xoro h  xax cyaHTb, He Moran coraacHTbca, h t o  cHHTaTb 3aoM, 
h t o  ao6poM. He 3HaaH, xoro obBHHaTb, xoro onpaBabmaTb. Jhoan ybHBaaH apyr apyra b xaxoh-TO 
beccMbicaeHHOH 3aobe.406
‘AnoxajiHnTHHecKHe npeanyBCTBHa ^ocToeBCxoro, 3amH(J)poBaHHbie b otom CHe, 
napaaoxcaabHO cbbmaiOTca HaaBy b spy rao6aaH3auHH, b anoxy bohhbi c 
Teppopn3MOM ’ ,407 wrote Blagova and Emelianov, and pointed to Shestov's strong sense of 
identification with Dostoevsky's concerns and especially to Shestov's drawing a parallel 
between Dostoevsky and existentialist philosophers such as Nietzsche, Pascal and 
Kierkegaard.
Another aspect of post-modernism is a loss not only of sincerity and truth, but, as it were, 
of the very notions of them, when ‘the self ultimately “vanishes fully into the state of 
relatedness. One ceases to believe in a self independent of the relations in which he or she 
is embedded’” .408 As Gergen writes further, ‘if one is multiply populated, harboring myriad
405 Monas, p. xxii
406 Dostoevskii, IIpecmynjieHue u HaKa3aHue, nojiHoe cobpaHHe c o h h h c h h h  b 30 TOMax 
(Leningrad: Nauka, 1972-1986), vol. 6, pp. 419-420.
407 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 117.
408 Kenneth Gergen, Saturated Self: Dilemmas o f Identity in Contemporary Life (New York: Basic
Books, 1991), p. 17. Cited in A. Cento Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil 
war”: an analysis of the self-narratives of neofascist protagonists’.
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voices from culture and history, there is no expression that stands as true. And for the 
postmodern, words do not “reflect” or “picture” states of mind. Words are not mirrors or 
pictures but integral parts of ongoing interchange’.409 This description of what Gergen calls 
a ‘saturated self resonates very strongly with the polyphonic world of Dostoevsky’s 
heroes, thus reinforcing the point of the writer’s intrinsic involvement with the post­
modern. On the other hand the concept of a ‘saturated self is an extreme implication of 
social constructionism which informs narrative approaches to research.410 Within these 
approaches, as Bull writes drawing on the works of Crossley and Freeman, ‘what was 
needed was “a different kind of psychology -  one which retained the ability of appreciating 
the linguistic and discursive structuring of ‘self and ‘experience’, but one which also 
maintained a sense of the essentially personal, coherent and ‘real’ nature of individual 
subjectivity’” .411 As Freeman sees it, one has to ‘maintain and embrace this primacy of 
word without losing world in the process' 412 From this point of view Shestov’s treatment 
of Dostoevsky in the vein of ‘narrative psychology’ should seem as most appropriate, 
except that the degree of being ‘a saturated self for Dostoevsky’s heroes is such that the 
resulting complexity of his fictional world resists entirely being treated as self-narrative. 
Yet, as we have shown, certain one-dimensional spaces within the writer’s multi­
dimensional cosmos do seem to lend themselves to Shestov’s ‘narrative psychology’ 
approach, which clearly anticipated its modem forms.
Equally pertaining to modernity is Shestov’s connection with the absurd. As Czeslaw 
Milosz aptly points out, Shestov wanted to highlight the absurdity of human existence 
concealed by reason. And it is not surprising, Milosz says, that Albert Camus in his Myth o f  
Sysyphus mentions first of all Kierkegaard and Shestov as protagonists of paradox and 
absurdity.413 Indeed, Shestov felt, following Dostoevsky, that reason and the advances of
410 See Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’” .
411 Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’”, citing M. L. Crossley, 
‘Formulating Narrative Psychology: The Limitations of Contemporary Social Constructionalism’, 
Narrative Inquiry, vol. 13, No 2, 2003, p. 289.
412 M. Freeman, Re-writing the Self: History, Memory, Narrative (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 16. Cited in Bull, forthcoming, ‘Political violence, stragismo and “civil war’” .
413 Milosz, p. 107
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the human mind are unable to help man in his existential suffering. This schism between 
scientific advances and our inner world continues to become frighteningly large and today 
poses a real threat for the survival of humanity. It is this schism that Shestov's premonitions 
were about. He treasured the words of Shatov from Dostoevsky's The Devils: ‘Hmcor/ja 
pa3yM He b  cnjiax 6 l i j i  onpeaejnm, 3J10 h  zto6po, h j ih  r aace oxzjejiHTb 3no o t  ^o6pa, x o t a  
6 b i  npndJiH3HTenbHO; HanpoTHB, Bcer^a no3opHo h  ^cajixo CMeuiHBaji; Hayxa >ke AaBana 
pa3peineHHH KynaHHbie’.414
Following Dostoevsky, Shestov mocked any pretence of science to solve the problems of 
human spirituality. We have demonstrated above how Dostoevsky says in The Brothers 
Karamazov through the lips of Mitia who is telling Alesha about the real discovery of a 
contemporary of Dostoevsky's, the physiologist Claude Bernard, that little tails of nerves in 
the brain are the cause of his ability to think, and not his living soul and the fact that he is 
created in the divine image and likeness. Shestov repeated such mockery starting from his 
very first book where he described as a major fact of modem history the phenomenon of a 
scientist having left his study in order to claim authority over life in all its aspects.415
In a similar sense if we view globalism as a phenomenon whereby technological progress is 
used to shield the purely utilitarian interests of a minority and to facilitate their high 
standard of living at the expense of others, in particular neglecting individual needs, then 
we can assert that Shestov's warnings against the encroachment of technocracy with its 
neglect of the individual, of technological advance validated by soulless rationalism, were 
also a precursor of anti-globalism. Shestov, following Dostoevsky, was constantly warning 
mankind against the dangerously self-assured power of reason, saying that ‘a soulless 
force’ acquired through science a power over people. N. V. Motroshilova sees the main 
message of Shestov and Dostoevsky in claiming that ‘ecjin pa3yM, Hayica, 
onpe^MeHHBaiomaa h x  TexHHKa dyztyT OTopBaHbi o t  h o c t o h h h o h  npoBepKH aeiicTBeHHbiM 
cyzjOM HpaBCTBeHHOH coBecTH HejioBeica h  HejioBenecTBa, t o  o h h  cnocodHbi cTaTb
414 Dostoevskii, Eecbi in Tlonme codpanue coHuuenuu e 30 moMax, vol. 10, p. 199.
415 The appropriate quotation in the original Russian was already given in Chapter 2 (or see directly: 
Shestov, UJeKcnup u ezo xpumm Epandec, p. 11).
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orpoMHMM 3 J io m ’ .416 ‘He TaKaa j ih  “paBHOflyiiraafl cn j ia ” BJiacTByeT cero ^ H a  H a# b c c m h  
HaMH, nojiB3yflci> p acK p trm M H  HayKofi h  pa3yMOM TaiiHaMH aTOMHoro a # p a ? ’,417 
M o tr o s h ilo v a  a sk s  in  h er  a r t ic le  o n  S h e s to v . ‘H  pa3B e He 0K a3ajiact npunacTHOH k  s t o h  
Tpare^HH coB peM eH H oro H ejioB enecT B a c n e n a a  B epa b  aicofibi caMOCTOjrrejibHoe h  b  c e d e
A 1 86naroe “mecTBHe” HayHHoro pa3yMa?’, she continues. Motroshilova emphasises the 
relevance o f this dangerous cult o f science and reason especially in the case o f Russia, 
because in contrast to the West where an anti-science movement had an opportunity to 
make its voice heard, in Russia any criticism of scientific reason was regarded as politically 
subversive. This concealed an attempt o f the political and administrative system to 
subjugate science and philosophy to its aims. Motroshilova stresses that, as is clear today, 
in the epoch of the most powerful advance of reason and science, ‘pa3yMy h  Hayice He 
y^ajiocb c/tep>KaTb 3aBbimeHHbix ofieinaHHH KpaHHHx paunoHajiHCTOB, c u h c h t h c t o b  Bcex 
BpeMeH h  H a p o / j O B  -  c#ejiaTb HejiOBeuecTBO SnaronojiyuHbiM h  cnacTjiHBbiM, He 3HaK>mHM 
CTpaaaHHH h  ipare^HH, ^epacamuM b  c b o h x  pyxax h h t h  yHHBepcajibHoro rocno^CTBa Haa 
m h p o m , ero TaiiHaMH, 3ara^KaMH’.419
In an existential sense, the central conflict exposed by Shestov, which by and large he has 
derived from Dostoevsky's writings, -  between the private and the general, between 
individuality and ‘b c c m c t b o ’ understood in a broad sense, between man's irrational inner 
world and the rational means offered by reason to deal with it -  can also be regarded as 
underlying for such characteristics of contemporary society as consumerism and addictions 
of all kinds including drugs, virtual reality and popular culture. For they are manifestations 
of a lack of individuality in the face of sweeping forces that represent by-products of 
scientific progress and suppress personality. Moreover, the emptiness and helplessness 
inflicted by man's realisation of his tragic fate and existential solitude cannot be solved by 
rationalist scientific methods. Such problems have to be combated by means of art, or 
aesthetics, for it is the latter which is responsible for everyone’s ‘uncommonness of visage’.
416 N. V. Motroshilova, ‘IlapaSojia 3kh3hchhoh cy^bbbi JIbBa IIIecTOBa’, Bonpocu <pwioco<puu, No 
1, Moscow, 1989, pp. 135-136.
417 Motroshilova, ‘FlapaSojia k^h3hchhoh cy,ab6bi JIbBa IIIecTOBa’, p. 135.
4.8 Ibid.
4.9 Ibid, p. 136
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To quote Brodsky again, our ‘aesthetic choice is always individual, and aesthetic sensation 
is always private. Any new aesthetic reality renders the person experiencing it even more 
private, and this privateness, which sometimes acquires the form of literary (or some other) 
taste, may in itself turn out to be if not a guarantee then a form of defence against 
enslaving’.420
In o u r  v i e w  S h e s t o v 's  w h o l e  p h i l o s o p h y ,  w h e n  v i e w e d  f r o m  a n  a r t i s t i c  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
h i g h l i g h t s  t h i s  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  e n i g m a t i c  a n d  s u p e r n a t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  
h u m a n  p s y c h e  i n s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  r a t i o n a l  m e a n s ,  a n d  p a s s i o n a t e l y  p r o t e c t s  t h e  i r r a t i o n a l  f r o m  
t h e  r a t i o n a l .  At t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  w h e n  v i e w e d  m o r e  l i t e r a l l y ,  i t  o f f e r s  u n q u e s t i o n i n g  f a i t h  a s  
t h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n  t o  m a n 's  t r a g e d y .  S h e s t o v  c l a i m e d  t h a t  D o s t o e v s k y 's  The Devils 
d e m o n s t r a t e d  ‘b o  h t o  n p e B p a m a e T c a  H e jiO B e n e c K a a  5KH3HB, o T o p B a m ia a  3 H a m ie M  o t  e e  
T B o p i j a ’ .421 In b r o a d e r  t e r m s ,  a s  Y v e s  B o n n e f o y  w r o t e ,  ‘S h e s t o v  i s  a  w i t n e s s  o f  t h e  h o p e  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s e n s e  a n d  v a l u e  t o  e x i s t e n c e .  T h e  t h o u g h t  w h i c h  i s  c e r t a i n l y  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o
ADOkeep alive and active than a belief in a simple miracle’. And it is no accident that Milosz 
drew a parallel between Shestov the philosopher and Brodsky the poet, calling both 
defenders of the sacred in an age of faithlessness. This reinforces the timely and modem 
nature of Shestov's philosophy today, because the chasm mentioned by Brodsky between 
man and his thoughts about himself (in the sense of his preoccupation with existential 
questions) is becoming with time ever wider and more irremediable.
6.II.6. The religious in Dostoevsky within and beyond his times. Apophatic theology, 
minimal religiosity and the Hassidic tradition of Shestov's childhood.
However, this process is dual because simultaneously with an undeniable spiritual decline 
rooted in newly found Russian capitalism within the country's motion to join the free world, 
there is a rise of re-bom religiosity in Russia today, which deserves close attention and 
which, in many ways, leads us back to Dostoevsky's religious world. That is why in our
420 Joseph Brodsky, ‘Uncommon Visage. The Nobel Lecture’, p. 49.
421 Shestov, O 'nepepoDfcdenuu ydeotcdenuu ’ y  flocmoeecKoeo, p. 194
422 Bonnefoy, ‘A l'impossible tenu: la liberte de Dieu et celle de l'ecrivain dans la pensee de 
Chestov’,pp. 16-17.
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analysis below we shall refer to Malcolm Jones's article ‘Modelling the Religious
49^Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’.
In it Jones draws on Ninian Smart's book The World’s Religions.424 Amongst the seven 
dimensions of religion that Smart provides in his book it is the practical and ritual 
dimension together with the narrative or mythic one which, in our view, by and large 
dominate the other dimensions in modem Russian Orthodoxy. They serve as an umbrella 
for the experiential and emotional dimension first of all together with the ethical and legal 
one, and to a lesser extent for the doctrinal and philosophical dimension as well as the 
social and institutional. The other strong dimension is the material one, whereby religion is 
embodied in material objects such as icons, buildings and works of art. This dimension, in 
the Russian context, is incorporated, in a certain sense, in the first two dimensions above.
Religious rituals, the Russian Orthodox Service and Liturgy indeed are, and have been 
historically, the leading components of Russian religiosity. At the same time the mystical 
tradition of the Eastern Church is well known. From a certain perspective one can trace its 
roots in apophatic theology which is ‘a way towards mystical union with a God who is 
incomprehensible to us’,425 as Malcolm Jones writes paraphrasing Vladimir Lossky. Jones 
explains that apophatic is
negative theology which leads us ultimately to total ignorance. God is beyond existence, so to 
approach him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior to him, that is to say, all that exists. By 
progressively setting aside all that can be known, one may draw near to the Unknown in the 
darkness of ignorance, wherein He who is beyond all created things has his dwelling. The mysteries 
of theology are finally laid bare in a darkness of silence beyond the light of created things.426
423 Malcolm Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal, vol. 37, 2003, pp. 41-53.
424 Ninian Smart, The World's Religions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
425 See Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology o f the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke and 
Co Ltd, 1957), pp. 25-28. Cited (paraphrased) in Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of 
Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
426 Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
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Thus, paradoxically, the experience of the divine presence is only possible by a way of total 
ignorance. On the other hand, ‘theology must be not so much a quest for positive notions 
about the divine being as an experience that surpasses all understanding’.427
This description of apophatic theology as a way towards mystical union with an 
incomprehensible God in the dark silence of total ignorance and as an experience which 
surpasses all understanding is strikingly close to Shestov’s emphasis on revelation rather 
than speculation, and on faith being the second dimension of thought that does not lend 
itself to any rational understanding. In turn the roots of Shestov’s religious philosophy lie, 
as Sidney Monas suspects, in the Hassidic tradition. Indeed, Monas elaborates, ‘like the 
Hassidim, Shestov believed in the unique, the overwhelming, the ineffable insight. What 
can be thought through or reasoned out, what lends itself to abstraction or to precision or 
formulation is at best provisional, ‘preparatory’. [...] Like the Hassidim, Shestov cultivated
49Ra respect for mystery that survived the most intense rationalist training’, Monas wrote. 
As he explains, ‘The Hassidic movement [...] went very much against the grain of 
established [...] Jewish thought which tended to be rationalist in its approach to the world 
and allegorical in its interpretations of Holy Writ’ 429 He highlights the Hassidic emphasis 
on revelation, on the experience of the divine presence which is invariably instantaneous 
and intuitive. There seems to be a difference, however, between apophatic theology and 
Shestov's, as well as Hassidic, perception of the divine. It lies in the fact that although 
‘apophatic theology will never be abstract, working through concepts’, it still appeals to the 
human mind by being ‘contemplative, raising the mind to those realities that pass all 
understanding’,430 while in Shestov's outlook mind, reason, speculation are orthogonal to 
faith and essentially have no place in religious consciousnesss which exists by way of 
revelation alone.
427 See Lossky, The Mystical Theology o f the Eastern Church, p. 38. Cited in Jones, ‘Modelling the 
Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
428 Monas, p. ix
429 Ibid, p. xiii
430 See Lossky, The Mystical Theology o f the Eastern Church, p. 38. Cited in Jones, ‘Modelling the 
Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
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On the other hand, as Jones explains, the apophatic tradition is closely related to 
deconstructive nihilism, because ‘the silence at the core of apophatic religion may be 
interpreted or experienced either as fullness or as an absence, as glorious plentitude or as 
desolate abyss’.431 Jones thus concludes that nihilism and faith should be regarded as 
opposites that converge rather than as separate poles. He then gives another expression of 
this idea suggested by Mikhail Epstein that ‘apophaticism is a liminal phenomenon through 
which faith crosses into atheism, while atheism itself reveals the unconscious of faith’ 432 
‘This fateful proximity, at a vanishing point beyond the horizon, of belief and unbelief433 
Jones observes in Dostoevsky's personal experience reflected also in his novels, and which, 
we add, Shestov, of course, was very aware of. Jones writes that unsurprisingly this 
experience is often associated with epilepsy, but emphasises also that illness for 
Dostoevsky ‘could be the privileged gateway to higher spiritual awareness’.434 Similarly, 
Shestov wrote that ‘DnnjienTHKH h cyMacmeanme, mojkct 6tm>, 3HaiOT Taxne Bemn, o 
KOToptix HOpMajibHbie jikmui He HMeiOT aaace OT/jajieHHoro npeanyBCTBHa’435 and that a 
delirious mental state may simplify our search for truth.436 Further, Jones describes this 
experience of Dostoevsky as oscillation between total despair and hope. ‘This threshold 
experience has its roots in a mystical experience’ which was most intensely felt in 
Dostoevsky's epileptic fits, Jones writes, and was described by the novelist as the most 
ecstatic joy, the extreme peak of harmony, beauty, peace and completeness; ‘an ecstatic and 
prayerful fusion in the highest synthesis of life, in which he understands the saying that 
time shall be no more’.437 This resonates with the Hassidic tradition, the followers of 
which, contrary to rationalism, ‘emphasized experience, personal experience, rapture,
431 Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
432 Mikhail Epstein, ‘From Apophatic Theology to “Minimal Religion’”, in Mikhail N. Epstein, A. 
Genis and Slobodanka M. Vladiv-Glover, eds, Russian Post-Modernism: New Perspectives on Post- 
Soviet Culture (New-York and Oxford:Berghahn Books, 1999), p. 355. Cited in Jones, ‘Modelling 
the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
433 Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 47.
434 Ibid.
435 Lev Shestov, BenuKue Kanynbi in CoHunenuH e deyx moMax, II, p. 293.
436 See Ibid, p. 296.
437 Jones, ‘Modelling the Religious Dimension of Dostoevsky's Fictional World’, p. 48.
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ecstasy -  they were ‘dionysiac’ and not so different perhaps from the early Christians’,438 
as Monas writes.
However, the apophatic tradition taken to the extreme leads to atheism, but both remain 
interconnected, as Jones explains in his article. Referring to the modem religious 
developments in Russia, Jones gives an account of M. Epstein's vision of it, in which the 
long suppression of theology has played a major role. Epstein introduces the term of 
‘minimal’ religion which comprises a vague sense of the divine and results from the 
spiritual vacuum of the Soviet era. However, the tendencies of post-Soviet Russia include 
not only minimal religion, but also a return to the pre-atheist stage as well as neo-paganism, 
together with the blend of the latter with the former. This blend is characterised in 
particular by mystic and superstitious beliefs which are particularly prevalent in 
contemporary Russia. The process of people awakening to religion from a state of 
suppressed religiosity is interwoven with their interest in the supernatural and a rather 
pagan belief in simple miracles. In fact, these elements of paganism and mysticism are not 
exclusively due to the instilled atheism of the Soviet period, but to a large extent have 
historically always been present in Russia and have differentiated it from the West. This 
spirit was captured by Shestov, who was, as we mentioned earlier, by origin and education 
a product of both Eastern and Western culture, in the following lines (partially quoted in 
Chapter 1):
E B p o n a  a a B H b iM - f la B H o  3 a 6 b u i a  o  n y a e c a x :  O H a  a a n b u i e  n a e a n o B  H e  u u i a ;  3 t o  y H a c  b P o c c h h  a o  
c h x  n o p  n p o ,a o j D K a i o T  C M e u iH B a T b  n y a e c a  c  H a e a n a M H ,  K a ic  6 y zrro  6 b i  3 t h  a s a  H H n e r o  o b m e r o  m o k  
c o 6 o h  H e  H M e i o m H e  n o H H T H a , 6 b u i H  c o B e p m e H H O  o a H 0 3 H a n a m H M H .  B e a b  H a o b o p o T :  H M e H H o  
O T T o r o ,  h t o  b E B p o n e  n e p e c T a j m  B e p H T b  b n y a e c a  h  n o r n u m ,  h t o  b cb  H e j i o B e n e c K a a  3 a a a n a  
C B O flH T c a  k  y c T p o e H H i o  H a  3 e M J ie ,  T a M  H a n a j iH  H 3 o 6 p e T a T b  H a e a j i b i  h  n a e n .  A p y c c K H H  n e j iO B e K  
B b iJ ie 3  H 3  C B o e r o  M e a B e x c b e r o  y r a a  h  o m p a B H J i c a  b E B p o n y  3 a  x c h b o h  h  M e p T B O H  B o a o f t ,  k o b p o m -  
c a M O J ie T O M , c e M H M H J ib H b iM H  c a n o r a M H  h  t .  n .  B e m a M H ,  n o j i a r a a  b C B o e n  h b h b h o c t h ,  h t o  
> K e j ie 3 H b ie  a o p o r n  h  3 J ie K T p H H e c T B 0  -  3 t o  T O JibK O  H a n a n o ,  h c h o  A O K a 3 b i B a i o m e e ,  h t o  C T a p a a  h x h x  
H H K o r a a  H e  r o B o p n j i a  H e n p a B a w  b c b o h x  c i c a 3 K a x . . .  H  x a x  p a 3  s t o  c j i y n m i o c b  b t o  B p e iv w ,  x o r a a  
E B p o n a  H a B c e r a a  n o K O H H H J ia  c  a c T p o j i o r n e H  h  a j ix H M H e H  h  B b i u u i a  H a  n y r b  n o j i o x c H T e j i b H b i x  
H 3 b IC K a H H H , n p H B e a iH H X  K X H M H H  H a C T p O H O M H H .439
438 Monas, p. viii.
439 Shestov, Ano<peo3 decnoueeHHOcmu, pp. 29-30.
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Thus we can summarise our elaboration above by concluding that apophatic theology, 
which Jones closely connects with Dostoevsky's religiosity, can be seen as underlying 
Russian modem minimal religiosity and at the same time resonating with the Hassidic 
sentiments of the nineteenth century that in turn bear the roots of Shestov's philosophy and 
in a sense define his struggle against speculative trend in theology, to free faith from any 
dogma. Simultaneously, the nature of the Russian mystical tradition captured by Shestov at 
the dawn of the last century in the most penetrating fashion, is deeply encoded into the core 
of religious developments in contemporary Russia with a strong presence of neo-paganism 
and mysticism.
More generally, on the religious plane Shestov offers mankind a radical faith as the only 
way to salvation. As Valevicius writes, ‘as a solution to the crisis of today, to the 
multiplicity of discourses, Shestov gives us nothing but faith as the solution’.440 However, 
Shestov remains silent regarding either the form or the content of this faith. Similarly to the 
parallels we have drawn above between Shestov's philosophy and post-modernism, 
Valevicius too sees in Shestov's religious thought a direct post-modernist connection, 
because, just as in Shestov's philosophy of tragedy man is vulnerable in the face of eternal 
necessity, in post-modernism he is also no longer at the centre of tmth; instead man is an 
accident of creation, insignificant, mortal and pitiful. And the ecological crisis has only 
contributed to the above point, Valevicius notes. He emphasises that for Shestov faith is 
‘exactly that which strips us of pur usual balance, which breaks and smashes our experience 
into infinitely small pieces, which takes away from us our joy, sleep, rules, convictions and 
firmness’.441 Thus, Valevicius demonstrates how Shestov’s ‘frenzied restoration attempts, 
interrogations about the validity of our understanding, the hermeneutic approach’442 prove 
futile and it is only the extreme leap of faith that is powerful and can lead to salvation 
mankind which is suffocated, according to Shestov's premonitions, by the spiritual void and
440 Andrius Valevicius, “‘Celui qui edifie et detruit des mondes”: Leon Chestov et le post- 
modemisme a partir d'une lecture de Tolstoi’ in Leon Chestov, Un philosophe pas comme les 
autres?, p. 140.
441 Valevicius, “‘Celui qui edifie et detruit des mondes”: Leon Chestov et le post-modemisme a 
partir d'une lecture de Tolstoi’, p. 139.
442 Ibid, p. 139.
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absurdity that result from the dominance of rational thinking and self-evident truths. On the 
other hand, this leap of faith in the form of a constant striving towards unattainable 
Christian ideals is equally pertinent to Dostoevsky.
Furthermore, with Shestov's existential approach breaking, very much in the spirit of 
Dostoevsky's novels, the divisions between the social, cultural and religious, Shestov with 
his adogmatic thinking summons humanity to learn to live in uncertainty and to think 
independently. As Zakydalsky writes, ‘More and more Russian intellectuals are coming to 
realize that the roots of their country's tragic history lie in dogmatism, suppression of 
individuality, and intolerance of doubt. Learning to live in uncertainty may be necessary 
today for the very survival of society, and there is no finer teacher of this than Shestov’.443 
The same can be said about Dostoevsky's literary creations which with time do not lose 
their acute modernity and which lie behind most of Shestov's writings as a constant source 
of inspiration.
443 Zakydalskii, ‘Lev Shestov and the Revival of Religious Thought in Russia’, p. 164.
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Chapter 7. Shestov and Chekhov. A conflict of ethics and aesthetics
While Shestov's affinity for Pushkin in a sense symbolised his love for and affiliation with 
Russian literature as a whole, and the influence of Tolstoy, and especially Dostoevsky, was 
extremely profound and to a large extent shaped his philosophy, Shestov's encounter with 
Chekhov was much more modest in comparison. Shestov dedicated to the latter only one 
significant piece -  the article entitled ‘Creation out of the Void’ (‘TBopnecTBo H3 Hnuero’) 
-  and numerous aphorisms in his preceding work -  Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness 
(Ano<peo3 decnowenHocmu). Otherwise references to Chekhov are only scantily scattered 
throughout Shestov's writings. Yet, it is this relatively brief exposure of views which is of 
the utmost importance for understanding Shestov's relationship with art and notably 
literature, because it encapsulates his fundamental stance on the concepts of ethics and 
aesthetics, the analysis of which lies at the core of our study. It is our task in this chapter to 
elucidate this stance of Shestov and to explore its consequences for his creative work as a 
whole. In doing so we shall take issue with some of the interpretations of Shestov's main 
article on Chekhov and argue that the portrait Shestov drew was by and large a self-portrait. 
More importantly, we shall examine Shestov's treatment of literature in general as 
stemming from his treatment of Chekhov.
7.1. The theme of hopelessness. Looking for a kindred spirit in Chekhov’s ‘mirroring 
text’.
Shestov's article ‘Creation out of the Void’ was in some sense conceived in his preceding 
book Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness, and both works were produced in close sequence: the 
article was written in 1904 and published the following year in the March issue of Voprosy 
zhizni (Bonpocu chcu3hu),1 while Apotheosis appeared in January 1905, published by 
Obschestvennajapol’za (OdufecmeeHHcm nojib3a). The book was written in a deliberately 
fragmented and subversive fashion -  as a collection of challenging aphorisms -  evidently in 
order to break away from imposed literary and broader -  philosophical, ethical and even 
aesthetic -  conventions. Nietzsche's rebellious influence is acutely felt, both in its content
1 See Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 77.
2 See Ibid, p. 69.
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a n d  fo rm . As S h e s to v  a n n o u n c e d  h im s e lf ,  in  th is  w o r k  h e  w a n te d  to  d o  a w a y  w ith  th e  ‘a ll-  
u n it in g  id e a ’ . As h e  w r o te  in  th e  p r e fa c e , ‘caM oe ofipeM eHHTejiBHoe h  T arocT H oe b  KHHre - 
3 t o  o d m a a  n ^ e a . Ee HyacHO b c b h c c k h  BBiTpaBjurTt’ .3 In h is  v ie w  it  is  fo r  th e  sa k e  o f  th is  
g e n e r a l id e a  an d  o f  c o n s is t e n c y  that ‘fr e e  th o u g h t’ i s  n o r m a lly  s a c r if ic e d .4 He r e b e lle d  
a g a in s t  th is  p a ttern  an d  p r o c la im e d  g r o u n d le s s n e s s ,  a  r e v o lt  a g a in st  a n y  e s ta b lish e d  
in te lle c tu a l d o g m a . T h a t is  w h y  th e  su b t it le  o f  th e  b o o k  re a d s  A n  A t te m p t  a t  A d o g m a t ic  
T h in k in g  ( O n u m  a d o s M a m m e c K o e o  M b iu u ie n m ).
As Ivanov-Razumnik points out, the book was originally intended to have the title 
Turgenev and Chekhov.5 However, Shestov's plans had changed -  both for internal and 
external reasons. His decision to deconstruct the existing materials and to reassemble them 
in a different way so as to escape coherence and consistency for the sake of inner liberation 
are explained in the preface to Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness which he ended up writing 
instead. An urgent call to attend to his sick father in Kiev in October 1903 forced Shestov 
out of his creative refuge in Switzerland and the interruption this entailed may have 
contributed to the change of his original plans. Still, in Apotheosis numerous aphorisms are 
dedicated to both Turgenev and Chekhov. Shestov's book on Turgenev remained unfinished 
and the existing materials were published as a complete piece only in 1982 by Ardis under 
the title Turgenev. It is in the next chapter of this dissertation that we examine Shestov's 
treatment of Turgenev. Other preparatory materials formed a part of the subsequent article 
on Chekhov. In fact a close relationship between Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness and 
Creation out o f  the Void is expressed by Shestov in his letter of April 1905 to his sister 
Fania where he says that in his article on Chekhov ‘cBJBHee h npome nepeaaHo 
co^epxcaHHe Ano$eo3a decnoneeuHOcmu’.6
In 1905, when Shestov's article on Chekhov appeared in print, Shestov was still, 
figuratively speaking, in his ‘literary period’, even though the vector of his evolution was 
distinctly directed from literature to philosophy. However, his more profound theological,
3 Shestov, Ano(peo3 6ecnoneeHHOcmu, p. 5.
4 Ibid, p. 4.
5 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 229.
6 Shestov’s letter of 14 April 1905 to his sister Fania Lovtskii. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 80.
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religious and philosophical self-education was yet to take place and to result ultimately in 
his most significant and purely philosophical writings. At the time of Shestov's article on 
Chekhov these could not yet be conceived.
Shestov's deep interest in Chekhov started when the writer was still alive. Shestov 
recognised Chekhov's immense literary talent and clearly distinguished him from other 
authors. In particular, as Andrei Stepanov writes, Chekhov was the only Russian writer 
whom Shestov regarded as telling the truth of his own free will rather than being forced
n
into it by the ‘idea’. In his letter of 1902 Shestov wrote to his wife about Chekhov: 
‘e^HHCTBeHHBIH H3 pyCCKHX nHCaTeJiefi (KpOMe ToJICTOro), C KOTOpbIM MHe ZieHCTBHTeJIbHO
o
yxcacHO xoTejiocb 6bi no3HaKOMHTbca\ He conceived of writing a critical essay on 
Chekhov and asked Diagilev to convey his intention to the latter and to request from him a 
chronological list of his writings. Chekhov fulfilled the request and supplied the list to 
Diagilev in December 1901. However, he did not live to see the manuscript which was 
completed only three years later. Thus one can only guess what Chekhov's reaction to 
Shestov's article might have been. In all probability it would hardly have been sympathetic 
given Chekhov's rather sardonic attitude to critics and also taking into account that he 
disliked Shestov's book on Tolstoy. On the other hand, Chekhov expressed a sympathetic 
attitude to Veniamin Albov's critical review of his works,9 which, in Stepanov's view is 
closely related in some of its messages to Shestov's article on Chekhov.10 However, as we 
shall argue below, the ideas of Albov that Chekhov liked are most probably those where 
Albov departs from Shestov.
The principal idea of Shestov's article is already expressed at the outset in Shestov's laconic 
style: <xIexoB’, he writes, ‘6bui neeifOM  6 e3 H a d eo fcn o cm u . YnopHO, yHbuio, 0flH006pa3H0 b
7 Andrei Stepanov, ‘A h t o h  H ex o B  icaic 3epKano pyccK O H  k p h t h k h ’ in A. 77. Hexoe: Pro et Contra. 
Teopnecmeo A. 77. Hexoea e pyccKou mucjiu Komfa X IX - Hana/ia XXe. (1887-1914), Anthology, ed. 
I. N. Sukhikh, A. D. Stepanov (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo 
Gumanitamogo Instituta, 2002), p. 1001.
8 Shestov’s letter of 05 December 1902 to his wife. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 53.
9 V. P. Albov, ‘Jlpa. MOMeirra b pa3BHTHH T B opnecT B a AHTOHa IlaBjiOBHHa H e x o B a ’, f ir s t  p u b l is h e d  
in  Mup Eookuu in  1903, n o  1, p p . 84-115.
10 See Andrei Stepanov, ‘A h t o h  H ex o B  icaic 3epKano pyccK O H  k p h t h k h ’ , p . 1001
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TeneHHe B een  CBoeft noHTH 25-neTHeH jiHTeparypHOH aejrrejiBHOCTH H exoB  t o j i b k o  o ^ h o  h 
^ e j ia j i :  t c m h  h j ih  h h b im h  cnocobaMH y fiH B a ji H ejiO B en ec K H e  H a a e^ W B i. B s t o m ,  H a  m o h  
B3rjia,q, cymHOCTB ero TBOpuecTBa’.11 Subsequently, during the whole article, Shestov 
circles over this thesis of hopelessness as if gathering new strength, only to swoop down on 
the same place. What seems to be remarkable here rather than the actual merits of the case 
or what precisely Shestov finds in Chekhov's works (and what he overlooks), or the 
challenging controversy of his opinions, is the impression that Shestov interacts with 
himself rather than with Chekhov, tearing at his own shadow, at the route which effectively 
was the road of Shestov's own philosophy. Whether he recognised this himself or not, for 
Shestov with his profoundly psychological approach and tragic vision labelling Chekhov a 
singer of hopelessness concealed within it a proclamation of his great affinity with the 
writer whose main focus was also on human psychology and the tragic dead-ends of 
existence. However, the frequent assertion that Shestov assigned his own ideas to the 
writers under study becomes especially visible in the case of Chekhov, possibly because 
Chekhov was, in the words of Andrei Stepanov, a perfect mirror that reflected the opinions
19of those looking in it.
On the other hand, indeed, it was not too difficult for Shestov to find a kindred spirit in 
Chekhov. As we know, Shestov's primary focus has always been on the tragic fate of the 
individual and his point of departure in any philosophical search came to lie in hopelessness 
and despair, and philosophical truth for him was achievable only through extreme 
loneliness -  ‘t o  CTpanmoe oflHHonecTBO, H3 KOTOporo [...] He b  cnjiax b b i b c c t h  h h  o ^ h o  
caMoe npe^aHHoe h  mofiamee cep/me’,13 using his own words. Moreover, as was explained 
in the previous chapters, his favourite quotation was from Plato's Phaedo that philosophy is 
nothing but the contemplation of dying and death. Thus, Chekhov's lonely heroes whose 
will to live on is broken represented for Shestov perfect material to fit into his paradigm. 
Behind them for Shestov there stood Chekhov himself and it is in reaching to the latter's 
existential experience exposed predominantly through the ‘revelations of death’ that
11 Shestov, Teopnecmeo m umeao, p. 185.
12 Andrei Stepanov, ‘A h t o h  HexoB kslk 3epKano pyccKO H  k p h t h k h ’, p. 976. 1 ^ Shestov, flocmoeecKuu u Huipuei p. 369.
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Shestov saw the central task of literary interpretation. That is why Chekhov's A Dreary 
Story (CKyHHOR ucmopm) that resonates with Tolstoy's The Death o f  Ivan Ilich (CMepmb 
Heana Hjibuna, which, we recall, was of extreme importance to Shestov in his study of the 
mature Tolstoy) plays a defining role in Shestov's analysis of Chekhov. As usual, Shestov 
searches in the thoughts of the dying professor for Chekhov's own ideas and wants to see 
the effect of tragedy on the hero as well as on his creator.
More generally, in the case of Chekhov, as in those that we saw above, Shestov's study of 
literary works turns into a pilgrimage through the soul of the writer, trying to reveal his 
hidden but invariably present crises and breaking points, the outcome of which in Shestov's 
eyes was to give rise through such a catharsis to total transformations of convictions. 
Shestov implies that, as the works o f Tolstoy, such as the Death o f  Ivan Ilich, and of 
Chekhov, such as A Dreary Story, show, tragic experience makes everyone equal by 
annihilating what constituted previous success or comfort and transfers man into a different 
spiritual reality. A mediocre person, just like a sophisticated one, when ‘nyTb tojibko 
naxHyjio Ha Hero xojioaom TpareflHH —  oh Becb npeo6pa3HJica’.14 In this context Shestov 
stresses that ‘y pa36nToro nejioBeica obbiKHOBeHHO OTHHMaeTca Bee, KpoMe choco6hocth 
co3HaBaTb h nyBCTBOBaTB CBoe nojioaceHHe. Ecjih yroflHO —  MbicjiHTejibHbie cnocobHOCTH 
b TaKHX cjiynaax bojibmen nacTbio yTOHHaiOTca, obocTpaiOTca, BbipacTaioT jxo 
KOJioccajibHbix pa3MepoB’.15 Thus Shestov's main preoccupation in the case o f Chekhov 
becomes, just as in the cases of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, to follow the writer into the 
domain of tragedy and to see which discoveries this brings back.
In this respect Shestov considers Tolstoy's influence on Chekhov to be of crucial 
significance because it gave the latter, who was still young, a protective shield of authority 
behind which Chekhov could express the same subversive ideas which Tolstoy ‘smuggled 
through’ in his last works. ‘Ecjih 6bi Tojictoh He npojioaoui nyra, ecjin 6bi Tojictoh cbohm 
npHMepoM He noKa3aji, hto b jiHTepaType pa3pemaeTca roBopHTb npaBjiy, roBopHTb nmo
14 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmezo, p. 188.
15 Ibid.
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y e o d n o ,  HexoBy npmunoct 6bi, mojkct 6i>m>, aoato bopoTbca c co6oh, npexc^e neM oh 
peHiHjica 6bi Ha ny6jiHHHyio HcnoBe^b, xoth 6bi b (j>opMe paccKa30B’,16 Shestov writes.
T h u s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  C h e k h o v  S h e s t o v 's  u s u a l  p a t t e r n  b y  a n d  l a r g e  s t a y s  u n b r o k e n .  T h e  i d e a  
o f  h o p e l e s s n e s s  l i e s  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  S h e s t o v 's  a n a l y s i s  o f  C h e k h o v 's  c r e a t i v i t y  a n d ,  l i k e  a  
b o o m e r a n g ,  c o m e s  b a c k  t o  S h e s t o v 's  o w n  w o r l d - v i e w .  R a t h e r  p r e d i c t a b l y ,  S h e s t o v  l o o k s  
f o r  i t s  s o u r c e s  i n  C h e k h o v 's  p e r s o n a l  d r a m a ,  i n  t h e  l i t t l e  c o m e r s  o f  C h e k h o v ’s  l i f e  h i d d e n  
f r o m  b i o g r a p h e r s .  T h u s  h e  w r i t e s ,  4M e a n o e  h CK yuncm  u c m o p m  n pe/jcT aB jra iO T C fl M He 
B em aM H , hocahihmh H a n b o n e e  aB T obH orpa(])H H ecK H H  x a p a ic r e p .  B hhx n o n r a  K ancA aa 
C TpoH K a p t m a e T  —  h ipyzmo n p e A n o n o jK H T b , H T o b b i T a x  p b m a T b  M o r  nejiO Bex, tojibko 
r j u m a  H a  n y n c o e  r o p e .  H  bhaho, hto r o p e  H O B oe, H ejK A aH H oe, tohho c H e 6 a  C B ajiH B H ieeca . 
Oho ecT B , oho B c e r j j a  b y A eT , a  hto c hhm A e n a T b  —  H eH3BecTHO  ’ . 17 S h e s t o v 's  c e n t r a l  c l a i m  
i s  t h a t  ‘H e x o B  H a A o p B a jic a ’ : ‘B M e a n o e e  rn a B H b in  r e p o n  cp aB H H B aeT  c e b a  c
H azjopBaBH iH M CJi p a 6 o H H M ’, S h e s t o v  s a y s  a n d  e l a b o r a t e s  f u r th e r :
R nyMaio, h t o  Mbi He ouinbeMCA, ecjiH npnjioacHM o t o  cpaBHeHHe h  k  aBTopy ApaMbi. [...] H b o t  
[...] HeT npemiero HexoBa, Becejioro h  paAOCTHoro, HeT CMeniHbix paccKa30B a b b  EydunbHUKa, a  
ecTb yrpioMbiH, XMypbiH nenoBeK, “npecTynHHK”, nyraiomHH c b o h m h  cjiOBaMH Aaace onbiTHbix h  
SbiBanbix jHOAefi. [...] O h  nocTOAHHO monno e 3acade cudum, BbicMaTpHBaa h  noACTeperaa 
HejioBenecKHe HaAeacAbi. H byAbTe cnoKoifHbi 3a Hero: h h  o a h o h  H3 h h x  o h  He npocMOTpHT, h h  
OAHa H3 HHX He H36e5KHT CBOeH yHaCTH. HCKyCCTBO, HayKa, AK)6 0 Bb, BAOXHOBeHHe, HAeaJIbl, 
SyAymee —  nepebepwrre Bee CAOBa, KOTopbiMH coBpeMeHHoe h  npouiAoe neAOBenecTBo yTemano 
h jih  pa3BAeKajio ceba —  c t o h t  HexoBy k  hh m  npHKOCHyrbca, h  o h h  MrHOBeHHO bAeKHyr, b h h > t  h  
yMHpaiOT. H caM HexoB Ha Harnnx ma3ax bAeKHyA, BAHyA h  yMHpan —  He yMHpano b hcm  t o a b k o  
ero yAHBHTeAbHoe HCKyccTBO o a h h m  npHKOCHOBeHHeM, Aaace AbixaHHeM, B3rAAAOM y6HBaTb Bee, 
HeM ACHByT H TOpAATCA AIOAH.18
Thus, ‘b p y K a x  M e x o B a  B ee  y M H p a n o ’ 19 b e c o m e s  S h e s t o v ’s  c a t e g o r i c a l  v e r d i c t .
7.2. A portrait or a self-portrait? A close reading of Shestov’s article.
However, the implication of a crucial breakdown essentially conceals Shestov's own self­
perception, with a major crisis being implicitly at the centre of one's destiny and having a
16 Shestov, Teopuecmeo U3 nm ezo, p. 188.
17 Ibid, p. 187.
18 Ibid, p. 186.
19 Ibid.
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defining role for shaping one's mind set. So much so that Shestov, as Simon Karlinsky 
somewhat effortlessly exposed, distorted the facts of Chekhov’s biography. ‘With no access 
to Chekhov’s letters, with little knowledge of his biography, Shestov postulated a traumatic 
event in Chekhov’s life which occurred between the completion of Steppe and the writing 
of his next two works which Shestov claimed were autobiographical: Ivanov and A Dreary 
Story',20 Karlinsky writes. Furthermore, ‘Shestov believed that Ward No 6 was Chekhov’s 
temporary concession to the humanistic ideals of the Russian literary tradition from which 
Chekhov then slid back to his usual despair in his next work, The D uel',21 Karlinsky
99explains. ‘The chronology is as wrong as the interpretations’, he then comments. Indeed, 
as he explains, ‘Steppe (January 1888) was written after Ivanov (October 1887), not before 
it; A Dreary Story (July-August 1889) was written simultaneously with one of Chekhov’s 
most affirmative works, the comedy The Wood Demon. This makes a shambles of the 
trauma of 1888-89’,23 Karlinsky concludes. ‘The writing of the Duel did not follow that of 
Ward No 6, but preceded it by one year’, he elaborates further, and affirms that ‘a number 
of stories on gloomy themes were written before Ivanov' and Chekhov in fact ‘went on 
writing humorous stories after the publication of that play’.24 It is worth pointing out in this 
context, however, that Shestov’s own experience reflects the somewhat peculiar chronology 
of his personal traumas and their impact on his works. Indeed, as we pointed out in Chapter 
4, his idealistic Pushkin was written (even if it remained unpublished) between his fully 
anti-idealistic books Tolstoy and Nietzsche and Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.
Karlinsky’s strong and essentially irrefutable arguments are directed against the trend of 
critical thought that admired Shestov’s article on Chekhov. For Karlinsky it remains ‘a 
derivative piece of writing that deliberately distorted both Chekhov’s texts and his 
biography’ and ‘combined Mikhailovsky’s On Fathers and Sons and Mr Chekhov with 
Zinaida Gippius’s On Trivia'?5 Karlinsky traces the former influence in Shestov’s
20 Simon Karlinsky, ‘Russian Anti-Chekhovians’, Russian Literature, (15) 1984, p. 189.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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treatment of A Dreary Story as ‘Chekhov’s most self-revealing work’ and the latter in the 
idea that ‘Chekhov “assassinated human hope’” .26
As Erofeev stated in the quotation that we gave in the previous chapter, the question of the 
authenticity of a writer’s image was for Shestov essentially devoid of meaning. Hence the 
frequent exaggeration up to the complete distortion of reality in his critical essays. Thus 
trying to adjust Chekhov to Shestov’s own personal ends he interprets the writer in the 
familiar light of tragedy. While attributing to Chekhov's pen a description of extreme and 
hopeless situations, it is in essence the tragic predicament of Job, so dear to Shestov and 
taken so personally by him, that he assigned to Chekhov's characters. Indeed, Shestov 
basically insists that the only route for salvation suggested by Chekhov is essentially the 
route of Job and the route of the ancient prophets: to scream and wail, to beat your head
97against the wall. This phrase and its variations -  of beating your head against the wall -  
became a leitmotif of Shestov’s entire essay and was presented as ‘the only solution 
Chekhov ever had to offer to life’s problems’,28 as Karlinsky points out.
He also notices in this connection that Shestov again violated the truth by introducing two 
quotations from an entirely different story, The Neighbours (Cocedu), and used them out of
70context to compose, in his usual way, a new, alternative, reality. Shestov's implication in 
using the image of Job in relation to Chekhov is that this was Chekhov's own way of 
rebelling, which Shestov clearly shared, as his own writings consistently demonstrate. Thus 
in his work on Chekhov Shestov is trying to show that the writer's enemies are the same as 
Shestov's own, and therefore, as always, Shestov gets very personally involved in trying to 
uncover Chekhov's means of struggle. In Shestov’s view, as we shall argue shortly, 
Chekhov fought against idealism by great disdain, but materialism did not leave the latter 
any other method of fighting except this radical resistance of screaming and beating against 
the wall.
26 Karlinsky, ‘Russian Anti-Chekhovians’, pp. 188-189.
27 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmezo, p. 210.
28 Karlinsky, p. 189.
29 Ibid, pp. 189-190.
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Furthermore, very much like Shestov himself in fact, Chekhov, in the latter's view, is 
inspired by desperate people, by wailing Jobs. ‘IIoKa HejiOBex npncTpoeH k  xaicoMy- 
Hn6ym> fleny, noKa nejioBeK HMeeT x o t b  HTO-HH6ym> Bnepe^n ce6x —  HexoB k  HeMy 
coBepuieHHO paBHoaymeH’, Shestov states; ‘E c j ih  h  onHctraaeT ero, t o  obbiKHOBeHHO 
HacKopo h  b  HebpexcHo HpoHHuecKOM TOHe. A b o t  Kor,na o h  3anyTaeTca, m  Tax 
3anyraeTCH, h t o  HHKaKHMH cpeACTBaMH ero He BBinyraemb —  Tor^a HexoB HaHHHaeT 
o x c h b j m t b c ^ .  Tor#a y Hero h b j m io t c h  xpacKH, aHepnui, no/iteM TBOpnecKHx c h j i ,  
B^oxHOBeHHe’. It is precisely here where the equality sign lies -  the perpetual interest ot 
both thinkers in the deadlocks of human existence, in the agony of a living creature in the 
mouse-trap o f necessity, in the claws o f inexorable destiny. However, Shestov describes 
Chekhov's rapt attention to the truth in a strangely unmasking, almost brutal manner, as if  it 
were not Shestov himself who ultimately dedicated his life to the unending search for truth; 
who himself, like Job, yelled and cried, while realizing and even being resigned to the fact 
that his voice remained a voice crying in the wilderness.
A striking similarity can be observed between the above conjectures by Shestov regarding 
Chekhov and some thoughts on Shestov himself from an article by Igor Balakhovsky -  
Shestov's great-nephew -  Proof by absurdity (floKa3amejibcmeo om adcypda). In it the 
author mentions certain turbulent biographical events from Shestov's youth. We have 
already given substantial extracts from this article in Section 1.2 of Part I, so here we shall 
confine ourselves to just a short quotation and brief reiteration. Balakhovsky speaks of the 
abduction of Lelia Shvartsman (the future Lev Shestov), either real or staged by the boy 
himself, at the age of twelve, by an unknown political group who held him at ransom, but 
in vain. His tough, self-made merchant Jewish father refused to pay and the boy was 
returned home unharmed a few months later. This was Shestov's first exposure to the 
horrors of the world which might have scarred him for life. He then underwent a profound 
personal crisis and had an illegitimate son who was brought up separately. He did re- 
emerge from his crisis, but apparently the inner change was irreversible. More subtly, as 
Balakhovsky writes, ‘j i k w i  BnajjaioT b  aenpeccnio He noTOMy, h t o  juisi 3Toro ecTL
30 Shestov, T eopn ecm eo m  nuneao, p. 193.
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BHeniHflfl npHHHHa, a noTOMy, h t o  TaicoBo h x  BHyrpeHHee, 3H,aoreHHoe ycTpoftcTBO. H 
eCJIH IlIeCTOB TpaTHT CTOJIBKO CHJI, HToGbl CMBIBBH TOJICTblH rpHM, nOKa3BIBaTB, HTO 
(J)HJIOCO(J)HH MHOTHX BCJIHKHX JnOflCH 3TO <j)HJIOCO(])H5I OTHaHHbB, TO TOJlbKO nOTOMy, HTO OH 
caM npHHa^jiexcHT k  3 t o h  xce nopo^e h  /taxce xax-TO rop^HTca 3 t h m ’ .31
Thus the suggestion is clear: in describing the gloom of ‘overstressed’ Chekhov, Shestov in 
fact is looking at his own image in the mirror, or rather beyond the looking-glass, in that 
domain of tragedy which (in his own words) ‘j i k w i  H ^yr jn m ib  noHeBOJie’ .32 A related 
conjecture was expressed by Boris de Schloezer whose multifaceted closeness to Shestov 
gives his ideas an  additional weight. In his introduction to Shestov's book L'hommepris au 
piege: Pouchkine, Tolstoi, Tchekhov he considers exactly this extreme interest of both 
thinkers in the overstressed person and regards it as a continuation of their own personal 
crises, a turning point in their ideologies which, as he believes, clearly took place in the 
case of both Chekhov and Shestov. ‘In fact there is nothing in common between the naive 
idealism and moralism of Shestov's Pushkin and his passionate interrogations addressed to 
Tolstoy’, Schloezer writes; ‘A natural question arises which cannot be ignored’, he says 
later, ‘how precise is Shestov's interpretation of Chekhov, isn't this portrait in fact a self- 
portrait?’.33
To appreciate Schloezer's point, we must look in more detail at Shestov's interpretation of 
Chekhov advanced in his article of 1905. It became part of Shestov's book Beginnings and 
Ends (Hanana u Konifbi) which continued in spirit his previous works, especially those on 
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche and was marked by Shestov's distinct attack on 
positivism and idealism. It is certainly his own inextricable scepticism with respect to the 
idealistic system of beliefs that Shestov readily assigns to Chekhov. In doing so he equates 
Chekhov's experience with his own in terms of having taken the usual path of Belinsky, 
Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and so many others -  as Shestov came to demonstrate in his later 
writings -  who too started with idealism only to grow ultimately to a complete
31 Balakhovskii, p. 50.
32 Shestov, ftocmoeecKUU u Huifiue, p. 327.
33 Schloezer, ‘Preface’ to Leon Chestov, L'Homme pris au piege: Pouchkine, Tolstoi, Tchekhov 
(Paris: Plon, 1966), pp. 11-12.
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disillusionment and to seek different answers. According to Ivanov-Razumnik there is a 
dichotomy in the question about the meaning of life: either there is no meaning and our life 
is accidental, or there is no accident and so there is meaning to life. ‘niecTOB’, Ivanov- 
Razumnik asserts, ‘Hanaji co BToporo otbctb h npmneji k nepBOMy’.34 Chance reigns on 
earth, and equally -  in Chekhov’s writings. It is the power of the accidental in which the 
main originality of Chekhov lies, Shestov asserts. To exemplify this point he focuses on the 
play The Seagull (Varna), where, as he writes
Hanepexop BceM AHTepaiypHbiM npHHunnaM, ochoboh achctbha hbjihctch He norHHecxoe 
pa3BHTHe CTpacTeft, He HeH36eacHafl cbh3b Memory npeAbiAyujHM h nocjieflyiomHM, a ronbiH, 
deMOHcmpamueHO hhhcm He npnicpbiTbiH cnynau. HHTaa ApaMy, hhoh pa3 KaxceTCfl, hto  npeA 
to 6oh HOMep ra3eTbi c OecKOHenHbiM paAOM faits divers, HarpoMO>KAeHHbix apyr Ha Apyra 6e3 
BCHKoro nopflAKa h 3apaHee odAyMaHHoro miaHa. Bo BceM h Be3Ae uapHT caMOAepxcaBHbifi cnynaii, 
Ha 3TOT pa3 Aep3KO dpOCaiOlAHH BbI30B BCeM MHp0B033peHHaM.35
Interestingly, Shestov was not alone in singling out these features of Chekhov’s writings. 
Chance and a lack of causal connections were attributed to Chekhov, largely 
disapprovingly, by the majority of critics at the time. Thus, for instance, such different 
critics as Merezhkovsky, Pertsov, Mikhailovsky, Volynsky, Liatsky and Nevedomsky all 
reproached Chekhov for the ubiquitousness of the accidental in his works, as Stepanov 
observes in his overview.36 ‘PTror noABOAHT /Joahhhh b 1914 roAy’, Stepanov writes and 
quotes the latter:
KopeHHOH ero ac(J)ckt, cAabocTb CHHTe3a, CKa3biBaeTca nopoio oneHb chabho b tom ah, hto 
BHHMaHHe HHTaTeAA c caMoro Hanana pa36HBaeTca no AByM hah HecxoAbKHM cioxceTaM, b 
CAynaiiHOM ah  3nH30Ae, majio CBjnaHHOM c xoaom co6bithM, b KaxoH-HnbyAb 4>Hrype, BApyr 
OTKyAa-To BbiHbipHyBuieii h Ha BpeMH 3acAOHAiomeH Bee noAe 3peHHa, hah, HaxoHeu, b HeHyxcHOM 
HpKOM UJTpHXe, B AHUIHeH TOpHaUjeH HaCTHOCTH.37
The difference of Shestov’s view in this respect was in the implication that the accidentality 
of Chekhov’s literary world was something to be praised rather than denounced. As 
Shestov believed, chance reigns on earth, and only the accidental deserves close attention
34 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 171.
35 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 Huneao, p. 189.
36 Stepanov, p. 983.
37 A. S. Dolinin, ‘O HexoBe (IIyTHHK-co3epuaTenb)’, first published in 3aeemu, (7) 1914, part II, 
pp. 64-102. Cited in Stepanov, pp. 983-984.
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(hence Shestov’s animosity to what he perceived as the natural sciences’ obsession with the 
regular rather than the irregular, with rules rather than exceptions). Thus Chekhov’s 
writings for Shestov were more true to reality than any results o f scientific knowledge 
derived by way of generalisations.
If the power of the accidental in Chekhov’s works as well as his causal lapses were widely 
acknowledged, Shestov's implication about Chekhov's hatred for all ‘conceptions’ was not 
something universally shared. A substantial number of critics perceived in the writer a 
continuous quest for ideals and ideas, and attempted in various ways to single out his 
underlying philosophy. For example, I. Dzhonson (a pen name of the critic I. V. Ivanov) 
believed in the strong presence of ideals in Chekhov’s world-view. In Dzhonson’s opinion 
all Chekhov’s writing career was a continuous search for the truth and meaning of life. It is 
exactly ‘cTpacraaa h CBjrraa “xcaxma npaB^Li’”38 that guided the writer, Dzhonson asserts. 
Similarly, A. S. Dolinin wrote that Chekhov ‘ncxaji “o6meft *meH”, “6ora h c h b o tc )
in
HejioBeica”’. Equally, Sergei Bulgakov asserted that all Chekhov’s creativity is dedicated 
to ‘ncKaHHe npaBflbi, Bora, aymn, CMbicjia 5 k h 3 h h ’ .40 Iu . I. Aikhenvald in his turn drew a 
strikingly tender portrait o f Chekhov the artist who ‘3aBeTHO MenTaji o 6eccMepTHOM 
oxzjbixe HenoBenecTBa’.41
Shestov's essentially opposite stance is noted by Valevicius in his study of the latter. ‘As 
with Dostoevsky, so too does Shestov understand Chekhov to be rebelling against the 
“idea”’,42 he observes. Similarly Sidney Monas notices that what Shestov ‘loved about 
Chekhov was precisely the absence of any violating idea, any general conception - indeed, 
the shrinking into absurdity, the ironic exposure of all general ideas, especially ideas of 
society, human behaviour, and morality, the withering of idealistic self-delusion’.43 Indeed, 
‘MHp0B033peHHH h H^eii’, Shestov states in his article, ‘k  KOTopbiM oneHb MHorne
381. Dzhonson, ‘B noncxax 3a npaBAOH h c m b i c j i o m  5kh3hh’ in A. 77. Hexoe: Pro et Contra, p. 424.
39 A. S. Dolinin, ‘O H e x o B e  (IIy T H H K -co 3 ep n a T ejib )’ in A. 77. Hexoe: Pro et Contra, p . 960.
40 S. Bulgakov, ‘H ex o B  icax MbicjiHTejib. IlyOjiHHHaa jickuhb’ in A. 77. He:w e :  Pro et Contra, p. 542.
41 Iu. I. Aikhenval’d, ‘HexoB’ in A. 77. Hexoe: Pro et Contra, p. 752.
42 Valevicius, p. 45.
43 Monas, p. xix.
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O T H O C flT C J I  f lO B O J I b H O  p a B H O ^ y U I H O  ------  B  C y i lJ H O C T H , A p y T O r O  O T H O in e H H f l  3 T H  H e B H H H b i e
Bemn h He 3acjiy»cHBaiOT —  CTaHOBBTca ajib HexoBa npe^ MeTOM Tioxenoft, HeyMOJiHMOH h 
6 ecnomaflHOH HeHaBHCTH ’ ,44 Shestov demonstrates through his usual ironic and indirect 
discourse what he perceives as Chekhov's opposition to scientific speculative philosophy. 
He quotes the old professor Nikolai Stepanovich from A Dreary Story contemplating his 
imminent departure to another world, and emphasises the fact that in the scientist's gloomy 
and desperate thoughts, the soul suddenly gains the indisputable upper hand over the mind 
or reason. Identifying, in his familiar manner, the hero with the author, Shestov 
summarises:
Y m  CHOBa, B npOTHBOnOJIOHCHOCTb TOMy, HTO 6bIJIO paHbUie, nOHTHTeJIbHO BblTaJIKHBaeTCH 3a 
ABepb, h  e r o  npaB a nepe/jaiOTCfl “a y u ie ” , TeMHOMy, HeacHOMy CTpeMJieHHio, KOTOpOMy H exoB  
T enepb , xorA a o h  c t o h t  npeA  poxoB oft nepT oft, OTAenaiom eft H enoB exa o t  BeHHoft TafiHbi, 
h h c t h h k t h b h o  AOBepaeT d o jib u ie , neM CBeTnoMy, HCHOMy co3HaHHio, HanepeA  
npeA onp eA ejia iom eM y Aaxce 3aM ornnbHbie nepcneKTHBbi. H aynH aa <j)Hnoco4)Ha B03MyTHTca? 
H exoB  no^KanbiBaeTca noA  He3bi6jieM eftiiiHe ee ycTOH?45
Shestov claimed that ‘Aa)xe y TojiCToro, TO>xe He cahhixom neHHBHiero (J)Hjioco(|)CKHe 
CHCTeMbi, b li He BcipenaeTe Taxoro poAa pe3KO BbipaaceHHoro OTBpameHHa ko Bcaxoro 
poAa MHpoB033peHHAM h hacam, xax y HexoBa’.46 Just as in Shestov himself, ‘HAeanH3M
BO Bcex BHAaX, ABHblft H TaHHblft, BbI3bIBaJI B HeXOBe HyBCTBO HeBblHOCHMOH TOpeHH’ 47
Furthermore, the following lines by Shestov about Chekhov are applicable without any 
change to Shestov himself, for they express, as was mentioned above, the essence of 
Shestov's outlook:
EcTb b MHpe xaxaa-TO HenoSe/jHM aa CHjia, AaBam aa h  y p o A y io m a a  H enoB exa —  3 t o  b c h o  a o  
0CH3aeM0CTH. M an eftin aa  HeocTopoacHOCTb, h  caMbift b c a h x h h ,  x a x  h  caMbift Manbift, CTaHOBHTca 
e e  xcepTBOH. OdMaHbmaTb c e 6 a  m o a ch o  TOJibxo a o  T ex n o p , n o x a  3Haeinb o Heft TOAbxo 
noH acjib im xe. Ho k t o  OAHaxcAbi noSbiB an b xcejie3Hbix Jianax HeoOxoAHMOcra, t o t  HaBcerAa 
yrpaTHA B x y c  x  HAeanHCTHHecxHM caM oodojibineH H aM .48
44 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 rnmeeo, p. 196.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, p. 189.
47 Ibid, p .  206.
48 Ibid.
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Yet, Shestov's choice of words resembles more an attack on Chekhov and his Dreary Story, 
although this attack is in fact directed against ‘b c c m c t b o ’ , conventional public opinion 
which in Shestov's eyes Chekhov rebelled against in this story within the framework of a 
broader rebellion -  against philosophical trends of the positivist and idealistic variety. 
Deciphering Shestov's ironic, if not totally sardonic indirect discourse, one can see that 
Shestov really approves of what he sees as Chekhov's anti-idealistic stance:
llpe/jcT aB bT e c e 6 e  KapTHHy: jibicbin, 6e3o6pa3H bin  CTapmc, c TpacymnMHCH pyxaMH, c 
HCKpnBJieHHbiM pTOM, c B b icoxu ie ii m e e n , c  o6e3yMeBuiHMH ot CTpaxa rjia3aMH, BajiaeTca, Kaic 
3Bepb Ha 3eM jie, h Bororr, BonHT, B onirr!.. H ero  eMy hjokho?! Oh npoacnji /yiHHHyio, HHTepecHyio 
5KH3Hb, T enepb  OCTaJIOCb 6bl TOJIbKO KpaCHBO 3aKOHHHTb e e ,  B03M0>XH0 THXO, CnOKOHHO H 
Top^cecTBeHHO pacnpocTHBuiHCb c 3eMHbiM cymecTBOBaHHeM. Ho oh pBeT h MeneT, npH3biBaeT k 
c y o y  n yrb  jih He bcio BcejieHHyio h cyAopoacHO ueruiaeT ca 3a ocT aB iim eca  eM y ahh. A H exoB ? Hto 
AenaeT H exoB ? Bmccto T oro, htoSm paBHO/jyniHo n p o ir o i mhmo, oh 6epeT  CTopoHy HyAOBHiijHoro 
yp oA a, oh nocB flm aeT  acchtxh cTpaHHU e r o  “AyuieBHbiM nepeacHBaHHBM” h nocT eneH H o aoboaht 
HHTaTejia ao T oro, hto BMecTO ecTecTBeHHoro h 3aKOHHoro nyBCTBa HeroAOBaHHB b e r o  c e p /m e  
3apo3KAaiOTCH HeHy^cHbie h onacH bie CHMnaTHH k pa3jraraiom eM ycB h rHHiomeM y cymecTBOBaHHio. 
BeAi> noMOHb  npo(J)eccopy Hejib3a —  sto 3HaeT bcbxhh. A ecjiH  Hejib3a noMOHb, to, CTano 6biTb, 
Hy^cHO 3a6biTb: sto n p onncH aa hcthha. K axaa  nojib3a, x a x o n  CMbicji MoaceT 6biTb b SecxoHenHOM  
pacnncbiBaHHH, —  rp. Tojictoh cxa3an  6bi “pa3Ma3biBaHHH” , —  HeBbiHocHMbix Myx aroHHH, 
HeH36e>KHO npHBOABineH K CMepTH?49
Furthermore, Shestov makes (one could say: in the impetuosity of his narration) some 
claims that are even more anti-humane (when talking about the same hero of Chekhov- the 
old professor Nikolai Stepanovich) which again are, in fact, implicitly directed against the 
‘eternal morality’, as Shestov calls it, considering the latter as an offspring of reason -  of 
speculative philosophy and the rationalist system of beliefs. And just as he would assign to 
a writer his heroes' views, Shestov assigns some anti-human sentiments to the ‘eternal 
morality’:
FIorjiHAeTb c o  CTopoHbi Ha T axoro  y p o /ja , h b cepA U e caM oro A ob p oro  h cocT paaaT ejibH oro  
nejiOBexa HeBOJibHo meBejibHeTca xcecTOxaa Mbicjib: n o c x o p e e  AodHTb, yHHHTOXHTb 3Ty acanxyio h 
OTBpaTHTejibHyio raAHHy, hjih, ecjin  Hejib3B b crniy cy in ecT B y io m n x  3axoHOB npH derH yrb x  T axoii 
peniHTejibHOH M epe —  to n o  xpaHHeft M epe npHnpaTaTb e r o  n oA ajib w e ot HejiOBenecxHx rjia3, 
xyAa-HHbyAB b TiopbMy, b SojibHHuy, b cyM aciueAiuHH aom: npneM bi 6op b 6b i, pa3pem aeM bie He 
TOJibxo 3axoHOAaTeAbCTBOM, ho, ecjiH He o m n b a io cb , h bchhoh M opaAbio.50
49 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmeeo, p. 192.
50 Ibid.
438
Thus in his philosophical attack against ‘ideas’ and in particular against autonomous ethics 
Shestov assigns to the latter concept the sort of Freudian currents of thought according to 
which the dominant aspect of each person is animal, carefully hidden under the make-up of 
manners, education and other social but purely cosmetic tricks. This core of human 
behaviour, Shestov implies, is simply a corollary of the utilitarian function which idealism 
conceals within itself, and Chekhov, according to Shestov, knew it only too well. To some 
extent it would be fair to say in this respect that Shestov's encounter with Chekhov, whom 
Shestov perceived as his twin in the writer's fearless adogmatic thinking, evoked in him 
feelings so strong that they were capable of throwing even basic humaneness into the 
polemic fire. In other words, such disavowing of basic humaneness was a deliberate step on 
Shestov's part deployed to emphasise how detached from real life the ‘eternal morality’ in 
fact is.
There are two important implications that follow from the above interpretation of Chekhov 
by Shestov. One points to a hidden, but close proximity between the consequences of 
Shestov's philosophy and Freudean theories which at the time were still to emerge. The 
other concerns a confusion between what Shestov interprets as Chekhov's hatred for the 
‘idea’ or ‘conception’ and what in our view is the writer's disdain for any kind of hypocrisy. 
We shall address these two issues in sequence.
7.3. Freud, Shestov and positivist philosophy: proximity to the enemy.
As V ik to r  E r o fe e v  o b se r v e s , ‘cajiBaijnoHajiH3M  UJecTOBa b cB o en  MaKCHMajincTCKon 
OCHOBe npHXOflHT B  npOTHBOpeHHe C TpebOBaHHHMH KyJlbTypHOH TpaflHmiH, TeM CaMBIM 
npHBOAa 4)HJioco<j)a k  onpe^ejieH H O M y KyjiBTypHOMy hhthJiH 3M y’ .51 E r o fe e v  s tr e sse s  
im p o r ta n tly  th a t ‘na(j)oc M. T epm eH 30H a x a x  onnoH eH T a Bah. HBaHOBa n o  “IlepenH CK e H3 
flB yx yrjiOB” b paccM O T pem m  KyjiBTypBi b KanecTBe “ c h c tc m b i TO H nanm nx npH H yam eH un”
BecBMa po,zjCTBeH IIIecTOBy, k o to p b ih  npnxoflHT b BOCTopr b ch k h h  pa3, Kor^a ‘T o jio c
52
5K H B O H  n p n p O f l B I  6 e p e T  B e p x  H a #  H a H O C H B I M H  K y J I B T y p H B I M H  n p H B B I H K a M H ’ ” . Georgn 
Adamovich in his article ‘Viacheslav Ivanov and Lev Shestov’ goes even further, asserting
51 Erofeev, p. 172.
52 Ibid.
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that in this polemical correspondence with Gershenzon Ivanov was really speaking over the 
head of the latter to Shestov.53 Thus essentially Shestov seeks to celebrate what, if taken to 
its logical extreme, in Freudian language would be a victory of the id over the super-ego. 
Indeed, Freud's concept of the super-ego -  the entity which contains internalised norms, 
morality and taboos, can be interpreted as implying the forced nature of cultural and social 
norms which are only accepted by humans in order to make their co-existence possible. In 
other words, the corollary of both Freud's theory and Shestov's attacks on rationalism is an 
assertion of the purely utilitarian nature of human morality. By the same token, Shestov's 
assertions, most notably in connection with Chekhov, of the flimsy character of human 
cultural habits that disintegrate fast in the face of a serious crisis such as illness and death, 
are also evidence of his proximity to Freudian perceptions, to a vision of man as grown 
straight from the animal kingdom.
In this connection it is instructive to compare Shestov's view of Chekhov with that of 
Albov, since they have, as we already briefly mentioned, a clear resemblance, but only up 
to a certain point. Indeed, Albov singles out at the initial stage of Chekhov’s search for the 
meaning and purpose of life the writer’s rather disillusioned portrayal of humans as being a 
continuation of fauna. He gives a long list of examples where such epithets are used by 
Chekhov to describe people as a toad, hamster, lizard, little bird, sheep, or viper.
3 to  coBepmeHHO uejibHbie, 3BepHHbie (jmrypbi, HHorna 6ojiee JiOBxne, yMHbie h HcecToxne, neM Te 
3BepbKH, KOTOpbIX OHH HanOMHHaiOT. OHH BOpyiOT, ybHBaiOT, JiyKBBHT, AbllliaT HeHaBHCTbK) H 
3JI060H, OHH CnOCObHbl Ha Bee, HfiHX Ayuie, OrpaHHHeHHOH HHCTHHKTaMH, He B03HHKaeT Aaace 
Bonpoca, 3aneM ohh Tax AejiaioT h Boobme 3aneM ohh HCHByT, xax noAobHbin Bonpoc He MoaceT 
B03HHKHyrb, HanpHMep, y  cobaxH. Ohh ctoht Hmxe 3toh rpaHHUbi, xoTopaa, c tohxh 3peHHa r-Ha 
TexoBa, OTAejiaeT HejioBenecxoe,. ocMbicneHHoe, pa3yMHoe o t acHBOTHoro, becuejibHoro, 
beccMbicjieHHoro,54
Albov writes. He then asserts that other heroes of Chekhov can rise above this watershed, 
although they do so only temporarily.55
53 See Georgii Adamovich, ‘BanecjiaB HBaHOB h JleB IIIecTOB’ in Odunonecmeo u ceododa (New- 
York: Izdatel’stvo imeni Chekhova, 1955), pp. 253-254.
54 Albov, p. 376.
55 Ibid, p. 377.
440
Albov’s central claim concerning that initial period of Chekhov’s literary creativity is the 
writer’s vision of the incredible instability and ephemeral character of the cultural side of 
human nature. This is strikingly similar to Shestov’s perception of the universe and of the 
way he viewed Chekhov. Indeed, the following words of Albov which describe Chekhov’s 
perception of mankind could have easily been written by Shestov for they reflect exactly 
the views that the latter was trying to promote in connection not only with Chekhov, but 
with every thinker he ever studied (it is also significant that these words of Albov refer to 
Chekhov’s Dreary Story -  which is a cornerstone in Shestov’s analysis of the writer): ‘Kaic 
o t o t  K y jiL T y p H b iii H a jieT  fibiCTpo cnojmeT c nejioBexa, noA B J iH a m ieM  t b k h x  h h h t o j k h b i x  
oficTOHTejibCTB, xax 6ojie3Hb, CTpax CMepra h  t .  n., h  xaxaa ApaHHaa acHBO TH aa noAKJiaAxa 
ofiHaacaeTca Aaace no# TaKHM a b c t x o m  ) x h 3h h ,  xax cTapbin npo(J)eccop. [...] Kaxoe B O o6 m e  
^CHBOTHoe 3 t o t  HeaoBex, ^cHBO TH oe acanxoe, becnoMomHoe, noTepaHHoe cpeAH 
6e3rpaHHHHoro, HenoHaTHoro Mnpa’.56
H o w e v e r , a fterw a rd s A lb o v ’s v ie w s  o n  C h e k h o v  d r a s t ic a lly  d ep art fr o m  th o s e  o f  S h e s to v .  
In d e ed , A lb o v  s e e s  a  su b sta n tia l e v o lu t io n  o f  C h e k h o v ’s w o r ld -v ie w , h e  o b s e r v e s  ‘h o b b ih  h  
oueH b BajxHbin n ep en o M ’57 in  C h e k h o v ’s c r e a t iv ity . T h is  is  a c h a n g e  fro m  s e e in g  cu ltu r e  as  
a th in  c o a t in g  o n  th e  e s s e n t ia l ly  a n im a l fo u n d a t io n  o f  a h u m a n  b e in g  to  d is c o v e r in g  th a t th is  
cu ltu ra l d im e n s io n  c o n st itu te s , in  fa c t , th e  n u c le u s  o f  p e r s o n a lity  an d  th e  n u c le u s  o f  l if e .  ‘C 
t - h o m  HexoBbiM  cjiy u n jia cb  jnofionbiT H aa MeTaM op(|)03a. T o , h t o  paH bine, o h c b h a h o ,  
npeACTaBJMJiocb eM y cym ecT B yiom n M  Ha noBepxHOCTH 5KH3HH x a x  HeycTOHHHBbiH HajieT 
Ha HHCTO ^CHBOTHOH OCHOBe, T en ep b  OHyTHJIOCb B CaMOM HH3y, B TJiyfioXHX TaHHHXaX
^ ch3h h ,  h  HMeHHo xax ee HenpexoA^maa peajibHocTb’, Albov concludes and adds that ‘H
co
HMeHHo c 3Toro BpeMeHH ero TajiaHT npnofipeTaeT fioAee o6mee 3HaneHHe’.
Shestov, on the contrary, does not acknowledge any such evolution. The only 
transformation of convictions that he sees in Chekhov, and for that matter in everybody
56 Ibid, p. 387.
57 Albov, p. 389
58 Ibid, p. 402.
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else, starting, undoubtedly, with his own self, is that from idealistic illusions to tragic 
revelations. Perhaps any turn that Shestov can recognise is that from, as it were, the better 
to the worse. Or, more precisely, from naive unawareness to real tragedy, while in 
Chekhov, according to Albov, the change was essentially from sceptical and painful 
disbelief to faith. Of course, later on, in his phase of Biblical existentialism, Shestov 
himself would undergo such a transformation -  from disbelief and horrors to faith, or rather 
to a desperate and never-ending attempt to find it. However, at the time of writing his piece 
on Chekhov this transformation had not yet taken place, and Shestov paced in despair 
together with Chekhov’s characters in front of the impenetrable wall of tragic reality trying, 
in his usual way, to salvage some constructive answers from the writer and his heroes.
Thus at the time the above perception of man as essentially wild, but forced into cultural 
norms by practical necessity ultimately characterised Shestov's own vision which he also 
recognised in Chekhov (as did Albov, but only in a very restricted sense as a transient 
phase in Chekhov’s literary career). On the other hand, in B. M. Eikhenbaum’s opinion, 
Chekhov displays a distinct animosity to everything primary and spontaneous (i.e. precisely 
to those phenomena which Shestov labels as the ‘voice o f nature’) as opposed to culture 
which the writer was in awe of, as Eikhenbaum asserts.59 He traces the source o f this divide 
in what he deems to be Chekhov’s belief in the transitory and derivative nature o f the abyss 
between prose and poetry, reality and the ideal. ‘...3aMeHaTejibHO, h t o  pa3pbiB o t o t  MQyKjxy 
npo3on h  no33neii hjw HexoBa -  He o c h o b h o h ,  He MeTa(J)H3HHecKHH, He Taxoft, xax y 
/^ocToeBcxoro. [...] JJjib HexoBa 3 t o t  pa3pbiB -  He o t  Bexa, He o t  cybcTaHijHH, o h  
BpeMeHHbiH, npoH3BO^ HbiH. OTCiOfla -  npexjiOHeHHe nepe/j xyjibTypon h  BpawtedHoe 
OTHomeHHe xo BceMy CTHXHHHOMy, H3HanajibHOMy’ ,60 Eikhenbaum writes.
Thus the perception of a human being which for Shestov obviously signifies his proximity 
to Chekhov, in Eikhenbaum’s eyes would be their point of drastic departure. Although 
Shestov sarcastically accuses eternal morality of such a perception and uses it to expose the 
utilitarian roots of the latter, his own idea of mankind is in fact of little difference, precisely
59 B. M. Eikhenbaum, ‘0  T e x o B e ’ in A. 77. Hexoe: Pro e t  Contra, p. 964.
60 Ibid.
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because of his insistence on total freedom which ultimately runs into a conflict with culture. 
Such a perception is, of course, also a pointer to Darwinism, and thus to the usual 
contradiction of Shestov's philosophy where his very struggle conceals within it the seeds 
of revolt which grow to turn it into its opposite and to bring Shestov into the enemy's camp.
Thus, in this paradoxical way, the above considerations of Shestov's proximity to Freud 
link Shestov's extremely anti-positivist stance to the opposite -  materialistic -  position. 
While we think that it is a rather natural corollary of Shestov’s theories, in his treatment of 
Chekhov it becomes particularly evident. In a way, Chekhov due to his immense tolerance 
and pluralistic discourse inadvertently facilitates the disclosure of Shestov’s rather extreme 
stance and authoritarian style. Below we shall elaborate the latter point further, but here it 
seems appropriate to quote Simon Karlinsky who noticed the general property of 
Chekhov’s writings essentially to become a litmus paper of sorts that reveals the hidden 
tendencies of those whose world view suffers from monologism: ‘What is surprising is the 
way Shestov and other sophisticated metaphysicians of the Symbolist era were led by their 
fear and mistrust of Chekhov’s pluralism to form ideological alliances with the materialists 
and utilitarians of the earlier generation’,61 Karlinsky writes.
Similarly to the way that Shestov ends up in the opposite camp, Nietzsche's philosophical 
constructions signifying the crisis of nihilism bring him very close to Freud -  a proximity 
which was frequently noted. In very basic terms, at the core of both Freud's and Nietzsche's 
theories there lies a perception of the human being as an essentially cruel, self-serving and 
instinct-driven animal, whatever attitude these thinkers themselves might have adopted to 
such a state of affairs. In similar terms, as we have just observed, Shestov's struggle against 
ideologies and ideals as well as against crude materialism being a consequence of 
positivism, lands him, ironically, in his protest against necessity understood too broadly, 
very close to this very materialism.
‘Ilo,zjBeprHyB aKTHBHOMy nrrypM y “3aKom>i n p H p o/jb i” , LLIecTOB He M eHee peniHTejitH O  
ocajK^aeT 3aKOHbi KyjibTypbi, b h jj# ee c y m n o cT b  b  CTpeMjieHHH k  “3aKOHHeHHOCTH” , k
61 Karlinsky, p. 190.
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“cnHTe3y”, k  “npeflejiy”, no3BOjnnomHM eBponeiiuy y c T p O H T b ca  b  ) k h 3 h h  c  H 3B ecT H biM  
k o m < J )o p to m , h o  He HMeiomHM HHKaKoro OTHomeHHB k  HCTHHe’,62 Erofeev writes. He then 
points out Shestov's juxtaposition of European ‘lie’ to the truth of Russian lack of cultural 
tradition and subsequent boldness of Russian literature. However, as Erofeev notices 
further,
cnpaB eajiH B O  OTMenaa c jio h ch m h  h  npO TH BopennBbiH  x a p a ic r e p  A y x o B H o r o  obm eH H H  P o c c h h  c  
E B p o n o h , fllecT O B  H rH opw pyeT  t o ,  h t o  d ec icop b icT H b ie  nowcK H  h c t h h m ,  npeanpH H A T bie pyccKHM  
HCKyCCTBOM, KOHTpaCTHpyiOT C HeBOJIbHOH “ KOpblCTHOCTbK)”  eTO COGCTBCHHOH KOHHenUHH, 
CTpeMflineHCH OCBOdOAHTbCH OT KyjIbTypHOH H npHpOflHOH “ orpaHHHeHHOCTH”  n u n  T o r o , HToSbl 
M03KH0 6bIJIO npOH3HeCTH: “B MHpe HeT HHHerO HeB03M 05KH0r0” . 3
This declaration in Shestov's case should be clearly distinguished from Nietzsche's implied 
‘all is permitted’, because of the salvation-seeking nature of the former's philosophy. Also, 
we have to point in this connection to the important, and as it were discursive, difference 
between Nietzsche and Shestov, as well as between Freud and Chekhov. Indeed, stemming 
from Shestov's existential despair as a primary cause, finding salvation is his purpose, 
which ultimately comes to play the leading role in his philosophy. In Nietzsche's case, on 
the other hand, the impression is that his insoluble existential tragedy overshadowed any 
real search for a solution, thus pointing to the dominance of the cause over the purpose. In 
other words, to capture the roots of Shestov’s philosophical activity the question ‘what 
for?’ is more appropriate, while for Nietzsche, especially if we accept Shestov's non­
standard interpretation of him, it is the question ‘Why?’. Chekhov's work, on the other 
hand, is an artistic attempt to understand life and as such is free from any applied 
considerations. Similarly, in the case of Freud, it is too, predominantly, an attempt at 
understanding, but also followed by ensuing applications, such as curing mental illness.
Interestingly, Shestov's attitude to Freud's teaching when the latter did emerge and take 
shape can be described as positive, but quite distant. This may be at least in part connected 
to the abstraction of Shestov's thought, which grows from the specifically philosophical
62 E rofeev , p. 176.
63 Ibid. T h e phrase ‘B  MHpe HeT HHHero HeB03MO>KHoro’ is a q uotation  from  S hestov, Ano(peo3 
decnoneeHHocmu, p. 140.
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nature of his investigations, which in turn is linked to his engagement predominantly with 
the human spirit rather than the body. As we mentioned previously, Shestov seems to go 
silent over the issues o f human sexuality and his silence is o f significance. The lines of Igor 
Balakhovsky that we quoted in the chapter on Tolstoy in our view are relevant here. 
Balakhovsky speaks of ‘BjiacTt Tena, t o  caMoe no3Hamie c o G c t b c h h o h  HaroTBi, KOTopoe 
JleB UcaKOBHH CTtm JiH BO  npjiHeT noa h b t h h c k h m  c j io b o m  “concupiscentia” ’.64 
Balakhovsky then connects Shestov’s implicit shame and unease in dealing with sexual 
problems with the latter’s personal experience, the concealed upheavals and crises of his 
personal life.
Shestov's own descriptions of his attitude to Freud can be found in his private letters of the 
1920s, some fifteen years after his article on Chekhov (a piece which reveals, as we argued, 
a hidden proximity between Shestov's and Freud's perceptions of man). In this 
correspondence Shestov talks of his friend and unequivocal supporter Dr Max Eitingon, a 
Russian-Jewish Berliner, who was the first psychiatrist to undertake analytic training under 
Freud. Eitingon was also a member of the ‘Committee’ and Freud's long-term close friend 
and a founder of the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin and later in Palestine. Shestov's 
acquaintance with him took place because of Shestov's sister Fania Lovtsky who was 
learning to be a psychoanalyst and became Eitingon's student. She was later closely 
involved in shaping the psychoanalytical movement in Palestine where she later lived. As 
follows from Shestov's letters to Fania of 1922 it is not the study of the libido and Freud's 
theories of sexuality that were at the core of the Shestov-Eitingon intellectual kinship. 
Indeed, as Shestov wrote, ‘c D h t h h f o h o m  m b i Gojitme fiece^yeM o c u m b ix  ofimnx 
Bonpocax ncnxoaHajiH3a -  h  Oedipus-Komplexus b  Harnux pa3roBopax yxo^HT Ha 
nocjieaHHH njiaH’.65
While Shestov's approach was reminiscent of Freud's similar technique devoted to the 
psychoanalysis of the author, using the literary text as evidence, Shestov's concerns were
64 Balakhovskii, p. 49.
65 Shestov’s letter of 10 November 1922 to his sister Fania Lovtskii. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, 
p. 243.
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invariably of a spiritual rather than a psycho-sexual nature. In his letter to Fania o f 10 
November 1922 Shestov describes how he suggested to Eitingon that ‘5Kam>, h t o  Opeifn; 
cTaji BpanoM -  He < J> hjioco(])O m , h 6 o ,  ecjiH 6bi y Hero He 6buio cneiuiajibHbix 3a£an, 
CB33aHHbix c Me^HUHHoii, ero CMenocTb h  HaOniOAaTejibHOCTb Momn 6bi npHBecTH k  
oneHb HHTepecHbiM otkphthbm ’.66 To this Eitingon replied that if  Freud knew Shestov he 
would regret similarly that the latter was not a doctor. ‘Ho a  ayMaio, h t o  a 6jinace k  
HCTHHe ’, Shestov concluded.
For us it was important to discover the connection between Shestov and Freud at the 
fundamental level, as we did above, -  in that both perceived man's relations to culture as 
rather forced, feeble and secondary, although in the case of Freud this conclusion is 
explicit, while in Shestov's case it is implied. Also for both of them this phenomenon 
follows from their respective conceptions of man and the human predicament, or in other 
words from their very philosophies. At the same time at a more superficial, or if you like a 
more obvious level, the link between Shestov's philosophical search and Freud's pioneering 
ideas is more visible. Indeed, Shestov's ground-breaking ideas laid foundations for the 
psychoanalytic as well as ‘narrative psychology’ trends in literary scholarship. As we 
demonstrated earlier, what Shestov invariably did when interpreting works of literature is to 
reconstruct a philosophical psycho-biography of the thinker under study. We have argued 
that effectively he always uncovered the schism between the writer's unconscious feelings 
and the ideas that the latter consciously advanced as an artist (in the form of what Shestov 
basically perceived to be a self-narrative).
In other words, Shestov's main focus was on unmasking the thinkers under study through 
treating their fictional works as their narrations of themselves, and exposing the conflicting 
discourses of their psyche. It is this which can be viewed as intrinsically relevant to proper 
psychoanalytic activity, as Freud and Eitingon understood it. This can explain in particular 
why Eitingon found Shestov's writings fascinating and became Shestov's deep admirer and
66 Shestov’s letter of 10 November 1922 to his sister Fania Lovtskii. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, 
p. 243.
67 Ibid.
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life-long friend and supporter. In a sense both explored the correlation between the 
conscious and the subconscious, only in different domains: Shestov - in the domain of 
philosophy by literary means, Eitingon and Freud - in the domain of real life through the 
methodology of theoretical medicine.
On the other hand, Shestov's understanding of the ‘voice of nature’ versus ‘cultural habits’ 
is not, of course, the same as Freud's. For Shestov it was important to capture the 
metaphysical state of mankind before the Fail, prior to what he viewed as the destruction 
caused by acquiring reason. The illustration of this state of humanity Shestov saw in 
Dostoevsky's Dream o f a Ridiculous Man (Con CMemnoeo nenoeeKa), as was discussed in 
the previous chapter. Thus he conceived civilisation as poisoned at its roots by rationalism, 
and struggled to see the human spirit liberated, totally free from all bonds, in particular 
those introduced by abstract conceptions. In this we can see again Shestov's proximity to 
poetry, and notably to Tsvetaeva, whose writings constituted ‘4>poHTajibHyio 
ceMaHTHHecKyio aTaxy Ha no3HijHH, 3aHHMaeMbie b HameM co3HaHHH abcrpaxTHbiMH 
KaTeropnaMH’,68 as Brodsky put it. At the same time the aforementioned paradox of 
Shestov's philosophy is exposed here in the fact that with all the abstraction of his thought 
it is precisely the abstract concepts of our world-view and of our mental processes 
themselves that he tried to defeat. This is another way of saying that Shestov's struggle 
against reason took place on the very territory and by the means of this very reason, as 
Berdiaev famously noted. For Freud, on the other hand, it was fundamental to view man 
largely as a creature defined by his primary instincts and determined by his sexual drives, 
and Freud's theory became naturally linked with medical science which points in particular 
to the very concrete nature of this theory.
Interestingly, Chekhov too, being a doctor, was very concrete as a writer as well. Shestov's 
thought, as we have just noted, was, on the contrary, extremely abstract, and yet it is 
abstraction that he fought against, or more precisely, the abstract conceptions that in his 
eyes enslaved mankind. However, Andrei Stepanov observes that there is a way in which
68 Brodskii, ‘IIo3T h npo3a’ in Epodcruu o Ifeemaeeoii (Moscow: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1997), p.
72.
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‘npeaejibHO aScipaKTHbra IlIecTOB CMbncaeTca c npe^ejibHO KOHKpeTHbiM M c x o b b i m ’ ,69 and 
the meeting point that Stepanov singles out is the acknowledgement by both of the 
multiplicity of truths. As Stepanov puts it, both Chekhov and Shestov: ‘6 y/rro CTpeMHTca 
Ha xax m o 5k h o  6 ojiee u i h p o k o m  MaTepnajie Bbipa3HTb He CTOJibKo paijnoHajibHoe
“ M H p o B 033p e H n e ” , cK O J ib K o  H p p a ijH O H a n b H o e  M H p o o m y m e H H e ,  a o n y c K a i o m e e  m h o x c c c t b o
70
“ n p a B f l ” ’ . S t e p a n o v  e x p l a i n s  S h e s t o v ’ s  s t a n c e  ‘h t o  B e j iH H a n m H M  3 a 6 j iy x m e H H e M  
H e j iO B e n e c T B a  ro  c h x  n o p  6 b iJ ia  n p e 3 y M m j H f l  eztH H C T B eH H O C T H  H C T H H bi. [ . . . ]  O h  [ S h e s t o v ]  
y T B e p x c a a j i  M H O ^ e c T B e H H o c T b  h c t h h  -  M eT a < f)H 3 H H ecK H x  h  O M n n p H H e c K H x ’ , 71 S t e p a n o v  
c o n t i n u e s .  ‘ H  3 t h  H C TH H bi O T K p b r a a iO T c a  TOJibKO O T ^ e jib H b iM  H H ^ H B H ^ y a jib H o c T H M  -  
jn o ,n a M  b  h x  j i h h h o h  H n o c T a c H .  “ H c t h h  c t o j i b k o  x c e  C K O JibK o jH o ^ e H  H a  C B e T e ’” , 72 
S t e p a n o v  q u o t e s  f r o m  S h e s t o v ’ s  Apotheosis o f Groundlessness.
Moreover, these individual truths are perceived by Shestov in his treatment of Chekhov 
through the latter’s heroes and then catastrophically united into one that fits into Shestov’s 
paradigm. Thus, Robert Louis Jackson notes that ‘one of the weakest links in Shestov’s 
approach is his almost total identification of Chekhov with the Chekhovian hero and 
mood’. In Chekhov's artistic world these truths are again delivered through individual 
heroes, as it were on the aesthetic plane of the narrative. This, in a sense, resonates with 
Dostoevsky's literary universe where ideas gain meaning and substance only by being 
carried out (or embodied) by individual characters. Also, this assertion of the multiplicity of 
truths, as we mentioned in the previous chapter in connection to Dostoevsky and Shestov, 
brings Chekhov as well very close to post-modernism, where ‘Bee t o h k h  3pemni 
paBHonpaBHbi’.74
In more specifically literary rather than general cultural and philosophical terms this 
tendency of both Shestov and Chekhov to assert the diversity of equally valid viewpoints
69 Stepanov, p. 1006.
70 Ibid, pp. 1005-1006.
71 Ibid, p. 1006.
72 Ibid.
73 Robert Louis Jackson, ‘Introduction: Perspectives on Chekhov’ in Chekhov, A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. R. L. Jackson (New York: Eaglewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 9.
74 This criterion of post-modernism is stated in Blagova and Emelianov, p. 116.
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can be connected to romanticism (which preceded and was then superimposed on realism) 
which was a step forward from classicism. Indeed, classicism that thrived in the era of the 
French revolution proclaimed that everybody was equal before God and the people, 
whereas romanticism actually asserted that everybody was also very different (but 
nevertheless might be equally right in their beliefs and convictions). Of course, the standard 
position is that Chekhov was much more of a realist than a romantic. However, it is also 
widely acknowledged that he painted realism with completely new colours which various 
schools then claimed to be their own (thus the Symbolists saw Chekhov as one of their 
predecessors; equally he was labelled an impressionist, and this list can be continued). One 
thing remains unquestionable -  both Shestov and Chekhov grew up and became writers 
during the century which witnessed the transition from the romantic to the realistic 
tradition, and thus both could not be free from the former.
Returning to the above discussion on the intrinsic contradictions of Shestov's 
philosophising as manifested in his reading of Chekhov, the obvious point is that the 
acknowledgement of the multiplicity of truths runs into conflict with Shestov’s dictatorial 
discourse. Hence, ironically, Shestov’s monological tendency unites these multiple truths 
derived from Chekhov’s heroes to fit into his rather one-sided philosophical paradigm. 
Thus, in our view, Stepanov's shrewd observation nevertheless suffers from a too direct, if  
not altogether superficial, approach to Shestov which takes the latter’s proclamations at 
face value. This once again points to the impossibility of reading Shestov without having a 
literary perspective in mind first and foremost. Indeed, by putting together Shestov's 
explicit statements and the implicit meaning of his words derived from his indirect 
discourse, from his very style, one can obtain a clear picture. That is why also an inter- 
textual approach that reveals the points of sustained importance, together with a 
biographical reading which helps to elucidate those points, is necessary methodologically. 
The case of Chekhov reveals this most explicitly because of the aforementioned mirroring 
effect that it has on any attempts at critical interpretation. Thus, after proclaiming that there 
are as many truths on earth as there are people, Shestov then affirmed in his subsequent 
book that it was necessary to break away from any sort of truths altogether: ‘Hymio HaHTH
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c n o c o 6  BBipBaTbca H3 B jiacra  BCHKoro p o ^ a  h c t h h ’ ; ‘ b  3Ty CTopoHy h  r a y j in  $ a K H p u ’, 
h e  a d d s. T h e r e fo r e , fo r  h im  it is  a g a in  th e  irra tio n a l w h ic h  h e  s e e s  a s  a  w a y  fo rw a rd  rath er  
th an  a n y  ra tio n a l c o n c e p t io n s  w h ic h  h e  v ie w s  a s th e  p e r so n a l e n e m y  o f  m a n k in d  an d  s tr iv e s  
to  d estro y .
Passionate, even if  impotent protest in the face of cold eternity as an attempt to find a way 
out, and cold rationalisation as an alternative -  these are the features of Chekhov's writings 
which Shestov clearly sensed and singled out, because for him they were of crucial 
(essentially personal) importance. Thus the ‘dreary story’ of the professor Nikolai 
Stepanovich must have embodied for Shestov the central conflict of his whole philosophy -  
that of revelation and speculation, and ultimately, of faith and reason, even though at the 
time his philosophy as such was not yet formed. Seeing Chekhov as struggling against the 
invincible force of necessity, against the power of the accidental, against idealism and 
materialism as offspring of the same rationalist system of beliefs -  this is the reading of 
Chekhov that Shestov chose, and put across with his usual extreme assertiveness (which
n/r
Karlinsky refers to as the latter’s ‘power of persuasion and his argumentative energy’).
The latter point is crucial in trying to unravel Shestov’s interpretation of Chekhov. The 
importance of Shestov's authoritarian discourse becomes evident when traced from his style 
to the content of his ideas. Indeed, as usual Shestov imposes on Chekhov his own vertical 
‘author-hero’ hierarchy, that is to say that the author ‘inhabits’ the hero, as it were, from 
above, taking on both creative and governing functions. Chekhov, on the other hand, 
displays in his writings a distinctly horizontal arrangement between the author, his heroes 
and, for that matter, the reader -  all are located on the same plane, at equal heights. Indeed, 
Chekhov’s writings demonstrate a profoundly democratic vision, free from any kind of 
didacticism or impositions. In Chekhov’s literary world the author speaks from a position 
of equality rather than dominance and his voice, if  and when it is at all audible, is just 
another one in the chorus of his heroes who essentially appear to be free from any authorial
75 Shestov, ‘IIpeflnocjieflHHe c j io B a ’ in Hmana u kohi u^ , p. 272.
76 Karlinsky, p. 188.
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guidance. As James Wood wrote, Chekhov’s characters ‘act like free consciousnesses, and 
not as owned literary characters’, they ‘forget to be Chekhov’s characters’.77
Thus, forcing Chekhov’s pluralism, just like Dostoevsky’s polyphony, into Shestov’s own 
monological world is bound to cause distortion. Therefore it is not surprising that Erofeev 
talks of Shestov's ‘spiritual terrorism’ of sorts which he distinguishes in Shestov’s 
propensity to inscribe the process of overcoming the laws of ‘humanness’ into a symbolic
• 70
act of approximating the tragic. Similarly, Balakhovsky compares Shestov's ideology, by 
labelling it extreme, to Bolshevism translated to the verbal or metaphysical plane only.79 
Furthermore, if we recall here that, as Joseph Brodsky wrote, ‘both the German and the 
Russian versions of socialism sprang from the same late-nineteenth-century philosophical 
root, which used the shelves of the British Museum for the fuel and Darwinian thought for
OA
a model’, we obtain through Shestov's inadvertent (since consciously he was extremely 
opposed to it), or even metaphysical, proximity to socialism, his de facto return to 
Darwinism -  a teaching whose consequences for human spirituality Shestov together with 
Dostoevsky so passionately hated and despised.
All this is extremely significant, as it brings us back to the same intrinsic and thus 
inextricable contradiction of Shestov's philosophy that we described above: his struggle 
carrying within it the grains of self-destruction. We perceive this paradox, or if you like the 
fundamental contradiction of Shestov's thought as being essentially a contradiction between 
its content and its form. Indeed, largely because of the extreme form that it acquires, 
Shestov's central struggle for liberation from rationalism and idealism, as we saw, tends to 
become counter-productive, i.e. his anti-rationalism and anti-idealism ultimately turn into 
their opposites, which leads Shestov directly to the enemy camp. While in a sense this 
phenomenon of Shestov's philosophy ironically illustrates the Hegelian principle of the 
unity and struggle of opposites, it is not this principle itself that is significant for our
77 James Wood, The Broken Estate. Essays on Literature and Belief (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1999), p. 87.
78 Erofeev, p. 173.
79 Balakhovskii, p. 6 8 .
80 Brodsky, ‘Profile of Clio’ in On Grief and Reason, p. 130-
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purposes, but rather the aforementioned conflict between content and form. The concrete 
embodiment of this contradiction will be discussed shortly in direct relation to Shestov's 
treatment of Chekhov's work. More precisely, as we shall demonstrate, it is Shestov's 
neglect of the aesthetics of Chekhov's writings (or in other words, focusing on the content 
and ignoring the form) which causes a certain distortion of Shestov's vision of the writer.
7.4. Ideologies, ‘lofty words’, and the difference between them.
We shall now look more attentively into Shestov's claim about Chekhov's hatred of ‘the 
idea’ -  the implied rejection of all conceptions which Shestov assigns to him. ‘HeM ^ojimie 
5KHBeT HexoB, TeM 6ojn>nie ocjiafieBaeT Ha# h h m  BjiacTt b b ic o k h x  c j io b  — BonpeKH 
codcTBeHHOMy pa3yMy h  co3HaTejibHOH BOJie. Floa KOHeu; o h  coBepmeHHo 
OMaHCHnHpyeTca o t  b c b k o t o  poaa H^eii h  jxslhkq Tepaet npeacTaBJieHHe o cb h 3 h
O 1
3KH3HeHHBix c o 6 b i t h h ’ , Shestov writes in his article. Thus in two consecutive sentences he 
speaks of ‘lofty words’ and ‘ideas of every kind’ as being equivalent concepts. However, 
rather than being identical they are complementary, or more precisely, ideas are 
traditionally accompanied by lofty rhetoric. In other words, the cause of this confusion, as 
we see it, lies in the phenomenon of hypocrisy which for Chekhov was especially important 
and constantly present in his writings. As James Wood observes, ‘His father, Pavel, may be 
seen as the original of all Chekhov’s great portraits of hypocrites. Pavel was a grocer, but
O'}
he failed at everything he touched except religious devotion’. Wood notes also in 
connection to Pavel's habitual flogging of his children that he was ‘exceptionally cruel’ and 
‘horribly pious’.83 Thus, Wood comments, ‘Chekhov would become a writer who did not 
believe in God, hated physical cruelty, fought every sign of “splendour” on the page, and 
filled his fiction with hypocrites. The ghost of Pavel can be found everywhere in 
Chekhov’.84
Indeed, his Varvara and the priest from In the Ravine {B oepaee), his Father Christopher 
from Steppe (Cmenb) and his Countess (fpa(puHR) as well as endless examples of other
81 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmeeo, p. 189.
82 Wood, p. 78.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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heroes are the hidden embodiment and the necessary part of evil in the world. As Albov 
wrote, using Chekhov's own phrase, Varvara in essence provides a defence for evil, serves 
as a ‘protective valve in a machine’: ‘BapBapa Bnojme obpHCOBbmaeTCfl nepea h 3m h , He 
CKaacy, KaK onpaB^aHne 3Jia -  oto cjihuikom  MHoro, -  a KaK ero 3amHTa, Kan
Of
“npe^oxpaHHTejiBHBiH KJianaH b  MauiHHe”’. So do other of Chekhov's hypocrites who by 
their very existence and by their preaching seem to validate and seal off the horrible 
injustice of the world. Chekhov's disdain for hypocrisy is all-pervasive and it alone already 
puts him next to Dostoevsky in their anticipation of the next century. As Andrei Bitov 
observed, ‘...neM cTaHeT XX Bex ajib  P o c c h h  —  o h  [HexoB] nyBCTBOBaji xojxen, xax Ta 
anoHcxaa pbidxa, h t o  npeAcxa3bmaeT 3eMjieTpaceHHB’. Indeed, if in the Russian society 
contemporary to Chekhov hypocrisy was intensified in particular by the emerging 
bourgeois morality facilitated by fast urbanisation, but could still be felt as something alien 
and shameful, in Soviet Russia it acquired a new scale having become effectively the only 
official way of life. The hypocritical rhetoric which covered the immense schism between 
thoughts, words and deeds totally discredited the values it proclaimed, as we already 
mentioned. Idealistic pathos was no longer trusted, and cynicism penetrated all layers of the 
life of society. In Chekhov's time this was not yet on such a massive scale endorsed at 
every level, but Russian social backwardness and its recent history of virtual slavery 
facilitated a national inferiority complex which gave rise to all sorts of authoritarian 
discourses in the cultural sphere too.
Brodsky in his essay ‘On Tyranny’ describes new tyrants as associated largely with the new 
level of cruelty and hypocrisy they introduced. ‘Some are more keen on cruelty, others on 
hypocrisy’,87 he writes. Brodsky also mentions that the easiest and fastest way to 
dictatorship is through becoming a family tyrant. Chekhov, no matter to what extent we 
connect this, following Wood, to his particular personal history of a tyrannical family 
experience, was, evidently, particularly sensitive both to cruelty and to the discrepancy
85 Albov, p. 397.
86 Andrei Bitov, ‘M o h  ^ e A y m x a  H e x o B  h  n p a A e A y m x a  I ly m K H H ’ in Hemupeotcdbi Hexoe (Moscow: 
Emergency Exit, 2004), p . 11.
87 Brodsky, ‘On Tyranny’ in Less Than One, p. 114.
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between words and actions, and his very poetics consequently resists tyranny of every 
breed.
However, we assert that what Shestov correctly observed as Chekhov's intolerance of high 
rhetoric should not be confused with the writer's hatred for ideas per se. Thus, in our 
opinion, when Shestov talks of Chekhov's ‘emancipation from ideas’, he falls victim to the 
confusion between these ideas and their discrediting by lofty discourse. In other words, it is 
not ideals as such that Chekhov despises, but rather the hypocritical emotionalism of 
idealism and the philistine values that loom behind it. As, for example, Aikhenvald writes, 
‘noinjiocTL ... 3acTaBjiaeT jnozjen ynoTpe6jnm> o z jh h  h  Te >Ke (J)pa3bi h  npndayTKH, H3 
KOTopBix BBiHyTBi nomrma; 0Ha 3acTaBjiaeT t j d k c j io  nepeBopauHBaTB b yMe o ^ h h  h  Te ace 
BBi^oxuiHecfl n^en, h  Bee h b c t b i  > k h 3h h , b c c b  ca# ee OHa npeTBopaeT b h c u t o  
HcxyccTBeHHoe, dyMaacHoe, 6e3,m>ixaHHoe’.88
As to Chekhov's relationship with ideals, this topic attracted a lot of critical attention and 
controversy, for the same reason that the authorial voice in Chekhov's writings is so hard to 
discern. As Wood writes, ‘more completely than any writer before him Chekhov became 
his characters’89 (but not in the sense that Shestov means -  that Chekhov is self-revealing; 
rather in the sense of a brilliant actor who has the ability to penetrate another’s soul and to 
convey it to the audience). However, many conflicting critical voices essentially agree that 
Chekhov oscillated between, or existed on the verge of horrible reality and the unattainable 
ideal. The difference in these opinions is largely in the discussion of Chekhov's bias 
towards either of these two entities, and in the attempts to pin down chronologically the 
dynamics of his longing for the ideal.
Thus, Aikhenvald talks of Chekhov’s distinct tendency to focus on a memory, on its beauty 
which is profoundly connected to the light sadness of the unattainable ideal: ‘HHKoraa He 
noK H ^ajio e r o  sto  njiaTOHOBCKoe BOcnoMHHaHHe, 3Ta CBeTjiaa n en a jib  o aajieicoH  c(j)epe
88 Aikhenval’d, p. 735.
89 Wood, p. 83.
454
Hfleana’,90 Aikhenvald writes on Chekhov in connection with his story Kpacaeuijbi 
{Beauties). He explains Chekhov’s transition from light humorous anecdotes to serious and 
tragic stories by the depth of Chekhov’s spirituality. Tjiy6oKOMy ^yxy cxopo OTKptmaeTca 
BHyTpeHHee cpoacTBo Meamy cMeuiHtiM h  c k o p 6 h h m , h  HexoB t o j ib k o  noBHHOBajica 
cBoen c t h x h h h o h  rnydHHe’,9* Aikhenvald explains, and adds that ‘HecooTBeTCTBHe MOK^y 
H^een h  ee npoaBJieimeM b ozumaKOBOH cTeneHH MO^ ceT 6 b it b  nocjie^HHM h c t o h h h k o m  
xax cMeniHoro, TaK h  TparHHecKoro’.92
B. M. Eikhenbaum in his early criticism on Chekhov views the same phenomenon in a 
different light by pointing to what in his opinion is an unsurmountable abyss between 
reality and the ideal, the prose of life and the poetry of fantasy. ‘)K h 3 h b  , “TaKaa, KaKaa OHa 
ecTb”, - np03a. II o 3 3 h ji h  KpacoTa -  “r^e-To”. 3 t h  odjiacra y HexoBa pa3o6mem>i’,93 
Eikhenbaum asserts. ‘B ero xyaoacecTBe Bee “njiOTCKoe” coBepmeHHO o t k o j io j io c b  o t  
“ayxoBHoro”, no33mi -  o t  np03bi, MenTa -  o t  ^encTBHTejibHocTH ’ ,94 he writes about 
Chekhov. Moreover, Eikhenbaum sees the main driving force of Chekhov’s creativity in 
trying to penetrate the spheres of the trivial, abased, horrible, only in order to be pushed up 
ever more powerfully into the domain of dreams. In this for Eikhenbaum lies the main 
alcohol of Chekhov’s artistic creativity.95 Consequently he views Chekhov as no more than 
an epigone of realism: ‘HacToamnft t o j i c t o b c k h h  peajiH3M 3aBepmaji b HexoBe c b o h  
Kpyr’,96 Eikhenbaum asserts.
This discrepancy between the prose of life and the poetry of an ideal also constitutes one of 
the central thematic preoccupations for Shestov. In fact in his case this is equivalent to the 
discrepancy between reality and art, or the pen and the soul which we see as Shestov’s 
fundamental concern. However, unlike Eikhenbaum we do not support this view of 
Chekhov as drastically divorcing reality and fantasy, prose and poetry, or for that matter as
90 Aikhenval’d, p. 724.
91 Ibid, p . 723.
92 Ibid.
93 Eikhenbaum, p. 964.
94 Ibid, p . 968.
95 Eikhenbaum, p. 965.
96 Ibid, p . 9 6 8 .
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being an epigone of realism. In our opinion Chekhov imbued realism with lyricism 
(understood in the sense of a very profound penetration into and a steadfast focus on one’s 
inner life) to such an extent that it has changed the very nature of realism as hitherto 
perceived and marked a distinct step forward in the development of literary genres. 
Curiously, Eikhenbaum’s claim that Chekhov basically hated reality and longed for the 
ideal, and thus succumbed to the world of fantasy is opposed to Shestov’s claim that 
Chekhov hated ideals and ideologies of any kind, being a sober and disillusioned realist.
On the other hand, Albov, as we saw, distinguishes two distinct periods in Chekhov's 
creativity. At first the writer was shocked and distressed by the victory of evil over the 
ideals of truth and justice, but later on discovered that the latter concepts are quite real and 
can, in fact, provide a firm foundation for human existence. Chekhov, as Albov writes, 
‘cKJioHeH Tenepb cMOTpeTb Ha flencTBHTejibHocTb KaK Ha h c h t o  HeycTOHHHBoe, 
ofiMaHHHBoe, HJuiio3opHoe. Oh h m c h h o  h i i j c t  KopHen 5KH3HH, H^eajibHbix o c h o b  Bbicmeft
Q7 ,peajibHocTH, ueM 3Ta rpyfiaa BHemmni ofionoHKa > k h 3 h h ’ . Thus, apparently, Albov, unlike 
Eikhenbaum, insists not on a sharp divide, but instead on a certain clear dialectics or 
correlation that Chekhov distinguishes between the real and ideal worlds. In fact even 
separating them into two worlds would mean misinterpreting Albov, who talks instead of 
the ideal being rooted inseparably in the real. Moreover, essentially like Eikhenbaum, 
asserting Chekhov’s profound need for a dream (i.e. for an ideal), Albov comes to a totally 
different conclusion from Eikhenbaum. Instead of separating ideals from reality Albov 
insists on the former being the driving force behind Chekhov’s ultimate reconsideration of 
his whole world-view and discovering the deeper -  idealistic -  roots of things. ‘3Ta 
noTpefiHocTb b MeHTe HeofibiKHOBeHHo CHjibHa y nncaTejiH, HencKopeHHMa [...] OHa 
3acTaBHjia ero H3MeHHTb B3rjum Ha 5KH3Hb, OKpbuiHjia ero h  nepeBepHyjia Bee BBepx ^ h o m  
b ero B3numax Ha 5KH3Hb’.98
Thus, unlike Albov, both Shestov and Eikhenbaum imply that ideals for Chekhov
97 Albov, p. 402.
98 Ibid, p . 3 8 9 .
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were clearly distinguished from reality, only they assign, as it were, opposite signs to this 
phenomenon: for Shestov Chekhov’s treatment of ideals was negative (hatred, disdain), for 
Eikhenbaum -  positive (intoxication, longing). However, various critics, and most notably 
Vladimir Kataev, corrected Shestov’s claim that Chekhov was killing human hopes and 
ideals, and suggested that hopes in this context should be replaced by illusions. Indeed, 
Chekhov was distinctly free from illusions and freed his readership from them as well, to 
the extent of having a very sobering effect on the reader. Albov apparently viewed this as 
Chekhov’s initial disillusionment with bitter and unconsoling reality and his simultaneous, 
even if deeply suppressed, longing for the transcendent illusion (‘noipeGHOCTb b  
B03BbimaiomeM jxymy ofiMaHe’).99 For Albov, it seems, these illusions were equivalent to 
daydreams, to lofty human aspirations, and he emphasised Chekhov’s tendency to disavow 
such dreams, and yet to maintain their importance. “H3o6pancaa nycTOTy h  6eccHjine 
MeHTbi, obHa^caa 5KH3Hb, o h  noHHMaeT BMecTe c TeM, h t o  3Ta ofiHaaceHHafl >KH3Hb, >KH3Hb 
6e3 MeHTbi, “HeoSbiKHOBeHHO cicymia, 6eciiBeTHa h  y6ora” (Tloijejiyuy, Albov wrote.100
Importantly, as Albov noted, these illusions reappear later in Chekhov’s work, only this 
time they emerge in the form of ideals, but having changed their substance, as it were. To 
discover that unknown, ‘t o ,  o  neM mo/m TocxyioT, Hah t h  b  c b m o h  >kh3hh  3JieMeHTbi 
npaBflbi, cnpaBeflJiHBocTH, xpacoTbi, cBoboflbi -  c 3 t h x  nop h  c t b h o b h t c b  rjiaBHoii 3an,aHeii 
r-Ha HexoBa’,101 Albov writes, and views Chekhov’s first attempts in this direction, such as 
My Life (Mom 0fcu3Hb) or The Peasants (MyotcuKu), as not yet sufficiently successful 
(although he stresses the superiority of the latter story over the former). However, in such 
subsequent stories as In The Ravine (B oepaee), The Lady with the Lap-dog (JfaMa c 
codaHKOu), Concerning Love (O Juo6eu) and various others Albov distinguishes Chekhov’s 
growing mastery on this new path.
While Albov talked about the clear development of Chekhov’s writings due to the 
corresponding transformation of his views, Sergei Bulgakov insisted on Chekhov's
99 Albov, p. 388
100 Ibid, p . 3 8 9 .
101 Ibid, p . 394.
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fundamentally humanistic stance throughout his writing career, and connected this in spirit 
to Christian values: ‘HexoBy 6jiH3Ka 6tuia KpaeyrojibHaa H^ea xpncTHaHCKOH Mopajin, 
HBJIHIOmaHCa HCTHHHbIM OTHHeCKHM (JtyHflaMeHTOM BCHHeCKOrO AeMOKpaTH3Ma’.102 In the 
same vein Bulgakov labels Chekhov a ‘singer of universal grief (‘neBeij m h p o b o h  
cKopdn’).103 In contrast to these views Shestov radically insists on Chekhov's disdain for all 
conceptions and regards his whole creative work as a struggle against idealism (very much 
like Shestov's own struggle) rather than (what to our mind would be much more 
appropriate) against hypocrisy that uses idealism as a shield.
This struggle against idealism that Shestov assigns to Chekhov very possibly originates in 
the distinctly rebellious elements of Chekhov’s art. Indeed, Chekhov’s principal drive is 
that for freedom, for a liberation of the human spirit from the bonds of the philistine, 
mundane mentality of hypocrisy and self-deception. As such it resonates highly with 
Shestov’s own drive for human salvation which he perceived as a boundless freedom too, 
only for him the concept of freedom had a different meaning. For Shestov freedom is much 
more abstract than for Chekhov, it is a freedom from all conceptions, freedom to attain the 
allegedly impossible, it is a leap into faith. In particular, this philosophical striving of 
Shestov includes liberation from utilitarian morality which in Chekhov’s case turns into an 
almost equivalent struggle against social and personal hypocrisy. Thus, it is clear that 
although Chekhov’s understanding of freedom in its concreteness and its ethical nature was 
substantially different from Shestov’s abstract and irrationalistic one, Shestov easily 
singled out in Chekhov’s ponderings the elements native to him (or rather he was able 
easily to interpret those elements in his own light). In other words, it is the very concept of 
freedom that was crucial for the two.
Indeed, as Susan Sontag affirms, Chekhov’s whole oeuvre is a dream of freedom, and the 
same, we add, can be said about Shestov. Even though, as Bernard Martin notices, at the 
time of the Apotheosis o f Groundlessness (i.e. of the time of his article on Chekhov too) 
‘Shestov was merely beginning his struggle against the ideas dominating European thought
102 Bulgakov, p. 552.
103 Ibid.
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which he felt had to be overcome in order to provide room for what was later to be the chief 
burden of his positive message’; it is ‘the possibility of the restoration of human freedom 
through religious faith’ which Martin places at the centre of this message together with ‘the 
reality of the living God of the Bible’.104 Chekhov’s concept of freedom, though, is not 
specifically religious in nature. It is ‘an absolute freedom [...] the freedom from violence 
and lies’, as Wood writes, quoting Chekhov, and notices the frequency of ‘the open fields’ 
at the edge of a village in Chekhov’s works. Because for Chekhov, as Wood explains, 
freedom is ‘a neutral saturate’, it is more than political or material liberty, it is rather ‘like 
air or light’.105 For abstract Shestov freedom is understood, as it were, more 
metaphysically. It is what God originally endowed man with, and it is what rationalism 
destroyed, thus subjecting man to universal necessity. Absolute freedom for Shestov is in 
overcoming this necessity of existential horrors, it is essentially in the domain beyond the 
rational and beyond the natural. For concrete Chekhov, on the contrary, it is certainly to be 
found within the boundaries imposed by natural law on human life, it stems from our 
individual inner freedoms which have to be restored by humanity itself. Thus, in a way, 
both Chekhov and Shestov would agree that the source of man’s liberation is in 
‘remembering our divine image’ (using Gurov’s phrase from Chekhov’s Lady with the 
Lapdog), even though they would differ in the interpretation of this phrase.
Interestingly, for both Chekhov and Shestov their leap for freedom incorporated as an 
integral, even if an implicit part, the notion of creative freedom. Thus Chekhov wrote in his 
notebooks: ‘ecjiH xonemb CTaTt o h t h m h c t o m  h  nomm> >KH3Hb, t o  nepecTam> BepnTB TOMy, 
h t o  roBOpHT h  nmiiyT, a Hafimoaaii caM h  BHmcaii’.106 At the same time Shestov, as Andrei 
Belyi observed, ‘yTBep^aaeT CBofioay TBopnecTBa: Bee -  c<j)epa TBopnecTBa: $Hjioco$Ha, 
normca, HcxyccTBO, pejinrna; npaB t o t ,  k t o  t b o p h t ,  h  TBOpa, no6e5K^aeT’.107 However, one 
of the most important aspects of both Chekhov’s and Shestov’s understanding of freedom 
lies on the existential plane. This is what Shestov almost unconsciously discerned in
104 Martin, pp. 19-20.
105 Wood, p. 8 6 .
106 From Chekhov’s Notebooks in A. 77. 'Lexoe, JJojiuoe coOpanue c o h u m h u u  u  nuceM e 30 moMax 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1974-1983), vol. 17, p. 169.
107 Andrei Belyi, ApaOecxu (Moscow, 1911), p. 484.
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Chekhov’s literary works and translated into his own philosophical formulae engaged with 
human reason and faith. More precisely, it is the captivating feature of Chekhov which is 
very well formulated by James Wood: ‘In Chekhov’s world, our inner lives run at their own
10Rspeed’. For Shestov this inner space which is invaded by necessity of all sorts also 
remains sacred and Chekhov’s ability to focus first and foremost on existential liberation 
from one’s own inner slavery is what Shestov must have found very resonant with his own 
philosophical search.
On the other hand, however, in defining Chekhov’s enemies Shestov rather dresses them up 
as his own, that is to say as rationalistic ideas and conceptions. In other words, as we 
argued above, Shestov replaces Chekhov’s fight against illusions by that against ideals. 
Thus it is again in Shestov’s fundamental interpretation of ideals as shackles and hence in 
waging a war on them that the general confusion actually originates. Because if one’s 
considerations are based on a feeling of love for a human being rather than on misanthropy 
(and in Shestov’s case due to the Salvationist character of his philosophy it is certainly the 
former rather than the latter which applies), then it is precisely in the ideal where the 
highest freedom of the human spirit is concealed. Chekhov clearly was aware of this, 
certainly consciously in the last period of his writing career. Hence his constant striving for 
the unattainable ideal as an act of spiritual liberation, despite his extremely sober stance 
with respect to reality. Shestov, on the contrary, and quite paradoxically, while desperately 
seeking the universe where all things are possible, denied the ideal any liberating qualities 
but ultimately strove instead for something much broader than a system of ideals, namely -  
for a religious faith. Perhaps the grain of this fundamental difference lies again in 
Chekhov’s very concrete and Shestov’s very abstract nature respectively. Indeed, for 
Chekhov a human ideal embodies as much as there can be to aspire to spiritually in this life 
(and he knows no other), while for Shestov the ideal is only an impediment which stands as 
a deceptive consolation on the way to real salvation -  to be sought beyond the rational.
108 Wood, p. 87.
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7.5. ‘Aesthetism’ versus ‘Creation out of the void’. Revolt and cruelty.
However, regardless of the above confusion of ideals with illusions, as well as of ‘the idea’ 
with the accompanying hypocritical rhetoric, it is the very ability of Chekhov to portray 
reality as it is, without dressing it up with illusory idealistic consolations that was especially 
dear to Shestov. In contrast to Viacheslav Ivanov's works whose ideas, using Shestov's 
words, were radically tom away from reality and instilled with their own independent life, 
because they did not feed ‘on the juices coming from real life’, Chekhov's writings depicted 
reality with great precision, in all its tragic hopelessness. No wonder then that Shestov 
‘found himself in perfect harmony with the writer who, more than any other, both 
expressed and typified the “violet hour” of Russian culture’,109 wrote Sidney Monas. But 
the roots of this harmony ran deeper than depicting tragedy in a manner stripped of all 
illusions -  for Shestov they went straight to the heart of his philosophical problems.
As Viktor Erofeev notes, to Ivanov's aesthetism and ‘b 6ojiee mnpoKOM njiaHe Been 
“jiHTepaType” IIIecTOB npOTHBonocTaBHJi KOHuemjmo “TBOpnecTBa H3 HHHero’”,110 
because this, according to Shestov, was the destiny of Chekhov's characters. They were 
tragic, ‘underground’ people, ‘living dead’, who had found themselves in desperate 
situations and lost their balance due to extreme unbearable strain, but who continued to 
exist as if by inertia. As was already mentioned, Shestov observed that Chekhov's central 
focus and main interest was in the description of boundary situations, ‘h3 KOToptix HeT h 
abcojuoTHO He MonceT 6brn> HHKaKoro Bbixona’,111 a description of overstressed people, of 
people for whom there is nothing else left but to ‘ynacTb Ha non, KpnnaTb h 6 htbcji 
tojioboh 06 non’.112 Shestov elaborated on this concept of creation from the void in the 
following lines:
HopMantHbiH nejiOBeK, ecjiH o h  nance MeTa(j)H3HK caMoro KpaiiHero, 3ao6jiaHHoro TOJiica, Bcerna 
npHroroieT c b o h  TeopHH k  HyacnaM MHHyrbi; o h  pa3pyinaeT jiHnib 3areM, h t o 6 m  noTOM BHOBb 
cTpoHTb H3 npeacHero MaTepnajia. Oiroro y Hero Hmcorna He 6 bmaeT HenocTaTica b MaTepHane. 
noKopHbiH ocHOBHOMy HejioBenecKOMy 3aKOHy, yace naBHo OTMeneHHOMy h  (J)opMyjiHpoBaHHOMy
109 Monas, p. xix.
110 Erofeev, p. 170.
111 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nuneao, p. 189.
112 Ibid, p. 190.
461
MyapeqaMH, oh orpaHHHHBaeTca h AOBOJibCTByeTca ckpomhoh pojib io  HCKaTejia cJ)opM. H 3 5Kejie3a, 
KOTopoe oh Haxo^HT b n p n p o fle  roTOBtiM, oh BbiKOBbreaeT Men huh ruryr, K onbe hjih ce p n . M bicjib  
TBopHTb H3 HHHero e^Ba jih flance npnxoAHT eMy b rojiOBy. HexoBCKHe ace re p o n , jiioah 
HeHopManbHbie par e x c e l le n c e , nocTaBjieHbi b npoTHBoecTecTBeHHyio, a noTOMy CTpauiHyio 
HeoSxOflHMOCTb TBOpHTb H3 HHHerO.’13
Sidney Monas adds yet another angle to Shestov's choice of the title for his article on 
Chekhov: ‘Steeped as he was in Cabalist and Neoplatonist literature, he could only have 
meant to attribute something godlike, something akin to divinity, to Chekhov's melancholy 
poetry’,114 Monas wrote. However, the main reason for this concept of creation from the 
void was that Shestov saw the real and only hero of Chekhov as a hopeless person who has 
nothing left to do in life, who brings a contagious destruction wherever he goes. He has 
nothing, he has to create everything from the void and this creation is the only thing, 
according to Shestov, that can evoke Chekhov's inspiration. ‘Kor^a o h  ododpaji CBoero 
repoa ao  nocjieflHefi h h t k h ’ he ‘HaHHHaeT nyBCTBOBaTb h c h t o  Bpo^e yaoBjieTBOpeHiw’,115 
Shestov believed. But does this task -  to create from the void -  not go beyond the limits of 
human strength, of human rights, Shestov asks, and adds that even Chekhov himself would 
not have been able to answer this question. In fact, Shestov asserts that those who do have a 
ready answer without hesitation had never really come near such a question, or for that 
matter any ‘ultimate questions’ of existence. Because -  and this is Shestov's important and 
recurrent theme -  hesitation is a necessary element in the reasoning of a person brought to 
face with fatal tasks. In Dreary Story the old professor has nothing better to offer to his 
dearest person, young Katia, who feels desperately lost, than to utter ‘I don't know’.
Ramona Fotiade argues in her book on Shestov that ‘the ambivalent meaning of this answer 
can be understood’, according to Shestov, ‘in view of Baudelaire's similar remark: 
“Resigne-toi, mon coeur, dors ton sommeil de brute’”.116 Fotiade affirms that ‘what man 
discovers in the confrontation with death is not mere resignation (in the sense of a passive
113 Ibid, p. 197.
114 Monas, p. xix.
115 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nuneeo, p. 201.
116 Ramona Fotiade, Conceptions of the Absurd. From Surrealism to the Existential Thought of 
Chestov and Fondane (Oxford: Legenda, European Humanitites Research Centre, University of 
Oxford, 2001), p. 77.
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117acknowledgement of “eternal”, rational truths), but resignation mixed with revolt’. She 
then observes that this moment of revolt ‘points to the biblical story of Job whose
1 1 Q
significance provided a constant source of inspiration [...] for Shestov’. She explains that 
‘Job's revolt paradoxically emerges from utter powerlessness and despair’ and similarly ‘his 
“inhuman”, one-to-one communication with God is established not through speculative 
reasoning, but through a revolt that destroys reason and re-discovers faith as the “creation” 
of meaning and truth ex-nihilo' .119 Similarly, Milosz points to Shestov's idea of revolt in the 
face of necessity lying at the core of his entire philosophy. ‘Shestov fumed against Greek 
wisdom which led to stoical resignation. He even reproached Nietzsche, whom he 
esteemed, with amor fati, a final blessing given to fate’.120 Indeed, the following words by 
Shestov confirm his perception of Chekhov's alleged ambivalence as a hidden revolt. 
Shestov first repeats that ‘E^ ceAHeBHLiH, oKenacHbm, aa^ce eaceMHHyTHbm ontiT y6e^aeT  
Hac, HTO OflHHOKHH CJiafiblH HeJIOBeK, CTaJIKHBaflCb C 3aKOHaMH npHpOflbl, nOCTOUHHO
191
flO jm eH  n p H cn oco6jM T b ca  h  y c iy n a T b , ycT ynaT b, ycT yn aT b ’ . H e  th e n  p r o c e e d s  to  q u o te  
a g a in  th e  e p ig r a p h  h e  c h o s e  fo r  th is  a r tic le  ‘Resigne-toi, mon coeur, dors ton sommeil de 
brute’ an d  e x p la in s  th at ‘h h b ix  c j io b  mbi He HaifzjeM n p e /j  j ih h o m  KapTHH, pa3BepHyBixiHXCn 
b nexoBCKHx npoH 3B e^eH H ax’. 122 H o w e v e r , S h e s to v  e x p la in s  th a t ‘noKOpHOCTb BH ernm m, a 
n o fl H en 3aTaeHHaa, TJDKejiaji, 3Jio6Hafl HeHaBHCTb k  HeBe^OMOMy B pary. C o h ,  3a6BeHHe 
TOJibKo Ka^cym necB —  h 6 o  pa3Be cnHT, pa3B e 3a6biB aeT ca nejioB eK , KOTOpbiH c b o h  c o h
1 97Ha3bmaeT sommeil de brute?’.
Yet, this notion of revolt is absent from the interpretation of Shestov's article by Ivanov- 
Razumnik. He only sees in the quoted lines of Baudelaire a call for humble resignation, an 
attempt ‘nomofiHTb cboio 6eflHyio, fiojibHyio, Hejienyio 5KH3Hb’.124 In other words he finds 
in it a confirmation of Shestov's current outlook on life, where Shestov, following
117 Ibid, p. 77.
118 Ibid, p. 79.
119 Fotiade, p. 79.
120 Milosz, pp. 116-117.
121 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmezo, p. 207.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid, pp. 207-208.
124 Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 221.
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Nietzsche, adopted the latter's formula of ‘amor fatV. While Milosz, as we have just seen, 
decisively disagrees with such an interpretation, according to Razumnik this formula 
appeared to Shestov much more helpful for dealing with the horrors of existence. The 
alternative, as Razumnik sees it, was in Shestov’s attempt to justify the existence of these 
horrors by appealing to the concepts of high morality and ideals. ‘Ho e c j in  B ee o t o  Tax, 
e c jm  nocjieflH H fi 3axoH  Ha 3eM jie -  oflHHonecTBO h  n o cjie^ H e e  c j io b o  <J)hjioco(J)hh TpareflHH  
-  6e3Hafle)KH0CTi>’, Ivanov-Razumnik exclaims,
ecjiH Bee HopMbi, B ee  “a priori” h HMneparaBbi noTepnejin KpyuieHHe; ecjiH mm He mohccm, TaKHM 
o6pa30M, H36e>KaTb noAnojibH, -  to  xaKHM nee nyreM CMOHceM Mbi H36erHyTb npHHsrraa 
cneAyiomero BbiBO^ a noAnojibHoro nejioBeica: “...Ha Aejie MHe Haao 3Haeuib nero? Hto6 bm 
npoBajiHJiHCb, bot nero. MHe Ha^o cnoxoHCTBHH. /fa a 3a to , hto6 mchji He 6 ecnoKOHjiH, Becb cbct 
3a KoneiiKy npo^aM. CBeTy jih npoBajiHTbca hjih MHe naio He n«Tb? R cxaacy, hto  CBeTy 
npoBanHTbca, a hto6 MHe nan Bcer^a nHTb” .125
Thus Ivanov-Razumnik sees the main law of Shestov's philosophy of tragedy in absolute 
egoism. Similarly, Viktor Erofeev insists that Shestov's tragic outlook, for which the 
adequate form of perception is ‘beating your head against the wall’, intensifies not only 
despair, but also egoism. Erofeev explains that the balance between a tragic person and the 
world is broken, the former puts himself above the latter, hence the morality of tragedy is 
characterised by moving from humanism to cruelty, Erofeev concludes. However, he then 
notes that the idea of cruelty is in fact alien to Shestov and can be attributed to the excesses
19Aof Shestov's struggle against idealism and positivism.
We consider that these views somewhat miss the point. In contrast to them, as we saw in 
the previous chapters, Berdiaev claimed that the meaning of the Underground Man's 
demands is in the problem of individuality, of the juxtaposition between the private and the 
general. Ordinary egoism, according to Berdiaev, can adjust its needs to the world only too 
easily; it is free of tragedy and even insured against it. Instead Berdiaev found the question 
‘about tea’ to be ‘^ h j i o c o ^ c k h h ,  s t h h c c k h h  h  pejiHrH03Hi>m, s t o  -  “npoKjum>m Bonpoc”,
125 Ibid.
126 Erofeev, pp. 172-173.
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npoB aji b n o fl3eM Hoe ijapCTBo. [ .. .]  3 t o  [ ...]  o ch o b h b h  n p o6jieM a HejioBenecKOH )k h 3h h , [ ...]  
n p oS jieM a T eozm neH , KaK ee nacTO Ha3braaiOT’, 127 he wrote.
Nevertheless, Erofeev's idea above prompts an interesting observation of the underlying
mercilessness of Chekhov's hopeless heroes, or in other words, of mercilessness stemming
from extreme solitude, involuntarily exuded by the tragic person, severed from the world.
However, their mercilessness is derived from their very hopelessness and is directed above
all to themselves. In fact, Chekhov's characters overwhelmingly lack an egocentric streak
and prefer to suffer in silence without making a drama out of their utter crisis. Such are the
heroes of ‘About Love’ (‘0  jik>6b h ’) ,  ‘House with an Attic’ ( ‘^ om  c mc3o h h h o m ’) , ‘A
Name Day’ ( ‘H m c h h h m ’) ,  ‘Wife’ (‘Cynpyra’), not to mention ‘Lady with the Lap-dog’
( ‘^ aMa c cobaHKon’) (which is exceptionally full o f hope), and many others that seem to
have completely escaped Shestov's attention. Chekhov himself followed this pattern of
civilized behaviour. As Andrei Bitov writes, ‘Hyzjo bbjichhb MHpoBoro KyjibTypHoro
ypOBHH b  oflHOM pyccKOM n ejioB eice (nym icH H ) paBHOCHJibHO nyzjy jiBjieHHfl
nHBHJIH30BaHH0CTH B pyCCKOM HHTeJUIHreHTe B nepBOM nOKOJieHHH (HeXOB).
E jiaropoflC T B O  h  a o cto h h ctbo . HecTb h  CTbm. Cnpenb KyjibTypa. T juiuh h o  pyccxaa
n p on acT b  M e ^ o y  xyaoK ecT B eH H oii K yjibTypon h uHBHJiH3aimeH 6 b u ia  n p eo ^ o jieH a  iram b  b
1283thx flByx KyjibTypHbix repoax’.
Interestingly, Shestov's rather radical tendency to identify the writer with his heroes proves 
in the case of Chekhov analogous to what used to be done to the writer by Western literary 
criticism. That is to say, creating ‘the durable cliche of the morose, despondent Chekhov’, 
reducing his writings ‘to gloom and twilight’,129 using Karlinsky’s words. Karlinsky 
equally criticises the Soviet school which used to draw the ‘equally shortsighted image of 
the politically correct proto-Bolshevik Chekhov’. As Bitov writes in this respect, 
‘CoBeTCKaa BjiacTb B03flBHrjia BceM KjiaccmcaM naMHTHmcH, co3^aB  b  n pom n oM  T axoe
127 Berdiaev, ‘Tparefliw h odsweHHocTb’, p. 476.
128 Bitov, p. 9.
129 Karlinsky, p. 183.
130 Ibid.
465
1 *11nyryHHoe nojiHTbiopo pyccxoft JiHTepaTypBi’. He also observes that ‘CoBeTcxoe 
jiHTepaTypoBeaeHHe TeopeTHHecxn CMemajio aBTOpa h repoa’. In our view, however, if a 
parallel can at all be drawn between Chekhov's heroes and their creator it should align 
Chekhov not with those overstressed characters who have lost their will to live, but on the 
contrary with those who exemplify a hidden heroism, a humble modesty covered up by 
irony. In other words, by those of numerous Chekhov heroes who present a combination of 
being declasse by origin and aristocratic in spirit. As Bitov writes, his own attempt to repeat 
Chekhov’s journey to Sakhalin was considered extreme even now. ‘Kax ace Tor^a 
KBanH(J)HiiHpoBaTi, nexoBcxoe nyremecTBHe?’, he reasonably asks; and answers: ‘IIoABHr. 
H e x o B  6 b i Hmcorfla Taxoro cjiOBa o cede He ynoTpebnji’. In this respect the words from 
Chekhov's obituary to Przhevalsky that Bitov quotes are particularly instructive: ‘B Hame 
boJiBHoe BpeMH, x o r a a  eBponeftcxHMH obmecTBaMH obyajra j ic h b , cxyxa acH3HH h  HeBepne, 
xor^a B CTpaHHOH B3aHMHOH XOMbHHaiJHH I^ apflT HejnobOBB X 5XH3HH H CTpaX CMepTH, 
xor^a Aaace JiyHinne j i io a h  c h a b t  cjioaca pyxn, onpaBAtiBaa c b o h  j ic h b  h  c b o h  pa3BpaT 
OTcyTCTBHeM onpeAeJieHHoii uejiH b acH3HH, noABHacHHXH HyacHBi xax cojimje’.134 This, in 
fact, reveals Chekhov's own stance which normally remains carefully hidden in his fictional 
writings. This stance is strikingly reminiscent of that held by Ivan Dmitrich from Ward No 
6 (Jlcmama HOMep 6), a story that was essentially brushed aside by Shestov and almost 
deliberately, it seems, misinterpreted.
Indeed, as Shestov wrote, ‘y HexoBa 6 b d i m o m c h t ,  xorAa o h  peimmca b o  h t o  6 b i t o  h h  
CTano noxHHyTB 3aHfliyio hm  no3miHio h  noBepHyTB Ha3aA. I I j io a o m  Taxoro pemeHHa
i ■jf
fiBUia Ilanama No 6 \  In this story, Shestov asserts, Chekhov backtracked from the 
conclusions he reached in Dreary Story and Ivanov. Indeed, says Shestov, when the doctor 
Ragin's destiny is swung around, ‘b  h cm  aBJiaeTca acaacAa bopBbBi, npoTecTa. IIpaBAa, o h  
Tyr ace yMHpaeT, h o  HAea Bce-Taxn TopacecTByeT. Kpmnxa Morjia c h h t b t b  ceba BnojiHe
131 Bitov, p. 10.
132 Ibid.
133 Bitov, p. 12.
134 n  • i -i a134 Ibid, p. 14.
135 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 mtneeo, p. 203.
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1yflOBjieTBopeHHOH —  HexoB OTKptrro noKaanca h OTpexcfl ot Teoprni HenpoTHBjieHHH ’. 
Now, Shestov does not really focus on the figure of Ivan Dmitrich, while it is the latter who 
proclaims exactly the sentiments that encapsulate Shestov's own philosophy. Indeed, in 
response to the preaching of stoic behaviour and proclaiming the unlimited power o f reason 
which allows one to concentrate on one's inner life and in consequence to achieve 
detachment from external reality, thus proving the latter to have no power over a thinking 
individual, Ivan Dmitrich passionately replies:
Bor co3,zjaji Meiw H3 Teiuioii xpoBH h HepBOB, Aa-c! A opraHnnecKaa TKam>, ecjiH 0Ha 
5KH3Hecnoco6Ha, AOJDKHa pearnpoBaTb Ha Bcaxoe pa3ApaaceHHe. H a pearapyio! Ha 6ojib a 
OTBenaio k p h k o m  h  cjie3aMH, Ha noAJiocTb -  HeroAOBaHHeM, Ha Mep30CTb -  OTBpameHHeM. 
no-MoeMy, 3 t q , coOc t b c h h o , h  Ha3biBaeTca 5KH3Hbio. HeM HHace opraHH3M, TeM o h  MeHee 
nyBCTBHTejieH h  TeM cjiadee OTBenaeT Ha pa3ApaaceHHe, h  neM Bbirne, TeM o h  BocnpHHMHHBee 
h  3HeprHHHee pearapyeT Ha AeficTBHTejibHOCTb. Kax He 3HaTb 3Toro? JJoicrop, a He 3HaeT TaxHx 
nycTaxoB! MTo6bi npe3HpaTb CTpaAaHHe, 6biTb BcerAa AOBOAbHbiM h  HHHeMy He yAHBAaTbca, 
HyacHo a o h t h  b o t  a o  3Taxoro cocToaHHa, -  h  HBaH ^ m h t p h h  yxa3aji Ha TOJiCToro, 3anjibiBmero 
acHpoM MyacHxa, -  hjih  ace 3aKajiHTb ce6a CTpaAaHHam h  a o  Taxoii cTeneHH, h to 6 bi noTepaTb
137BCaxyiO HyBCTBHTeJlbHOCTb K HHM, TO eCTb, ApyrHMH CJlOBaMH, nepeCTaTb aCHTb.
These arguments are exactly those with which Shestov's philosophical affiliation is
eloquently expressed by Czeslaw Milosz: ‘is a philosophy preoccupied with ho  an thropos,
with man in general, of any use to f i s  an thropos, a certain man who lives only once in space
and time? Isn't there something horrible in Spinoza's advice to philosophers? "N o n  ridere,
non lugere, n eq u e  detestare, s e d  in te llig ere”—“Not to laugh, not to weep, not to hate, but
to understand”? On the contrary, says Shestov, a man should shout, scream, laugh, jeer,
1protest. In the Bible, Job wailed and screamed to the indignation of his wise friends’. In 
this context Milosz asserts that Shestov particularly treasured the ideas of Kierkegaard who
1 'IQ‘too opposed Job to Plato and Hegel’. Clearly, Ivan Dmitrich's revolt against inactivity 
and indifference that have been validated by the rhetoric of stoicism is identical to 
Shestov's own rebellion against universal necessity invading every individual. In Milosz's 
words explaining Shestov's stance:
136 Ibid, p. 204.
137 A. P. Chekhov, ‘nanaTa HOMep 6’ in A. 77. Nexoe, IJonnoe codpanue cohumhuu u nuceM e 30 
moMax (Moscow: Nauka, 1974-1983), vol. 8, p. 101.
138 Milosz, p. 105.
139 Ibid, p. 108.
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the “I” must accept the inevitable order of the world. The wisdom of centuries consists precisely in 
advising acquiescence and resignation. In simple language, “Grin and bear it”; in more 
sophisticated language, “Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt"—“The Fates lead the willing 
man, they drag the unwilling”. Stoicism, whose very essence is to curb the shameful pretense of 
transitory individual existence in the name of universal order (or, if you prefer, Nature), was the 
final word of Graeco-Roman civilization. But, says Shestov, stoicism has survived under many 
disguises and is still with us.140
Dr Ragin's response to Ivan Dmitrich which reflects Ragin's general philosophy, so typical, 
as Shestov's notices, o f Chekhov's characters is demagogical in nature. It is a call for 
‘comprehension of life’ ( ‘k ypaayMemno 5kh3h h ’) ,141 for conquering necessity by thought 
alone and developing resistance to external irritants by strengthening the inner self. Ragin 
quotes Marcus Aurelius's words that ‘“Bojib ecTB rniBoe npeflCTaBjiemie o 6 ojih: c^ejiaii 
ycnjine bojih, hto6 h3mchhtb 3to npejncTaBJieime, otkhhb ero, nepecTaHB ^canoBaTBca, h 
6 ojib HCHe3HeT”. 3 to cnpaBefljiHBO. My/ipeu hjih nonpocTy mbicjiaiiihh, BAyMHHBBift 
uejiOBeK oTJiHHaeTCB hmchho TeM, hto npe3HpaeT cTpa^aHHe; oh Bcerjia aoboach h 
HHneMy He yjiHBjihctcb’ . 142 it is interesting that Shestov's own reference to Marcus 
Aurelius in Overcoming the Self-Evident implicates the latter in ultimately submitting to 
necessity despite his striving for freedom:
I I o h th  Bee HanSojiee MyHHTejibHO HCKaBiune h )Ka}KAaBiiiHe cboGoam jiioah, BepyiomHe h
HeBepyiOmHe, C KaKHM-TO HeCJIBIXaHHO MpaHHbIM BAOXHOBeHHeM BOCCAaBJIHJIH "Heo6xOAHMOCTb". 
Jlyumee cohhhchhc JIioTepa, "De servo arbitrio", HanpaBjieHO npoTHB 3pa3Ma PoTTepAaMCKoro, 
BcanecKH CTapaBiiieroca oTCToaTb xoTb Majiyio aojiio cboGoam nejiOBeKa. IIaothh H3o6pancaji 
Harny xcH3Hb Kax npeACTaBAeHHe MapnoHeTOK hjih aicrepoB, noHTH aBTOMaTHuecKH HcnojiHJHomux 
3apaHee npnroTOBAeHHbie AJia hhx ponn. Mapx ABpeAHH roBopmi o tom 5Ke.143
Thus, Ragin in Ward No 6 preaches resignation to necessity and explains every injustice by 
pure accidentality, struggle against which is obviously pointless. Gromov on the contrary 
believes in rebellion and distinguishes superior life forms by their ability to suffer. In fact, 
the principal dialogue between Ragin and Gromov embodies the nucleus of Shestov’s 
debate with Hegelian philosophy. Indeed, as Bernard Martin summarises, amongst
140 Ibid, pp. 104-105.
141 A. P. Chekhov, ‘Ilanara HOMep 6’, vol. 8, p. 101.
142 Ibid.
143 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 103.
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Shestov’s ‘own passionately held convictions’ there were above all his ‘rejection of 
Hegelian idealism as mere word-play of no ultimate significance to the living individual; 
the insistence that man's salvation lies in subjective, rationally ungrounded faith rather than 
in objective, verifiable knowledge; the awareness that the root of sin is in man's obsession 
with acquiring knowledge through the exercise of reason and through empirical 
procedures’.144 Essentially the same beliefs are those defended by the subjective and 
passionate Gromov (who hates Diogenes, sees Christ as a tormented suffering being rather 
than a wise, omnipotent God and comes close in his stance to the wailing Job), against 
rational Ragin who choses to be pacified by the fruits of speculative philosophy. Yet, the 
polemics between Ragin and Gromov are not, in contrast to some of Shestov’s sentiments 
taken from Dostoevsky, centred around the inability of science and of rationalism in 
general ultimately to explain the universe and man. Instead its emphasis is first and 
foremost, still much in the spirit of Shestov’s central claims, on the self-evident truths that 
reason supplies, on the harmful (in its dormant effect), utilitarian role of the constructions 
of a rationalist petit bourgeois variety, on the conflict between soul and mind, subjective 
and objective.
Curiously, Shestov ignores this striking resemblance of the dialogue between the main 
protagonists of the story to his own life-long dialogue with speculative philosophy. Instead 
of identifying Ragin with bccmctbo, with the stoics' rhetoric and idealistic consolations, in 
brief -  with the ‘philosophy of resignation’ and non-resistance, Shestov views him as a 
distinctly ‘negative’ character because of his extreme weakness -  a typical hero of Chekhov 
-  and only notices that this time this hopeless hero is given up to public opinion that does 
not want to see hopelessness triumph.145
Thus, ironically, being constantly on the alert for any victory of idealism, so that a decisive 
resistance could be put forward whenever necessary, Shestov here misses the stance (that 
Gromov is invested with) which is so akin to his own. Moreover, the situation is even more 
ironic because when this stance eventually triumphs in Dr Ragin’s revolt, which does not
Martin, p. 25.
145 See Shestov, Teopnecmeo m  nmezo, p. 204.
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escape Shestov’s attention, then instead of giving Chekhov credit Shestov sees in it the 
writer’s concession to idealism. This reinforces once again the fundamental paradox of 
Shestov’s thought which, like a cat catching its tail, cannot be satisfied by being 
acknowledged true because it would mean a victory of the idea and thus would be self- 
defeating.
However, in our view Shestov sensed correctly that Ward No 6 is a somewhat exceptional 
work of Chekhov, even if Shestov misidentifiea the reason. Indeed, in this story Chekhov 
set up, in the figure of Gromov, an open and direct opposition to the voice of resignation 
and inactivity which constitutes the philosophy of most of his heroes. Normally the 
devastating results of this philosophy, so masterfully portrayed by Chekhov, are left to 
speak for themselves. The inter-textual approach to Chekhov's writings reveals that for him 
the problem of inactivity inherent in the Russian intelligentsia of his generation and its 
prevalent apocalyptic mood of resignation, was particularly painful and particularly 
personal, for he was able to view it both from inside, by being a member of the 
intelligentsia of the first generation, and from outside since he was a newcomer from a 
lower social class. Chekhov’s private letters testify to his ambivalent attitude to the Russian 
intelligentsia and his bitter feelings regarding its sick state. Chekhov's words from his letter 
to Suvorin also elucidate his personal experience, demonstrating at the same time the 
breadth of his social awareness: ‘hto nHcaTejiH-flBOpflHe fipajin y npHpo^Bi flapoM, to 
pa3HOHHHui>i noxynaioT ueHoio mojioaocth’.146
In fact, the image of Gromov to some extent is a manifestation o f this statement o f 
Chekhov. Gromov was beaten by his father as a child, then after his father’s death he 
encountered hardship as a student, and had to earn his bread by intense labour. His personal 
philosophy is not simply derived from learned books, but is a result o f his painful 
existential experience. Ragin, on the other hand, as Gromov aptly observes, is healthy, 
well-off and got everything he has essentially for free. ‘Pocjih bli no,a KpbiJibiniKOM OTija h
146 From Chekhov’s letter to Suvorin of 7 Jan. 1889 in A. 77. Hexoe, IIojiHoe co6panue cohumhuu u 
nuceM e 30 moMax (Moscow: Nauka, 1974-1983), vol. 3, p. 133. Cited in Aikhenval’d, p. 772.
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yHHJiHCB Ha ero cneT, a noTOM cpa3y 3axBaTHJin CHHeicypy’,147 Gromov says to Ragin 
reproachfully. However, in his letter to Suvorin Chekhov meant predominantly the inner 
freedom of an individual, and in the case of Gromov and Ragin the situation is somewhat 
reversed -  Ragin, who is supposed to be morally superior by virtue of his very breed, is in 
fact, in his criminal lazy indifference, much inferior to the tormented and passionate 
character of Gromov.
Furthermore, considered against the background o f Chekhov's obituary to Przhevalsky 
quoted above, the character o f Gromov comes to symbolise to a large extent Chekhov's 
own beliefs: ‘roBopHT o h  o  HejiOBenecKOH no/uiocTH, o HacHjnm, nonnpaiomeM npaB^y, o 
npeicpacHOH )k h3h h ,  Kaxaa co BpeMeHeM dyjxQT Ha 3eMJie, 0 6  o k o h h b ix  pemeTKax, 
H anoM H H aiom H X  eMy xa^myio MHHyry 0  TynocTH h  h c c c t o k o c t h  HacHJibHHKOB’. It is this 
wake-up call for humanity instead of, as suggested by Shestov, his singing of hopelessness 
that constitutes, in our view, the core of Chekhov's creativity. Ironically, it is also what 
Shestov shares with Chekhov, and it is this great hope for the redemption o f man, in 
overcoming the power o f necessity (even though the latter is embodied differently for the 
two o f them), where Shestov and Chekhov have, as it were, their metaphysical meeting 
point, which results, somewhat paradoxically, from their common interest in the dead-ends 
of life.
7.6. Nietzschean motifs in Chekhov: unravelling hidden parallels. The concepts of 
strength and rebellion. Akhmatova and Shestov as ‘Russian anti-Chekhovians9.
This predominantly negative interpretation of the inner weakness of many of Chekhov's 
heroes and the ascription to the writer of a certain delight and enthusiasm in depicting 
tragedy point to Shestov’s reading of Chekhov taking place still in the Nietzschean key. 
Even though Shestov hardly mentions Nietzsche in his analysis of Chekhov the distinct 
shadow of his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche is still felt in this work. Thus Shestov quotes 
Mikhailovsky for whom Chekhov is characterised by unkind, almost evil sparks in his eyes 
(‘HeflodpBie oroHBKH’), and draws a distinct parallel between Dostoevsky and Chekhov by
147 Chekhov, ‘n a j i a T a  HOM ep 6’, vol. 8 , p. 102.
148 Chekhov, ‘najiaTa HOMep 6’, vol. 8, p. 75.
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deeming Mikhailovsky’s labelling of the former (KjiaflOHCKaTejib) applicable to the latter. 
Shestov then transfers the implicit accusation against Dostoevsky of his unhealthy interest 
in the dead to Chekhov with equal force and essentially almost calls Chekhov a cruel talent 
too. This echo of Nietzsche, understood this time perhaps in a more conventional rather 
than specifically Shestovian way, is especially audible in Shestov's descriptions of 
Chekhov's strong and ostensibly positive characters such as von Koren in The Duel.
‘O oH -K op eH , KaK b h ^ ho  n o  (JjaMHJinn, H3 HeMijeB, cT ano 6bm >, HaponnTO 3^opoBi>m  n  
HOpMaJIBHBIH, HHCTBIH HCJIOBeK, nOTOMOK TOHHapOBCKOrO IIlTOJIblja, npJIMaa 
npoTH Bonojio^cH ocTb JlaeBCKOMy, b cboio o n e p e ^ b  co cT o a m eM y  b 6jih3kom p o ^ c r a e  c o  
CTapnKOM 06jiom obbim ’,149 S h e s to v  w r ite s , b u t m a k e s  an  im p o r ta n t d is t in c tio n :
Ho y TOHHapoBa npO T H B ocT aB jieH H e OfiaoMOBy UlTOJima HMejio co B ceM  h h o h  xapaKTep h  c m u c j i ,  
neM y HexoBa. [ . . .]  ^odpoAyuiHbiH yBajreHb 06jiomob BbipoAHJica b  oTBpaTHTejibHyio h CTpaniHyio 
ra/iHHy. A h h c t m h  IIlTOJibu >khb h  ocTanca b  cbohx noTOMKax hhctwm! Tojibxo c hobbimh 
OSjiOMOBbiMH oh yace HHane pa3roBapHBaeT. OoH-KopeH Ha3 biBaeT JlaeBcxoro HeroaaeM h  
Mep3aBueM h TpedyeT k  HeMy npHMeHeHHa caMbix CTpornx xap. [. ..] Oaho H3 AByx: jih6o 
HOpMajibHbiH 4>OH-KopeH, jih6o Bbipo^caeHeu fleicafleHT JlaeBCKHH. npuneM bcb BHemmw, 
MaTepnanbHaH CRiia Ha CTopoHe AoH-KopeHa, k o h c h h o .  Oh Bcer/ja npaB, Bceraa nobeaytaeT,
150B c e rA a  T o p acecT B y eT  h  b  n o c T y n x a x  c b o h x  h  b  T e o p w ix .
However, there is, as usual in Shestov, a twist here. He sees von Koren as an embodiment 
of necessity, of that blind and ubiquitous force that subjugates everything to its will: 
‘hhctbih, nocjieflOBaTejibHbiH MarepHajiH3M, KOTopbin nponoBeayeT 4>OH-KopeH, Hanfiojiee 
nojiHO Bbipa^caeT Hamy 3aBHCHMOCTb ot cthxhhhbix chji npnpo^bi’.151 Thus, von Koren is 
not a positive hero as such, but necessity incarnate, an enemy of sorts. Yet, here Shestov 
stops short of any humanistic conclusions, and steers instead into his familiar philosophical 
pattern. ‘Jliofionbiraaa Beim>: HexoB —  HenpnMnpHMbm Bpar BcaKoro po^a 4)hjioco<J)h h ’, 
he writes; ‘H h o^ho H3 zteHCTByiomnx jihu; b ero npoH3Be,aeHH5ix He <j)Hjioco(j)CTByeT, a 
ecnH $Hjioco4>CTByeT, to ofibiKHOBeHHo Hey^auHo, cMemHO, cjiafio, Heyfie^HTejibHo. 
HcKJiioHeHHe npe^CTaBJiaeT (j)OH-KopeH, THiiHHecKHH npe^cTaBHTejib no3HTHBHO-
149 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 n m ezo , p. 205.
150 Ibid, pp. 205-206.
151 Ibid, p. 206.
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MaTepnajiHCTHHecKoro H an p aB n em w . Ero cu oB a AbirnaT c h j io h , yfiexc^eHHeM . B h h x  ecTb  
Zjaace na(J)oc h  MaKCHMyM jiorHHecKOH nocjieaoBaTenbHOCTH’.152 H o w e v e r ,  S h e s to v  im p lie s  
th a t C h e k h o v  a lm o s t  d e lib e r a te ly , a s  i f  o u t  o f  m a s o c h is t ic  d r iv e , m a k e s  v o n  K o r en  s o  s tro n g  
an d  in v in c ib le :  ‘O oH -K op eH  roB opu T , t o h h o  m o jio to m  6 b c t ,  h  KaxcflbiH e r o  y a a p  n o n a ^ a eT  
He b JIaeBCKoro, a  b H ex o B a , b caM bie fiojibH bie M ecTa e r o . O h  aaeT  K op eH y B ee 6 o j ib m e  h  
6oJ ib m e ch ji, o h  caM noACTaBJiaeT ce f ia  n o a  e r o  y a a p b i. 3aneM ? n o n e M y ?  A b o t  no/jH Te 
xce! M oxceT  G bitb, x o u ia  b H e x o B e  TaHHaa H ajjeacaa, h t o  caMOHCTa3aHne /u ia  H ero
ejUHHCTBeHHblH IiyTb K HOBOH XCH3HH?’ . 153
Importantly, Shestov suggests that for Chekhov, putting up with crude materialism was less 
offensive than to accept humanising idealism: ‘eMy Jierue 6btno BbicnymHBaTb 
becnoma^Hbie yrpo3bi npaMOJiHHeiiHoro MaTepnajiH3Ma, ueM npiiHHMaTb xy^ocouHbie 
yTemeHHfl ryMaHH3Hpyiomero H/ieajiH3Ma’.154 However, Chekhov was afraid to insult the 
positivist idealism that was fully dominant in the literature of the time, Shestov claims; and 
thus the writer had to finish off the story in a conventional, uncontroversial way -  another 
concession on Chekhov’s part, Shestov implies.155 Thus the rather Nietzschean strength of 
von Koren is interpreted by Shestov essentially in a negative key, as a manifestation of 
necessity in the universe against which there is no antidote.
This implicit and quite ambiguous parallel with Nietzsche and Chekhov’s rather ambivalent 
deference to strength which stems from Shestov's reading becomes explicit and 
unambiguous in the study of Chekhov by Donald Rayfield. Indeed, he sees in such heroes 
as von Koren the direct influence of the German philosopher on Chekhov in the most direct 
sense. Rayfield describes Chekhov’s ‘deference to strength’ being ‘part of his hard core’. 
He gives what for him are examples of this deference in Chekhov’s biography and writes 
that in Chekhov’s work ‘this love of strength is attenuated, but it is undoubtedly there in the 
Nietzschean von Koren of The Duel, in the railway engineer of My Life, in Lopakhin of the 
Cherry Orchard. Chekhov by no means intended us to deplore these characters’, Rayfield
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid, p p . 2 0 6 -2 0 7 .
154 Ibid, p . 2 0 6 .
155 Ibid, p . 207.
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affirms.156 Interestingly, what for Rayfield exemplifies Chekhov’s affiliation with strength, 
such as for instance the writer’s friendship with Suvorin ‘the Beaverbrook or Hearst of
1 ^ 7Tsarist Russia’ is viewed in a rather different light by James Wood. For the latter 
Suvorin is far from representing a paragon of strength -  on the contrary it is Chekhov who 
is stronger and offers moral guidance to Suvorin, becomes ‘ Suvorin’s kidney, extracting the 
businessman’s poisons — his anti-Semitism [...], his artistic conservatism, his wariness of
1 Wthe slightest political radicalism’, to use Wood’s metaphor.
Rayfield’s interpretation is in outright conflict with that given by Komei Chukovsky who 
on the contrary insists on Chekhov's personal affiliation with his weak characters and 
argues that it is strength rather than weakness which Chekhov found deplorable. Notably, 
Shestov describes many of Chekhov’s heroes as being of materialist orientation, but with a 
tinge of hidden idealism according to the canon of the 60s. ‘TaKHX HexoB ,ziep5KHT b 
nepHOM Tene h BticMeHBaeT’,159 Shestov writes and then explains this by Chekhov’s 
extreme animosity towards idealism in any form. However, for Chukovsky the situation is 
directly opposite: he sees Chekhov’s materialists, that is to say his strong characters like 
von Koren, as being acceptable by the author only because and insofar as they do carry 
within them that grain of hidden idealism. In other words it is their weakness not their 
strength that Chekhov admired, according to Chukovsky, and moreover it is for their 
weakness that the writer was able to ‘put up with’ or to ‘forgive’ their strength. Indeed, 
Chukovsky writes:
HexoBCKHH reHHH Tax h  He cyMea SjiarocnoBHTb h c jx h o h  CBoefi no33Heii 3t o  TBepaoe, yBepeHHoe, 
uejiecoo6pa3Hoe Hanano >x h 3 h h  -  jionaxHHCKoe. H npHMHpeHHH c 3 t h m  HanajiOM, — KOTopoe, 
Ka3anocb 6 bi, jjo ju x h o  Tax oOpaaoBaTb Bee 3t o  o6e3yMeBUiee o t  t o c x h  nexoBCxoe uapcTBO, - 
noHaao6 HJiocb npmiaTb eMy nepTbi nprnvio npoTHBonojioxcHbie, b  xopeHb ero OTpnuaiomHe. /frm 
npHMHpeHHH c yBepeHHOH, uejiecoo6pa3HOH c h jio h , no3T npn^aji en xaxyio-TO j io jik ) 
HeyBepeHHocTH, SecuejibHocTH, He3HaHHa. Cnjiy eMy yaanocb nonioSHTb t o jib x o  b MHHyry ee 
cjia6 ocTH.160
156 Donald Rayfield, Understanding Chekhov. A Critical Study o f  Chekhov's Prose and Drama 
(Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1999), p. xiii.
157 Ibid.
158 Wood, p. 79.
159 Shestov, Teopnecmeo U3 nmeeo, p. 206.
160 Komei Chukovskii, ‘A. HexoB’ in A. IT. Uexoe. Pro et Contra, p. 845.
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Not in the same way, but with the same result, as it were, did Sergei Bulgakov comment on 
Chekhov’s attitude to strength, and notably on Chekhov and Nietzsche. For him Chekhov 
was preoccupied by the mediocre, by the weak, and thus immersed in human grief. 
Nietzsche, on the contrary, focused on the strongest representatives of mankind, ‘^ cho, KaK 
Mano OT3ByKa Morjia Hairrn b  jjyme HexoBa m b ic j ib  o  “rop/jOM h  TparHHecKH-npeKpacHOM” 
nejioBeKe, Boobme KyjiBT HaTypajiBHoro, aeHCTBHTejiBHoro HenoeeKa, k o t o p b i m  H e3 aM eT H O  
noztMeHHBaexca nepBOHauajiBHO Bce-TaKH HjieajiBHBiH CBepxnej i o b c k ’, Bulgakov writes; 
‘b c h  xyaoacecTBeHHaa jjejiTejiBHocTB HexoBa HBjueTca KpacHOpeuHBBiM h  flocTaroHHBiM 
OTBeTOM Ha 3Ty nponoBe^B caMO^ OBOJiBCTBa, caMOBjnodjieHHOCTH, roBopa npaMO, 
4>HJiHCTepcTBa’,161 he concludes, thus displaying an understanding of Nietzsche which is 
diametrically opposite to Shestov’s. Bulgakov’s conclusion is therefore that Chekhov and 
Nietzsche are related in exactly the same way as ‘oroHB h  BO^a h j i h  acap h  Jiejj, b s b h m h o  
HCKJHonaa apyr apyra’.162
Chukovsky's article on Chekhov, which appeared only three years after Shestov's, radically 
differs in interpretation from the latter. We do not know if Shestov was familiar with it, but 
what we do know is that Chukovsky certainly did not read Shestov's article at the time. He 
first encountered it decades later and the idea behind the strong reaction that it evoked in 
him provides the backbone for our own conclusions concerning Shestov's treatment of 
Chekhov, as will be shown below.
First, however, we would like to reflect further on Shestov’s attitude to the concepts of 
rebellion and resistance in the case study of Chekhov’s works. If we take Ivanov- 
Razumnik's point above rather than Fotiade's, that in Chekhov's broken heroes Shestov 
found no revolt, but a mere hopelessness and resignation, then it appears that despite the 
leitmotif of Shestov's own works being in the rebellion of the individual against the general, 
in Chekhov (whom Shestov, as usual, equated to his heroes) Shestov refused to recognise 
this approach of an artist to the drama of life as valid (an approach which pays attention
161 Bulgakov, p. 552.
162 Ibid.
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first of all to exactly those unhappy people that are always unhappy in their own separate 
fashion, and not to the happy who are happy in the same way). In this sense, despite his 
distinctly existential approach, the price of those little tragedies which fill an individual 
existence, a concrete human life, remained unappreciated by Shestov.
In this context the word ‘rebellion’ may be crucial, because what might have irritated 
Shestov and grated upon him, either explicitly or implicitly, with his ideological extremism 
was precisely the inability of Chekhov's heroes to act, their absolute failure in everything 
that concerned rebellion. Shestov's lack of compromise and rebellious nature can be traced 
to his youth when his doctoral thesis on law remained undefended due to its being too 
radically left-wing, and then to his persistent affairs with gentile women against his father's 
will, which led through a sequence of crises of eventual submission to the ultimate revolt in 
a secret marriage to a Russian Orthodox woman. Equally, throughout his career Shestov 
would not give an inch of ground in his fight against rationalism and especially the 
rationalist approach to faith, although this resistance is more subtle and deep, for it is a 
manifestation of his fight against his own nature. However, Shestov's extremism which in 
many ways, as was discussed previously, brings him close to poetry and art in general, can 
also be viewed in cultural terms as a certain impediment, as was shown earlier in 
connection with Shestov's proximity to Freud.
This was the consequence of Shestov's uncompromising search for human salvation, for 
freedom from necessity. It is therefore not surprising that the concept of rebellion was one 
of the central concepts for Shestov, and could have played a decisive role in his 
understanding of Chekhov. Here, it seems, a most interesting analogy can be drawn with 
the judgements on Chekhov by Anna Akhmatova recorded in numerous sources, in 
particular by Lidia Chukovskaia in her Notes. Each time when this topic is touched upon 
Akhmatova talks about Chekhov abruptly and harshly, invariably evoking bitterness in 
Chukovskaia for whom Chekhov was a favourite writer. The reasons that Akhmatova gives 
when explaining her dislike of Chekhov are strangely reminiscent of Shestov's statements 
on Chekhov -  the air of hopelessness which permeates the writer's works, his heroes’ 
complete feebleness and inability to act. Notice that the same strangely naive identification
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of Chekhov with his characters takes place. To which Chukovskaia reasonably objects: ‘Ho 
y HexoBa-TO XBarajio MyxcecTBa HanncaTb ‘npnnajjox’, ‘B OBpare’, ‘MyacHXH’ h XBarajio 
reHnajiBHOCTH npeo6pa3HTB rope nejiOBenecxoe b rapMOHHio.
So it turns out, paradoxical though it may seem, that these extremely independent and 
active personalities, disdaining conventional norms -  Akhmatova and Shestov -  were so 
blinded by the inner weakness and inability to act of Chekhov's heroes that they could not 
see the wood for the trees. Maybe in the case of Akhmatova it was the subconscious 
outrage of a strong person, degraded to a state of permanent grief by the cruel era, when 
seeing people (in this case invented) over whom the power of external circumstances is 
basically absent and it is they who condemn themselves to capital punishment. Whatever 
the case, Chukovskaia, submitted to the same inhuman conditions by the same terrible 
times, cannot imagine her life without Chekhov's books: ‘noMHHTe?’, she asks Akhmatova, 
‘bbi o/ma5K£Bi MHe cica3ajiH, hto He cxynaeTe no Mopio, noTOMy hto oho Bcerzta npn Bac, 
B03Jie Bac, c BaMH? Hy bot, MHe He TpedyeTca nepeHHTbiBaTb HexoBa, noTOMy hto oh 
Bcenja co mhoh’.164
Moreover, Chukovskaia sees in Akhmatova's dislike of Chekhov a manifestation not o f a 
personal taste, but of something rather parochial -  that o f the Acmeists:
aKMencTbi ... xoTejiH cbpocHTb HexoBa c xopabjia coBpeMeHHocTH, xax, HanpHMep, 4>yiyPHCTlbI -  
nyuiKHHa h  TojiCToro. ... TyMHJieBy, AxMaTOBOH h  ManaejibiirraMy, noxa o h h  6bura h o b o h  
u ik o j io h  xaxoro-TO HOBoro HexyecTBa, TpeboBajiocb /yi a nero-TO OTBepraTb HexoBa, 
npoTHBonocTaBJiaTb TojiCToro .ZJocToeBcxoMy h  Tax zjairee. Tenepb yace Tpyzmo noHHTb /yia nero. 
Ulxojibi-To npoxo^HT, a HexoB ocTaeTca -  xax, BnponeM, h  ManaejibiuTaM, h  AxMaTOBa, h  
TyMHjreB, h  MaaxoBCXHH.165
Andrei Bitov writes in this respect that ‘OTcyTCTBHe na(J)oca, naTeTHKH, odHaaceHHoii H/jen 
—  jxqmq mbicjib yTaeHa b ctojib  jichom H3JioxceHHH, h to  MoxceT h mbicjibk) He noxa3aTbca, 
noxa He BbipacTemb HacTOJibxo, hto6bi ee BoenpHHHTb. O rroro npo nymxHHa Ha/jo 
HeTepnenHBO npoB03rnacHTb, h to  oh  ycTapeji ( o t  nncapeBa flo MaaxoBcxoro, BnjiOTb flo
163 Chukovskaia, II, p. 434.
164 Chukovskaia, II, p. 533.
165 Ibida, II, pp. 433-434.
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ceroflHfluiHHx nonoji3HOBeHHH), a npo HexoBa —  h t o  o h  HyaeH, cep, npHHH5KeH h  T.n. ( o t  
ero coBpeMeHHHKOB, nepe3 AxMaTOBy, ao Epoflcxoro) ’ . 166 Thus, Bitov implies that many 
Chekhov readers, including even Akhmatova and Brodsky, were not able to discern 
Chekhov’s subtle wisdom. It is probably fairer to say that they were ‘unwilling’ rather than 
‘unable’. This is especially true o f Brodsky, who can be compared with Chekhov in many 
ways, including their treatment o f time, their creative courage in the face o f eternity 
revealed to the utmost in their sobering intonation.
Akhmatova’s intrinsic proximity to Chekhov is even more noticeable. It is interesting to 
point out in this connection that in many ways Akhmatova’s poetry is close to Chekhov's 
prose, and extreme sobriety together with the elusive nature of their marked inner freedom 
and independence, their emphasis on private liberties and personal mystery certainly form 
their common denominator. In fact there is a sufficient number of scholarly opinions that 
suggest that Akhmatova's dislike of Chekhov stemmed in a sense from their excessively 
close proximity. Thus L. A. Davtian talks of the kinship between their artistic worlds. 
Davtian observes such a common feature of Akhmatova’s poetry and Chekhov’s prose as 
elevating a mundane detail into a lofty poetic symbol. On the other hand, as Davtian 
notices, Akhmatova’s often unexpected observations which put into one psychological field
1 /in
very distant concepts are akin to Chekhov’s affinity to the random and absurd.
M. A. Sheikina essentially suggests that it is Akhmatova’s belonging to the spirit of the 
Silver Age with its tendency to myth-creation, to the surreal, to art that is larger than life 
that hindered her appreciation of Chekhov. A lyrical heroine of Akhmatova did not want to 
recognise her prince in Chekhovian images, opting to wait for somebody distant and
1 ASunknown, Sheikina explains. Similarly, although Akhmatova’s early letters were
compared in style and manner with those of Chekhov’s heroines, the two writers’
Bitov, p. 9.
167 L. A. Davtian, ‘M o t h b m  h c x o b c k o h  flpaMaTyprHH b  c t h x o t b o p c h h h  A. A. AxMaTOBOH “3a 
03epoM j iy H a  ocTaHOBwiacb’” in Hexoeuana. Hexoe u 'cepedpnubiu eem' (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), 
e d . M.Goriacheva, pp. 137-138.
168 M . A. S h e ik in a , ‘H e x o B , K. T aM cyH  h  A. A xM aTO Ba ( “ H a u x a ” b  xoH T excT e “ c e p e S p a H o r o  
B e x a ”) ’ in  Hexoeuana. Hexoe u ‘cepedpxnbiu eex p p . 127, 132.
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apparently different understanding of the nature and scope of art resulted in what Naiman 
described as sharing a common language, but having a different tonality.169 Also, A. P. 
Kuzicheva effectively connects both Akhmatova and Chekhov with the moods of the 
beginning of the twentieth century with their theme of both hope and the need for spiritual
1 70redemption. Thus, as a consequence of such multiple similarities between Akhmatova’s 
and Chekhov’s poetics, Simon Karlinsky even labels Akhmatova’s manifest dislike for
171Chekhov ‘almost willfully capricious’. He himself draws a close parallel between ‘the 
lyrical persona of her [Akhmatova’s] poetry’ and ‘such Chekhovian heroines as Masha in 
Three Sisters, Anna Akimovna in A Woman’s Kingdom and Anna Sergeevna in The Lady 
with the Lap-Dog\ 172
Curiously, unlike Akhmatova or Brodsky who could be named as Chekhov’s spiritual kin, 
even if  in disguise, Shestov is not one of the same variety. This is because despite 
Shestov’s and Chekhov’s common interest in spiritual decline and tragic existential tests, 
the vector of their aspirations remains different. For Chekhov is indeed sober and free from 
illusion, while Shestov in his passionate rebellion against idealism remains idealist and 
romantic. In other words, Chekhov in his sobriety is free in the spirit, Shestov -  in the 
letter, however strong their mutual hope for human salvation might be.
7.7. Getting to the core: wider implications of a theoretical conflict. Lev Shestov and 
Kornei Chukovsky as two poles of understanding Chekhov.
In connection with Shestov's treatment of Chekhov Viktor Erofeev raises an important 
issue. As he shrewdly observes, realist writers like Chekhov, whose work (unlike that of 
Viacheslav Ivanov and his group) feed on the juices of real life, ‘oKa3bmaiOT 
“conpoTHBjieHne” caMOMy coTBopuecTBy IIIecTOBa, ero noMomn b  obHaxcemra h x  
“TeH/jemum”. B pe3yjibTaTe no^obHoro “conpoTHBjiemw” mecTOBCKoe coTBOpuecTBo
169 A. G. Naiman, PaccKa3bi 06 Anne AxMamoeou (Moscow, Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1989), 
p. 41. Cited in Davtian, p. 127.
170 A. P. Kuzicheva, ‘OT3ByK “jionHyBineu CTpyHbi” b no33HH “cepebpaHoro Bexa’” mHexoeuana.
1Texoeu 'cepedpxHbiu eeK’,p. 147.
171 Karlinsky, p. 195.
172 Ibid.
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TpaHC<j)opMHpyeTCJi, He3aMeTH0 npHHHMaa xapaKTep pa3o6jiaHHTejn>CTBa’, Erofeev claims. 
He writes:
B coKpbiTHH TpareAHH 0Ka3biBaeTca noBHHHa He t o j i b k o  “jiHTepaTypa”. LLlecTOB noA03peBaeT 
caMHx nHcaTejieH b ManoAyuiHH, jiHHeMepHH, npeAaTejibCTBe, “noBopoTe Ha3aA” [ . . . ] .  O c h o b h o h  
CMbicji pa3o6jiaHHTejibCTBa onpeAenaeTca TeM, h t o  UlecTOBy rnySoKO nyacA nacjjoc AHCTaHHHH no 
OTHouieHHio k  paccMaTpHBaeMOMy h m  nncaTeAK), h t o  b  c b o k )  onepeAb CB»3aHO c  h 3 b c c t h o h  
AorMaTHHHOCTbio ero “aAomaTHHecKOH” < J )h a o c o 4 )h h . 173
This is due to Shestov's affirmation of a certain monism in his perception of tragedy, 
despite all his disdain for monism, Erofeev explains. And he adds that the above ‘na<j)oc 
AHCTaHUHH’ in Shestov's methodology gives way to the ‘arbitrariness’ that Shestov himself 
once proclaimed as his literary-critical method. As a result the image of the writer gets 
distorted beyond recognition, Erofeev concludes.
We see such a distortion in Shestov's perception of Chekhov as taking place first of all on 
the plane of aesthetics. Thus, returning to Komei Chukovsky’s views on Chekhov’s oeuvre, 
-  he was, notably, outraged by Shestov's article on Chekhov and expressed it in the 
following terms in his letter to his New York correspondent: ‘CeSnac y Bac b  CHIA Bbiinna 
KHHra JlbBa IlIecTOBa, rAe ecTb ero ctbtba o  HexoBe “TBopnecTBO H3 HPrnero”. 51 nponen 
ee c HeroAOBaHneM. TepneTb He Mory pe30Hep0B, KOTopbie x o t h t  pemaTb Bonpocbi 06 
HcxyccTBe BHe acTeTHKH, HHHero He noHHMaa b  HcxyccTBe’,174 It is possible that a deep 
meaning is concealed in this remark of Komei Chukovsky, and even more so -  a key to the 
understanding of Shestov's thoughts about Chekhov, for Shestov all his life remained first 
of all a philosopher, and in the constant inner struggle between philosopher and artist it is 
the former who invariably won.
As we explained in Part I, despite the dream of his youth to become a writer, in his mature 
years Shestov rejected any attempts to be called such and remained indifferent to the 
generous praise of his style and artistic talent. He persuaded his only disciple -  the poet
173 Erofeev, p. 171.
174 Quotation from Chukovskii’s letter is given in L. Rzhevskii, ‘3araAOHHaa KoppecnoHAeHTKa 
KopHea HyKOBCKoro’, Hoeuu jfcypncui, No 123, June 1976. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 98.
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Benjamin Fondane -  in his philosophical work to steer clear of any form of ‘literature’: 
‘You must write concisely, a purely philosophical article. No ‘literature’; this is going to be
1 7^difficult. But you'll have to grab eloquence and break its neck, you know’, Shestov 
instructed Fondane. Similarly, in literary works which, as a matter of fact, brought him to 
philosophy, he was primarily interested in the latter, preferring bare ideas to the artistic 
value of the work. This means that an idea as such was dearer to Shestov than, using 
Chukovsky’s word, ‘aesthetics’.
This brings us back to our important discussion in Section 3.1 of Part I on the role of 
aesthetics for Shestov and his complex relationship with the latter. It is in the case of 
Chekhov that this becomes particularly visible. We need to recall here our suggestion that 
for an artist, which is what a writer or a poet is above all, form is inseparable from content 
and even, in a certain sense, prevails over it, if  by form one understands the dictates of 
language. For a philosopher, on the other hand, it is the idea or even the concept which 
carries weight. In the same way for Shestov, with all the splendour of his style, the most 
important thing was the philosophical conception.
Hence Shestov is primarily concerned not with the artist Chekhov, not with literature as 
such, but with its philosophical aspect, at the centre of which he sees Chekhov's revolt 
against speculative philosophy, a revolt so akin to that of Shestov himself.
This could possibly be explained by a certain paradoxical poetic deafness of Shestov, his 
skating over the surface, where as a result he remains deceived. It is paradoxical because 
while drawing his ideas from, essentially, pure poetry -  from classical Russian literature, -  
and moreover, while inspiring poets with them, it is as if Shestov himself is insensitive to 
the full beauty of the original, and rather approaches it from an applied (read -  
philosophical) point of view. This is even more amazing given that in his first book 
Shakespeare and his Critic Brandes he himself speaks precisely from the position of an
175 Fondane, p. 146. The French original reads: ‘II faudra ecrire serre, un article purement 
philosophique; 9a sera difficile; pas de litterature; il faudra prendre l'eloquence et lui tordre le cou, 
vous savez’ (which has a reference to Verlaine's famous line: ‘Prends l'eloquence et tord-lui le 
cou’).
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artist rather than a thinker and in any case rigorously distinguishes the border that separates 
poetry from the world of raw ideas. Moreover, he clearly feels that poetry, understood in 
the broad sense, is an alloy of artistic form and one's perspective on the world:
OneBnaHo, BapuejiOTTH 6 m ji HecnpaBeAJiHB k  TaHy, Koraa yTBepacaaji, h t o  b  h c m  xyao>xHHx 
‘aonojiHaeT h  HcnpaBJiaeT’ MbicjiHTejia. HaobopoT, b  TaHe MbicjiHTejib noTOMy TOJibKO h  nojiyHHJi 
TaKoe pe3KO BbipaxceHHoe npoHBJieHHe, h t o  He BCTpeTHJi npoTecTa b  xyaoxcHHxe. Boobme, He aejio 
THnHHecKoro nejiOBexa ‘aonoJiHaTb h  HcnpaBjnrrb’, t .  e. 3aMa3biBaTb ecTecTBeHHbie TpemHHbi 
CHCTeMbl. T3H KpaCHOpeHHB H nOTOMy CHHTaeTCH XyAOHCHHXOM. Ho 3T0 -  bojlbiuoe
Heaopa3yMeHHe. Becb na(J)oc ero, Becb nbui ero yBJieneHna cxjiaabiBaeTca npea ajiTapeM Toro 
6ora, KOTopoMy HHKoraa h h  o / jh h  xyzjoacHHX He m o jih j ic a .  O h  roBopHT o xpacoTe, a bb i 
nyBCTByeTe, h t o  o h  noeT t h m h  ‘npHHHHe h  c j i c a c t b h i o ’ ; m  o h  h  He cxpbreaeT 3Toro.. ,176
However, already then, in his ‘idealistic’ period, the thinker in Shestov was already ousting 
the artist in a certain sense -  in his early literary experiments Shestov spoke through the lips 
of his hero (as we saw in Chapter 1): ‘Bca no33HJi npeflCTaBjnuiacb MHe Tor^a ano(j)eo30M 
npaBtfbi, TOHHee aobpa... ${ Bcer^a ayMaji, h t o  5KH3Hb ecTb He h t o  HHoe, Rax nocToaHHoe 
CTpeMjieHHe 3T oro  “aobpa” k  nobe/je Haa 3 j io m  h  h t o  h o c h t c j i h  H^en Aobpa nocTOAHHO 
yBejiHHHBaioTCH b  CBoeM HHCJie h  n o b e ^ a  h x  ecTb t o j i b k o  Bonpoc BpeMeHH’.177
Curiously, Shestov's views remained steadfast to the end of his life -  as can be seen from 
his letter to Schloezer of 4 January 1933 (Schloezer had then just published his book on 
Gogol). Shestov continues with considerable conviction to draw a borderline between form 
and content, as if trying quite consciously to separate one from the other and undoubtedly 
taking the side of content:
A h t o  m o w  HHTepecyioTCH b o jib m e  h j ih  /jaace  H cxjnoH H TejibH o jiH TeparypH O H  c t o p o h o h  b  KHHre, 
h  He B ^yM biBaioTca b  ee coaepxcaH H e, t o  B e/jb 3x0  C Tapaa H CTopna: He HaM nepB biM  h  He HaM 
nocjieflH H M  npnxoAHTCH HcnbiTbiBaTb 3 to .  BpeM eH aM H  xaxceT ca Aaxce, h t o  b  xaxoM -TO  cM bicjie T ax 
3TOMy h  bbiTb n o jia ra e T c a . B e /jb  o rp o M H o e bojibuiHHCTBO jn o f le ii h  B n b jin eH  3aHHTbiBaioTca 
T o u b x o  noTOM y, h t o  OHa oneH b x o p o m o  H an n caH a . H  B e^b , t o h h o ,  xoM y o x o T a  T ax  nepecT paH B aT b 
CBoe M biuuieH H e, HTob B h 6 jth h  M o rjia  CTaTb h c to h h h x o m  h c th h m .178
176 Shestov, UJeKcnup u ezo xpum ux Epandec, p. 13.
177 Unpublished story by Lev Shestov He m yda noncui. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14.
178 From Shestov’s letter of 4 Jan. 1933 to Boris Schloezer. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 113.
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Speaking more generally, the problem represented by Shestov's separation o f ethics from 
aesthetics when analysing works o f art can be elucidated by the following lines o f Joseph 
Brodsky. Art, he says, is ‘ c p e f l C T B o  nepe^BHHceHHJi, jiaH^ma(J)T, MejibKaiomHH b  oKHe, -  a
17QHe nepe^BiDKeHHfl 3Toro ijejib’, its origins are distinctly non-utilitarian, and hence any 
‘conceptual’ considerations in it are secondary. And thus, any ‘applied’ approach to art is 
bound to be distorting. Equally relevant here is Milosz's conjecture, also previously 
mentioned, of Shestov's personal drama lying in his lack of poetic talent, hence his inability
1 O A
‘to approach the mystery o f existence more directly than through mere concepts’.
In this light it is instructive to compare Shestov's understanding o f Chekhov with that o f the 
writer Fazil Iskander who is, unlike Shestov, not a writing philosopher, but on the contrary 
-  a philosophising writer. In his tale I l o 3m  Iskander states through the voice of his main 
hero that ‘EanpoH BHenme repoHHeH, h o  BHyrpeHHe npocT h  o£Hoo6pa3eH. MexoB BHemHe
1 Q 1
npocT, h o  BHyrpeHHe MHoroo6pa3eH h  c k p b i t o  repOHHeH’. This is an extremely 
interesting remark in the context of Shestov's essentially opposite understanding of 
Chekhov and Byron: Chekhov is no more than a singer of hopelessness, an overstressed
person professing surrender to destiny, whereas Byron is a true poet, ‘HeyKpoTHMaa
1 80  18^HaTypa’ for whom ‘6emeHbie nopLiBLi’ are characteristic.
Curiously, a somewhat similar comparison between Chekhov and Byron was suggested 
decades earlier -  by Sergei Bulgakov, even though Iskander seems to have gone further 
along the same road, thus reaching deeper conclusions. ‘HexoB h  EafipoH, o6a neBijbi 
MHpoBOH CKop6n, cKopbn o HejioBeice, oica3biBaiOTca b  xyztoacecTBeHHOM h  (})h j i o c o (J)c k o m  
TpaKTOBaHHH HejioBeica aHTHno/jaMn: oAHoro 3aHHMajin h c k j h o h h t c j i b h o  cym>6bi
cBepxnejiOBeKa, b h c h i h x  3K3eMnjiapoB HejiOBenecKOH npnpoAbi, ^pyroro -  ayxoBHbm MHp
179 Brodskii, ‘06 oahom cthxotbopchhh’ in Cohumhur Mocucpa EpodcKoao, vol. 5 (St Petersburg: 
Pushkinskii Fond, 1999), p. 146.
180 Milosz, p. 103.
181 Iskander, ‘IIo3T’,p. 130.
182 Shestov, UleKcnup u ezo Kpumm Epandec, p. 15.
183 Ibid.
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nocpeflCTBeHHOcra, Hecnoco6HOH #aace CTaTb BnojiHe HejioBexoM’, Bulgakov wrote in 
1904.184
Thus, Shestov displays in this case some fundamental misapprehension of the nature of 
artistic creation, intensified or facilitated by Chekhov's technique of elusiveness, of 
deliberate withdrawal from his own stories. In fact, why in Chekhov it is especially 
important to deal with the ethical and the aesthetic in their entirety represents a separate 
topic in its own right, which we are yet to address. However, we wish to make the point 
here that in contrast to Shestov's usual reading between the lines he seems to remain 
deceived by the face value of Chekhov's writings. As Sergei Bulgakov remarked on the 
critical reception of Chekhov’s writings: ‘t o ,  oTnero o h  Sojieji, neM o h  6 b ij i  caM oipaBJieH, 
cHHTanH npe^MeTOM ero nponoBe#H, cjiHBaa aBTopa c ero repoaMH, h  co3#aBanocb h
185Kpenjio oto T5DKejioe He#opa3yMeHHe...’.
In this light Chukovsky's outrage seems a natural reaction to Shestov's radical article that 
does not dive in to reach under the impenetrable surface of Chekhov's writings. This 
reaction becomes particularly clear against the background of Chukovsky's own 
interpretation of Chekhov which was expressed in his article ‘A. Chekhov’ of 1908 -  only a 
few years later than Shestov's paper, as was stated earlier.
As we have already mentioned, Chekhov appeared to Chukovsky as a writer who 
juxtaposed clear, determined and self-assured strength to the dream-like uncertainty of 
human gentleness which can ultimately be deemed weakness. Moreover, lie placed 
Chekhov on the side of the weak and found the highest tragedy of Chekhov’s plays in the 
inevitable victory of the strong over the weak. ‘B ero #paMax BenHaa poxoBaa 6opi>6a sthx 
flByx Hanaji, poxoBOH hcxo# 3toh 6opb6bi, b  hhx BHyrpeHHee #BHaceHHe k HeH36eacHOMy -  
k BenHOH no6e#e JIonaxHHa Ha# #a#en BaHen’, Chukovsky comments and adds: ‘rio6e#a 
JIonaxHHa Ha# #a#ei\ BaHen -  sto Bcer#a Kaxaa-To no3opHaa no6e#a. HHTHMHaa npaB#a, 
KpacoTa 3toh npaB#bi, no33Ha stoh npaB#bi, -  Bcer#a y TaeBa, y HBaHOBa, y nopTHoro
184 Bulgakov, ‘HexoB kslk MbicjiHTejib’, p. 552.
185 Bulgakov, p. 544.
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1MepxyjioBa, y “Se^Horo, OeflHoro” jvljxp. BaHH, y Tpex cecTep’. For Chukovsky 
Chekhov’s cosmos is extremely hostile to any kind of firm sense of purpose; instead it
1 87unites all things beautiful and tender with purposelessness and emotional disorientation.
This singing o f praises to purposelessness that Chukovsky assigns to Chekhov he explains 
on a rather unexpected sociological plane. It is with the formation o f towns, with 
industrialisation, that Chukovsky connects Chekhov’s choice o f sympathies and antipathies. 
The new morality that the town had brought into Russian cultural history was philistine in 
nature. Tocno^HH npeBpaTHJica b xo33HHa, b ropo^cKoro cobcTBemmica, b MemaHHHa. C 
ero npnxoflOM ^BopaHCKaa, noMenumtfl, “pbmapcicaa uecTb 3aMeHHJiacb 6 yxrajrrepcKOK) 
necTHocTbio’” and parks turned into vegetable gardens. 188 For Chukovsky Chekhov with 
his disdain for the world o f purpose is the writer subversive o f this new utilitarian epoch 
which started back in the 1880s. However, this social meaning o f Chekhov’s works is for 
Chukovsky rather secondary, while the stunning lyricism, the gentle poetics of his literary 
talent are primary.
Thus both Chukovsky and Shestov essentially see Chekhov's main character as a weak 
person, but the emotional colouring of this vision is entirely opposed. For Chukovsky 
Chekhov was an ally, friend and supporter, if  not perhaps even an admirer of a lost person, 
while Shestov implied that Chekhov took delight, like a hunter or a practitioner o f black 
magic, in proving the ultimate hopelessness o f existence and observed ‘unkind sparks’ 
flashing in Chekhov's eyes whenever the latter saw another one o f his characters trapped 
and lost. For Chukovsky Chekhov despised ‘yBepeHHyio uejiecoo6 pa3Hyio cnjiy’ , 189 ‘s to  
TBepaoe, yBepeHHoe uejiecoo6pa3Hoe Hauajio >kh3hh’190 and found its inevitable victory 
disgraceful. One of many definitions of a member o f the intelligentsia is a person consumed 
by doubt. According to Chukovsky Chekhov's sympathies were with those permeated by
186 Chukovskii, ‘A. T e x o B ’, p. 847.
187 Chukovskii, ‘A. TexoB’, p. 848.
188 Ibid, p. 850. The quotation Chukovskii gives is from ‘HenoicoHHeHHbie 6 ece/u>i’ by Saltykov- 
Shchedrin (see M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, Co6p. coh. e 20 m. (Moscow, 1972), vol. 15, p. 241).
189 Ibid, p. 845.
190 Ibid.
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doubt, those with a blurred sense of direction. Thus for Chukovsky at the ethical level it 
was Chekhov's warmth and mercy to the fallen that he singled out as central, and at the 
social level it was Chekhov's resistance to the fast advancing philistine and petit-bourgois 
values. Shestov, on the contrary, assigned to Chekhov no mercy whatsoever and perceived 
him as an enemy of ideologies, as a man who was emancipated from the ‘idea’, much to 
Shestov's delight. However, Chukovsky’s stance on Chekhov’s disdain towards crude 
force, towards self-assured strength coincides in essence with Shestov’s. He interprets such 
force as an embodiment o f universal necessity and thus assigns to Chekhov (just as in 
Shestov’s own case) a steadfast hatred o f the latter.
Chukovsky's conclusions were derived predominantly from the emotional effect that 
Chekhov had on his readers -  in this case on Chukovsky himself. He referred to Chekhov’s 
writings as ‘o th  jiyHHbie KOJiayiomne co3,zjaHmi, KOTopwe jxaji HaM CTbmnHBO-reHHanbHBiH 
xyzjomuHc’ . 191 Thus for him the very poetics o f Chekhov suggested the ensuing ethical 
interpretation. The difficulty is, however, that Chekhov's art mirrors the critic or reader 
looking at it, as we mentioned before referring to Stepanov's observation in his article on 
Chekhov. Hence, for Shestov this looking glass reflected exactly what Shestov expected to 
find -  essentially Shestov's own image, the image o f his own philosophical ideas. The 
paradox of Chekhov's poetics is, though, that it is not the complexity which may be difficult 
to disentangle, but on the contrary its apparent extreme simplicity and clarity that may lead 
to confusion by hiding meaning, by not producing any explicit moral. Hence, it is difficult 
to argue one way or another what the author's stance really is. Equally it is easy to dismiss 
any interpretations that do not suit a particular model.
This is o f course facilitated and intensified by Chekhov’s conviction that the writer's job is 
merely to report, hence his authorial voice is deliberately concealed if not altogether absent 
from his writings. More precisely the author’s stance gets absorbed by the narrative itself; it 
settles, as it were, into the very poetics o f Chekhov’s works. Thus Bitov commenting on the 
engima of Chekhov emphasises the primacy o f artistic values over ethical openness: ‘IfraK, 
h to  flyMan HexoB —  HeH3BecTHo. H bo h to  BepHJi. Bee 3 to  caepacaHHo, Bee 3 to  Ha
191 Chukovskii, ‘A. TexoB’, p. 851.
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noBO^Ke xyAo^cecTBeHHOH 3a^aHH5. In the same vein Chukovsky contemplates 
Chekhov’s reserve along the lines of his poetics: ‘ajhi octcthkh HexoBa xyaoxcecTBeHHaa 
O TK pO B eH H O C T B  n p O C T O  H eB b lH O C H M a’ . 193
That is why (and here we appear to be in full agreement with Chukovsky’s views) any 
attempt to separate ethics from aesthetics in the case of Chekhov leads to total 
disintegration. As in poetry translation, using Brodsky's words, ‘form is noble [...] It is the 
vessel in which meaning is cast. They need each other and sanctify each other reciprocally 
-  it is an association o f soul and body. Break the vessel and liquid will leak out’ . 194 In other 
words, the fact that Chekhov’s ethics and aesthetics are truly inseparable can be explained 
by the phenomenon already discussed above -  the distinctly poetic origin o f Chekhov’s 
prose. Indeed, in poetry ‘(])OHeTHKa h ceMaHTHKa 3a MajiMMH hckjhohchhjimh 
T05K£ecTBeHHi>i’.195 Remarkably, Chekhov as it were patched the gap between Russian 
prose and poetry by effectively saturating the former with the latter. Moreover, Chekhov, 
unlike Turgenev, did it in actual fact rather than in theory. By the time that Chekhov 
emerged into the literary scene Russian prose which effectively grew out o f Russian poetry 
to begin with, matured and became divorced from its poetic origin. Following Pushkin’s 
‘novel in verse’ and Gogol’s ‘poem in prose’ the development o f these two genres was 
largely in the direction o f divergence. Thus hardly anybody got further from poetry in his 
prose than Lev Tolstoy.
However, Chekhov appeared to be turning this process backwards; and those fundamental 
shortcomings that realist criticism accused him of -  namely: accidentality, the absence of a 
thematic hierarchy and causal connections, are in fact the most essential features o f poetry 
(this was recognised fully only in the twentieth century). ‘...llyTb komct -  IIo3tob nyn». // 
Pa3BejfflHbie 3Bem>fl // FIphhhhhocth -  b ot cba3b ero! . . .  H Oh t o t ,  kto  CMeniHBaeT KapTbi,
192 Bitov, from a newspaper version of the ultimate book chapter; published in Hoean zm em a  12 
July 2004. Bitov rephrased this in the book (see therein p. 14).
193 Chukovskii, ‘A. HexoB5, p. 845.
194 Joseph Brodsky, ‘On Some Problems in the Translation of Poetry’, N ew  York Review o f  Books, 1 
February 1974.
195 Brodskii, ‘IIost h npo3a’, p. 138.
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// OSMaHtreeT Bee h  cneT, / /O h  t o t ,  k t o  cnpaniHBaeT c napTbi, / /  K t o  KaHTa HarojiOBy 
6beT...’,196 Tsvetaeva says in her TJoom u  (as we saw in Chapter 3 in connection with 
proximity of Shestov’s philosophy to poetry). In the same vein, Czeslaw Milosz writes 
about Brodsky’s poetry: ‘O h  yxBaTbmaeT yjiHuy, apxHTeKTypHyio /jeTajib, aTMoc(])epy 
MecTa -  h  H3BJieicaeT h x  H3 noTOxa BpeMeHH, H3 npocTpaHCTBa, HTodbi coxpaHHTb HaBcer/ja 
B KpHCTajIbHbIX MeTpax’.197
Thus, Chekhov, with his distinctly poetic prose where a passionate defence of human 
privacy is interwoven with a modesty-driven understanding of literary craft, is concealed 
entirely in the elusive beauty of the subtext. It is exactly for this reason that looking in 
Chekhov’s works for open philosophical didacticism would be an obvious mistake. 
However, Shestov does precisely this, by ascribing to Chekhov as his life stance that 
sacramental ‘I don’t know’ that Nikolai Stepanovich from D rea ry  S to ry  is invested with. At 
the same time, in a rather paradoxical way, Shestov claims that numerous critics of a 
positivist variety ‘3aacHBO xopomrr nexoBCXHX repoeB Ha cbo h x  H^eajiHcthhcckhx  
KjiafltSnmax, HMeHyeMbix MHp0B033peHHHMH’, while ‘caM )xe HexoB ot “pa3pemeHHa
1 OSBonpoca” B03/jep5KHBaeTca’, and his only answer is the above ‘I do not know’.
Interestingly, in contrast to Komei Chukovsky, Bunin held Shestov's article on Chekhov in 
very high regard, to the point of referring to it as ‘o^Ha H3 caMbix jiynuiHX cTaTen o HeM 
[HexoBe] ’ .199 The same remark was repeated half a century later by Sidney Monas in his 
foreword to an English' republication o f Shestov’s article. It is instructive that Bunin 
ascribed to Shestov's pen an epithet which the latter in fact never used in his article, 
namely, he called Chekhov ‘decnoma^HeHHiHM TanaHTOM ’.200 This in fact suggests that 
Bunin also hid behind the pillars o f content, or, if  you like, ethics, trampling on aesthetics. 
This is especially true since Bunin’s own stories are characterised, in our view, by a
196 Tsvetaeva, ‘IIoaTbi’, vol. 2, p. 184.
197 Milosz, ‘Bopbda c yayuibeM’, p. 246.
198 Shestov, Teopnecmeo m  rnmezo, p. 209.
199 Ivan Bunin, Co6panue coHunenuu e 10 moMax (Berlin: Petropolis, 1934-1936), vol. 10, p. 226. 
Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 97.
200 Ibid.
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distinctive touch of coldness, and thus for him reading Chekhov in a somewhat Nietzschean 
key seems natural and even to be expected. For, in contrast to Chekhov, Bunin takes a 
somewhat superior position with respect to his own narrative, as it were elevates himself 
spiritually from it and from his own heroes, thus displaying a considerable degree of 
detachment. Without going into any detailed comparative analysis (which has to remain 
outside the current thesis) we would nevertheless like to suggest that there is a substantial 
difference between what is conventionally perceived as Chekhov’s detachment (which is 
often described misleadingly as coldness and mercilessness) and Bunin’s. The nucleus of 
this difference lies, in our opinion, in Chekhov’s democratic stance which manifests itself 
through the author locating himself on exactly the same plane as his characters. As a result 
Chekhov’s narrative can be characterised by extreme objectivity, which was indeed 
Chekhov’s openly declared goal. To achieve this objectivity the author exposes and uses 
detail as a hidden gateway into human psychology, thus penetrating into the depth of the 
soul by stripping it o f any self-delusions and pretence.
7.8. Where is the real Chekhov? A continuing debate.
Notably, Bunin’s and Shestov’s ‘merciless’ vision o f Chekhov has survived to this day. 
Indeed, Andrei Stepanov, who is a contemporary Chekhov scholar, clearly approves of 
Shestov's drastic and merciless interpretation of the writer, implying that it served Chekhov 
right. Indeed, in his article on Shestov’s treatment of Chekhov Stepanov notes that while 
many critics, regardless of their point o f departure, ultimately arrived at pointing to 
Chekhov’s compassion and underlying humanistic idea, for Shestov, by contrast, any such 
conclusions in relation to Chekhov’s writings were completely absent. *Y IlIecTOBa >xe hh 
o KaKoft HcajiocTH HeT hh cjiOBa’,201 Stepanov writes.
However, as Albov writes, ‘IIpo Hero [HexoBa] mo)kho cica3aTi> to  3Ke, hto cTyzjeHT 
BacHJibeB roBOpHT npo ce6 a. “Oh odjiaaaeT tohkhm, BejiHKOJienHtiM Hyn>eM k 6 ojih 
Boodme” (U punadoK ), a CTajio 6 tm> h ko BceMy TOMy, h to  mojkct npHHHHjm> 6 ojib, 
CTpa^aHHe. [...] Kax oh BHHMaTejieH k HejioBexy, k ero floGpOMy hmchh, Tor^a, Kor^a
201 Stepanov, p. 1001.
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3to y Hero othjito’. When Chekhov invents his doomed heroes he is not mocking them, 
he is suffering for them, Albov claims -  ‘oh CTpa^aeT ayuiOH 3a hhx , hto y hhx HeT hh 
Bora, hh coBecTH, hh 3axoHOB; eMy rpycTHO h 6 ojibho 3a 3th 6eccne^Ho rnOHymHe
90^MeHTbi’. Otherwise, as Albov argues, Chekhov could not have created such works of 
literature at all. The parallels such as the hero of M y  L ife  makes -  between a slaughter 
house, his conversation with the mayor and the action of Doctor Blagovo ‘Mor cflejian> 
tojibko aBTop, KOToptiH caM HyTOK k 6 ojih Boodme, k CTpa^aHHio’ ,204 Albov asserts.
In fact, we would go as far as to assert that the concept of ‘cold blood’ is hostile to 
Chekhov’s inner self. As the quotation given above from Chekhov’s obituary to 
Przhevalsky testifies, Chekhov believed passionately in outstanding and selfless human 
deeds, in positive and daring action rather than disintegrating spiritual slumber and 
demagogical philosophising of any variety. However, his own feelings had always been 
carefully concealed, ‘hto6 li HHTaTejib He 3aMeTHji’,205 as Chekhov himself proclaimed. In 
other words, it was his deliberate and considered literary tactics. As he wrote in his private 
letters to Lidia Avilova: ‘Korvta H3o6pa^caeTe ropeMbiK h OecTajiaHHbix h xothtc 
pa3)Kajio6HTb HHTaTejra, to CTapaiiTecb 6brrb xojioflHee -  3to aaeT nyacoMy ropio xax 6bi 
(J)oh, Ha KOTopoM oho BbipHCOBbmaeTCH pejibe(J)Hee. ...HeM oSbeKTHBHee, TeM cnjibHee
9 AZ
Bbixo^HT BnenaTjieHHe’. Thus Chekhov quite intentionally, as it were, cooled down his 
narrative for the sake o f objectivity, and gave the readers, as a matter of principle, full 
freedom to make their own judgements. In reality, however, as Komei Chukovsky
909convincingly argues in his book on the writer produced in 1967, Chekhov was full o f jo ie  
de v ivre , o f passionate thirst for life and was, unlike the majority o f his heroes, never idle.
Even Albov, who, unlike Chukovsky, did not have the advantage o f knowing Chekhov’s 
biography and personality, thus commented on Chekhov’s apparent authorial calm: ‘Ho 3to
202 Albov, p. 388.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 From Chekhov’s letter of 29 April 1892 to Lidia Avilova in A. P. Chekhov, IIojiHoe codpanue 
coHmenuu u nuceM, vol. 5, p. 58
206 From Chekhov’s letter of 19 March and 29 April 1892 to Lidia Avilova, Ibid., p. 26 and p. 58.
9fi7 •Komei Chukovskii, O Mexoee (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1967).
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cnoKOHCTBHe -  npocTO caep^caHHOCTb BocnHTaHHoro nejioBeica, 3a KOTopoii CKptmaeTca
70R
H a T y p a , rn y b o K O  n y B C T B y io m a a , T O C K y io m aa , CTpacTH O  n e ro -T O  H m y m a a ’ . A l b o v  a r g u e s  
t h a t  C h e k h o v ’s  s u b j e c t i v i t y  b e c o m e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n s  
o f  n a t u r e .  ‘C t o h t  to j ib k o  b 3h tb  e r o  i io h t h  j n o b o e  o n n c a H H e  n p H p o ^ B i , K O T opaa  C M eeT ca, 
n j i a n e T ,  TOCKyeT, to m h tc j i ,  h t o 6 l i  c o c T a B H T t o  HeM n p e f lC T a B J ie m ie  KaK o  n n c a T e n e  
r j iy b o K o  c y d teK T H B H O M ’ ,209 A l b o v  w r i t e s .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t e m p t i n g  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
m o d e l  f p r  C h e k h o v ’s  c r e a t i v e  s e l f  b e f o r e  h i s  f e e l i n g s  a n d  t h o u g h t s  g e t  s i e v e d  t h r o u g h  th e  
s e v e r e  a n d  d e m a n d i n g  f i l t e r  o f  h i s  a r t i s t i c  a s  w e l l  a s  e x i s t e n t i a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  i s  I v a n  D m i t r i c h  
f r o m  W ard N o  6 , w i t h  h i s  p a s s i o n a t e  d e f e n c e  o f  l i f e  a n d  s e n s i t i v i t y  a g a i n s t  d e a t h  a n d  
s t o i c i s m ,  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  a n d  t e m p o r a l  a g a i n s t  t h e  g e n e r a l  a n d  e t e r n a l .  I n  t h i s  s t a n c e  a n d  
l a r g e l y  i n  t h i s  a l o n e  S h e s t o v ,  i n  o u r  v i e w ,  i s  t r u l y  c l o s e  t o  C h e k h o v ,  a n d  i t  i s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  
w h e r e  C h e k h o v  c a n  i n d e e d  b e  l a b e l l e d  S h e s t o v ’s  s p i r i t u a l  t w i n ,  c o n s i d e r a b l y  m o r e  s o  t h a n ,  
a s  S h e s t o v  h i m s e l f  m i g h t  h a v e  t h o u g h t ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  b r e a k i n g  p o i n t s ,  t h e  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  c o n v i c t i o n s  o r  t h e i r  n e a r - d e a t h  s i t u a t i o n s  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e .
However, our point o f view remains controversial inasmuch as we perceive Chekhov as a 
passionate writer. Associating him with the ‘cold blood’ that he wrote about continues to be 
as common a trend nowadays as in Chekhov’s times. Back then E. A. Liatsky in his article 
o f 1904 quite characteristically juxtaposed Chekhov to ‘great Russian writers’ such as 
Gogol, Dostoevsky and Garshin who were capable, he wrote, o f investing human tragedy 
with profound artistic revelations and yet portraying the deep torment of a truly living 
creature, while Chekhov, Liatsky asserted, was merely ‘Ha6 jnoAaTejihHMH h BflyMHHBtm 
Bpan, t o h k h h  HccjieflOBaTejib h  y>xe 3aTeM -  xyaomniK ’ .210 Liatsky quotes defenders of 
both trends o f thought with respect to Chekhov. On the one hand, he mentions those (like, 
for example, Obolensky) who saw Chekhov as a writer full o f love and pity for everything 
on earth. On the other hand, he notes that loving everything and everybody is equivalent to 
loving no-one and quotes those (like, for example, Volzhsky) who claimed that an all- 
pervasive loving pity often turns into moral indifference.
208 Albov, p. 370.
209 Ibid.
210 E. A. Liatskii, ‘A. II. HexoB h ero paccKa3w’ in A. U. Hexoe: Pro et Contra, p. 453.
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Liatsky also effectively joins those who viewed Chekhov as too impartial, unable to suffer 
for mankind. Thus he clearly supports the above claim, hence going even further than those 
who accused Chekhov o f coldness; indeed, he accuses the writer o f being too moderate, of 
steering away from extremes, from any kind of passion of his own. For Liatsky this 
moderation of Chekhov results not in the writer’s balanced approach, but in his alleged 
indifference. Thus, instructively, Liatsky approves o f the applicability o f the following 
quote from the Holy Scripture to Chekhov: ‘3Haio tboh ijejin, hto hh xojio^ch tbi, hh 
ropjiH. O, ecjiH 6bi tli 6 biji hjih xojioaeH hjih ropan. Ho Tax xax tbi TenjiOBaT h hh ropan, 
hh xoJioaeH, - H3BeprHy Te6a H3 ycT mohx’.211 This quotation best exemplifies the view of 
Chekhov as belonging to writers o f the ‘cold blood’ variety, understood as the triumph of 
indifference and reserve. Importantly, denying any considerations o f mercy, pity, 
compassion or warmth in interpreting Chekhov’s art continues to be one of the main 
existing angles of view on Chekhov, with the other being that of seeing the writer as largely 
continuing the Russian humanistic literary tradition.
By the same token Shestov’s treatment o f Chekhov continues to be analysed essentially in 
conflicting directions. Thus Stepanov who does not go down the path of Albov (i.e. of 
viewing Chekhov as a compassionate humanist) makes a clear juxtaposition between 
Albov’s and Shestov’s perspectives on the writer. It is exactly that part of Shestov’s 
analysis of Chekhov when he had parted from Albov which for Stepanov is worth 
considering. Continuing the line o f Bunin in his assessment o f the writer, Stepanov 
essentially asserts that Shestov penetrated into the very nucleus of Chekhov’s art. However, 
for Stepanov the essence o f Shestov’s discovery is not in his principal claim about 
Chekhov’s ‘hopelessness’, but in various philosophical aspects o f Shestov’s interpretation. 
Thus, in particular, Stepanov stresses Chekhov’s profound engagement with the 
‘rHoceojiorHHecKaa npo6 jieMa’, which, Stepanov asserts, Shestov, importantly, managed to 
feel and to identify. This, we add, in a way is not surprising as Shestov can be legitimately 
labelled a ‘rHoceojiorHHecKHH yronHCT’ himself (see, for instance, L. Kolobaeva, “ TIpaBO
2,1 Ibid, p. 437.
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H a cyS beK T H B H O C T t” . A j ie K c e n  P eM H 30B  h  J le B  I I Ie c T O B ’) ,  h e n c e  p r o b l e m a t i c s  o f  t h i s  
k i n d  a r e  v e r y  f a m i l i a r  t o  h im .
However, Stepanov’s ideas, although valid as theoretical constructions are not, in our view, 
sustainable ‘in practice’, that is to say when applied within a broader framework than 
merely conceptual (philosophical) -  namely, within a literary one. This phenomenon is 
perhaps akin to utopian doctrines which, although perfectly valid in theory, turn into failure 
in reality (Marxism is an obvious example). Similarly, Stepanov’s considerations on the 
validity of Shestov’s analysis of Chekhov stand to reason as an abstraction, but when 
applied to literature they reveal an insoluble conflict. The kernel of this conflict lies on the 
plane of aesthetics where Shestov’s spiritual extremism and the dictatorial tendencies of his 
discourse display a distinct incompatibility with Chekhov’s extreme tolerance and the 
feature of ‘praising purposelessness’ so deeply inherent in his art. In other words, the very 
poetics of Chekhov resists Shestov’s paradigm. Shestov turns Chekhov’s alleged 
emancipation from ‘the idea’ into a naked principle, thus losing the context by neglecting 
the aesthetic dimension.
In other words what is lost is that poetic colouring which the above ‘emancipation’ acquires 
in Chekhov’s art and which in fact transforms its very substance into something almost 
opposite. For, as we argued above, in Chekhov’s world aesthetics sheds some crucial and 
unexpected light on matters which can change their very nature. The logic of this is, in fact, 
somewhat akin to Shestov’s own assertions that the truth is lost in transmission, that ‘npo 
Bora Heni>3H cKa3aTi>, h t o  o h  cymecTByeT. H6o CKa3aBiHHH: “Bor cymecTByeT” - TepaeT 
Bora’.213 The above phenomenon is precisely due to the fact that for Chekhov, as for any 
true artist, content is subjugated to form, the ethical to the aesthetic. With this in mind, 
Shestov’s misconceptions in his treatment of Chekhov become apparent. More precisely, 
this approach helps us to see the essential misunderstanding which Shestov got involved in
2,2 L. Kolobaeva, ‘“ f lp a B o  H a cySbeK TH BH O C T b” . A j ie K c e i i  P eM H 3 0 B  h  J le B  IIIe cT O B ’ , Bonpocu 
jiumepamypbi, (5) 1994, p . 76.
213 Shestov, Ha eecax Hoea, p. 105.
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by applying to Chekhov purely philosophical approach looking in his literary works for the 
ideological (or conceptual) rather than artistic truth.
However, Shestov’s view of Chekhov with all its controversy and misapprehensions 
continues to this day to be a source of inspiration for many Chekhov scholars and to 
stimulate thought, often even in the form of heated debate. Also, notwithstanding our 
previous argument, there is, as was pointed out above, a clear meeting point between the 
writer and the philosopher. We see it in the passion o f both in their approach to the world 
which manifests itself in respecting human tragedy, in looking courageously into the gap 
between reality and the ideal, essentially searching for salvation; in valuing the private 
more than the general and in the underlying disdain for scholastic philosophy and ‘self- 
evident’ truths. Shestov explained to Fondane, as we saw in Chapter 2, that he did not study 
philosophy at university and this allowed him to keep his freedom of thought.214 ‘I am often 
chastised for quoting passages that nobody ever quotes, for uncovering texts that were left 
ignored. It is just possible that, had I gone through a proper training in philosophy, I too 
would only cite “authorised” texts’, Shestov told Fondane.215 Pretty much in the same vein 
Chekhov simply exclaimed, ‘K nepTy (Jjhjioco^ hio bcjihkhx Mupa cero!’ and summoned 
one, as was quoted earlier, to be independently-minded, to trust only one’s own 
observations of life.
Stepanov finds somewhat different words for describing basically the same meeting point:
‘B 3 to h  OTHaaHHOH Hazjeayje Ha ocymecTBjieHHe HeB03MO)KHoro h 3aKJiiOHeHO caM oe
rjiy fioK oe po/jctbo n H ca rejia  h (jm jiocotjm ’,217 he writes. What remains to ad d  to the a b o v e
as another testimony of its validity as well as a final chord, is Husserl’s description o f
Shestov’s life long mission, which is so applicable to Chekhov too, as an attempt ‘H aim i
218,zjjhi c e 6 a  h  fljw  B cex  E ohchh M ap, b  k o to po m  mojkho n o -H acT oam eM y jkhtb h yM epeT b’ .
214 See Fondane, p. 8 8 .
2,5 Ibid.
216 Chekhov, from his letter of 8 Sept. 1891 to A. S. Suvorin in IIojiHoe codpanue conm enuu u 
nuceM, vol. 4, p. 270.
217 Stepanov, p. 1QQ6 .
218 Edmond Husserl’s letter to Shestov of 3.07.1929. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, II, p. 33.
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Chapter 8. Shestov and Turgenev. The grounds for groundlessness
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, Shestov’s approach to Chekhov testifies first 
and foremost to the underlying conflict between ethics and aesthetics in Shestov’s treatment 
of literature, and, more generally, elucidates Shestov’s complex relationship with 
aesthetics. Shestov’s writings on Turgenev are no less significant, inasmuch as they 
illustrate Shestov’s fundamental struggle against European rationalism and Western 
idealism in general, and in a sense reveal the quintessence of his artistic philosophy with all 
its broad implications. In the case of Turgenev -  a Russian Westemiser -  it is particularly 
tempting for Shestov to illustrate his own, passionately defended paradigm of an existential 
path leading from rational thought and unpolluted idealistic beliefs to total disillusionment 
and subsequent irrationalism. From this point of view there could be no better way to finish 
our discussion of Shestov’s philosophical and aesthetic treatment of classical Russian 
literature (and of the general proximity of Shestov’s thought to art and literature) than 
analysing his views on Turgenev and their underlying philosophical and artistic meaning. 
In this respect we have to take issue with Andrius Valevicius, who, having first stated 
rather hastily that Shestov was preparing a book on Turgenev between 1908 and 1910 (the 
correct date is, in fact, 1903), then proceeds to claim that ‘the book deals more with 
questions of literary criticism and with the person of Turgenev himself rather than with 
questions of a philosophical importance’.1 In our view the book indeed deals with the above 
issues -  however, through Shestov’s treatment of them the very core of his philosophical 
stance becomes clear. In fact a stronger statement is true -  that the questions of literary 
criticism and Turgenev’s personality only serve as a springboard for the underlying 
philosophical struggle of Shestov himself.
8.1. Turgenev’s duality. Weltanschauung as an escape from groundlessness.
As was mentioned earlier, Shestov’s work on Turgenev was in a sense a by-product of his 
writing of Apotheosis o f Groundlessness. As Erofeev notes, Shestov was evidently going to
1 Valevicius, p. 50.
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w r ite  a ‘n o r m a l’ b o o k  d e d ic a te d  to  T u r g e n e v ,2 an d  in  fa c t  h a d  c o m p le te d  h a l f  o f  it ,  b u t th e n  
g r e w  tired  an d  w a r y  o f  s u c h  a  s ta te  o f  a ffa ir s .3 He d e c o n str u c te d  th e  h a lf - e r e c te d  b u ild in g  
an d  tu rn ed  to  p a r a d o x ic a l a p h o r ism  in  ord er  to  d e fe a t  a ll c o n s is t e n c y  an d  c o h e r e n c e  to  
a c h ie v e  th e  r e su lt in g  tr iu m p h  o f  fr e e  th o u g h t. ‘B H e n m e e  o(J)opMJieHHe M aT epnana  
T p ed oB ajio , hto6 bi b acepTBy nocjieflOBaTejiBHOCTH G tu ia  npH H eceH a “cB od o^ H aa  mbicjib”. 
He tojibko c jiy u a n H o e  coce^CTBO n p n ^ a B a jio  mbicjih HecBoftcTBeHHBift eft ottchok, ho 
flaace “ HeBHHHBie cok>3bi” 0Ka3BmajiHCB rjw IUecTOBa “ becnom a^H BiM H  THpaHaMH’” ,4 
E r o fe e v  w r ite s ,  q u o t in g  S h e s t o v ’s  o w n  e x p la n a tio n s  fro m  h is  in tr o d u c t io n  to  th e  
Apotheosis.
However, before Shestov changed his mind about the general plan for his new book and 
switched to a more avant-gardist form -  that of aphorism, clearly borrowed from Nietzsche, 
he had written the first part in a conventional style. This unfinished manuscript which was 
found in Shestov’s archive consisted of 146 densely handwritten pages, was dated 
31.07.1903 and had the title Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness. The title and two epigraphs 
from the front page of the manuscript were later used by Shestov for his subsequent book, 
while this particular piece remained unpublished during Shestov’s lifetime. Much of it was 
included, though, by Shestov in the first part of his Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness published 
in January 1905. Three other pieces appeared as journal articles in 1961 and 1978. 
However, the book as a whole was published by Ardis only in 1982 under the title 
Turgenev. Apparently, Shestov wrote most of the materials which constitute this book in 
Switzerland between July and October 1903. In October that year he was urgently 
summoned to Kiev to attend to his sick father. There, in Kiev, as Baranova-Shestova 
speculates, he probably resumed working on the book before finally realising that his 
original plan had to be drastically revised and abandoning his coherently written work on 
Turgenev for the sake of the discrete-aphoristical narrative of Apotheosis o f Groundlessness 
in its present form.5
2 According to Ivanov-Razumnik’s version it was going to be a book on both Turgenev and 
Chekhov (see Ivanov-Razumnik, p. 229)
3 See Erofeev, p. 175.
4 Ibid.
5 See Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 65.
496
Yet, it is significant that this title was originally planned for Shestov’s work on Turgenev. 
For the general idea of the book (a very concept which became hateful for Shestov during 
his work on the manuscript and forced him to redesign the whole structure) is indeed a 
demonstration through the case study of Turgenev how untrustworthy any firm ground in 
fact is, how illusory and unreliable our life’s foundations are (in the form of our morality 
and ethics, let alone the issue of our physical fragility). In brief, he wished to show how any 
existential evolution is a road from the rational illusion of having firm ground under one’s 
feet to the inevitable realisation of one’s ultimate groundlessness and, consequently, of the 
need for a leap into the irrational.
Indeed, Shestov begins his reflections with the description of Turgenev as an heir of 
Pushkin in continuing the realistic tradition initiated by the latter. Yet, a true portrayal of 
reality with all its horrors is too disturbing to be welcome, Shestov insinuates, and this is 
where a ‘Weltanschauung’ (MHpoB033peHne, world outlook) comes to the rescue. Its role in 
literature, Shestov asserts, is to be a magic wand of sorts: ‘c ero noMomtio Bee h to  yro^HO 
MoxceT ofipaTHTBCfl bo Bee h to  yroflHo’.6 At the same time it is akin to a sieve which 
‘nponycicaeT to j ilk o  BO#y h necox, a Bee CK0Jii>K0-HH6ym> KpynHoe h 3HaHHTejn»Hoe 
3a#ep5KHBaeT’.7 Shestov tells us that Turgenev’s world outlook was modelled solely on the 
last word of European culture with its enlightenment, positivist philosophy and scientific 
belief. ‘TypreHeB 6biji o6pa30BaHHeHinHM, KyjitTypHeftrnHM H3 pyccKHx nncaTejieii. 
IIoh th  bck) 5KH3HB CBOK> oh  npOBen 3a rpaHHuen h BnHTan b ce6a Bee, HTO MOTJIO flaTb 
3ana£Hoe npocBemeHHe. [...] O h rnyboxo Bepnji, h to  tojibko 3Hamie, T.e. eBponeHCKaa 
Hayica MoxceT otkpbitb  HejiOBexy r;ia3a Ha >kh3hb h oS'bbchhtb eMy Bee, Tpe6yiomee
Q
odbflCHeHHH’, Shestov explains. According to him Turgenev’s outlook resulted in the 
conviction that every tragedy is followed by a farce, and that this is what Turgenev’s own 
creativity demonstrates to us. By saying this Shestov evidently means that any profound
6 Shestov, Typaem e (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1982), p. 10.
7 Ibid, p. 31.
8 Ibid, p. 11.
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questions of existence are reduced by Turgenev, using his Weltanschauung, to a clear and 
pacifying moral dogma, to a logical corollary of the all-explaining European philosophy.
As an example Shestov offers Turgenev’s article ‘Tropman’s Execution’. Having pointed 
out the extreme power of this piece, Shestov then observes that the feeling of 
groundlessness which Turgenev experienced watching the execution -  ‘3eMJH t h x o  
nonjiBUia no# HoraMH’ -  led him to rush back to firm ground. By this he means that 
Turgenev was ultimately unable to face the insoluble questions of existence, like the one 
which Tropman’s execution presented him with, and escaped under the shield o f his 
ideological dogmas. Remarkably, it is in the conclusion o f the article where Turgenev 
argues for the abolition o f capital punishment (or at least of the accessibility o f the process 
to the general public) which Shestov perceives as the writer’s cowardly surrender: ‘CHOBa 
ropa poflHJia m m i i i b ! Ilocjie TpareflHH aaeTca BoaeBHJit, MnpoB033peHne BCTynaeT b  c b o h  
npaBa h nouBa B03BpamaeTcn noa Horn’ .9 Thus, interestingly, the socially and morally 
grounded rhetoric, part o f Turgenev’s stand as a public figure promoting the progress o f 
European civilisation, does not deserve Shestov’s trust, while the writer’s descriptions of 
his own existential experience when watching the execution are met by Shestov not only 
with unreserved trust, but also with admiration.
This really goes back to the very profound question of the interplay between the selfish and 
selfless sides of the human ego, as well as to artistic and documentary discourse. The 
former problem in fact borders on something fundamental for Shestov’s whole philosophy 
even though he may not voice it as such. Indeed, what he emphasises here is of everlasting 
importance to him: the undeniable value of existential experience against the pointlessness 
(or rather shamefulness and insincerity) of any attempts to wrap it up as socially useful. For 
anything useful has, by definition, utilitarian roots and grows, in Shestov’s eyes, from our 
fear, from our instinct of self-preservation. The latter is par excellence of an immoral 
origin. Quoting Dovlatov ‘TaKOBO jnoboe flencTBHe, b o c h o b c  KOTOporo j i o k h t  3amHTHaa 
peaioiHJi’ . 10 Thus, putting it simply, Shestov cannot fully accept Turgenev’s sincerity in
9 Shestov, Typeem e, p. 13.
10 Dovlatov, I, p. 42.
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defending the humanist ideals, for our morality, he argues, grows from purely utilitarian 
roots. In other words, virtually any seemingly selfless, especially nobly presented act is 
suspicious by definition.
The other issue -  of different discourses -  is also highly relevant to our general discussion 
on Shestov because it returns us to the crucial question of his relationship with aesthetics. 
Indeed, it suggests implicitly that despite Shestov’s repeated claims that beautiful form 
prevents one from seeing the real content behind it, he in fact is captivated by artistic 
descriptions and left untouched by documentary-type conclusions. On the other hand, it 
may serve to prove that artistic mastery is indeed a consequence of the depth of existential 
experience behind it, while the plainly and dully expressed ideological conclusion is more 
artificial. It is impossible to distinguish between the cause and the consequence here -  
whether Shestov intuitively trusts the powerful narrative, sensing real feeling behind it, and 
remains unconcerned with the relative coldness of the epilogue, or whether he takes a 
logical approach and spurns the ideological (rational) conclusion in favour of the passionate 
(irrational) description that precedes it for his own philosophical reasons. In fact both may 
be true, for, in a way, Shestov may be right in implicitly asserting that real poetic artistry 
can only grow out of real feeling, of true existential suffering. Thus the question of 
discursive differences is in fact closely related to the previous question of the relationship 
between our selfish and selfless drives, for it suggests that any considerations of an 
ultimately utilitarian nature (no matter how noble they sound), i.e. those which grow from 
rational thought rather than irrational feeling, are betrayed by the form they ultimately 
acquire. In other words, the artist’s sincerity is always of a poignant form, whereas any 
other form can be viewed as an artistic failure, thus hiding a possible lack of profound 
feeling. (Of course, we note in parenthesis, this argument gains validity only inasmuch as 
the rational and irrational can be separated from each other -  as they were in Shestov’s 
eyes).
All this, in fact, is a recurrence (which emerges sooner rather than later) of Shestov’s usual 
theme of the proximity between idealism and utilitarianism which is a manifestation of his 
central struggle against the traps and falsities of rational thinking. Turgenev is not alone in
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his misconceived belief in rationalism and idealism, Shestov asserts. ‘Ero ycTaMH roBopuT 
Bca eBponeiicKaa h h b h  JiH3aijH5i’,11 whose primary concern, Shestov argues, is to install 
comfort, to pacify any disturbing thoughts. ‘C jiob om  “nojib3a” obbacHaiOTca Kaicne yro^HO 
yacacbi h aaace npecTyiuiemra’. Shestov elaborates on the virtual symbiosis of idealism 
and utilitarianism throughout his book in order to disavow the former, as one would expect 
of him, and we are yet to return to his analysis below. However, inscribing Turgenev’s 
personal case into a broader philosophical picture of the times, Shestov explains that 
Turgenev was quick to get intoxicated by the preaching of European philosophical thought. 
Because he was ‘M arioiM , “ryMaHHbiM” h cjio b ck o m  h  HecoMHeHHbiM H^eajmcTOM : b 
m o jto a o c th  o h  aa)Ke npomeji imcojiy Terejra’ . 13 It is Hegel who taught Turgenev the huge 
importance of a full and complete, rounded ‘Weltanschauung’. This Westernised approach 
to life was a distinct characteristic of Turgenev and as such singled him out from the 
majority of great Russian writers. It put him in direct opposition, if not altogether creating a 
personal animosity, with such Russian classics as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Yet, at the same 
time, Shestov implies that Turgenev could never fully abandon his Russian roots, he could 
not quite defeat his deepest nature, and as such he represented for Shestov a fascinating 
case study (as well as one that was very convenient for his purposes).
Moreover, we believe that this fundamental conflict between Western rational thought and 
a Russian wild irrationalist search for final answers is too close to home for Shestov with 
the ongoing inner struggle between his education and cultural habits on one hand and his 
subversive, passionate ideas and tormenting doubts on the other. Thus in Turgenev Shestov 
must have found a perfect case of idealism and rationalism confronting their opposites with 
the latter ultimately taking the upper hand (i.e. irrational drives replacing speculative 
constructions). At least this was Shestov’s vision of Turgenev, his interpretation of this 
seemingly European acculturated thinker who in fact concealed within, as Shestov argues, a 
seed of doubt and disbelief which eventually grew to destroy his comfortable Western 
Weltanschauung. This is the main theme of Shestov’s Turgenev and the entire book in fact
11 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 13.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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consists of more detailed variations. Thus, once again, Shestov inscribes the writer into his 
own existential paradigm, trying to prove that in the struggle between ‘life’ and ‘idea’ (i.e. 
soul and mind) it is life which ultimately wins. Thus his book on Turgenev directly 
anticipates his more mature and purely philosophical works such as On Job's Scales and, 
even more, Athens and Jerusalem.
It is highly unlikely that at the time of writing about Turgenev, i.e. only twenty years after 
the writer’s death, Shestov was familiar with Turgenev’s detailed biography, as those were 
still early days. Even more curious then is Shestov’s perceptive understanding of the writer 
as being essentially tom between his, as it were, enthusiastic convinced ‘Westernism’ on 
the one hand and his wild and passionate ‘Russianness’ on the other. For these two poles 
reflect quite a dramatic divide between Turgenev’s paternal and maternal inheritance. As 
Frank Seeley puts it, Ivan Turgenev’s parents were ‘an ill assorted couple’ -  with the father 
being impoverished, handsome and thirteen years junior to his wife, who was wealthy, but 
‘without looks or graces’ . 14 Moreover, the father’s side ‘belonged to the ancient nobility’, 
while the mother’s ancestors ‘were undistinguished country gentry’ . 15 Also, most 
importantly in our view, ‘the opposition of background was matched by an opposition of 
temperament: the colonel -  cool, reserved, controlled (though capable of flashes of rage on 
occasion) and masterful; his wife -  possessive, tyrannical, passionate in the dark and 
violent tradition of her family’ . 16
The implications which Shestov draws from Turgenev’s work, which will unfold gradually 
in this chapter as they do in his book, of Turgenev’s actual duality, his inner schism 
between the cultured, indoctrinated and reserved on the one hand, and the wild, passionate 
and unmeasured on the other bear the clear imprint of the two influences that young Ivan 
was undergoing. Notably, he openly, or consciously, resisted the latter and opted for the 
former, but this is only true if one takes things at face value. Shestov’s suspicion of 
Turgenev’s perpetual, even if often concealed, longing for the irrational, of his manifestly
14 Frank Friedeberg Seeley, Turgenev. A  Reading o f  his Fiction  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 7.
15 Ibid.
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European rationalistic layer being just a thin coating covering his disturbed and passionate 
soul which eventually led him, according to Shestov, to grow tired of his Western 
speculative habits, rings much more true than is conventionally supposed.
Of course, in his usual way Shestov is keen to discuss Turgenev the man, incorporating as 
much biographical data as was known to him into his investigation of Turgenev through the 
writer’s literary work. Still, at best it remains an informed guess, but even more valuable 
for that, when we think of its actual plausibility. Of course, the ‘final truth’ in such matters 
always remains a matter of opinion. However, Shestov’s voice is definitely not alone, and 
echoes some much later (even modem) criticism which, to some extent, goes against the 
grain. Thus Richard Peace speaks, in a similar way to Shestov, of a ‘strange dichotomy of 
western blandness and a certain Russian darkness’ which is ‘reflected in his [Turgenev’s] 
writing’ . 17 He points out that ‘to his foreign friends, Turgenev was seen as a fairly bland, 
easy going liberal, who was, perhaps rather too gentle. [...] but fellow Russian writers saw 
another side of his character’. 18 Peace mentions the fact that Turgenev managed to quarrel 
with virtually every Russian writer. ‘It is remarkable that such an apparently “soft”, liberal 
man abroad, should have provoked such hostility at home’ , 19 Peace writes. Just like 
Shestov, Peace sees ‘a darker side to Turgenev’s talent’ in contrast to the conventional view 
of Turgenev’s oeuvre as ‘concerned with love in the idyllic setting of a country estate, 
where the civilized values are those of the Russian gentry’ .20 Peace traces Dostoevskian 
motives in some of Turgenev’s writings and comments that for Turgenev ‘love itself has its 
dark side’ .21 These darker elements he connects first of all to Turgenev’s personal youthful 
experience, depicted in Tlepem jno6oeb (First Love, 1860), which resonates with Shestov’s 
intense attention to the existential roots of the literary experience.
17 Richard Peace, 'Ivan Turgenev', entry in The (on-line) Literary Encyclopedia, 8 Sep. 2004. The 
Literary Dictionary Company. Accessed 23 February 2007. URL: 
http://www.litencyc.com/php/speople.php?rec=true&UID=4475.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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In a similar way, subversive to the more canonical image of Turgenev, Frank Seeley creates 
a portrait of the writer which in a certain sense also parallels Shestov’s unconventional 
approach in its focus on Turgenev’s intrinsic duality. But if Shestov’s reasoning is based on 
Turgenev’s characters and their voices and exchanges, Seeley’s absorbs into it also, as an 
integral part, Turgenev’s somewhat ambivalent attitude to nature. ‘Turgenev is unique 
among his peers in his personal love-hate relationship with nature’ ,22 Seeley writes 
revealingly, explaining Turgenev’s perception of nature as both Great Mother and creator 
on the one hand and a cruel, ruthless and indifferent destroyer on the other. ‘Within the 
frame of two-faced nature Turgenev’s personages live their little day -  or wrestle with the 
problem of how to live -  or try to live but fail. [...] The basic duality of nature is reflected 
in every major aspect of human life, including the author’s apprehension of it’ ,23 Seeley 
notes and explains, in a way which highly resonates with Shestov’s, the dichotomy of 
Turgenev’s realistic approach on the one hand and his poetic approach on the other, and his 
vision of philosophy as a form of art rather than science. Thus both Seeley and Shestov 
perceive Turgenev’s inner duality (even if somewhat differently understood) as 
fundamental to his whole being (and subsequently to his entire oeuvre), and both ultimately 
share the vision of this duality as springing from the conflict between mind and soul.
8.2. Western versus Russian as juxtaposition of mind and soul. Turgenev as a counter­
balance to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.
Curiously, at the time Shestov translates this unambiguous juxtaposition between mind and 
soul, rational and irrational (which later became fundamental for his entire philosophy) to a 
national plane -  more precisely, to the juxtaposition between Western civilisation and 
Russian ‘wildness’. He begins this by arguing that Turgenev, whose delicate soul was 
enchanted by the sweet tunes of Western philosophy and who remained almost up until his 
death a convinced Westemiser still could not quite become fully European.24 Having made 
a point of this being a reflection of the writer’s central conflict, which is found by Shestov
22 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 331.
23 Ibid.
24 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 15.
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everywhere in Turgenev’s literary work, he then proceeds to quote a proverb national in 
flavour. ‘Ha hSm onpaB/jajiact CTapmmafl nocjiOBima -  nocKpebn pyccKoro, Han/jenn* 
TaTapHHa’, Shestov writes about Turgenev.
Ironically, this is supposed to mean that under the thin coating of civilisation there is a wild 
spirit concealed, and the roles are then altered: Russian comes to be read as European, i.e. 
indoctrinated by Western philosophical ideas, while Tatar is read as Russian, i.e. wild, free 
of educational, cultural habits. However, for Shestov this risque labelling does not carry 
any negative meaning. Instead he can be suspected here of being on the side of the 
Slavophiles against the Westemisers, only with his own meaning given to both groups. 
Namely, it is not political or even social implications that are his concerns. In those terms 
his unambiguously critical attitude to the Slavophiles was expressed most directly in his 
Gift o f  Prophecy (on Dostoevsky’s conservative political views, discussed in Chapter 6 ). 
There Shestov condemned the Slavophiles’ radical nationalism and reduced their whole 
achievement to the ability to translate ‘6e3 nocTopoHHeii noMomn [...] c HeMemcoro h 
(J)paHijy3CKoro “Russland, Russland fiber alles’” .26 So, instead, his concerns here are, as 
usual, of a philosophical and existential nature. He is far from assigning to Russia some 
chosen destiny. Perhaps being a Jew by birth also inoculated him from such considerations. 
Thus, it is not Russia’s special role that is at stake here, it is rather the poison of 
rationalism, the harm of the enslaving role of any ideology which comes from the West and 
inscribes itself into the hitherto essentially blank page of Russian philosophical thought that 
Shestov is preoccupied with. Consequently he views Russia’s relative backwardness as its 
strength in that it has not been spoilt by any dogma and thus is open to independent 
thought. A similar phenomenon can be observed in Shestov’s taking pleasure if not pride in 
the fact that he received no formal philosophical education and hence can philosophise with 
the advantage of free vision, in an unconstrained fashion.
Such considerations, by having a somewhat utopian flavour, in fact bring Shestov quite 
close to the general spirit of the time -  of the Silver Age period of Russian culture with its
25 Shestov, Typaeuee, p. 16.
26 Shestov, UpopoHecKuu dap, p. 217.
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gen era l atm osp h ere o f  u top ia . Indeed , as S ergei A v er in tsev  ap tly  p o in ted  out, ‘ecjin  
cym ecTByeT o6 iu h h  3HaMeHaTejn>, n o #  k o to pbih  m o )kho  He 6e3  ocHOBaHHB noABecTH h 
CHMBOJTH3M, H (J)yTypH3M, h  ofilljeCTBeHHyK) peaJIBHOCTB nOCJiepeBOJHOUHOHHOH P o cch h , 
to  3HaMeHaTejieM st h m  SyjjeT yMOHacTpoeHHe yTonHH b  caMBix pa3JiHHHBix BapnaHTax -
(|)HJI0C0(J)CK0-aHTp0n0J10rHHeCK0M, 3CTeTHHeCKOM, 3THHeCKOM, JIHHTBHCTHUeCKOM,
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nojiHTnnecKOM ’. Averintsev emphasises that ‘peuB  h a c t  He o coiuiajiBHOH yronH H  xax 
acaHpe HHTejuieKTyajiBHOH AejrrejiBHOCTH, a h m ch h o  0 6  yMOHacTpoeHHH, 0 6  aTMOc<j)epe’.28
Shestov then develops his ‘national’ juxtaposition by giving a brilliant comparative analysis 
(which was already quoted in Chapter 1) of European cultural and scientific advances 
against Russian attempts to swallow progress rapidly without a slow Western evolutionary 
development. As a result Russia was poisoned by such a drastic leap and hugely 
misinterpreted European achievements by trying to interpret perfectly rational advances as 
pure magic, full of the supernatural and miraculous, Shestov argues. Russian subsequent 
disappointment with the West is no fault of the latter, he asserts. For Russians read into the 
words of European progress what they wanted to be the case rather than what actually was 
the case. Europe invented ideals and ideas precisely because it had stopped believing in 
miracles and realised that the task of humans is in achieving better arrangements here, on
90earth. In Russia, however, ideals had been forever confused with miracles, Shestov writes. 
Yet, this carries a positive message for him.
Indeed, he connects Russian freedom (i.e. being free from what he perceives as European 
cultural dogmas) to the fearless character of Russian literature. Erofeev sees in this a certain 
inner contradiction of Shestov’s stance.
CnpaBe,zviHBo OTMenaa cjiohchbih h npoTHBopeHHBbiH xapaicrep AyxoBHoro o6m em «i Pocchh c 
EBponoft, IIIecTOB nrHopnpyeT to, hto SecKopwcTHbie noncKH hcthhm, npeflnpHHJiTbie pyccKHM 
HCKyCCTBOM, KOHTpaCTHpyiOT C HCBOJIbHOH “KOpbICTHOCTbK>” ero COdCTBCHHOH KOHUenUHH,
27 Sergei Averintsev, ‘C y A B d a  h  BecTb Ocnna M aH A ejibu iT aM a’ in Ocnn M aH A ejibuiTaM , 
Cohumhur: e deyx moMax (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1990), vol. I: CmuxomeopeHWi, 
p. 23.
28 Ibid.
29 Shestov, Typaenee, pp. 16-17.
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CTpeMHmeHCH 0CB0 6 0 AHTbCH OT KyJlbTypHOH H n p H p O flH O H  “orpaHHMeHHOCTH” AJia Toro, HTo6bI 
MOHCHO 6 bIJIO npOH3HeCTH: “B MHpe HeT HHHerO HeB03MO^ CHOro”. 0
In other words, Erofeev perceives Shestov’s bias towards ‘uncultured’ Russian literature 
against established European thought as growing from Shestov’s search for salvation, for a 
way out from existential horrors. This is indeed a recurrence of Shestov’s eternal theme: 
instead of providing real answers Western speculative philosophy comes up only with 
deceptive consolations which serve as a gauge that smothers free enquiry, stops a natural 
scream in the face of the tragic human predicament.
By the same token Shestov implies throughout his writings that it is ultimately human fear 
that stands in the way of the truth. As we saw, already in his Dostoevsky and Nietzsche he 
declared that the most fundamental human feature is a fear of truth. Thus, Shestov believes, 
humanity shuts itself from the real mysteries and enigmas of life by this protective cover of 
comforting lies, for reality is too damaging for the human psyche to cope with. Hence, in 
his view the true giants are those writers and thinkers who dared to look beyond culturally 
imposed restrictions and beliefs and to challenge common truths. Western culture stifled by 
its rational philosophy could not do it, but Russian writers such as Pushkin, Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky could. Thus in his juxtaposition of Russia and the West Shestov contrasts the 
above Russian classics with Turgenev, who could not dare to step over accepted 
boundaries, who voluntarily confined himself to the narrow cell of European philosophical 
teachings and did not even attempt to break away almost until his death. In other words, 
while Tolstoy and Dostoevsky burst out of any cultural, philosophical boundaries into the 
unknown and irrational with all its horrors, Turgenev diligently and obediently grazed on 
the fields of comfortable European theories. This is the image of the writer that Shestov 
paints. To Turgenev, he writes, ‘T ojictoh h ^ octocbckhh Ka3ajincb cjihiiikom
4>aHTaCTHHeCKHMH, CJIHIIIKOM CaMOHaneAHHblMH B HX Aep3KOM, HH Ha HCM nO-BHAHMOMy 
He ocHOBaHHOM >KejiaHHH BbipBaTbCfl H3 BjiacTH rocnoACTBOBaBiiiHX Ha 3anaAe, no A 
HMeHeM HecoMHeHHbix h c th h , h a c k ’.31 Furthermore, Shestov claims that Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky played the part of Turgenev’s conscience with its function to disturb and
30 Erofeev, p. 176.
31 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 19.
506
trouble: ‘M H e KaxceTca, h t o  T o j ic to h  h  ^ o c t o c b c k h h  6 b u ih , ecjin  mo>kho TaK Bbipa3HTbca, 
coBecTBio TypreH eBa, cb o h m h  nepBobbiTHbiMH co m h ch h h m h  o h h  He pa3 HapymajiH noKoft 
eBponeftcKOH yfiexc^eHHOCTH T ypreH eBa’.32 At th e  sam e tim e , S h esto v  n o tes , T u rgen ev  
p la y ed  a sim ilar  ro le  for them  b eca u se  h e  ‘cBoefi HacwmeHHOCTbio eBponeiiCKHM 
o6pa30BaHHeM HeMajio CMymaji ^ocToeBCKoro h  T oncT oro h  6m ji, b 3 to m  CMbicjie, h x  
coBecTbio. O h h , 6e3  b c h k o to  coMHeHHH, 3aBH/jOBajiH ypaBHOBemeHHOCTH, KOTopaa HMejia 
3a c o 6 o h  TaxoH onjiOT, xax  b cb  eBponeHCKaa ijh b h  jiH3aii,HX’.
8.3. Turgenev’s existential portrait. Shestov’s theme of the revelations of death.
However, in this opposition in which Shestov quite clearly takes the side of Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky with their fearless daring against Turgenev’s complacent and enthusiastic 
apprenticeship, he by no means denies Turgenev’s goodwill, neither does he blame the 
writer for hypocrisy, but he does essentially imply Turgenev’s short-sightedness and his 
resulting self-delusion. Shestov constantly repeats the point that Turgenev did not suffer 
enough, did not undergo any excruciating torment and thus was not sufficiently perceptive, 
but instead was happy to hold on to European (ultimately deceptive) rules. Because for 
Shestov, we recall, any true philosophy is bom only out of extreme despair and it is tragic 
experience alone that can open our eyes to the ultimate truth. ‘B h jjh o , o h  eme 
He,aocTaTOHHO HazyiOMHJicfl’ ,34 Shestov writes and explains that
npHmaaceHHaa, nomrmafl, ecTecTBeHHaa >KH3Hb Ka3anacb eMy He t o , h to6 m  oneHb npexpacHOH, 
xopomen, bo  bchko m  cjiynae o t h k w > He h h u ic h c k h  SeflHOH, [ . . . ]  a Tax, He cjih iiikom  xopoiueii h  He 
cjih iiikom  jiypHOH, cymecTBOBaTb Bce-TaKH m o 5k h o  6biJio. H Aaace, xpoMe Toro, m o^ cho 6 m jio  npn 
cjiynae 3Ty acH3Hb onpaBflbiBaTb h  jiaace BOCXBanaTb. K 3TOMy TypreHeB CHHTan ce6a o6a3aHHbiM h  
CBOK) o6a3aHHOCTb OH HCnOJIHHJI CO CBOeil obblHHOH HObpOCOBeCTHOCTblO.35
Not without an ironic twist, this is particularly interesting in relation to Pauline Viardot’s 
description of Turgenev as ‘the saddest of men’36 and given that Shestov was fully aware
32 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 71.
33 Ibid, p. 72.
34 Ibid, p. 26.
35 Ibid.
36 See Letter 1190 of 14 Mar. 1862 to Countess E. E. Lambert (in I. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe co6pcmue 
coHUHenuu u nuceM e 30 moMax (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1980-1982). Cited 
in Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading of his Fiction, p. 30.
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that Turgenev’s personal life, perhaps as a consequence of his rather sad childhood, was far 
from happy. Shestov commented on this that ‘jimmaa 5KH3HB ero onem* yxc rpycTHO 
cKJia^biBaJiacB h He /jaBajia eMy nojiHoro yqoBjieTBopeHHfl’ .37 Yet this only reinforces for 
Shestov the statement o f the insufficiency of Turgenev’s suffering: ‘KaaceTca, 6 ynT0  6 b i  o h  
HHKor^a He /jbimaji nojiHOH rpyaBio, x o t h  c  Apyroft CTopoHbi —  eMy no-BH^HMOMy 
HHKor^a He npHxoflHJiocb 3a,m>ixaTi>ca’ ,38 Shestov writes. At the same time Frank Seeley 
when depicting Turgenev’s personality talks o f ‘deep melancholy’ which ‘imbues both his 
[Turgenev’s] work and his life from early on, fed openly and directly by his fear o f death 
and his sense of the precariousness o f life, and, less consciously, by a sense of
I Q
unworthiness or guilt’. Turgenev’s propensity for depression and hypochondria is also 
well known. Yet, for Shestov this is the case of a personality (or of a life) of mostly 
‘insufficient’ suffering. Perhaps a misapprehension here is concealed in judging personal 
suffering not by its internal intensity (often concealed from outside gazes -  the more 
reserved the person is, the higher the sense of integrity s/he possesses), but by its external 
manifestations (for instance, through literary work). Turgenev, may well have been 
precisely the type of discreet personality for whom any loud outpouring of his soul was 
simply unacceptable.
For, thinking of his extreme idealism (the very vice that Shestov incriminates him for), one 
gets a sense of the particular torment caused by the discrepancy between such high ideals 
and actual reality. Thus Turgenev’s life-long passion for Pauline Viardot easily inscribes 
into a perfectionist, maximalist type of personality that needs a perfect idol, a constant 
object of worship, the perpetual deity incarnate. Not surprising then is the fact that Seeley 
writes that for Turgenev Viardot was a kind of goddess.40 One also wonders if  this tendency 
(this need for worship) was not a consequence of Turgenev’s tyrannical mother whose 
obsessive presence leaves a negative space which demands to be filled by its positive 
double who would rule no less powerfully over Turgenev’s emotions. Thus the rebellious 
incident of 1850, when Turgenev in all intents and purposes commissioned by Pauline
37 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 23.
38 Ibid.
39 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his F iction , p. 30.
40 See Ibid, p. 13.
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rebelled against his mother in order to liberate himself from her power financially, looks 
not like a genuine revolt, but as if  there had been a change of female power in his life.
However, his existential portrait appears indeed to be very suitable to enter the frame of 
Shestov’s quest and in fact points to the roots of the latter. For it poses the question of 
whether idealists are indeed enslaved by the ideal, by the need for an object of worship 
which ultimately restricts their spiritual freedom. Or does the ideal, on the contrary, liberate 
them from the chains of the mundane and meaningless into the higher realms of human 
spirituality? It is quite clear that this is one of those dialectical issues of existence where 
both antitheses are true, and the judgement in every individual case depends entirely on the 
world-view of the subject. However, Shestov is clearly convinced that this is not a matter of 
taste, and this forces him to undermine the whole pillar of Western thought by 
unambiguously asserting the enslaving function of idealism, especially as far as existing 
‘European’ morality is concerned.
Yet, as Andreas Valevicius correctly observes in his book on Shestov, a distinction has to 
be made when defining Shestov in relation to idealism, between idealism in the 
philosophical, ‘Hegelian’ sense and the outlook of a person who has ideals. Indeed, it is 
quite clear that Shestov’s struggle originated from idealism in the above ‘Turgenevan’ 
sense, which is the frame o f mind that sees the world and life as ‘none other than the 
continuous striving o f the good to vanquish evil’ and believes that ‘people who bear the 
idea of the good are constantly growing in number and their conquering evil is only a 
question of time’ [ ‘h o o h b  ecTb He h t o  HHoe, ksk  nocTOflHHoe CTpeMJieHne [...] ao6 pa k  
nobe^e nan  3 j i o m ’ ; ‘h o c h t c j i h  H^en ao6 pa nocTOHHHO yBejiHHHBaiOTca b  c b o c m  HHCJie h  
no6 e#a h x  ecTb t o j i b k o  Bonpoc BpeMeHH’] ,41 as young Shestov stated in his attempt at 
creative writing. However, abandoning this type of idealism later in life in his ‘total re- 
evaluation of all values’ did not change the nucleus of his personality and his passion for a 
better world and human liberation from misery and death. The issue was only in what for 
him constituted the source o f human tragedy and how to defeat it, but the main idea of
41 Excerpts from Shestov’s youthful stories, cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 14. English 
translations are cited in Valevicius, p. 134.
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salvation for mankind (which is a purely idealistic concept) stayed intact and was inscribed 
well into an idealistic world view. Thus rebelling against the ways people live, reason and 
believe was for Shestov only a battle against the means rather than the cause. The nature of 
his own beliefs remained humanistic throughout, and its extreme form only reinforces their 
essentially idealistic flavour (as we pointed out before).
Thus, in a sense, Shestov must have seen in Turgenev his own youthful example with the 
difference that while he himself changed his convictions later on (and irreversibly so, as he 
believed) Turgenev remained faithful to them almost until the end. The reality was, though, 
as we shall demonstrate, that on one hand Shestov’s idealism in many ways remained 
irrevocable (impossible* to uproot), and on the other that Turgenev was much more 
ambivalent than Shestov suggests.
Thus Shestov’s assertions that Turgenev insufficiently suffered are based on the fact that 
the writer remained consistently idealistic, while Shestov implies that the only road that 
extreme suffering may take is through rejecting high ideals and lofty rhetoric. The latter can 
indeed be abandoned as superfluous in desperate times; however, the nature of human 
ideals is much more resilient and profound than the verbal framing they may take (possibly 
acquiring an inescapable tinge of hypocrisy). The examples of those who died for an Idea 
can serve as proof. At the same time, for many, an idealistic system of beliefs is indeed a 
convenient shelter to hide from the chaos of existence and the terror of death. It is against 
the utilitarian and hypocritical nature of the latter that Shestov rebelled. In the same way 
behind Turgenev’s humanistic proclamations he ultimately distinguished, if  we decipher his 
implicit logic, simple human fear as the only real root. In other words, Shestov suspected 
Turgenev of existential cowardice and, somewhat paradoxically, of insufficient belief. 
Paradoxically, because according to Shestov this belief was not sustainable in the face of 
death (at the very least because any ideological construction collapses in tragic 
circumstances).
Thus Shestov’s implication is that Turgenev, not capable of facing reality as it is (even if 
without realising this to the full), took on the rationalistic beliefs which basically freed him
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from the need to cope with horrors. This is exactly what the description of Tropman’s 
execution implies for Shestov -  Turgenev is incapable of coping with the ground drifting 
from under his feet, and therefore rushes back to the idealistic conclusions that his 
European convictions readily provide him with (i.e. he demands a change of legislation and 
talks of civil rights, social obligations and other issues which are, in Shestov’s view, 
designed only to brush over the tragic questions). That is why a farce, he says, follows a 
tragedy. As we saw in the previous chapter, Dostoevsky’s reaction to an execution that he 
is witnessing is the exact opposite of Turgenev’s -  instead of turning away at the crucial 
moment he peers right into the scene, thus representing an essentially opposite way of 
dealing with reality. For Shestov this opposition is unambiguous and represents 
respectively the two aforementioned types of perception: Russian versus European, daring 
versus cautioun, life versus the idea of life.
Yet, to say unequivocally that Turgenev was o f a cowardly nature and afraid o f life (as well 
as death) would not be entirely fair. For being afraid is one side o f the coin, the other is the 
actual efforts to conquer one’s own fears. For one thing he was not a religious believer in 
the direct sense o f the word. As Seeley writes, ‘although he professes [...] to keep an open 
mind as regards the existence o f God, he had certainly closed it to the possibility of a 
personal afterlife’ .42 This means that Turgenev could not afford intellectually this particular 
refuge from existential horrors (which by itself may be a sign o f honesty and bravery), for a 
true belief, if  it can be attained, is a way out o f such fears. But if  this, as can be argued, is 
not a matter o f choice, examples of his personal boldness are; and it is in this vein that 
Seeley describes Turgenev’s ultimate struggle with death: ‘in his last long years of hopeless 
pain he faced it as bravely as his own Bazarov’ .43 Regardless o f what he must have felt in 
the depth of his soul, he was capable of writing then to Dr L. B. Bertenson that he was calm 
and courageous: ‘a coBepmeHHO cnoxoHHO CMOTpio uepTy b  rjia3a [...] Ho noBTopaio, 
h h c k o j ib k o  He yH M Baio’ .44 Similarly, he would risk entailing serious consequences when 
escaping from his confinement on his estate (ordered by the emperor for Turgenev’s
42 Seeley, Turgenev. A  Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 330.
43 Ibid.
44 Letter 6079 to Dr L. B. Bertenson of 3 Jan. 1883 (in I. S. Turgenev, Flonnoe co6panue 
coHuuenuu u nuceM e 30 moMax). Cited in Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading of his Fiction, p. 338.
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publication in Moscow, despite its ban in St Petersburg, of the obituary to Gogol) to see 
Pauline Viardot on her last visit to Russian capitals (thus rising to what he believed to be 
the heights of love and devotion).
Generally, it is the (at least attempted) consistency of his words and actions which points to 
the genuine depth and strength of his beliefs. Yet, without contradiction, Shestov’s sense of 
the volatile nature of Turgenev’s emotional strengths and of his resulting tendency towards 
a firm basis for his convictions seems perceptive enough. Turgenev’s indisputable sense of 
worthlessness and personal insecurity may stem from the same root -  a tyrannical and 
passionate mother who feverishly loved Ivan and singled him out of her sons as her 
favourite. It is almost a commonplace in psychology that such a background is extremely 
unhealthy, leading to those very features in a child -  feelings of insecurity and guilt. Ivan 
Turgenev was obviously a very, sensitive boy who suffered quite a lonely childhood. As 
Seeley puts it, ‘how he hungered for his father’s affection we read in First Love; how ready 
he was to pour out his heart to anyone who showed feeling for him appears touchingly in 
the five letters -  the only ones to survive from his childhood’ .45 Seeley also points out that 
Turgenev’s mother is often blamed for ‘breaking her son’s spirit’ and causing his notorious 
weakness of will.46 Yet, Seeley warns against making too much of this, for ‘Turgenev’s 
self-denigration on this score tends to be couched in hyperbolic terms’ .47
Turgenev’s fear of life should therefore be interpreted more as his over-sensitive awareness 
and apprehension of the precariousness of life (mentioned earlier), resulting in his need and 
longing for emotional support. However, due precisely to this profound insecurity which 
largely explains his extreme idealism, Shestov’s persistent insinuations that accuse 
Turgenev of cautiousness which borders on cowardice are not without merit. Yet, it is 
equally clear that Turgenev did everything he could to live up to his convictions and to 
exercise courage whenever at all possible, and that it is his convictions which help him to 
exude this courage. In fact, when Shestov claims that lofty ideals are ultimately useless, one
45 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 8.
46 Ibid, p. 10.
47 Ibid.
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can argue that Turgenev’s life shows, on the contrary, how they helped him to float on the 
surface of existence, without drowning him completely in depression and inactivity, how 
they provided him with a constant guiding star whose distant light forever beckoned him to 
struggle on.
In other words, one could argue that high ideals are useful first and foremost for those who 
are too subtle and thus weak, and who consequently need ideological crutches to survive. 
And these crutches do help them through, whether deceitfully or not (which is an open- 
ended question anyway). Thus one way to a symbolic interpretation of Shestov’s spiritual 
activity is to portray him as an honest doctor who may actually damage the sick through his 
very honesty by telling them about their hopeless situation. Of course, he offers his own 
way to salvation that he deems the only one acceptable, but his ideas are not necessarily 
shared. In other words, Shestov as it were stands next to Pushkin, who utters the words 
‘t l m b i  h h 3 k h x  h c t h h  H aM  flopoHce Hac B 0 3 B B iin a io m H H  o b M a H ’48 and tries to explain that on 
the contrary deception will remain deception no matter how lofty, and thus is to be 
abandoned. He does not believe in this particular (idealistic) deception’s rescuing 
properties, and with the persistence and force of an extremist wants the whole of mankind 
to choose another way instead. That is why, one feels, Igor Balakhovsky, as we saw in 
Chapter 7, compared Shestov to the Bolsheviks (even if in virtual terms only) -  and the 
famous painting featuring Lenin with an outstretched hand springs to mind -  where the 
future leader prophesies to his mother: ‘We shall go another way! ’.
It is for this reason, one can argue, that Shestov portrays as a fearful weakness what can be 
interpreted as Turgenev’s ultimate inner strength: as it were, the obstinate bravery of his 
last years when he upheld his ideal to the last. Thus when describing Turgenev’s last years, 
that is to say the time when for Shestov, by definition, one parts with any pretence in the 
face of death and realises that there is nothing to lose any more because the game (of life) is 
over anyway, Shestov still blames the writer for sticking to his old speculative 
constructions, for being afraid of giving up his old ideals, as this would prove the beliefs of 
his whole life wrong and futile. ‘Bot hto 3HaHHT cnjia npHBLiHKn! Ha CMepTHOM o,ape
48 A. S. Pushkin, Tepoir’ in Tlojinoe co6pmue conmeHuu e 10 moMax, vol. 2, p. 251.
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T y p r e H e B ,  H 3M yH eH H B m  5 k h 3 h b io  h  y>Ke H azm oM jieH H B iH  6 o jie 3 H B io , B ee  e m e  n p o A O jm a e T  
3a m H m a T B  C T apB ie “ nocB iJiK H ” ’,49 S h e s t o v  c o m m e n t s  o n  T u r g e n e v ’s  r e a c t i o n  t o  T o l s t o y ’s  
Confession. ‘O  KaKHX “ n o c B iJ iic a x ”  ro B o p H T  T y p re H e B  m b i H e 3H aeM , h o  H e CTpaHHO j ih ,  h t o  
H3M yHeHHBIH, H a^JlO M JieHH BIH  HCJIOBeK, JX HH K OTOporO  nOHTH COHTeHBI, 6 0 HTCH
H n r n j iH 3M a! ’ , S h e s t o v  e x c l a i m s  a n d  e l a b o r a t e s :  ‘T .  e .  6 o h t c h ,  h t o  n p aB A H B o e  h  C M ejioe  
c j i o b o  n o A o p B e T  A O B e p n e  k  TOM y “ M H p o B 0 3 3 p eH H io ” , K O T opoe  o h ,  T y p r e H e B , npoB O A H Ji 
T a x  M H o ro  jieT , h t o  3 t o  C M ejio e  c j i o b o  n p H B eA eT  k  M panH O M y O T p n u a H H io  b m c c t o  B e c e j io r o  
y T B ep jK A eH H a! ’ .50
B u t  S h e s t o v ’s  u l t i m a t e  a i m  i n  h i s  b o o k  i s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  T u r g e n e v ’s  c l i n g i n g  t o  t h e  o ld  
c o n v i c t i o n s  e v e n t u a l l y  g a v e  w a y  w h e n  h e  f i n a l l y  r e a l i s e d  t h e i r  s h e e r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  h e l p  h i m  i n  
h i s  h o p e l e s s  p r e d i c a m e n t .  T h u s  S h e s t o v ’s  u s u a l  p a t t e r n  r e v e a l s  i t s e l f  i n  h i s  Turgenev w i t h  
d i s t i n c t  c la r i t y .  H e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w h e n  o n e  i s  o n  a  t r a g i c  t h r e s h o l d  o n e  a b a n d o n s  o n e ’s  
t a m e d  a n d  c o m f o r t i n g  r a t i o n a l i s m  a s  n o  l o n g e r  h e l p f u l  a n d  c o n s o l i n g  a n d  l e a p s  t o  t h e  
i r r a t i o n a l ,  w h e t h e r  i t  b e  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h  o r  j u s t  a  g e n e r a l  s e a r c h  f o r  t h e  m i r a c u l o u s .  H o w e v e r ,  
w h a t  S h e s t o v  s e e m s  t o  b e  i g n o r i n g  h e r e  i s  t h e  c r u c i a l  f a c t  t h a t  T u r g e n e v  h a d  n o t  a  s h o r t ­
l i v e d ,  b u t  a  ‘l i f e - l o n g  t e r r o r  o f  d e a t h ’,51 a s  S e e l e y  p u t s  i t ,  d e r i v i n g  a s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  i t  
t h e  w r i t e r ’s  t o t a l  d i s b e l i e f  i n  a  p e r s o n a l  a f t e r l i f e .  ‘H e n c e  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  m e l a n c h o l y ’ a n d  
‘h e n c e  t h e  e l e g i a c  n o t e  [ . . . ]  a t  t h e  r o o t  o f  h i s  c e l e b r a t i o n  o f  b e a u t y ’,52 a s  S e e l e y  w r i t e s .
I m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  T u r g e n e v ’s  p e r m a n e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r a n s i e n t  ( l a t e  i n  l i f e )  
f e a r  o f  d e a t h  u n d e r m i n e s  S h e s t o v ’s  w h o l e  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  T h u s  t h o s e  n e w  m o t i f s  t h a t  S h e s t o v  
d i s c e r n s  i n  T u r g e n e v ’s  l a t e  w o r k s  m u s t  b e  d u e  t o  s o m e  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  r a t h e r  t h a n  h i s  a c tu a l  
a p p r o a c h i n g  d e a t h  ( e v e n  t h o u g h  h i s  f e a r s  m i g h t  h a v e  i n t e n s i f i e d  w i t h  i t ) .  I n  f a c t  T u r g e n e v ’s  
l a s t  y e a r s  s p e n t  n e x t  t o  P a u l i n e  -  t h e  l o v e  o f  h i s  l i f e  -  c o u l d  b e  c a l l e d  h a p p y .  F o r  P a u l i n e  
a n d  h e r  c h i l d r e n  c l e a r l y  b e c a m e  h i s  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t  a n d  p r e o c c u p a t i o n ,  E v e r y t h i n g  e l s e ,  
i n c l u d i n g  h i s  t r a v e l s  t o  R u s s i a  a n d  s o c i a l i s i n g  w i t h  F l a u b e r t  a n d  h i s  m i l i e u ,  e v e n  i n c l u d i n g  
h i s  c r e a t i v e  w r i t i n g ,  t o o k  a  s e c o n d  p l a c e .  T h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c a n  b e  t a k e n  a s  e v i d e n c e
49 Shestov, Typaenee, pp. 35-36.
50 Ibid, p. 35.
51 See Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 330.
52 Ibid.
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that, as is often the case, Shestov’s observations, although of a perceptive and original 
nature and not without clear merit, are still observations not so much about Turgenev and 
his writings as about Shestov’s own world-view and philosophical convictions, and 
Turgenev here is used predominantly as a springboard for the latter.
Thus, the above supposition which is fundamental for Shestov -  that only the revelations of 
death make us see things in their true light and beyond our everyday restrictive boundaries 
(whereas speculative philosophy is unable to help us there and thus its whole validity has to 
be questioned) is a recurrence of Shestov’s most sustained theme. We have already seen it 
in Shestov’s mature writings on Dostoevsky and Tolstoy (dealt with in the previous 
chapters). Also the same leitmotif of the ‘revelations of death’, as was also discussed 
earlier, is already distinctly audible in Shestov’s treatment of Chekhov reflected in his 
article on the writer as well as in his Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness. However, it is only in 
Turgenev where this critique of speculative Western thought appears, perhaps for the first 
time in Shestov’s writing career, in a coherent and consistent presentation, as a formed and 
purposeful argument. Thus, it is to Shestov’s Turgenev that the distinct beginning of his 
struggle against speculative philosophy can be dated, essentially anticipating Shestov’s 
purely philosophical writings. In other words, it is in his Turgenev where the philosophical 
implications of the ‘revelations of death’ in terms of the above critique of Western 
speculative philosophy are consistently discussed (by contrast with his article on Chekhov 
where they are not yet conceptualised).
8.4. Turgenev and Chekhov as fear and fearlessness. Turgenev’s ambivalence in 
relation to Westernism.
On the other hand, as Ivanov-Razumnik claims, Shestov’s original plan was a book on both 
Turgenev and Chekhov. This looks very plausible given that in the resulting Apotheosis o f  
Groundlessness a significant number of aphorisms are dedicated to both Chekhov and 
Turgenev. Moreover, the epigraph from Baudelaire ‘Resigne-toi, mon coeur, dcrs ton 
sommeil de brute’, which was ultimately used for Shestov’s article on Chekhov appeared 
first as an epigraph to the materials which came to constitute the unfinished manuscript on 
Turgenev. At the same time the implied juxtaposition of the two writers arising from
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Shestov’s reflections is very clear. Indeed, according to Shestov, Turgenev was completely 
in the power of a Weltanschauung and instead of exercising independent thought he used 
the ready-made answers of European speculative philosophy, while Chekhov was 
extremely independent in his writings and despised any kind of ideology or Idea.
Interestingly, Chekhov’s lines from his Notebooks, which were quoted in the previous 
chapter, could not have been known to Shestov at the time o f his writing the article on 
Chekhov: ‘Ecjih xoneiiiB c tu tb  oiithmhctom h nornm* 5KH3HB, to  nepecTaHB BepnTB TOMy, 
h to  roBopjiT h nuinyr, a Ha6 jno,zjaH caM h BHmcan’. These lines indeed confirm Shestov’s 
conclusion about C hekhov’s disdain for any borrowed wisdom and ready-made answers, 
while in Turgenev’s case these are precisely the vices o f  which he essentially accuses the 
writer. On the other hand, we note that Shestov failed to grasp Chekhov’s optimism in 
relation to life, and on the contrary assigned to the latter an extremely pessimistic image. 
Yet, as Shestov’s intention to apply the same epigraph to both writers suggests, he saw no 
real difference between Chekhov’s lack o f definite answers and Turgenev’s explicitly 
didactic stance, perhaps because he did not believe in the sincerity o f  this didacticism and 
viewed it as only a transient delusion in Turgenev’s personal evolution. Or, more precisely, 
this didacticism was for Shestov only a camouflage designed to conceal, ju st the same, the 
absence o f  a real answer. Turgenev is unable, Shestov claims, to say openly and honestly: I 
do not know, because this would mean ‘ofipenB ce6 a Ha Bee nocjieflCTBHB 6e3yTeniHOCTH
  HCKJIIOHaiOmeH B03M05KH0CTB KaKOTO 6bI TO H H  6 BIJIO MHp0C03epIjaHHfl ---  3TOTO
T y p re H e B  H e x o n e T  h H e CM eeT c ^ e jia T B  n p e a  jihhom e B p o n e h c K O H  H ayK H , o ^ H a ^ B i  h 
H a B c e r ^ a  O T B ep rH y B H ien  bcbkoto p o ; j a  H e3aK 0H H eH H 0C T H ’ .54 T h u s  S h e s t o v ’s  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  
t h a t  T u r g e n e v ,  f u l l  o f  d e v o t i o n  t o  t h e  E u r o p e a n  m o d e l  o f  l i f e  a n d  t h o u g h t ,  i s  n o t  c a p a b l e  o f  
a c k n o w l e d g i n g  h i s  e x i s t e n t i a l  b a n k r u p t c y ,  h i s  l a c k  o f  d e f i n i t e  a n s w e r s ,  u n l i k e  C h e k h o v  
w h o ,  b e i n g  f r e e  o f  i l l u s i o n s ,  d o e s  i t  w i t h  a n  u n s h a k i n g  p e n ,  w h e n  h i s  o l d  p r o f e s s o r  i n  t h e  
f a c e  o f  d e a t h  u t t e r s  h i s  e p i c  ‘I d o n ’t  k n o w ’ .55
53 From Chekhov’s Notebooks in JJonme cobpanue coHunenuu u nuceM, vol. 4, p. 270.
54 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 128.
55 See A. P. Chekhov, ‘CicyHHafl h c t o p h h ’ .
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All this said, the main uniting thread between the two writers for Shestov (as the very title 
of Apotheosis o f  Groundlessness suggests, let alone its content), must have been the idea of 
the ultimate groundlessness of European ideology, including its morality and ethics, of its 
uselessness in the face of tragedy and death. In other words, it is the revelations of death 
which were to provide the common ground for Shestov’s treatment of both Chekhov and 
Turgenev. While the former was capable and inclined to cope with the truth, the latter was 
not. Chekhov with all his sobriety looked straight into the eye of tragedy, while Turgenev, 
as Shestov insists, hid behind illusion, having erected a sandcastle of ideas which he 
conveniently borrowed from the West. Thus Shestov, not only in philosophical terms, but 
in literary terms too, despite labelling Turgenev a realist, in fact regards him as much more 
of an idealist, as opposed to Chekhov. This stance in a sense echoes that of Frank Seeley 
who argues that, contrary to the conventional view, Turgenev was not a proper realist 
because he was at the same time a romantic. As Seeley claims, Turgenev ‘may be said to 
represent an interesting combination: a realist at heart or (perhaps better) in intuition, he is a 
fantast intellectually’ .56 For Seeley ‘Turgenev’s intellectual fantasy is projected into many 
of his stories in the guise of illusions on which the personages wreck themselves or 
others’ .57 For Shestov, however, with his tendency to equate the writer with his characters, 
it is Turgenev himself who is wrecked by the ‘European illusion’ of harmony.
This, in fact, points back to Turgenev’s duality, which, as we saw, was noted, even if 
differently understood, by both Seeley and Shestov. This duality for both clearly serves as 
an important source of explanations of Turgenev’s oeuvre. For Seeley the result of it is that 
Turgenev’s work ‘is steeped in antinomies and paradoxes, both psychological and 
philosophic’ and that ‘Turgenev’s surface harmony and transparency are likely to prove as
CO
deceptive as nature’s: they quite often overlay themes of many-layered richness’. Shestov, 
on the other hand, implies that the conflict between realism and idealism was slowly eating 
Turgenev from within, that his self-imposed ideology was putting an unbearable restraint 
on his innately wild soul, thereby stifling his whole life and work: ‘H b caMOM ^ene b
56 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 4.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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npoH3BeaeHHax TypreH eBa 3aMeHaeTca Hapjmy c Tpe3B0H, b b i h i k o j i c h h o h  m b ic j ib io ,  
crpeMHmeHca k  o t h c t j i h b b i m  h  a c h b i m  c y ^ eH H a M , KaKaa-TO HenoHaTHaa, coBceM He 
eB ponencK aa TOCKa h  Hey^OBaeTBopeHHOCTB’.59
This remark squares up with Seeley’s observation that
Turgenev is obviously so much more reasonable than Tolstoy and Dostoevsky that readers are apt 
to take the intellectual components of his work at face value. They should be warned by his own 
admission in 1869: “Whenever I am not dealing with images, I become quite confused and am at a 
loss how to proceed. I always feel as if one could equally well assert the opposite of all I am 
saying” .60
It appears that Seeley is right in his warning and that Shestov makes exactly this mistake -  
of falling whole-heartedly for Turgenev’s apparent ‘reasonableness’ (even though he does 
acknowledge another, different, side to Turgenev) and, obviously, of looking for its roots in 
the West.
In fact Shestov does not deny that all Russian writers looked W est for some final answers, 
only their perception and interpretations o f those answers differed widely. Hegel managed 
to unite everything into a complete well-rounded system, Shestov explains, which provided 
uneducated Russia with rich food for thought. However, the Hegelian Absolute was the 
spitting image o f a Russian magician ‘k o t o p b i h  Bee MoaceT, t o j i b k o  He Bee eme xoueT’, and 
thus it ‘fiyzjTO 6 b i  OTKpBiBan t o t  fiecKOHeuHBin npocTop, o k o t o p o m  MeHTajiH 
3acH^eBmHeca Ha oahom MecTe HjiBH-MypoMijBi’ .61
Yet, Turgenev was seduced above all by the external arrangements of Europe, Shestov
AOclaims; especially when viewed against Russian ‘ignorance, serfdom, poverty, stupid
A^inactivity, helplessness and irresponsibility of a multimillion population’. He thus was in 
favour of a slow gradual advance, unlike writers such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky who
59 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 22.
60 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 3.
61 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 20.
62 See Ibid, p. 18.
63 Ibid, p. 19.
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seemed too im patient and unrestrained to him. ‘IIpeHCfle neM cnpauiHBaTB y EBponti ee 
nocjie^Hee c j i o b o ,  HyacHO pa3o6paTB ee nepBBie cjiOBa, Hymio npoftTH t o t  ace nyTB 
“nporpecca”, k o t o p b i h  npomjia OHa, h j o k h o  CTaTB eBponeinjaMH’ ,64 Shestov explains 
Turgenev’s stance. He also stresses Turgenev’s alleged doubt as to the effectiveness o f this 
path: ‘O h  3Haji, h t o  o t o  Hejienco, 6 Buia b  h c m  h  6 o h 3h b ,  h t o  nocjie/jHee c j i o b o  o S m b h c t  
ero, h o  Apyroro BBixoaa o h  He BH^eji’ .65 Hence Shestov’s interpretation o f  Turgenev’s 
whole oeuvre which we described above as that o f  suppressed inner conflict, o f European 
convictions straggling with the w riter’s innately Russian qualities: ‘B epoarao 3Ta 
Heo6 xo,zjHMOCTB “nocTeneHHo” flBHraTBca Bnepe/i, Heobxo^HMOCTB, MyHHTejiBHO 
CTecHflBinaa ero, b  KOHije k o h i i o b ,  nopBiBHCTyio, HenpHpyneHHyio h  HecnoKoiiHyio 
HaTypy, HeicyjiBTypHyio, AOBepaiomyio CHaM, h  HajiomiJia OTnenaTOK TaHHoft rpycra  Ha 
Bee ero npoH3BefleHHfl’ .66
In this one can see that through his vision of Turgenev’s inner duality which Shestov 
inscribes into the ‘Western Europe versus Russia’ conflict, he clearly intercepted a certain 
ambivalence in Turgenev’s attitudes to the West and to his homeland. While being a 
‘convinced Westemiser’ Turgenev was never to become as it were a real Westerner, for his 
ties with Russia as a writer and man were too strong to let him go and ‘be converted’ into 
the Western tradition fully and irrevocably. At best he was a double conductor of cultural 
values between Russia and the West and could observe and note their respective 
differences, in both their strengths and weaknesses. It is no coincidence therefore that, as 
Natalia Volodina writes about Turgenev’s characters, ‘they valued the uniqueness of their 
own country and their relationship to Russia was the most important and closest one for 
them’ .67 She emphasises that Turgenev ‘was not a simple “Western” man, but a European 
in the broad sense of the word when it denotes not only a geographic point or a place of
64 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 21.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Natalia Volodina, ‘Ivan Turgenev’s Characters as Russian Europeans; the Spiritual Experience of 
the Past’, abstract in ICCEES VII World Congress Europe -  Our Common Home?, Abstracts, 
Editors: Thomas Bremer, Heike Dorrenbacher, Inken Dose, German Association for East European 
Studies, 2005, p. 455.
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living, but also a certain way of thinking and type of behaviour’ .68 Hence Volodina is 
essentially in accord with Shestov in so far as the aforementioned ‘external arrangements of 
Europe’ are concerned. She writes that ‘“Europe-ism” for Turgenev is first of all a man’s 
civil liberty, assurance of his rights as a personality and self-respect’ .69 However, 
importantly, she also notes that ‘if the social rights of a person can be maintained only by 
the state, then everything else is a result of his own development’ .70
It seems that what Shestov is trying to prove is that it is essentially impossible to achieve 
this inner development of a true European while being yourself flesh and blood of Russian 
culture, but significantly more importantly he questions the very benefits and desirability of 
such an achievement. Shestov wants to prove using Turgenev as a perfect example that 
European values do not actually supply the writer with any solutions or relieve his own 
fate. Moreover, Shestov basically asserts that this very Russianness which, as Shestov 
implies, is concealed deeply in Turgenev, is an antidote of sorts against the deceptions of 
European philosophy. Interestingly though, while Shestov, in his usual way, seeks to divide 
(Europe and Russia, speculation and revelation, etc.), Turgenev in both his life and work 
seeks to unite, to achieve enhancement, if not perfection, through reconciliation. Thus, as 
Volodina aptly points out, Turgenev ‘h b h o  ncxan repoa, xoT pobift Mor 6b i 6bm > no^JiHHHO
n ipyccKHM eBponemjeM’. She stresses that this was by and large an ‘h c k o m b i h  H^eaji 
j i h h h o c t h , noHBTb h  B0CC03^aTb KOTopbifi CTpeMHjiHCb Kax pyccxaa JiHTepaTypa, Tax H 
pyccxaa Hayxa, pejiHrao3Haa <j)HJioco(])Ha, obmecTBeHHaa m b i c j i b ’ . However, as Volodina 
concludes, such a character is absent from Turgenev’s writings. ‘O^HaKO Taxoro
n ' t
nepcoHajxa b  ero TBopuecTBe h c t ’ , she writes, explaining that Turgenev’s ‘heroes who
68 Volodina, ‘Ivan Turgenev’s Characters as Russian Europeans; the Spiritual Experience of the 
Past’, p. 455.
69 Ibid
71
70 Ibid.
N atalia  V o lod in a , ‘PyccxHH eB poneeu b  TBopnecTBe H. C. TypreHeBa’ in ^uHcmunecKue Modenu 
npocmpaucmeeHHO-epeMeHHOu Kapmmu Mupa e pyccKou numepamype (V ologda: Rus’, 2006), p. 
12.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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are interested in this or that area of European life did not become Western men’ and ‘their 
extended visits to Europe did not necessarily make them Europeans’.74
This, it appears, can hardly be accidental, and must reflect not only Turgenev’s profound 
concern with Russia’s backwardness, but also his inner observations of his own nature 
which, while longing in many ways for the West, was also too deeply rooted in Russian 
soil. In this, it appears, Shestov correctly recognised Turgenev’s concerns. Indeed, on the 
one hand, the writer himself tended to accommodate Europe in his consciousness in all its 
entirety, as a complete and balanced mentality, and to incorporate European culture into his 
own. On the other hand, he never denigrated his Russianness while criticising (often 
severely) the multitude of Russia’s weaknesses, and moreover, he saw quite clearly the 
advantages of both cultures. Indeed, his definite understanding and subtle admiration of his 
native country as well as a distinct appreciation of Western Europe are highlighted in the 
following definition of their differences formulated in a conversation with Flaubert and his 
friends: ‘vous etes des hommes de la loi, de l’honneur; nous... nous sommes des hommes 
de l’humanite! ’ .75 As Seeley points out, the French ‘were struck by “the originality of a
nr
superior mind (esprit)” and by “his immense and cosmopolitan knowledge”, meaning by 
“knowledge”, knowledge of both books and life’ .77
Importantly, Turgenev did not promote a mere implantation of Western values onto 
Russian soil, but hoped for their creative appropriation and integration into Russian culture. 
As Volodina demonstrates by quoting Potugin in Smoke (‘no cyra e^HHCTBeHHtm repon, 
KOTOporo nncaTejib H3o6paacaeT nocjieaoBaTejiBHBiM 3anazuniKOM ’ and ‘no^nepKHBaeT
no
6 jih 3 0 ctb  n ^ e n  IIoTyrHHa coO ctbchhbim  npeflCTaBjiemniM’) in  h is  co n v ersa tio n  w ith  
L itv inov : ‘K to  tkq Bac 3acTaBjiaeT nepemuviaTB 3pa? BeflB bbi nyacoe SepeTe He noTOMy,
74 Volodina, ‘Ivan Turgenev’s Characters as Russian Europeans; the Spiritual Experience of the 
Past’, p. 455.
75 Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, Journal, under 5 Mar. 1876. Cited in Seeley, Turgenev. A 
Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 30.
76 Ibid, 2 Mar. 1872. Cited in Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 30.
77 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 30.
78 V o l o d i n a ,  ‘P y ccK H H  e B p o n e e u  b T B o p n ecT B e  H . C. T y p r e H e B a ’, p p .  11-12.
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h t o  o h o  ny3Koe, a  noTOMy, h t o  o h o  BaM n p H r o a H o ;  C T a n o  6 b m > ,  b b i  c o o 6 p a 5 K a e T e ,  b b i  
B b i 6 H p a e T e ’ .79
Thus in a way Turgenev hoped for a certain cultural convergence (ideas quite akin to those 
expressed by Andrei Sakharov a century later). Indeed, as Volodina writes,
eme b  1917 n3BecTHbin couHOJior FIh t h p h m  CopoKHH nncaji: “...nopa hcho  h  onpeaeneHHO 
CKa3aTb, h to  cnaceHHe He b HauHOHanbHOM npHHunne, a b  (jjeuepauuu rocyuapcTB, b 
CBepxrocyAapcTBeHHOH opraHH3auHH Been EBponbi, Ha noHBe paBeHCTBa npaB Bcex b x o /u iiu h x  b 
Hee jiHHHOCTeH”.80 H.C. TypreHeB nonyBCTBOBaji h  xyuoacecTBeHHO ocMbicjiHji 3Ty BMHyio 
TeH^eHUHK) oSmeeBponeucKoro pa3BHTiw, ocymecTBJieHHe KOTopou, kbk  o h  nojiaraji, b o 3m o >kho  
TOJibKO “Ha noHBe o6mux HHTepecoB, conyBCTBHH, odmero 3HaHba”.81 B  st o m  cjiynae nejiOBeK, 
ocTaBaacb rpaacaaHHHOM CBoeu CTpaHbi, OKa3biBaeTca bk ju o h c h  b  Hexoe euHHoe MeirrajibHoe 
npocTpaHCTBO, KOTOpoe MoaceT 6biTb o6o3H aneH O  onpe^ejieHHOH MeTaKaTeropHeii. O a h o h  H3 h h x  
h  HBJiaeTca CTaTyc eBponeiiua.82
8.5. Turgenev’s complexity in the framework of Shestov’s critique of idealism and 
utilitarianism as intrinsically related.
However, while Turgenev clearly tended to support a certain unity between Russia and the 
West, Shestov unambiguously separated the two, at least in his descriptions of Turgenev’s 
mentality. When Shestov unites them it is normally to talk about damaging Western 
influences and/or some parallel currents on Russian soil. Thus in his apprehension of the 
poisons of Western speculative philosophy Shestov warns against Russian thought going 
hand in hand with European in certain trends that for Shestov are altogether hostile. Hence, 
ultimately, his concerns, not surprisingly, rise above any national distinctions to the 
metaphysical heights of general anthropological and philosophical issues where his enemies 
become much more abstract. Indeed, continuing his analysis of the Russian reception of 
Western philosophy, Shestov warns that European metaphysics and positivism are of the 
same nature:
79 I. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe co6panue conumnuu u nuceM e 30 moMax [Collected W orks and 
Correspondence in 30 volumes] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akadem ii N auk SSSR, 1980-1982), vol. 7, 
p. 273. Cited in Volodina, ‘PyccKHH eBponeeu b TBopnecTBe H. C. TypreHeBa’, p. 12.
80 Pitirim  Sorokin, HenoeeK. Lfuemmaviiui. 06ufecmeo (M oscow, 1992), p. 251. Cited in Volodina, 
‘PyccKHH eBponeeu b TBopnecTBe H. C. TypreHeBa’, p. 13.
81 I. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe codpmue conuHenuu u nuceM e 30 moMax, vol. 10, p. 307. Cited in 
Volodina, ‘PyccKHH eBponeeu b TBopnecTBe H. C. TypreHeBa’, p. 13.
82 Volodina, ‘PyccKHH eBponeeu b TBopnecTBe H. C. TypreHeBa’, p. 13.
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H T yT  h  TaM  3 a K p b iT b ie  ro p H 3 0 H T b i, t o j i b k o  H H an e  p a c K p a m e H H b ie  h  p a 3 p n c o B a H H b ie . E [o3h t h b h 3m 
jtk>6h t  OAHOUBeTHyio c e p y io  K p a c x y  h  n p o cT O H , o p flH H apH biw  pncy H O K . M eT a(J)H 3HKa 
n p e ,a n o H H T a e T  C B epK aiom H H , OjiecTHiflHH k o j i o p h t  h  c u o B ecH b iH  y 3 o p ,  OHa B c e r f la  p a3 p H C 0 B b raaeT  
c B o e  no jio T H O  n o f l  S e c K O H e n H o c T b . [...] Ho n o jiO T H o e e  flocTaTOHHO npoH H O , h  n e p e 3 H e ro  
HHKaKHMH yxH m peH H flM H  H e n p o O p a T b c a  3 a  n p e ^ e j ib i  fleH C TB H TejibH ocTH  b “ h h o h  m h p ”.83
E q u ally , fo r S h esto v  id ea lism  and  u tilita rian ism  are  tw in  b ro th ers  d esp ite  th e ir  apparen t 
an im o sity . T hus h e  w rites : ‘HfleajiH3M h  yrajiHTapH3M h b h o  npe3HpaioT h  He x o t h t  3HaTb 
A pyr flp y ra , a  BTaiiHe nocTOHHHo o a h h  flp y ro ro  noflflepxcHBaiOT. K orfla  y  yTHJiHTapH3Ma 
HccjucaiOT “flOBOflbi” , o h  o6pam aeT ca 3a ip o m k h m h  cjiOBaMH k H^eajiH3My. K orfla 
H/jeajiH3My HyxcHO OTbicKHBaTb “npH H unn B ceofim ero 3aKOHOflaTejibCTBa” o h , h h c k o jib k o  
He cM ym aacb, obpamaeTCH 3a noM om w o k  cBoeMy B pary ’. By th e  sam e to k en , in  
T u rg e n e v ’s id ea lis tic  “b e l ie f  in  th e  g o o d ” w h ich  is q u ite  E u ro p ean  in  n a tu re  S h esto v  sees 
n o th in g  m o re  th an  a  co n v en ien t d ev ice  to  g loss o v e r th e  to rm en tin g  q u estio n s o f  ex istence. 
As ex p ected , h e  u n m ask s  T u rg e n ev ’s ‘tru e  n a tu re ’, o r m o re  p rec ise ly  tru e  m o tiv es , 
e ssen tia lly  in  o rder to  u n m ask  th e  tru e  n a tu re  o f  E u ro p ean  p h ilo so p h ica l b e lie fs . To th is  end 
S h esto v  qu o tes  from  th e  fin a le  to  fleopnncKoe zne3do ( The Nest o f  the Gentry, 1859) w h en  
L av re tsk y  v isits  th e  m o n as te ry  w h e re  L iza  serves as a  nun: ‘H t o  noflyM ajm , h t o  
nonyBCTBOBajiH o6a? K t o  y3HaeT? K t o  cxaxceT? E c t l  Taicne MraoBeHHa b 5KH3HH, Taicne
85nyBCTBa... Ha h h x  m oxcho to j ib k o  yxa3aTb —  h  npoiiT H  m h m o ...’ .
For Shestov these lines testify unambiguously to Turgenev’s inner weakness, to his 
propensity for self-delusion, his inability to face the brutal reality of hopelessness. Indeed, 
having stressed how important for Turgenev was the question of the predicament of 
someone who had wasted his youth and was suddenly given hope, Shestov then emphasises 
that Turgenev resolves the issue by simply finding a way to justify such a destiny by noble
Q /r
idealistic words. ‘He BLinano cnacTta Ha a o j i io  —  He fiefla: ncnojim iH  c b o h  f lo u r ’, 
Shestov mocks Turgenev’s stance. He refuses to appreciate the noble sentiment with which
83 Shestov, Typzeuee, p. 20.
84 Ibid, p. 50.
85 I. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe codpanue cohumhuu u nuceM e 30 moMax, vol. 3, p. 397. Cited in 
Shestov, Typzeuee, p. 48.
86 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 47.
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Turgenev endows his character and by which he justifies him: ‘oh neiiCTBHTejibHO 
nepecTan nyMaTb o co6 ctbchhom cnacTbe, o CBoexopbicTHbix ijejrax’.87 Shestov 
sarcastically repeats Turgenev’s words about Lavretsky and Liza: ‘Kto y3HaeT, hto 
nonyBCTBOBajiH 06a?..’ and exclaims:
Ho 3an eM  y 3H aB aT b?! H yxcHO TOJibKo H a y n H T b ca  “ n p o x o a H T b  m h m o ” , B c e r o ,  h t o  h o c h t  
3 a ra ^ o H H b iH  h  n pob jieM aT H H ecK H H  x a p a ic r e p !  H yacH O  TOJibKO yM eT b HOCHTb m o p b i  H a r j i a 3 a x  —  h  
n o jiy H H T c a  B03M05KH0CTb co x p aH H T b  “ B e p y  b  n o 6p o ” . E c j ih  6bi JIaB p eu K H H  n o b o j ib in e  
B CM aTpH BancH  h  n p H C Jiyu iH B ancH  k  c b o h m  “ nyBCTBaM ”  h  H e s a d b m a j i  TaK H e M rHOBeHHn, icaic c b o io  
B C T p en y  c JIH30H b  M O H acT bipe, —  M o r  j t h  6bi o h  o c T a T b c a  AOBOJibHbiM c o 6o h  n o p a n o H H b iM  
HeJIOBeKOM H 3 a6 b IT b  O “ CBOeKOpblCTHblx”  UeJIHX?88
Shestov asks this with clear sarcasm, deliberately missing Turgenev’s point that Lavretsky 
has learned not to dwell on his own feelings. ‘LIo HafijuoflemuiM TypreHeBa, b xch3hh
on
moxcho h naxce nojixcHO yMeTb He BuneTb h He nyMaTb, Korna HyxcHo’, is Shestov’s 
conclusion.
Thus Shestov sees Turgenev’s treatment of his heroes as an attempt to resolve the insoluble 
in his own consciousness by providing some metaphysical consolations. However, Shestov 
as usual cannot be satisfied by such a substitute and it is in this connection that he points 
anew to the utilitarian roots of ethics through exposing once again the kinship between 
positivist and metaphysical philosophies. In particular, he writes that
3THHecKoe cyxcneHHe HMeeT cbohm hctohhhkom He obbiKHOBeHHbie ymriHTapHbie cooOpaxceHHa, a 
Bbicmyio, aBTOHOMHyio Haeio noTycTOpOHHero, MeTa(J)H3HHecKoro npoHCxo>KneHHfl. KaHT nance 
nan 4>opMyjiy nna aBTOHOMHOH HpaBCTBeHHOcTH: “Kancnoe H3 HauiHx ashctbhh nonncHO 6biTb 
TaKOBO, hto6 m npHHHHn ero Mor CTaTb npHHUHnoM BceoSmero 3aKOHonaTenbCTBa”. Ha hto ynce, 
KaxceTca, “hhctmh” npHHHHn — 6e3 MajiemueH npHMecn ynuiHTapHbix cooSpanceroiH. Ho 3to 
TOJibKO KaxceTca. Ha caMOM nene, HecMOTpa Ha cboh d>opManH3M, sto t nornaT HHHero, KpoMe 
oxpaHeHHa oSmecTBeHHbix Hyncn, He 3aKJiiOHaeT b ce6e.9
Although Shestov’s sole purpose seems to be to expose the utilitarian nature of both 
positivist and metaphysical philosophies, and Turgenev only serves to exemplify and
87 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 46.
88 Ibid, p .  48.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, p p .  49-50.
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reinforce that claim, Shestov’s ponderings in fact point to something deeper -  namely, to 
the existential despondency in which these philosophical trends may result. For Shestov 
Turgenev’s lack of daring and his habitual cheerlessness (for example his incapacity for 
self-mockery which Shestov observes) follow from the writer’s lack of profound suffering. 
But the reason could be the opposite (and this is also implicit in Shestov’s notes) -  it is 
because Turgenev feels stifled and suppressed by the strictures of his own idealistic and 
rationalistic beliefs, because he suffers too much rather than too little that he comes out 
subdued and sad, as his writings reflect. In other words Shestov implies that Turgenev’s 
very Weltanschauung modelled on the Western pattern is responsible for his, as it were, 
resulting broken spirit.
However, it is open to question whether it is a particular outlook that causes existential 
frustration, or whether it is the very presence of an outlook imprinted so strongly into one’s 
consciousness that has a stifling effect on the personality. In a sense Shestov’s rebellion 
against any system of beliefs implies just that -  the harm of the latter for the human psyche, 
its impediment to one’s freedom. Yet the cause may be misidentified here, for rather than 
an outlook as such it may be its unbalanced, exaggerated role. In other words, the cause of 
human misery may lie in the Hamlet-like feature of excessive reflection rather than in the 
exact nature of this reflection or its very presence. It appears that with Turgenev this may 
well have been the case. For it is clear that he knew Hamlets, as it were, from inside, hence 
his whole-hearted enthusiasm for Don Quixotes whom he perceived as the opposite and 
redeeming type.
Furthermore, it seems that Turgenev was fully aware of his own (as well as the general) 
limitations concealed in idealism and rationality, so in a way he was on Shestov’s side, 
which the latter failed to realise. Indeed, Shestov claims unambiguously that for Turgenev
rjiaBHoe —  yMeTb HHHero ana ce6a He TpeboBaTb. Ecjih 6bi Bee jnoan eorjiacHJiHCb acHTb no 3T0My 
npaBRiiy —  Ha 3eMJie BOflBopHUHCb 6bi cnoKOHCTBHe h MHp. CnoKOHCTBHe h MHp b Hauie BpeMa 
ueHBTca Bbirne Bcero Ha CBeTe. H Tax xax to , hto b Harne BpeMH npeacTaBJiaeTca caMbiM ueHHbiM, 
xaaceTca caMbiM ueHHbiM Boobme, to  TypreHeB (omrrb-TaKH BCJiea 3a eBponencKHMH
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MbicjiHTejiHMH, a 3to oco6eHHO noflnepKHBaio) npmueji k TOMy y6e>K^eHHK), hto Bbicmee 
HejiOBenecKoe KanecTBo —  3to cnocoSHOCTb k caMonoacepTBOBaHHio h OTcyTCTBHe 3roH3Ma.91
On the other hand, Judith Armstrong, who duly observes Turgenev’s constant 
preoccupation with the issue of self-denigration (or self-suppression) for the sake of a noble 
cause and his contemplation of the legitimacy of the dictates of duty in people’s lives, 
comes to an essentially opposite conclusion. Thus she firmly points to ‘Turgenev’s doubts 
about the heroics of misguided self-sacrifice’ and gives as examples the figures of Kister 
from ‘Breter’ (‘EpeTep’, 1847), the Hamlet of ‘Hamlet of the Shchigry District’ (TaMjieT 
UfiirpOBCKoro ye3^a’, 1852) and others.92 This alone shows, in fact, that Turgenev was not 
prepared to grant idealism the omnipotence which it takes in Shestov’s descriptions of the 
writer’s sensibility.
T h is  is  p a rticu la rly  ev id en t in  T u rg e n ev ’s p e rcep tio n  o f  lo v e  w h ich  o ften  com es c lo se  to 
D o s to e v sk y ’s (co n tra ry  to  S h es to v ’s in te rp re ta tio n  w h e re  h e  co n stan tly  ju x tap o ses  th e  tw o  
w rite rs , a lw ay s em p h asis in g  D o s to ev sk y ’s p sy ch o lo g ica l p e rcep tiv en ess  and  d a rin g  and  
T u rg e n e v ’s cau tious an d  o v er-cu ltu red  a ttitudes). In d eed , in  h is  s to ry  ‘Ilep e iracK a’ 
( ‘C o rre sp o n d en ce ’, 1856) T u rg e n ev ’s h ero  w rite s  ‘jik > 6 o b l  [ . . . ]  -  6one3Hb, H3BecTHoe 
cocTOHHHe flyum  h  Tena. [ . . . ]  B jik > 6 b h  h c t  paBeHCTBa, HeT Tax Ha3biBaeMoro CBo6o;m oro 
coeflHHeHHA ffym  h  n p o n u x  jmeajibHOCTen, npn^yM aHHbix Ha a o c y re  hcm chkhm h 
npo(J>eccopaMH... HeT, b  jik > 6 b h  o ^ h o  j i h i j o —  p a6 , a  a p y r o e —  BJiacTejiHH. [ . . . ]  
jn o 6 o B b —  u en b , h  caMaa Taacejiaa’.93 T h e  m en tio n  o f  G erm an  p ro fesso rs  h e re  is 
p a r tic u la rly  iro n ic  g iv en  h o w  closely , a lm o st lite ra lly , it re so n a tes  w ith  S h es to v ’s o w n  
re flec tio n s  (the  critica l th em e  o f  a G erm an  p ro fesso r, u n ex p o sed  to  real life , w h o  
n ev e rth e le ss  dares to  ‘p u t h is  h an d  on  l i fe ’,94 w as s ta rted  b y  S h esto v  as ea rly  as h is  
Shakespeare and His Critic Brandes).
91 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 79.
92 Judith Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary o f a Superfluous 
M anf in Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev: 1818-1883-1983, ed. Patrick Waddington (Wellington: New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal, 1983), pp. 1-19 (pp. 3-4).
931. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe co6panue conuneHuu u nuceM e 30 moMax, vol 6 , p. 190. Cited in English 
in Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary o f a Superfluous Manf ,
p. 18.
94 See Shestov, IUeKcnup u eeo KpumuK Epandec, p. 11.
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Similarly, and even more importantly in terms of demonstrating Turgenev’s awareness of 
fundamental existential contradictions (and, as a by-product of this, his proximity to 
Shestov) is the fact that he deemed incompatible happiness and reflection. In other words, 
he knew that rational inquiry inevitably kills the state of existential bliss -  the very thought 
that lies at the core of Shestov’s philosophising. Armstrong describes this as ‘the 
philosophical problem at the heart of Turgenev’s preoccupations: happiness, with its 
concomitant loss of self-awareness, almost o f identity -  the state of the sun-drenched fly -  
is to him incompatible with simultaneous intellectual self-understanding and objectivity, 
the prerogative and duty of homo sapiens'.95
Thus what Shestov seems to overlook in his concentration on the flaws of Turgenev’s (and 
hence Western) thought is the actual proximity of Turgenev’s philosophical observations to 
his own in some fundamental ways. However, they seem to come to different conclusions 
as a result of these observations: Shestov urges the renunciation of reason in order to 
achieve again what Adam and Eve once experienced -  that state of primordial happiness, 
free of any knowledge; while Turgenev deems it degrading to lose this ability to know and 
reflect, despite its sad consequences.
Thus, in a certain sense, idealism and rationalism by providing a firm ground, a banister of 
sorts, for support and assistance in navigating through a complex universe, at the same time 
demand in return a price to be paid. In particular, they seem to take away the spontaneity, 
the ability to enjoy life to the full, and inflict despondency by stealing jo ie de vivre and by 
stifling joys, by extinguishing the childish capacity for playing games, for being care free. 
These are indeed all the properties largely absent from Turgenev’s writings. Interestingly, 
Shestov compares Turgenev with Pushkin in this connection, implying that the latter, being 
free of (or even above) any Weltanschauung dared to step over any conceivable boundaries 
and thus found and derived joy even from hopeless situations. This in Shestov’s eyes is 
connected to Turgenev’s general fear of life (or in our terms to his deep awareness of life’s
95 Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary o f a Superfluous Man)\ 
p. 9.
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precariousness) and, on the contrary, to Pushkin’s celebration of life. Shestov’s claim is 
essentially that what used to be a hymn to a tour de force  (in the case of Pushkin) has now 
become a mourning song full of fear of real deeds (in the case of Turgenev). To 
substantiate this Shestov gives the example of Turgenev’s poem in prose ‘Ilopor’ 
( ‘Threshold’, 1878) which, actually, could be juxtaposed to Judith Armostrong’s remarks 
on Turgenev’s doubt as to the value of a misguided self-sacrifice. For this is a poem 
glorifying nothing but such a total and complete self-sacrifice where a noble cause is 
implied, but not even explicitly mentioned:
. . . n p e a c H H x  th m h o b  y a c e  H e T . O c T a n H C b  t o j i l k o  3 a y H b i B H b i e  n o r p e d a n b H b i e  n e c H H ,  K a K  
T y p r e H e B C K H H  “ I l o p o r ” . C p a B m r r e  e r o  c r a x o T B o p e H H e  c  n e c H e f t  n p e a c e a a T e j i H  H3 “ n w p a  b o  B p e M a  
n y M b i ” , h  B b i n o n y B C T B y e T e ,  K a K  M a n o  m o h c c t a a T b  H e j i o B e x y  e B p o n e n c K o e  o 6 p a 3 0 B a H H e  h  
c o B p e M e H H o e ,  n p o n H T a H H o e  M o p a j iH C T H H e c K H M H  h a c b m h  M H p o B 0 3 3 p e H H e .  K a K  m o iijh o ,  
B A O x H O B e H H o  3 B y n a T  c t h x h  I l y i i i K H H a :  Ecmb vnoenue e 6 ojo... h  K a K  c e p o ,  T y c K J i o ,  y H b u i o ,  
S e c n p o c B e T H o ,  H e H y x c H O  b “ I l o p o r e ”  T y p r e H e B a .  6
Yet, this was the case when, according to Shestov, Turgenev, in his old age, facing death, 
was struggling to recover the ground disappearing from under his feet by trying ‘to adjust 
his old beliefs to his new frightening existence’ ( ‘npncnocofiHTb npexcHne BepoBaHHfl k
07
h o b b i m  ycnoBHAM CBoero cipaniHoro cymecTBOBaHna’). However, speaking of 
Turgenev’s earlier experience, before the morbid threshold opened his eyes to the horrors 
of existence and to the uselessness of his ideals, as Shestov tries to persuade us, he still 
emphasises Turgenev’s constant despondency, his utter cheerlessness throughout his 
literary writings. The implicit cause for this, as has been mentioned, lies in the writer’s 
confinement to his Weltanschauung. Between life and idea, Shestov asserts, Turgenev 
opted for the latter, and in this he differed from writers like Pushkin and Tolstoy, who 
above all celebrated life and trusted life.98 Yet, as mentioned above, Shestov turns away 
from the distinct motives of proximity between his own philosophy and Turgenev’s 
(presumably because this would undermine Shestov’s central intention -  that of a struggle 
against the European system of beliefs). This proximity, however, is quite apparent. Indeed, 
as Armstrong writes, drawing on many critical opinions, Turgenev’s ‘train of thought had
96 Shestov, Typaenee, pp. 113-114.
97Ibid,p. 111.
98 See Ibid, p. 34.
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for long been closer to Schopenhauer’s than to Hegel’s, the philosopher of his youth, and 
his rapid adoption of a Schopenhauerian philosophy from the early 1860s on was less a 
conversion than a recognition of affinity’.99 Yet Shestov hardly ever mentions 
Schopenhauer in relation to Turgenev and certainly not in the above sense. In fact, this 
particular philosopher does not engage Shestov nearly as much as one would expect, which 
is quite puzzling. One of the reasons for that, we speculate, could be the simple fact that 
Schopenhauer was in many ways a precursor of Nietzsche, who, being chronologically and 
dialectically closer to Shestov, has for the latter overshadowed and replaced his famous 
predecessor.
Be that as it may, Shestov overlooks Turgenev’s affinity to Schopenhauerian motives, 
despite the fact that they are so akin to his own concerns. Indeed, Turgenev’s 
preoccupations with death, with our doomed fate and its lack of choice, and with the 
incompatibility of rationalism and existential harmony are all brushed away by Shestov, or, 
more precisely, configured in such a way as to appear that they emerged only just before 
the writer’s death. Yet, the ‘Diary of a Superfluous Man’ ( ‘/J h c b h h k  jiHnmero nejioBeica’, 
1849) where these themes originate (even though Turgenev then might not yet have been 
familiar with Schopenhauer) is dated as early as 1850. Instead Shestov claims that 
Turgenev’s writings until very late in his life remained stable, calm and morally instructive, 
if a little sad. Interestingly, he singles out just one story ( ‘/J o bo jib h o ’ , 1864) as the one 
where for the first time, even if momentarily, Turgenev rebels against his European 
Weltanschauung. Having criticised the overall artistic merits of this work for its lifelessness 
Shestov nevertheless distinguishes the narrator’s assertion that the really terrible thing in 
life is the fact that there is not anything terrible: ‘He npHBH^eHHH, He (j)aHTacTHHecKHe 
no^3eMHbie chjibi cTpaniHBi; He CTpauma ro^MaHiimna, no,o; k ukhm  6 bi b h a o m  OHa He 
H B Jianact... CTpauiHo t o , hto  HeT HHHero crpaiHHoro’.100 This for Shestov implies that the 
freedom which education, so much valued by Turgenev, gives one (as the writer 
maintained) is unsatisfactory, for it takes away a superstitious belief, a hope for magic. ‘H
99 Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary o f a Superfluous Man)',
p. 10.
100 I. S. Turgenev, IIojiHoe codpauue coHumuuu u nuceM e 30 moMax, vol 6, p. 433. Cited in 
Shestov, Typeenee, p. 24.
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B/jpyr 0Ka3tmaeTCH, h to  6e3 npHBH^eHHH h Be^tM —  coBceM KaK y ,I(ocToeBCxoro —  
“caMaa cyTb 5kh3hh MenKa, HenHTepecHa h hhihchckh njioxa’” , 101 Shestov explains.
On the other hand, in this story Turgenev joins Chekhov in his disdain for ‘wingless’, 
trivial life, for philistine values. However, paradoxically, Turgenev who is prone to 
depression and hypochondria in his constant terrifying awareness of death, speaks in this 
story of ‘nothing scary’. On the other hand, Chekhov, whose story ‘Crpax’ (1892) 
highlights precisely the terrifying foundations of existence and its frightening nature, 
implicitly displays in it the writer’s ability to deal with horror, to go to its depth without 
averting his eyes. This fearlessness, both artistic and existential, is a very characteristic 
feature of Chekhov, while for Turgenev the man it was instead existential fear thct was a 
common feature, even if  it took conflicting forms and he never fully surrendered to it. Thus 
in the juxtaposition of Chekhov and Turgenev, despite the assertions of the former through 
the narrator in ‘Crpax’ that existence is frightening and of the latter through the nairator in 
‘^ ob ojib h o’ that there is nothing frightening, the opposite seems to be true for the writers 
themselves. It was Chekhov who was intrinsically heroic, and it was Turgenev whose 
impulses were to withdraw from uncomfortable existential dramas and who forever tried to 
vanquish them in his writings and his life with varying degrees of success. At least this is 
what follows from Shestov’s interpretation and appears to have touched a certain chord. It 
is also this vision of Turgenev that essentially allowed him to use the writer for justification 
of his own paradigm whereby he blamed Turgenev’s fearfulness on European education 
and values.
‘0 6 p a 3 0 B a H H e  T y p r e H e B a ,  B o n p eK H  e r o  co b cT B eH H O M y  m hchhio, jihihhjio e r o  cbo5o,zu>i h 
noT O M y, OTH acTH, opnrH H ajn> H O C T H ’ , S h e s t o v  a s s e r t s  a n d  a d d s  t h a t  ‘Ecjih 6bi T y p re H e B , 
BMecTO T o r o ,  hto6b i ckjiohhtbcji n e p e f l  e B p o n e n c K H M  o 6 p a 3 0 B a H H e M , ocmcjihjici 6bitb  
caM HM  co6oh , e r o  y n H T e jia ,  H a B e p H o e , 6 lu ih  6bi e M y  M H o ro  S j i a r o / j a p H e e ’ . 102 N o ta b ly ,  
d e s p i t e  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  v i e w  t h a t  T u r g e n e v  l e f t  b e h i n d  a  d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  h is  e p o c h  
w i t h  a l l  i t s  e t h o s  a n d  v a l u e s ,  S h e s t o v  c l a i m s  t h a t  b e c a u s e  T u r g e n e v  w a s  t o o  o b je c t iv e  a n d
101 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 25.
102 Ibid, p. 88.
530
crucially lacked subjectivity his writings are of much more limited value as chronicles of 
the time than they could have been. This is because ‘oh  He flOBepjui ce6e, oh  cyzmji o ce6e
C  TOHKH 3peHHH HK0 6 bI “BeHHOH, HeH3MCHHOH, CTOBHieH BHe HeJIOBeKa H C T H H B l” ,  KOTOpyiO 
BbiHHTaji b HOBefiHiHX KHHrax’ , 103 Shestov explains. However, in Shestov’s deepest 
conviction ‘3aKOHOMepHocTb BBjiemiH, Bcincoro poaa 3aK0 H0 MepH0 CTb Boo6 me, t .  e. t o t  
H^eaji, KOTopbiii BbmBHraeT coBpeMeHHaa Mopajib h  <j)Hjioco<j)HJi, He BnpaBe Ha3bmaTbca 
BeHHOH h c t h h o h ’ . 104 M an’s love o f order is a conservative, philistine element o f human 
nature, Shestov believes. Poets, for example, ‘acayr 6 ypio h  ijeHjrr 6 ypio, t .  e. xaoc, 
HenpepbiBHyio CMeHy HeommaHHocTen, Tax ace, xax flpyrne neHaT noKOH’ . 105
At a  m o r e  t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l  h e  p o s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  ‘O n c y a a  n o p a a o x ?  I Io H e M y  n o p a ^ o x ,  a  
H e x a o c ?  —  H e 6 e c n o p jm o H H o c T b ! ’ a n d  a s s e r t s  t h a t  ‘e c j i n  6 b i  r a n o T e 3 a  3aK 0H 0M epH 0C T H  
H e npH H O C H jia  c  c o 6 o h  CTOjibKO n p aK T H n ecK H x  B b ir o a ,  jh o ^ h  H H K o ra a  6 b i ,  k o h c h h o , H e 
co 6 jia3 H H jiH C b  H a3 b m aT b  e e  H e o c n o p H M o n  axcH O M O H , H e  T p e b y io m e i i  flO K a3aTejibC TB  
h c t h h o h ’ . 106 In t h i s  r e s p e c t  S h e s t o v  j u x t a p o s e s  ‘w i l d ’ a n d  d a r i n g  D o s t o e v s k y  t o  c a u t i o u s  
T u r g e n e v  w i t h  h i s  E u r o p e a n  c o n v i c t i o n s :  ‘eM y  x a 3 a j io c b  H acT o am H M  6e3yM H eM  x o T a  6 b i  H a  
M H H y ry  c j je j ia T b  n p e ^ n o j io a c e H H e ,  h t o  B bipaboT aH H O H  H a  3 a n a j j e  T o m ce  3 p e H H a  M oaceT  
6 b iT b  n p o T H B o n o c T a B J ie H O , x a x  p a B H o n p a B H a a  HCTHHa, B 0 3 3 p eH H e H e x y jib T y p H o ro ,  
C TH X H H H oro H e jio B eK a , p y c c K o r o  n n c a T e j i a  J fo c T o e B C K o ro  ’ . 107 I n d e e d ,  i f  t h e  t e n d e n c y  o f  a  
E u r o p e a n  o u t l o o k  i s  t o  r o u n d  e v e r y t h i n g  u p ,  D o s t o e v s k y ’s  w r i t i n g s  h a v e  t h e  o p p o s i t e  e f f e c t  
o f  d i s t u r b i n g  t h e  v e r y  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  a n y  s e t t l e d  e x i s t e n c e .  As M a l c o l m  J o n e s  w r i t e s ,  a n y  
a t t e m p t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  a l l  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  o f  D o s t o e v s k y ’s  t e x t  a n d  to  i n s t i l  c a l m  a n d  
c o h e r e n c e  i n t o  i t  ‘h a r d l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  a c tu a l  t e x t u r e  o f  h i s  f i c t i o n a l  w o r l d ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
h i s  i n n e r  t u r m o i l ,  o r  t h e  u n s e t t l i n g  n a r r a t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  t h a t  h e  u n l e a s h e s  u p o n  h i s  
r e a d e r ’ . 108
103 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 88.
104 Ibid, p. 64.
105 Ibid, p. 65.
106 Ibid, p. 33.
107 Ibid, p. 34.
108 Malcolm Jones, Dostoevsky and the Dynamics o f Religious Experience (London: Anthem Press, 
2005), p. x.
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As was mentioned in the previous chapter (on Chekhov), for Shestov the ultimate truth 
does not exist, what does exist is a multiplicity of truths -  as many as people on earth. In 
his Turgenev he writes again that ‘H c th h m  HeT, ocTaeTca npeanoaom iTb, h t o  HCTHHa b 
nepeMeHHHBocTH nejiOBenecKHx BKycoB’.109 Furthermore Shestov insists on groundlessness 
as the highest prerequisite of proper human existence. For him
H y x c H O , h t o 6 i>i  co M H em ie  cT a jio  caM O C T O H T ejibH O H , e^H H C TB eH H O H  T B o p n e c K O H  c h j i o h . H 6 o
T B e p a o e  3H aH H e e cT b  y c jio B H e  H e c o B e p m e H H o ro  B o c n p m r r a i i .  C jia d b iH  a y x  H e c n o c o S e H  k  c jih u ik o m  
S bicT pb iM  H en p ep b iB H b iM  n e p eM eH a M . [...] Ho a y x  co3peB U iH H  n p e 3 n p a e T  B c a K o ro  p o a a  n o a n o p K H  
h  KOCTbuiH. E M y  H a a o e a o  n p e c M b iK a T b c a , o h  O T p b rea e T c a  o t  3 c m jih  h  y x o a H T  b n p o c T o p  
SeCKOHCHHOCTH,11 °
8.6. ‘Avoidance of the problematic’ as traced by Shestov through Turgenev’s theme of 
superfluousness.
Thus Shestov implies a certain immaturity (in Shestov’s definition) and feebleness of 
Turgenev’s spirit, unwilling to rise above the rational, constrained by European convictions 
and firmly tied to the ground. Turgenev’s alleged tendency to close his eyes to problematic 
issues (if they cannot be satisfactorily explained and made ‘tame’ and smooth by his 
European dogmas) plays a crucial role in Shestov’s treatment of the writer.
n o H T H  B ee e r o  n o B e c T H ,  p a c c K a 3 b i ,  p o M a H b i  h  K p H T H H e c K H e  C T a T b H  o c B e m e H b i  T e M  a c e  p o b h b im , H e  
c j ih u ik o m  n p a B f l a  a p K H M  h  H y rb -n y T b  K O J ie S j n o iu H M c a  c b c to m .  O r a p a H T e c b ,  y n i u i  o h  H a c ,  
n p H M H p H T b c a  c  H C H 3 H b io  h  H e  H u j H T e  T a i i H ,  h 6 o  B e e  p a B H O  H H H e r o  H e  H a i r a e T e .  I l p o i i u i o r o  
H 3M e H H T b  H e j i b 3 a ,  b  H a c T O J im e M  T o x c e  M H o r o r o  H e  c a e j i a e u i b  —  B 0 3 J io > K H T e  B e e  c b o h  H a a e x c a M  H a  
6 y a y m e e ,  k  n o a r o T O B J i e H m o  K O T o p o r o  a o J D K H b i S b i t b  y c T p e M J i e H b i  B e e  B a n i n  c h jim ,
Shestov writes explaining Turgenev’s outlook, and comments rather sarcastically that
j i k w i , Kax H3BecTH0, aaBHO yxce aoraaajiHCb nojib30BaTbcn HeH3BecTHbiM O y ay u jH M  a ju i 
onpaBaaHHH xopouio H3BecTHoro HacToaiaero h  npomnoro. H  x o t h  6yaymee ao c h x  nop HHKoraa 
eme He onpaBabiBano B03aaraBuiHxca Ha Hero b c jih k h x  H a a e x c a  —  o h o  h  no cefi nac noab3yeTca b 
raa3ax Bcex aioaefl 6e3rpaHHHHbiM KpeauTOM: aaBairre eMy 6e36o»3HeHHo KaKHe x o t h t c  
coKpoBHiaa, o h o  Bee BepHeT CTopuueH.111
109 Shestov, Typaenee, pp. 53-54.
110 Ibid, pp. 104-105.
1,1 Ibid, p. 26.
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Shestov then quite skilfully traces to Turgenev’s writings and his heroes this alleged 
tendency of the writer to reconcile with life and avoid the problematic by means of 
idealism. And a special role in this is assigned by Shestov to the theme of the superfluous 
man, especially as Turgenev was the first to introduce this term to Russian literature.
‘Jlmmme jnoflH ecTB —  h  ckojibko eme, a hto  c h h m h  flejiaTb —  HeH3BecTHO. OcTaeTca
110
o,h h o : H3o6peTaTb no noBO/jy h h x  ( s ic )  M H p oB 033p em w ’, Shestov m a k e s  h is  u su a l c la im ,
very much in the spirit of his previous assertions from his earlier books on Tolstoy,
D o s t o e v s k y  a n d  N i e t z s c h e .  T h e  e s s e n c e  o f  i t  i s  t h a t  ‘HyacHO yM eT b  O TB jieicaTb M b ic n b  ot
OTAejibHon j ih h h o c t h  h  oSpam aT b  BHHMaHne jin m b  Ha o 6 m n e  aBjieHHa. Jinn. T oro , h to 6 b i
j i y n r n e  h  y c n e n iH e e  a o c T H r a T b  sto h  n e n n ,  E B p o n a  p a 3 p a 6 o T a n a  i j e j i b r a  p a #  o c o b b ix
npneMOB, KOTOpbie oSbe/jHHaioTca nofl 3ByHHbiM h m ch cm  obnjecTBeHHO-MopajibHOH t o h k h
111
3peHHa. MeTa(J)H3HKH roBopflT — npocTO MopanbHOH tohkh  3peHHJi\ He uses the 
exam ple o f  Rudin to bring this point home. Unless Rudin is hidden away into a 
W eltanschauung and his fate sealed by it, he represents some metaphysical danger: ‘H t o , 
ecjin P y z jH H , BcnoMHHaa cboh  o6 n,zjbi, noBTOpHT BCJiea 3a C ojiom ohom  MyapbiM h  rp. 
T ojictbim : “cyeTa cyeT, h  BcanecKaa cyeTa” . A t o , noacajiyn, Bpo/je KaK nozuioJibHbm 
nejiOBeK y /(ocToeBCKoro, eme xyznnee npH^yMaeT’ . 114
T h a t  i s  w h y  ‘E B p o n a  c o B e T y e T  6 b iT b  c k p o m h b im , TaK  KaK B c a K o ro  p o ^ a  H ecK p o M H b ie  
T p e S o B a H H a  o x r e j ib H o r o  n e n o B e K a  rp o 3 H T  n p H B e c r a  k O T H aaH H io hjih  H H rH jiH 3M y ’ . 115 T o  
p r e v e n t  t h e s e  i m m o d e s t  c l a i m s  a n d  t h e i r  f r i g h t e n i n g  c o n s e q u e n c e s  T u r g e n e v ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  
S h e s t o v ,  f i n d s  f o r  R u d i n  ‘a  p l a c e  i n  t h e  W e l t a n s c h a u u n g ’ ( ‘mcctchko  b  
M H p 0 B 033peH H H ’) . 116 T h i s  i s  d o n e  b y  j u s t i f y i n g  R u d i n ,  d e s p i t e  h i s  l i f e  w h i c h  b y  a l l  
a c c o u n t s  h a d  f a i l e d ,  t h r o u g h  e m p h a s i s i n g  h i s  s o c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  ‘O h  B ee  ace 6 b m  n o jie 3 e H  
o b in e c T B y . O h  y M eeT  3B aT b j n o ^ e h  k j i y n m e M y ! ’ , S h e s t o v  w r i t e s  i n t e r p r e t i n g  T u r g e n e v ’s  
n o v e l ;  “ a a a c e  6 j ia ro p a 3 y M H b iH  JleacH eB , K o r ^ a - T o  6 o a B in H H c a ,  hto  P y u H H  otoS bct  y  H e r o
112 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 10.
1.3 Ibid, p. 41.
1.4 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid, p. 44.
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HesecTy, noa KOHeii, OTAaeT eMy AaHb cnpaBe^ JiHBOCTH n BMecTe c ropaHHM noKjiOHHHKOM 
PyflHHa BacncTOBbiM nseT maMnaHCKoe 3a 3AopoBbe Apyra CBoen oTAajieHHoii
1 17
moaoaocth’. This is for Shestov a manifestation of the triumph of idealism.
C a M b i H  B 3 b ic K a T e j ib H b iH  H H T a T e j ib  f l O J m e H  6 b iT b  y A O B J ie T B o p e H H b iM : m a M n a H C K o e  h  n o x B a n b H b i e  
c u o B a  o  n o j i b 3 e  o O m e c T B y ,  p a 3 B e  3 t o  H e  y T e m e H H e ,  H e  M e T a 4 > H 3 H H e c ic o e  y T e m e H H e ?  JJ,a  B e ^ b  s t o  
—  n e j i o e  M H p o B 0 3 3 p e H H e !  H  p a 3 B e  3 t h m  A O M a u iH H M  T o p A c e c T B O M  H e  C M b r e a iO T c a  B e e  o 6 h a b i  h  
y H H H c e H H a , n e p e H e c e H H b i e  P y A H H b iM . Ero B b iT a j iK H B a n H  O T O B C io f ly  h  B e e .  O h  c a M  3H a e T ,  h t o  y M e j i  
T O J ib K o  H a H H H a T b  h  A a A b i n e  6 j i a r o p o a H b i x  n o p b i B O B  H H K o r A a  H e  r n e j i ,  h o  B b i n n j i H  m a M n a H C K o e  h  
C K a 3 a n n  A o d p o e  c j i o b o .  H y a c H O  y M e T b  y f lO B O jib C T B O B a r b C J i n a e a j i b H b i M .118
Shestov then describes the standard path which Turgenev had taken as well as m any other 
o f  his idealistic contemporaries. At the beginning o f  it there lies H egel’s famous formula 
that reality is rational (‘/jeHCTBHTejibHOCTb pa3yMHa’). But one quickly starts doubting this 
claim  and tries to escape into idealism, from which, given its unsatisfactory nature, one is 
quickly expelled into empiricism (which one had rejected and condemned long ago). At the 
end o f  the day one is left with nothing but a ‘social’ point o f  view, Shestov asserts, and 
m akes further claims o f  a similarly critical, unmasking nature: ‘Ecjih HyxcHO BbibnpaTb 
MOK^y jihhhoctbk) h obmecTBOM, to, pa3yMeeTCJi, odmecTBO Bbime, h6o cyMMa Bceiyja 
SoJibine cnaraeMbix. Mbi Aaxce He noA03peBaeM, HacxojibKO 3Ta 6 aHajn>Haa npe^nocbuiKa 
onpeaeJiaeT Harne MnpoB033peHHe, h eme MeHee noA03peBaeM, hto bch ee npoHHOCTb 
ocHOBbiBaeTca Ha apn(J)MeTHHecKOM nonoK em ra ’ . 119
In the draft of the notes which Shestov ultimately rejected he puts this idea even more 
forcefully, having first stated that society expects from a writer some useful and consoling 
thoughts:
B ee a o  c h x  n o p  H 3o6peT eH H bie “ y T em eH H a”  - B im oT b a o  T ax  H a3biBaeM bix MeTa<j)H3HHecKHx, 
H H nero G oA bine He npeACTaBAflioT H3 c e 6 a ,  x a x  KOMHHecKyio CM ecb odmecTBeHHbix cooOpaAceHHH  
c  apH(J)MeTHKOH, KOTopaa MOJKeT 6biT b n c n e p n a H a  b  C B oen cymHOCTH cneA yiom H M  npH H unnoM : 
“ nejiOBeK n o r n 6  —  h o  s t o  H H nero; o h  n o r w b  3 a  n p a B o e  A e n o . I I p a B o e  A e n o  —  t .  e . A e a o  n o n e 3 H o e  
o b m e c T B y  paH o h a h  no3AHO BOCTopxcecTByeT h  t m c h h h  a i o a c h  O yA yr cnacTAHBbi H ecnacT beM
117 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 40.
118 Ibid, pp. 40-41.
119 Ibid, p. 42.
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oflHoro. A T b icn n a  —  b s t o m  h h k t o ,  p a3 y M eeT ca , He MO^ceT coM H eB aT bca —  S o j ib iu e , neM  o a h h ” . 
C T a jio  6biT b, 5KepTBa o n p a B ^ a H a ? 120
These, of course, are considerations in which Shestov merges with Dostoevsky who was 
profoundly preoccupied by the corollaries to his famous dilemma of whether one child’s 
tear can be sacrificed for the happiness of millions.
In other words, by stressing Turgenev’s concerns about the well-being of society, about the 
social good, Shestov implicitly accuses the writer of neglecting the individual whose 
significance, by comparison, appears small and pitiful. Therefore, by implication, 
somewhat paradoxically, despite Turgenev’s preoccupation with superfluous people, 
Shestov interprets the writer’s treatment of them in such a way as to make out that, blinded 
by his European convictions, Turgenev filters superfluousness through his Weltanschauung 
and only uses superfluous people as a device to reinforce the latter.
Another conclusion that can be derived from observing Shestov’s interpretation is that 
unlike Turgenev who is preoccupied by the reasons for superfluousness (including both 
socio-political and personal conditions which influence character formation) Shestov is 
concerned only by Turgenev himself in terms of his existential experience seen through his 
treatment of superfluous people which for Shestov signifies also how society treats them. In 
the latter theme Shestov is interested first and foremost in society’s inability and 
unwillingness to acknowledge and face tragedy. Interestingly this particular phenomenon 
largely survives into modernity, especially in the consumer society of the West, thus 
proving Shestov’s profound intuition about those burning and disturbing tendencies which 
were to last and develop into the twentieth century and beyond. Notably, Chekhov was 
preoccupied very much by the same questions of society’s inadequate and hypocritical 
treatment of difficult existential issues. The difference is, however, that if in Chekhov 
Shestov recognised these as deliberate motives introduced consciously by the writer, in his 
analysis of Turgenev he derives these socially oriented conclusions by himself from 
observing the writer and ‘his behaviour’ on the pages of his oeuvre. However, more
120 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 31.
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conventional readings of Turgenev -  such as, for example, that by Victor Ripp (quoted, in 
particular, in Armstrong’s article on the writer) somewhat overturns these insinuations of 
Shestov, since Ripp argues for the clear social implications of Turgenev’s texts where the 
writer demonstrates ‘the compromised public morality’.121 According to him, in Turgenev’s 
texts there is ‘not only the power of the established order, but the pernicious influence of 
the evils as well. ...The values of Russia’s public life seem to absorb all, and in 
consequence the critical impulse continually risks slipping into moral ambiguity’.122
Even more significant is Shestov’s understanding of superfluousness. Very much like 
Judith Armstrong does (and rather representatively so, one believes) Shestov is ready to 
seal the fate of such heroes of Turgenev as Hamlet of the Shchigry, Rudin, Chulkaturin and 
others by that label of superfluousness, readily and beyond any doubt meaning their total 
existential failure. Thus Armstrong classifies Hamlet’s sense that his life has totally failed
1 91as ‘quite accurate’. At the same time Shestov describes Rudin’s life as senseless, 
needless to him,124 thus inadvertently joining that very society and that very morality which 
he so eagerly strives to disavow. For who (speaking in his own terms) has given him the 
right to classify someone’s life as irreversibly failed (superfluous)? By contrast Frank 
Seeley demonstrates a much broader and more humane (and what would be important for 
Shestov, less conventional) approach, asserting that ‘the only existence that justifies despair 
is that of the man who dies without ever having loved or been loved’ because ultimately 
‘love is the justification of life’.125 Thus Seeley understands superfluousness as an inability 
to give oneself -  a conviction which reinforces our own point of view on superfluousness 
elaborated in Chapter 5 on Pushkin when comparing Onegin to Pechorin. We stressed there 
the emotional disability of sorts that characterises the superfluous man -  the combination of
121 See Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary of a Superfluous 
Man)’, p. 15.
122 Victor Ripp, ‘Turgenev as a social novelist: the problem of the part and the whole’ in Literature 
and Society in Imperial Russia, 1800-1914, ed. William Mills Todd III (Standford, 1978), pp. 237- 
258. Cited in Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary of a 
Superfluous Man)’, p. 15.
123 Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary of a Superfluous 
Man)’, p. 3.
124 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 42.
125 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 334.
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a gifted nature and a bright mind with the inability to love, to give himself to others. In 
other words, it is his debilitating and inescapable self-centredness which renders him 
superfluous (much more so from inside than from outside, i.e. superfluousness is much 
more a personal than a social construct). As Seeley writes, ‘this incapacity is the curse of 
the superfluous man’, ‘he is “locked” into him self.126
At the same time Armstrong (whose view in this respect is rather representative, as we 
pointed out above) understands superfluousness somewhat more superficially, it seems -  an 
inability to find one’s ‘niche’, and more specifically an incapacity to contract a marriage. In 
a sense Armstrong’s interpretation implies the hero’s inability to settle in life ‘properly’, as 
other people do. This, in fact, has a ring to it o f that very morality against which Shestov so 
passionately rebels. For he insists that the true purpose of European morality and ethics is 
to brush over problematic issues in order to help a philistine, bourgeois person to settle in 
life with a certain comfort -  this is what Weltanschauung is for, Shestov claims. Hence a 
superfluous man for Shestov is simply a person rejected by such a society, or even better 
put -  it is tragedy incarnate (which manifests itself through a particular existential 
experience). It is exactly in this sense that Berdiaev understood Shestov by stating that the 
latter raised the problem of a single personality (‘npofineMa hh^hbh^yanbHOCTH’). ‘3 to 
Taioxe ocHOBHaa npofineMa IHecTOBa. Oh fipocaeT bbbob “aofipy”, noTOMy hto oho 
6 eccHJibHO, noTOMy hto oho He cnacaer, a ryfiHT oaHHOKoe, noTepaBinee Haaeacay,
1 97yMnpaiomee HenoBenecicoe cymecTBo’, Berdiaev writes. He comments that ‘b noanonbe 
BorHana coBpeMeHHaa KyjitTypa mpaamecKue npofineMbi 5KH3HH’ and explains that ‘o tom, 
HTO npOHCXOAHT B TJiyfiHHe, B noa3eMHOM HapCTBe, O CaMOM HHTHMHOM H BaaCHOM, MajIO 
roBopaT Ha noBepxHOCTH coBpeMeHHOH 3eMnaHOH KyjitTypbi hjih roBopaT b cjihihkom yac 
otb jieneHHOM, odofimeHHOM h craaaceHHOM, ana “HCTopHnecKHx” neneft 
npHcnocobneHHOM BHae ’.128
126 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 332.
127 Berdiaev, Tpaeedun u odbidennocmb, p. 476.
128 Ibid, p. 467.
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However, while correctly identifying the tendency of modem society and European 
morality to deal with tragedy (with tragic, superfluous people) by avoiding and silencing it, 
Shestov at the same time, as we pointed out above, is least o f all interested in understanding 
either existential or socio-political reasons for superfluousness, and, what is more 
important, he joins, without realising it, the chorus o f this very society with its values and 
ideas by his unquestioning readiness to label someone superfluous and his life failed. The 
situation is not so simple though, for he may be doing this in order to expose and ridicule 
such a treatment o f the individual by society and the latter’s system o f values. This is 
probably so because at the same time as labelling a superfluous man’s life failed Shestov is 
equally capable o f rebelling against the social verdict itself passed on superfluous people, 
rather than rebelling only against society’s attitude to them (i.e. against the latter’s 
convenient avoidance o f tragic issues). Thus in connection to Veretev from ‘The Calm ’ 
(‘3aTHim>e’, 1856) who is characterised as someone whose fate is doomed (i.e. ‘oh H3 tcx , 
H3 Koro “HHHero HHKor^a He bbixo,hht” ’) Shestov comments: ‘KaaceTCfl, HecTpauiHBie 
cnoBa, a hmh, Kax rpoSoBon xptimKoft, HaBcer^a npHXjionbiBaeTCH HejiOBer. 3 to 
Ha3biBaeTca sthhcckhm cyacaeHHeM, h sthm 6 ecKpoBHbiM cnoco6 oM nbrnoi h K33HH, stoh
129
BHOBb H300peTeHH0H rHJIbOTHHbl MOpajIbHOH, HaHie BpeMfl rOpflHTCfl’ .
However, what is unambiguous is that, curiously, Shestov is never preoccupied by 
Turgenev’s treatment of nature which constitutes for the writer one of his most important 
themes. Yet, it is nature understood as soulless eternity whose indifference towards the 
human predicament Shestov continuously discusses and whose laws he constantly rebels 
against. Turgenev’s attitude to nature is ambivalent, but the above admission of its cnrel 
lack of concern with respect to an individual life is definitely one side of Turgenev’s 
complex relationship with Nature. Interestingly, not only does Shestov omit this issue from 
his consideration of the writer, but he seems never to be really concerned with the theme o f  
nature in literature (so notable, for example, in Chekhov), or rather it takes for him (as 
expected) a very abstract form -  as a system of natural laws, as a blind superior will whose 
purpose is to destroy. The impression is that Shestov is bypassed by the beauty of the worlld 
around him as revealed in nature because his principal (and overwhelming) interest is iin
129 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 49.
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people, their psychology, their predicament and their ultimate salvation. Even if this is 
often concealed in his ponderings on deity, in his search for God -  this is all happening as it 
were within his anthropocentric approach (as we mentioned earlier in this dissertation, 
following Erofeev), and his primary concern is human salvation (eliminating tragedy).
8.7. Decoding Turgenev through his treatment of his characters. Literary types and 
individual heroes; the private versus the general.
In his treatment o f  Turgenev Shestov does not betray his usual tendency to drag the w riter 
from behind his heroes, even though in this case, unlike with Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and 
Chekhov, he is less inclined to interpret the writer as directly hiding in particular heroes. 
Rather, Shestov ‘decodes’ Turgenev him self through the treatment that the latter displays 
with respect to his literary characters, as well as through the authorial voice which in 
Turgenev is stronger and more explicit or direct than in the writers above. Thus Shestov 
easily identifies the fact that ‘b “JIhmg” TypreHeB cneunajibHO C03#aeT (Jrnrypy IIoTyrHHa, 
HTOfibI HMeTb B03M05XH0CTB BbICXa3bIBaTb CBOH COfiCTBeHHbie, TaHHbie H JIBHbie MbICJIH’ . 130
From Turgenev’s incapacity for self-mockery that Shestov points out, he deduces that the 
writer’s love of self-denigration is authentic, but only up to a point:
E M y b  caMOM Aejie HpaBmiocb Taicoe 3aHflrae. Ho 3Ta cjiaAOCTb obpamaeTca b  ropenb, h  b 
HeBbiHOCHMyio ropenb, Kan TOJibKO TypreHeB ybe^aaeTca, h t o , bHHya ce6a, o h  He HcnpaBjiaeTca, a 
AobHBaeT ce6fl. Paccy^yteHHa JleacHeBa o nojib3e PyzjHHbix hjih  caMoro TypreHeBa o 3HaneHHH 
T aMJieTOB b  3KH3HH yKa3biBaioT, hto  TypreHeB npeAaBajicfl caMobnHeBaHrao, ho  b  rjiybHHe Ayiim 
Bce-TaKH nyBCTBOBaji ce6a He nocjieAHen cnHueft b  KOJiecHHue, h  flaace Aanexo He nocjieAHefl.131
Shestov then insinuates that Turgenev stayed away from anything too autobiographical and 
could easily deal only with those heroes who were sufficiently distant from his own self 
and his own interests. Thus, for example, Shestov distrusts Turgenev’s claims that the latter 
engaged in self-denigration in his Fathers and Sons. ‘Ea3apoBa, Kax “r a n ” TBepAoro n 
peniHTejibHoro HejiOBexa, TypreHeB Mor HafimoAaTb to j ib k o  BHe ce6 a, a He b ce6 e caMOM. 
Bee nepTbi 3Toro repoa 6b ijih  ny^CAbi aBTopy, h  o h  c  fiojibmHM TpyzjOM h  He Bcerna BepHO 
oraaAbiBaji, Kaxne BHyTpeHHHe c o c t o a h h h  cooTBeTCTBOBajin b ero repoe TeM nocTynxaM,
130 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 93.
131 Ibid, p. 94.
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KOTopue TaK nopa^cajiH oxpyxcaiomnx’, Shestov writes, but adds that Turgenev 
obviously likes his Bazarov. He explains that ‘uenBHOCTB HnrnjiHCTa HBJuuiacB bchhbim 
ynpexoM pacxojioTOCTH, pa3ABoeHHOcra co 6 ctb ch h o h  HarypBi TypreHeBa. Ho, ohcbhaho, 
3 t o t  ynpex He 6b>iji cjihihkom MyHHTe jibhbim. Ecjih 6bi TypreHeB nonyBCTBOBaji, h to  
Ba3apoB ero yHHHTO^caeT, h to  AHJieMMa nocTaBJieHa Tax: jih6o TypreHeB, jih6o Ba3 apoB —
1 ' X ' X
oh  6 bi, BepoHrao, He Tax nerxo avm pH Jica’ . Using the example of Bazarov Shestov 
compares Turgenev with Tolstoy to show that the former wanted peace and reconciliation 
above all:
T y p r e H e B y  x a 3a n o c b ,  h t o  m o h c h o  a s t b  A o p o r y  E a 3a p o B y  h  c a M O M y  o c T a T b c a  h c h t b .  T o j i c t o h  3H a j i ,  
h t o  3t h  a e j i a  He T a x  A e j i a i O T c a .  E c j i h  6 b i  o h  6 b i j i  H a  M e c T e  T y p r e H e B a  —  o h  6 b i A e p a c a n c a  c  
E a 3 a p o B b i M  h h o h  T a x T H K H . 3 T o r o  r e p o a ,  x o T o p b i f t  e m e  h h  n e p e a  x e M  H e  n a c o B a n ,  H y j x H o  6 w j i o  6 b i  
A a T b  > x h 3h h  n o H 3 M H T b  x o p o m e H b x o ,  h  o h  B 3 B b iJ i 6 b i H e  x y a c e  P y A H H a .  Ho T y p r e H e B  x o T e n  M H p a  —  
b o  h t o  6 b i t o  h h  C T a j io .  K a x  x p a c H B o  y M H p a e T  y  H e r o  E a 3a p o B . . .134
Thus Shestov demonstrates that in terms of his personal biography and inner integrity 
Turgenev was not, as it were, afraid of Bazarov, as he was o f Rudin, and therefore treated 
them differently. In other words, Shestov’s claim is that in his attempt to avoid the 
problematic, Turgenev did not feel the need to ‘conquer’ Bazarov, to sign him off to the 
Weltanschauung, as he did with Rudin. In this connection Shestov makes an important 
distinction between a literary archetype (depicting a ‘type’, as he calls it) and portraying a 
‘living’ individual, a single person. ‘“JIhiiihhh nejiOBex”, nepTBi xoToporo TypreHeB 
Hameji b ce6 e, tojibxo “ra n ” —  Hy, a o rane, pa3yMeeTC«, m hoto AyMaTB HeT h a a o 6 h o cth , 
He npHXOAHTca. To jih AeJio, ecjiH tob op htb  He o rane, a o cede caMOM, o 6jih3xom  
nejioBexe Aaxce. Tor/ja Bee oraomeHHa paAHxajiBHO H3MeHa io tca  , h Tonxa 3peHHa hjih
p i c
MHpoco3epi^aHHe npeACTaBJunoTCJi cobccm HeHyxcHBiMH BemaMH’, Shestov writes. This 
discussion comes to the fore particularly in connection with Turgenev’s famous essay 
‘Hamlet and Don Quixote’ which was already referred to earlier.
132 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 95.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid, p. 94.
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Shestov’s view is once again far from conventional. He thinks that Turgenev identified 
him self with Hamlet because o f  their mutual self-centredness and was therefore 
sympathetic to the Danish Prince, although he reckoned it best to conceal his sympathies. 
‘TypreHeB, otjihhho co3HaBaBinHH, hto oh, TaK ace, KaK h TaMJieT, CHHTaeT ce6 a ueHTpoM 
BcejieHHOH, He pemnjica OTKpLrro b3htb CTopoHy ^aTCKoro npHHua, a npeanoHen 
MopajiH3HpoBaTb. H oh aom en r o  toto, hto b KOHije kohuob eMy caMOMy CTajio acant
1 - l / r
fie^Horo TaMjieTa, h oh CTan r r x  Hero xjionoTaTb o MecreHKe b “MHpoB033peHHH”’, 
Shestov writes. He then points out that the device which Turgenev uses to achieve the 
above effect of transferring Hamlet from the real world to the ideal one is rather 
characteristic and consists exactly of creating ‘types’.
In Shestov’s own words, ‘TypreHeB hcxo^ht h3 ofimenpHmiTOH h noTOMy He Tpebyiomen 
flOKa3aTejn>CTB npeanocbuiKH, hto TaMJieT —  He npocTofi HejiOBex, a t h i i ,  T.e. hchto 
abcTpaKTHoe, He cymecTByiomee, h hto IXIeKcnnp, paccKa3aBinn HaM Tpare^nio TaMjieTa, 
xoTen TOJibKO noxa3aTb Ha BbiMbimjieHHOM npHMepe, k kbkhm nenajibHbiM nocjie^CTBHHM
117npHBO^HT aHajiH3 3a cneT bojih’. Thus Shestov characteristically translates the literary 
discussion onto a philosophical plane and gets on to his favourite theme -  of juxtaposing 
the private and the general. Normally, though, he accuses science of generalisations which 
neglect the individual, while art par excellence is designed to stand up for a private 
existence. However, in art Shestov eagerly distinguishes (and brings into the open) certain 
trends that are prone to generalised analysis. One of them is the above phenomenon of 
depicting literary archetypes. Interestingly, Shestov ignores it in Chekhov’s writings, even 
though Chekhov created a whole series of such easily recognisable types as ‘Thick and 
Thin’ (‘TojicTbiH h tohkhh’), ‘A Man in a Case’ (‘HejiOBex b (j>yTjrape’), the ‘Chameleon’ 
(‘XaMeneoH’) and others. Yet, Shestov prefers to focus on Chekhov’s heroes who are, in 
his eyes, individual rather than typical or general.
In Turgenev’s works, on the contrary, Shestov refuses to see individuals, but focuses on 
their ‘generalising’ aspect. This, Shestov claims, was no trouble for Turgenev as
136 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 73.
137 Ibid, p. 74.
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1 IQ‘oTBeTCTBeHHOCTb naAana He Ha Hero, a Ha eBponeHCxyio Hayicy’. Shestov then develops 
this claim by blaming Europe for such an approach where the general substitutes for the 
private, because o f the European tendency to make everything smooth and resolved in an 
all-uniting and all-explaining law. In the same vein Turgenev, according to Shestov,
b  r e p o f l x  co b cT B eH H b ix  poM aH O B [ . . . ]  BHAeji to jii> k o  “ T H nbi”  h  6 b iJi y b o K ^ e H ,  x a x  h  B ee  b  E B p o n e  
y 6 e> x n ,eH b i, x m e T C f l ,  a o  c h x  n o p ,  h t o  3 a A a n a  xyAOJXHHxa h m c h h o  b  to m  h  c o c t o h t ,  h t o 6 m  
H 3 o 6 p a a c a T b  “ T H nbi” , h t o  xy A o acecT B eH H o e  n p o H 3B eA eH H e a o j d x h o  A aB aTb M a T e p n a ji  A n a  o G ia h x  
BbiBOAOB, H y, a  x a x n e  a ce  o b u m e  BbiBOAbi m o jx h o  C A ejiaTb n o  noB O A y h c io h h  o A H o ro  n e jiO B e x a . H  
3aT eM , H e B c e rA a  npHJiHHHO, M o p a n H 3 y a , c o o b m a T b  A encT B H T ejibH bie , a  H e ab cT p aK T H b ie  
n ep ea cH B aH H a  n e jiO B e x a .139
Shestov then points out Shakespeare’s greatness, the quintessence of which he sees 
precisely in the daring of portraying an individual fate rather than toying with general types 
and general ideas. Once again he rebels against a utilitarian approach to life and literature 
which sees its task in forestalling and avoiding tragedy rather than understanding it, and a 
literary work then becomes only an excuse for moralising. ‘Teopna “THnoB” npHAyMaHa
AIOAtMH, y KOTOpbIX HCT OXOTbl HATH BCAeA 3a n03T0M  B Ty O^AaCTb BCHHOH TbMbI,
KOTopaa Ha3biBaeTca TpareAHen’, S hestov writes and adds that
r ip o H H T aB u iH  ra M J ie T a  h jih  J l n p a ,  o h h  pa3M bm uiH K )T  o  t o m  j in i i ib ,  x a x  6 b i  T a x  y c T p o H T b c a , H T obb i b 
MCH3HH 6 b m o  n o M e H b u ie  h jih  A a ^ e  c o b c c m  H e 6 b iJ io  T p a rH H e c x H x  c to j ix h o b c h m h , h 6 o  —  b s t o m  
o h h  H H e x o jib x o  He coMHeBaiOTCH —  T p a rH H e c x u e  j i io a h  e c T b  j h o a h  o x o H H aT ejib H o  n o rH b u iH e .  
EAHH CTBeHH aa n o j ib 3 a ,  x o T o p y io  o h h  M o r y r  n p H H ecT H  —  o  n o j ib 3 e  H H x o rA a  y  H ac  H e 3 a 6 b iB a io T  —  
3TO CBOHM npH M epO M  A aTb y p o x  A p y rH M .140
Thus, we can see once again that Shestov essentially demonstrates his very characteristic 
revolt not only against European thought, but also against the realistic criticism dominant at 
the time specifically in Russian literature, and in a certain sense joins the decadent wave 
which was emerging exactly in opposition to the above critical trend.
In a very similar way to his analysis of Turgenev’s treatment of Rudin Shestov exclaims 
that “TaMAeT” —  ran, h toabko xax ran npeACTaBnaeT HHTepec. Kax HenoBex —  pa3 oh
138 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 74.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid, pp. 75-76.
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n o n a n  b  T p a re^ n io , yxce He m o j k c t  Hac 3aHHMaTB. Hy>KHO npoHHTaTB eM y 
CHHCxo^HTejiBHoe H a^ rp o6H oe c j i o b o  Ha TeMy: de mortuis aut n ih il aut b e n e , h  3a6Bm> o 
HeM, h j i h  noMecTHTB e r o  b  “M H poB033peHHe” , Kyzta cBajiHBaeTca h  r /je  jjorHHBaeT b c j i k h h  
HeHy^cHBiH xjiaM  ’ . 141
However, in contrast to the rather conventional theme that Shestov unfolds in connection to 
Hamlet he makes a rather unexpected statement when it comes to Don Quixote. Namely, he 
acknowledges that the latter can indeed be regarded as a type and was in fact created by 
Cervantes as such. Hence, Shestov concludes, Don Quixote (who is a type) cannot be 
compared to Hamlet (who is not a type). Yet, Shestov stresses, Turgenev found it possible 
to regard Don Quixote as a real fighter for the truth and treats the blows received by the 
latter as perfectly real. In other words, Shestov accuses Turgenev of failing to discern 
between the private and the general (or between being a unique individual hero and being 
an archetype) in the case of Hamlet and Don Quixote.
S h e s to v  th e n  q u o te s  T u r g e n e v ’s  w o r d s  in  ord er  to  q u e s t io n  h is  a n a ly s is :  ‘M b o t  c  o a h o h  
CTOpOHBI CT03T TaMJieTBI, MBICJWIHHe, C03HaTCJIBHBie, HaCTO BCeofiBeMJHOIHHe, HO TaiOKe 
nacT o 6ecn ojie3H B ie h  ocyam eH H B ie 3a  h c h o a b h j k h o c t b ,  a c A p y r o n  nojiy6e3yM H B ie JIoh- 
K h x o t b i ,  KOTopBie noTOMy t o j i b k o  h  npHHOCHT n ojiB 3y h  noABHraiOT jn oaeH , h t o  b h j v i t  h  
3HaiOT O jm y j i h i h b  TOHKy, n acT o A ajxe He c y m e c T B y io m y io  b  t o m  o 6 p a 3 e , KaKOio o h h  ee 
b h u h t ’ . 142 F ro m  th is  S h e s to v  d e r iv e s  h is  q u e stio n :
hto ace, c o b c T B e H H o ,  u e H H J i  h n o p H i i a j i  T y p r e H e B ?  B e p y  b H e 3 b i 6 j i e M y i o  H C T H H y  hjih 
o S m e c T B e H H y i o  n o j i B 3 y ?  B e / i b  3to hhctoh c j i y n a H H O C T b ,  hto B e p a  O K a 3 a n a c b  n o j i e 3 H o f i .  M o r j i o  
6 b iT b , h c r u i o u i b  h p a / j o M  S b m a e T ,  hto B e p a  b H e 3 b i 6 j i e M y i o  H C T H H y  O K a 3 b i B a e T c a  B p e j j H o i i .  K a x  
6 b iT b  T o r j i a ?  I I p o A O j m a T b  jih n o /m e p ^ K H B a T b  aohxhxotctbo hjih B o c c T a T b  n p o T H B  H e r o  c o  B e e n  
3 H e p r H e H ,  x o T o p a a  p a c T p a n H B a j i a c b  H a  6 o p b 6 y  c r a M J ie T H 3 M O M ?  T y p r e H e B  T a K o r o  B o n p o c a  H e  
CTaBHji. B K a n e c T B e  c o B p e M e H H O  o 6 p a 3 0 B a H H o r o  n e j i O B e x a  oh C H H T a n  h3jihuihhm n p o B e p a T b  n p a B a  
n o j i b 3b i .  P a 3  to  hjih H H o e  H e j i O B e n e c K o e  cbohctbo H / i e T  H a  n o j i b 3 y  jho/uim —  H e n e r o  6 o j i b i n e  
p a c c n p a u i H B a T b .  ,Z (a a c e  “ n o j i y 6 e 3 y M H e ”  ( o T n e r o  H e  n p o c T O  6 e 3 y M H e )  o n p a B A b i B a e T c a ,  e c j i H  oho 
A a e T  S j i a r o T B o p H b i e  p e 3 y j i b T a T b i .143
141 Shestov, Typzeuee, p p .  76-77.
1421. S. Turgenev, T a M J i e T  h ^ oh K h x o t’, vol. 10, p .  443 . Cited in Shestov, Typaenee, p .  80.
143 Shestov, Typaenee, p p .  80-81.
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This in Shestov’s view testifies to the purely utilitarian goals of the modem outlook. 
Anything which is devoid of usefulness for the common good, no matter how noble, lofty, 
faithful, etc., is rejected by modem thought, Shestov asserts once again.
‘B epa b HCTHHy, npHBO/yimaH k pa3pymeHHio, 6e3yMHe, Hapymaiomee MnpHoe TeneHHe 
>kh3hh, #a)Ke reHHajibHaa Mbicjib, CMymaiomaa noicoH Sjihxchhx, (HanpHMep, Tojictoh h 
^ ocToeBCKHii), He Hamjia 6 bi ce6 e 3amHTHHKa b Jinije TypreHeBa’, he concludes . 144 In the 
end Shestov does not see anything else that Turgenev can offer to his readership except to 
urge for usefulness and positive deeds for the communal good. Shestov again stresses 
Turgenev’s emphasis on the collective rather than on personal benefits which, he claims, 
constituted for the latter the ultimate truth and the final criterion o f  human activity.
8.8. More on Hamlet and Don Quixote -  conflicting interpretations. Questions of 
literature, philosophy and morality.
Thus what we can see in Shestov’s analysis of this essay by Turgenev encompasses a 
variety of issues. First and foremost of them is that Shestov, as usual, is being extreme in 
his cmsade against utilitarianism, and in consequence in his conclusions. In his typical 
juxtaposition of the private and the general, he somewhat confuses the individual with the 
individualistic and the general with the communal. Thus again, as James Wemham aptly 
and more generally observes, following Berdiaev, Shestov philosophises as the 
Underground Man.145 We know by now that Shestov’s revolt against science because of its 
generalisation misconstrues the nature of science, and that he seeks refuge in art where he 
expects to find individual cases to be sacred and central, hence rebelling against what he 
deems as the failure to live up to this pattern. However, what apparently escapes his 
attention is that the individual in art, expressed through an individual language too, always 
touches a commonly recognisable all-human chord which reverberates through a plentitude 
of lives and individualities. This is precisely one of the effects of art which causes spiritual 
catharsis, no matter how momentary or how lasting. In other words art is the perfect ground
144 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 81.
145 See James C. S. Wemham, Two Russian Thinkers: An Essay in Berdyaev and Shestov (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 57-75 and Nikolai Berdiaev, The Russian Idea, transl. R. M. 
French, Geoffrey Bles (London, 1947), p. 235.
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where private meets general, where the two are united. Shestov, however, due to his 
extremism, cannot unite, but knows only how to divide and oppose. Hence whenever he 
suspects a tendency to generalise, to create a ‘type’ instead of a unique individual, he 
deems that art is betraying its nature.
On the other hand his remark on the impossibility of a proper comparison between Hamlet 
and Don Quixote, if  they are treated faithfully to their respective texts, seems very 
perceptive. Or rather, they cannot be compared unless both heroes are elevated to another 
plane where they both become abstractions, archetypes derived from the underlying ideas 
of their original literary sources -  and this is exactly what Turgenev is doing. Comparing 
them in any other way would be missing the point, for indeed they come from two totally 
different literary genres -  one being a tragedy, the other -  an epic comedy. In their literal 
even if hypothetical encounter, as Shestov rightly points out, a tragic hero meets the idea 
incarnate. Turgenev therefore, by juxtaposing the two considers them precisely as types, as 
derived tendencies, as two extremes of human nature, and uses them first and foremost as a 
springboard for his own considerations of a rather social nature. Surprisingly, Seeley in his 
analysis of this essay seems to miss the point entirely by accusing Turgenev of serving his 
own ends through a careless treatment of the underlying texts.
Indeed, on the one hand Seeley understands the essay as being essentially Turgenev’s 
political manifesto where he calls upon Don Quixotes who are needed by contemporary 
Russian society to lead it forward, instead of motionless Hamlets -  superfluous people -  
who are trapped in their agonising reflection. For Turgenev, Seeley writes, ‘Don Quixote is 
an enthusiast in the service of an idea, and its radiance is all around him. To Don Quixote 
Turgenev opposes Hamlet: as egoism to devotion, as critical irony to enthusiastic faith, as 
sceptical intelligence to heart and will’.146 Thus Seeley implicitly recognises Turgenev’s 
rather applied and symbolic treatment of the two characters. On the other hand, however, 
Seeley criticises Turgenev’s analysis for not being faithful to the original literary sources. 
Turgenev’s interpretation of these two literary characters, he points out, suffers from the 
writer’s selective neglect of certain features in order to suit his own ends. Thus, Seeley
146 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 162.
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claims, Turgenev ignores Don Quixote’s madness, his vanity and striving for fame and, 
most importantly, his destructive tendencies, especially had he succeeded in his exploits. 
‘While Don Quixote is idealised, Hamlet is disparaged’,147 Seeley writes. He stresses that 
Turgenev examines Hamlet outside the context of his predicament and ignores Hamlet’s 
capacity for love and devotion while twisting and distorting his other features. Moreover, 
Seeley observes that Turgenev contradicts not only the texts by Shakespeare and Cervantes, 
but also himself.
Thus Seeley is predominantly concerned with analysing Turgenev’s treatment of the two 
famous literary works as a literary critic, and finds endless flaws on Turgenev’s part, 
calling his treatment altogether ‘cavalier’. For once, it seems, Shestov comes on top 
specifically in literary criticism by emphasising the pointlessness of a literal comparison 
between the two heroes. At the same time Shestov’s criticism is directed against 
Turgenev’s particular attempt to compare the two, thus failing to recognise that Turgenev 
was far from treating the two characters literally (and even if Turgenev was not, i.e. if 
Shestov is right in his reproaches, it would be a bit ridiculous to try and redeem Turgenev’s 
attempt by fulfilling his intention ‘more properly’, because any literal comparison between 
the two would be misplaced).
Paradoxically though, Shestov is least of all interested in a fair analysis of Hamlet and Don 
Quixote from the point of view of literary criticism. Instead, he seeks to see what 
conclusions about Turgenev and his outlook, modelled on the European world-view, can be 
salvaged and how they fit into Shestov’s paradigm. In other words, while Seeley is 
focusing first and foremost on Hamlet and Don Quixote themselves, Shestov’s focus is 
ultimately on Turgenev and his existential experience. To be fair though, Seeley does make 
the point (shared widely) that the characteristics of both types are present in varying 
degrees in real people and ultimately claims that what Turgenev says about the types 
‘would be unexceptionable if he were not constantly referring it to Shakespeare’s and
147 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f  his Fiction, p. 164.
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148Cervantes’ heroes’. Shestov on the other hand unmasks Turgenev through the latter’s 
underlying conclusions.
In contrast to both Shestov and Seeley, Judith Armstrong takes a more balanced approach 
to Turgenev’s essay. Ironically though, she adds to the conventional interpretation of it (in 
favour of Don Quixotes who can act as new leaders, much needed in social terms, and 
against reflective superfluous Hamlets who cannot) a rather Shestovian slant by claiming 
that ‘for Turgenev himself the philosophical strings of the thought contained in the essay 
were as important as its social implications and applications’.149 She argues that while 
being critical of the Hamlets Turgenev feels sympathy towards them -  an idea that 
resonates, even if from another direction, with that of Shestov who points to Turgenev’s 
egotistic understanding of this type by self-identification with Hamlets leading to a 
subsequent inner, albeit hidden, conviction of their central importance for mankind. 
Armstrong, on the other hand, points to Hamlets experiencing ‘the universal tragedy of 
existence; their agony without illusion’.150 ‘They know the suffering of the world; and it is 
their suffering which elevates them above the mob’,151 she emphasises. Also, importantly, 
she notes that in his essay Turgenev consciously expresses abstract extremes in human 
nature that are never attainable. ‘While these two concepts may coexist in the mind of the 
philosopher, they are not simultaneously compatible, in their absolute form, either in life, or
1 ^ 9in the “realism” of fiction, where each must exist sequentially’, is Armstrong’s 
explanation, which in a way represents the other side of the coin with respect to Seeley’s 
statement that the two archetypes are present in combination in varying degrees in people. 
Shestov, on the other hand, does not view them in such a light at all, but instead follows 
Turgenev’s own convictions to disavow the writer’s social (not to say socialist) point of 
view.
148 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 166.
149 Armstrong, ‘Turgenev’s novella Dnevnik lishnego cheloveka (The Diary o f a Superfluous Marif,
p. 10.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid, p. 11.
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And yet, after all this bringing Turgenev out into the open, after unmasking the smooth, but
unreliable and borrowed nature of his Westernised ideas, Shestov then recalls Turgenev’s
inner duality, his irrevocably Russian soul and claims that the writer was not after all fully
1European (‘Bce-TaKH He 6biji BnojiHe eBponenneM’. Indeed, ‘oh, Aaxce npncTpOHB CBoero 
repoa k KaKOMy-Hn6 yai> MecTenxy npn MHpoB033peHHH, Bcer^a HyBCTBOBan, hto KaK 
6 yATO eme He Bee CAenaHO, h obtiKHOBeHHo 3aKaHHHBaji cboh npoH3Be,zjeHHa KpaTKHM 
jiHpHnecKHM oTCTynjieHHeM’, 154 Shestov writes. Such for Shestov is, for example, the end 
o f  Rudin where Turgenev, as Shestov sees it, is dissatisfied by m erely the idealistic 
justification o f  Rudin’s failed destiny as supplied by Lezhnev, and deems it necessary to 
recall God with His divine grace (even though he was him self an unbeliever): ‘H a  a 
noMoxceT TocnoAb bccm 6 ecnpHiOTHbiM CKHTajibnaM!’ . 155 In the same light o f  detecting 
some anxious inner unsettledness in Turgenev Shestov views the ending to the Nest o f  the 
Gentry where the writer, while refraining from psychological explanations, forces the main 
protagonists to meet again, but to walk past one another. 156 Yet, his European education 
forced Turgenev to silence the problematic and to make the good triumph, Shestov repeats.
Interestingly, in this connection Shestov talks about the cruelty of the European morality 
which, in his eyes, demands total obedience, especially from superfluous, unnecessary 
people -  second-class citizens as opposed to those who are in demand by society, who are 
successful by its standards. ‘B 5KH3HH ecTb HyxcHbie h  HeHyacHbie a io a h ’ Shestov explains 
the ‘European’ point of view, and
HeHy>KHbie a io a h  o6fl3aH bi x o tb  tc m  onpaBAaTb ce6a, h to  o h h  o x o t h o  h  paAOCTHo noorynaiOT Ha 
cjiyacby k h jo k h b im . JIaBpeuKHH h  JlH3a cBHXHyjincb b ach3h h . E cjih  o h h , Tax h jih  HHane, 
corjiacHTca npHHATb cjiyacedHyio pojib h  He to jib k o  ncnoAHATb ee, h o  ropAHTbca eio, Mbi 
no^cajieeM o h h x , Aaace byaeM XBajiHTb. E c jih  ace o h h  He noHAyr Ha o to , Hy, TorAa y Hac ecTb Bee 
npaBa npe3HpaTb h  Aaace npecAeAOBaTb h x  [ . . . ]  o 6 h a h b im h  h  yHHHTOJKaiomHMH cAOBaMH. [ . . . ]  
BnHOBaTbix 6bioT — 3t o t  npHHUHn uejiHKOM nepeuieA H3 TpaAHUHH HeKyAbiypHoro npoiimoro b 
coBpeMeHHyio 3THKy. [...] “BHHOBaTbix GbiOT”, a o h h  MOAHa uejiyiOT Kapaiomyio pyKy. H 3to
153 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 44.
154 Ibid.
155 Cited in Shestov, Typzenee, p. 45.
156 Ibid, pp. 47-48.
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Ha3bmaeTCH cnpaBeAJiHBOCTbio, h6o npn TaKOM nopaflice k33hht byATO 6bi yace He nejiOBeK, a HAea. 
H^ee ace Bee pa3peuiaeTca,157
Shestov concludes and exemplifies his point by the example o f  Veretev. ‘PyAHHa TypreHeB 
eme ma/jnT, Kan JIaBpeijKoro h JlH3y, noTOMy h to  ohh BepaT b Aobpo h no^HHHaioTca. Ho 
Kor,zja nona^aioTca rocno^a BpoAe BepeTteBa (b “3aTHHn>e”), o h h x yace He acajieioT, a 
npaMO odtaBJiaiOT: x o tb  ohh  h ^apoBHTtie h 3aMenaTeABHBie a ioah , ho H3 hhx “HHKoraa 
HHHerO He BBIXOAHT’” .158
Shestov’s attack on contemporary ethics and morality with their underlying cruelty reaches 
its peak in the following striking words where the distinct echo of Nietzsche is audible:
HpaBCTBeHHbie aioah Bceraa 6hjih cbmmmh HeyMOJiHMbiMH AecnoTaMH h cboio HpaBCTBeHHOCTb 
ohh ynoTpebjiajiH Kan jiyHiuee h HanboAee yTOHHeHHoe opyacne b 6opb6e 3a to, hto ohh Ha3biBajiH 
cbohm HaeanoM. Ohh He yAOBJieTBopjuiHCb y>Ke TeM, hto npocTO npe3HpanH h ocyac/iajiH cBoero 
6jiH>KHero, ohh xoTejiH, hto6 hx cyacAeHHa 6bijih BceobmHMH h o6a3aTejibHbiMH, T.e. HTobbi 
BMecTe c hhmh jhoah BoccTanH Ha ocy>KAeHHoro hmh, HTobbi Aaace cobcTBeHHaa coBecTb 
ocyacAeHHoro 6buia Ha hx cmpoHe. Tojibko TorAa ohh nyBCTBOBajiH ceba BnojiHe 
yAOBJieTBOpeHHblMH H yCnOKaHBaJIHCb. H KpOMe HpaBCTBeHHOCTH HHHero b MHpe He MOACeT 
npHBecTH k CTOJib bjiecTauiHM pe3yjibTaTaM.159
This also rather forcefully makes one recall Chekhov again, for Shestov’s struggle against 
morality and ethics is in fact reminiscent of Chekhov’s struggle against hypocrisy, often 
disguised as social morality.
8.9, Shestov’s reading of Turgenev’s last works.
Yet, Shestov’s inevitable conclusion is that Turgenev’s European idealism was doomed to 
failure in the face of real suffering which revealed Turgenev’s deeply hidden and carefully 
concealed Russianness. According to him, as we discussed above, this suffering came only 
with the rapprochement of death.
157 Shestov, Typzenee, pp. 48-49.
158 Ibid, p. 49.
159 Ibid, p. 28.
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In his last works Turgenev, Shestov claims, ‘He xyxce rpa(j)a T ojicto to  no^KanbiBanca no# 
“BbicoKHe HfleH’” . 160 In him, Shestov says,
HecMQTpa Ha Bee ero o6pa30BaHHe, xaic h  b o  b ch k o m  pyccKOM, no# KOHen >kh3hh Bee Sojibuie h  
6ojibine cKa3biBajica “TaTapHH”, t .  e. c t h x h h h b ih  nejioBeK, j x j i r  KOToporo u,HBHjiH3auHa He ycneaa  
CTaTb BTopoft npHpoAOH. rioHeMHory o h  CTaHOBHJica Bee paBHoayuiHeH h  paBHOAyniHeH k  yneHbiM 
TeopHBM H H f l e f l M ,  KOr^a-TO npeACTaBJlHBUIHMCH CaMbIM HyHCHbIM B 2KH3HH. B  ero JIHHe, 
H3MyneHHOM a o j h t im h  CTpaaaHHBMH h  HeyaoBjieTBopeHHOCTbio Bee 3aMeTHeii, Bee pe3He 
npocTynaioT nepTbi, KOTopbie Kor^a-To eMy yaaBanocb Tax HcxycHO cxpbiBaTb noa  
ohmeeBponencKHM rpHMOM.161
However, it is difficult to argue either for or against Shestov’s claims, for he asserts that 
these changes in Turgenev’s sensibility were rather subconscious, and consciously the 
w riter did not realise what was happening to him and furthermore that he continued to 
believe (and to a large extent to act!) as if  he was still ‘Bee t o t  xce “3ana/ufflK”, 
“nocTeneHOBeit” kbkhm 6 biji b MOJio^Bie to /jli. H fleftcTBHTejiBHO, b nocjieflHHX ero 
npoH3BeaeHHBX, aaxce b nocjie^HHX nncBMax, mbi nacTo cjiBimHM 3HaKOMBie 
BBiTBepxceHHBie peHH’ , 162 Shestov asserts.
Thus the claim is that on the outside Turgenev’s behaviour continues to look the same, but
on the inside there is turmoil, and everything is now doubted and questioned. In other
words, Shestov, somewhat characteristically, does not leave any grounds for a rational
dispute as to the validity o f  his claims, because his whole argument is based on what new
insinuations he thinks Turgenev is now making, even though Turgenev’s actual words m ay
look the same as before! Thus, Shestov says, the writer produces the novel Virgin Soil
1(.Hoeb, 1877) ‘Ha 3Jio6oflHeBHyio —  Ha oSmecTBeHHyio TeMy’. In this novel the question 
which long since had engaged Turgenev’s interest is being discussed -  that o f  Russian 
‘nihilism ’. The discussion provided is given ‘c tohkh  3peHHa ofimecTBeHHoro 
3HaneHHB’, 164 Shestov writes. In the epigraph to the novel ( ‘no^HHMaTB cjie^yeT hobb He 
noBepxHocrao CKOJiB35imeH coxoh, ho rjiyfioico 3a()HpaioiHHM nnyroM’) Shestov sees the
160 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 39.
161 Ibid, p p . 9 7 -9 8 .
162 Ibid, p . 98.
163 Ibid, p . 98.
164 Ibid.
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embodiment of Turgenev’s views on the social movement that he depicts in his work: 
‘B3rjum HejiOBexa niyfioKO yfieac^eHHoro, Bepyiomero, h t o  HCTopuHecKne cofiBroui h m c i o t  
acHyio jno^en mejit, h  h t o ,  cooTBeTCTBeHHO, Bee a c h c t b h h  o t a c j i b h b i x  j i h h  h  
odmecTBeHHBix rpynn a o j o k h b i  oijeHHBaTBca c t o h k h  3peHHH h x  ijejiecoo6pa3HOCTH’ .165 
Shestov then compares (as usual quite perceptively -  when it comes to concrete existential 
and psychological rather than abstract philosophical statements), Turgenev’s novel with 
Dostoevsky’s The Devils (.Eecbi). Written almost simultaneously with Turgenev’s Hoeb, 
and also, as Shestov puts it, with the social agenda in mind and a deliberate intention of 
portraying the younger generation in a caricatured way, Dostoevsky’s novel shows, Shestov 
claims, so much more sensitivity and understanding than Turgenev’s (‘HacxojiBKO 6 ojiBine 
nyTBH npoaBHJi o h  [Dostoevsky] b  “Eecax”, neM TypreHeB b  “ H o b h ” ’) . 166
Shestov then challenges Turgenev’s indisputable significance as a portrayer of nihilism and 
nihilists by comparing him unfavourably to Dostoevsky. ‘Y ,HocToeBCKoro H a u i H
167 ,“HHrnjiHCTBi” npeflCTaBjieHBi xax 6 b i  ofiBeBponeHBHiHMHca CHapyacn ceKTaHTaMH ’. They
passionately seek answers to the ‘accursed’ questions and ultimately forget about their 
original goals, if  not altogether contradicting those goals, Shestov explains, ‘ ^ o c t o c b c k h h  
[...] nyBCTBOBan h  yMeji nepejjaTB, h t o  “ h h t h j i h s m ”  ecTB h h c t o  pyccxoe HBjieHHe, t o j i b k o
1 AR
HapyacHo oKpameHHoe 3anajjHo-eBponeHCKHMH HflenMH’, Shestov claims, asserting a 
strong irrational element in the phenomenon o f  nihilism. ‘TypreHeB ace noHTH He OTJinnaji 
HHrHJIHCTOB OT JIHfiepaJIOB. EMy Ka3aJIOCB, h t o  “ h h t h j i h c t b i ”  t o j i b k o  O^Ha H3 
ofimecTBeHHBix napTHH, flofiHBaBuiaflca pecjiopM h  He yMeBmaa nomiTB, h t o  b c b k o t o  po;ja 
nporpecc aocTHraeTca He GypHBiMH peBOj h o i u h h m h , a pa/jOM Me/yieHHBix, nocTeneHHBix 
nepeMeH’,169 Shestov writes and adds that our nihilists would carry on their terrible 
business regardless o f  the outside conditions and reforms.
165 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 98.
166 Ibid, pp. 98-99.
167 Ibid, p. 99.
168 Ibid.
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Returning to the main thrust of Shestov’s claim about the changes in Turgenev’s outlook in 
the writer’s last years, we notice the same essential groundlessness of Shestov’s arguments. 
He asserts that Turgenev’s latest works and even his letters are permeated with mystical 
horror, and that now the ground is drifting from under his feet in such a way that he cannot 
stop it no matter how hard he tries. The effect of Tropman’s execution on Turgenev could 
be stifled and averted by considerations of usefulness and future progress, Shestov says, but 
now all these lofty words do not help any more. One could of course recall here the 
persistency of Turgenev’s terror of death which created an on-going motive for his writings 
from early on. Equally one could recall his permanent feelings of insecurity, of the 
unreliability of the world outside which would if not refute, at least dwarf Shestov’s claims 
of drastic changes in the writer. However, Shestov builds up an impenetrable defence by 
saying that Turgenev’s lament is indeed old, but now it gains new and real strength, while 
in the past he was crying Wolf like the boy from the corresponding tale. This time it is real, 
but nobody realises it as one has become used to his persistent outcries, Shestov explains.
These claims are further complicated by Shestov’s assertion that even when approaching 
death Turgenev was pulled back to his old convictions and behaviour by his lifelong habits, 
by his desire to hide his growing feebleness, even if behind an old illusion. In other words, 
although Turgenev is now suffering to the full extent, losing his faith in progress and social 
good, his suffering is not explicit and evident from the outside, and is thus taken to be 
‘literature’ only. It is very interesting to note that what Shestov here means by ‘literature’ 
implies a pure invention distant from reality, especially the existential reality of the writer.
The realist criticism of Belinsky, Pisarev and others which completely dominated in 
literature at the time assessed the latter first and foremost in utilitarian terms of social 
usefulness and moral lessons, of the closeness of a literary piece to reality. Shestov, it 
seems, to all intents and purposes struggled against such an approach, since drawing moral 
lessons for the sake of the communal good was very much in line with those European 
convictions that he rebelled against. In other words, in the utilitarian nature of such an 
approach he must have seen, as he did in science, the prevalence of the general over the 
private, the neglect of a particular individual unless his case reinforced some general
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theory. Equally, Shestov, as was mentioned in previous chapters (especially the one on 
Chekhov) condemned the aesthetic trend in literature (for example, Viacheslav Ivanov’s 
oeuvre), or, in other words, the approach of ‘art for art’s sake’. So, literature for him was to 
portray the (evidently tragic) truth of life from a strictly individual perspective which 
cannot be generalised rather than to describe that tragedy in an aesthetically enjoyable way 
in order to lead to a new philosophy (to use his own words of putting it).
This, however, means that curiously, i f  not paradoxically, Shestov, while in essence 
opposing the realist criticism o f  Belinsky et al. for its utilitarianism and considerations o f 
the collective good (signifying the preference o f  the general over the private), was 
nevertheless looking in literature for the great truth o f  life, and predominantly through the 
w riter’s existential experience which this literature invariably reveals. Yet, at the same time 
he seems to be defining literature as fantasy p a r  excellence, or rather implying that what the 
general public is prepared to see in literature is anything at all, but not its underlying 
existential revelations (which for him constitute its greatest and possibly only value). In 
particular, Shestov m ay be referring to that aesthetic feeling which is commonly expected 
from literature, and implying that for him  both such ‘idle’ writings and such ‘id le’ 
expectations are somehow bad literary examples. For him  the artistic power o f the oeuvre is 
secondary, but the revelation o f  the life o f  an individual is primary, as long as it does not 
becom e generalised, made abstract and ready to be used for the sake o f social progress. 
‘Ecjih aBTop 3aHHTepecoBajica He THnoM, a c^hhhhhbim hcjiobckom, Bcero tojibko o^hhm 
uejiOBeKOM h ero cyzmdoH, to Kaxoe 3HaneHHe MOxceT hmctb Taxoe npoH3BeaeHHe a  jib 
odmecTBa? Oho mojkct oxa3aTBca He tojibko nojie3HBiM, ho npjiMO Bpe/iHBiM, npHKOBBmaa 
Hame BHHMaHHe k jihhhbim Hyac^aM, bmccto toto, hto6bi HanpaBJiHTB ero Ha mnpoKHe 
odmecTBeHHBie sa lam i’ , 170 Shestov writes, referring to what he calls a special aesthetic 
theory prevalent in the nineteenth century.
This brings us back again to Michel Aucouturier’s claim, mentioned in Section 1.1, of 
Shestov’s treatment of literature being reminiscent of the ‘Russian tradition of “real 
criticism” where a work of literature is only an excuse rather than an object of study’.
170 Shestov, Typeenee, pp. 125-126.
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Furthermore, Aucouturier correctly states that ‘the reality that interests Shestov is not the 
outside world, but the inner world of the writer’ and that, importantly for our purposes, 
Shestov ‘is not trying to explain a literary piece, but seeks in it a confirmation of what the 
writer has lived through’.171 Yet, despite his claim that creative writing and sober thought 
are different things Shestov seems able to appreciate the inevitable blend of a thinker with 
an artist, even if in Shestov himself, as we argued in the previous chapter, the former would 
invariably subsume the latter. The artist was reflecting life with as much artistic power and 
faithfulness to reality as he was capable of, while the thinker would subversively (according 
to Shestov) try to squeeze it all into a procrustean bed of some Weltanschauung -  or, in 
Shestov’s words, Culture. Thus Shestov writes about Turgenev that on the one hand 
‘TypreHeB 6 b i a  A O C T a T O H H O  o 6 p a 3 0 B a H H B i M  uenoBeKOM, h t o 6 b i  n o H H M a T B ,  r/je KOHuaeTca 
xyzioacecTBeHHoe TBopnecTBO h  HanHHaeTca Tpe3Baa m b i c j i b ’ ,  but on the other that
x y /io > K H H K  b H e M  B c e r / i a  S o p e T C H  c M b ic j iH T e j ie M  h  H e  B c e r ^ a  A a e T  bo3m o>khocti>  B O A p y 3 H T b c a  
o b l l l H M  B b lB O f la M  H a  CJ1HUIKOM  B H flH O M  M e C T e . H H O H  p a 3  B b l A O H H T aJ lH  n O H T H  A O  K O H L ia n O B e C T b  
h a h  p o M a H ,  a B e e  e u i e  H e  3 H a e T e ,  ic a ic  c n p a B H T c a  K y n b T y p a  c H a p H c o B a H H b iM H  xyA O A C H H K O M  
K a p T H H a M H . / f a A c e  K a a c e T c a ,  h t o  K y A b T y p a ,  n o x c a A y n ,  c o h t c t  3 a  Aynrnee c o b c c m  n p O M O A H a T b . Ho 
O H a  o t  c b o h x  n p a B  p e A K O  O T K a 3 b iB a e T c n ;  n o H H M a e T  a h  O H a  h a h  H e  n o H H M a e T  n p o H c x o A a m e e ,  O H a  
B c e - T a K H  3 a r o B o p H T . 173
Thus, as Shestov explains, on the one hand Turgenev (presumably by virtue o f being an 
artist as well as a Russian, i.e. an uncultured m an deep inside) ‘c o c o 6 b i m  HHTepecoM 
pncoBan TparHnecKne c t o a k h o b c h h a  b  c b o h x  paccxa3ax h  HHKorAa He jxbbslji h m  
SAaronoAyHHOH pa3BA3KH’ . 174 Indeed, ‘TaM Bee repon h  repoHHH MeHTaiOT o a i o 6 b h ,  h o  
MeACAy AioSamHMH noHTH BcerAa BoccTaioT Henpeo6 opHMBie TpyAHOCTH, BHyrpeHHHe h a h  
BHeniHHe’ . 175 On the other hand, however, Shestov implies that being a thinker at the same 
time and due to his W estern values and desire for the common good, Turgenev ultimately 
bends reality to the necessary moral conclusion -  accusing equally the selfish and the weak
171 Aucouturier, p. 79.
172 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 25.
173 Ibid, p. 82.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
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and promoting moral goodness. To exemplify this point Shestov turns to Maria Nikolaevna 
and Sanin from Spring Currents (Beuiuue eodbi, 1872). He writes,
Hto Jiio6om>iTHoro h 3HaHHTejibHoro MoaceT paccica3aTb KynbTypHOMy nejiOBeicy “acemijHHa- 
KeHTaBp”? HaM Hyamo He BcnoMHHaTb, a no3a6biTb Bee Harne OTAajieHHoe npomnoe h 
npHodmHTbCfl k eBponeifCKOMy nporpeccy, KOToporo TypreHeB HHKoraa He 3a6biBaeT, b 3tom 
cymnocTb ero “o6pa30BaHHa”. Mapba HnmnaeBHa ocyacAeHa “HayKofl” noA HMeHeM aTaBH3Ma —  
B03BpaTa k npouuiOMy. “BeuiHHe boaw” KOHHaioTca y Hero nocpaMjieHHeM CaHHHa, He yMeBiuero 
nodopoTb co6jia3H h OTAaBineroca MHHyTHOMy yBjieneHHio.176
However, Shestov, as he implies, is evidently not deceived by the old motives in 
Turgenev’s last writings, for he can see through them the real inner regeneration of the 
writer. In other words, he can distinguish between ‘literature’ and the truth. Thus, Shestov 
basically implies that although Turgenev appeared (or tried to appear) on the outside pretty 
much as before, his torment was nevertheless truly horrific, i.e. at last real and total. As we 
mentioned, this is almost impossible to prove since Shestov essentially implies no 
substantial change in the manifestations of Turgenev’s new experiences. Yet, ultimately 
Shestov claims to find the traces of this new inner reality of the writer in his final literary 
creations. Thus he writes that Turgenev
B nOCJieAHHX CBOHX npOH3BeAeHHHX He TOJlbKO B “CTHXOTBOpeHHJIX B np03e”, HO H B “neCHH 
TopacecTByiomeH jik>6bh”, b “Knape Mhjihh”, b paccica3e “OTHaaHHbiH” — H3MeHaeT cbohm 
npeacHHM y6e>KAeHKHM — icaic ace He onpaBAbraaTbca, xoth 6w CTapocTbio h 6ojie3Hbio? /fo chx 
nop oh HeH3MeHHO h TBepAO iueji k onpeAejieHHofi KyjibTypHoft uejiH. Tenepb y Hero oahh mothb: 
Je vais sans savoir ou, J’attends sans savoir quoi [h3 JIaMapTHHa: R nay, He 3Haa xyAa, R acAy, He 
3Haa nero.].177
Shestov adds to this that ‘yace c 1878 roAa, T.e. 3a mm> act ao CMepra, TypreHeBa 
HaHHHaioT nocemaTb cipaniHbie bhachha, KOToptie oh yace He b chabx OTorHaTb 
oSbiHHbiMH npneMaMH’.178 As the most illuminating example Shestov gives Turgenev’s 
story ‘Orapyxa’ (‘The Old Woman’) from his Senilia (also known as Prose Poems -  
CmuxomeopenuR e npo3e) collection. In it the narrator is haunted by an ugly old woman 
who clearly embodies fading life merged with approaching death. The narrator is doomed,
176 Ibid, pp. 84-85.
177 Ibid, p. 108.
178 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 109.
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he has nowhere to hide from her and ‘MeneTCH KaK 3aaij Ha yroHKax, H3 cTOpOHbi b
» 179 CTOpOHy .
From this obvious doom and gloom Shestov, not unexpectedly and clearly not without 
reason, concludes that the horror of a fading life is now the central theme in Turgenev’s 
existence and creativity. However, Shestov’s opinion is at least in part counterbalanced by 
Seeley’s vision of Turgenev in his final years. He writes: ‘It is not all gloom and
i finhopelessness. While he can write he will not despair’/  On the other hand, Seeley too 
acknowledges the gloomy content of Senilia which contains ‘the bitter wisdom gleaned 
from disappointments, betrayals, denigration; the misery of lonely old age; the horror of
1 Q I
approaching death’. However, Seeley does not at all see Turgenev as betraying his old 
convictions and aspirations. He writes about the writer’s renewed bond with the younger 
generation who ‘in a period of dark repression [...] turned to him as a symbol of humanism 
and honesty’.182 For Shestov, on the other hand, the situation is transparent and points to 
Turgenev’s spiritual rebirth in the light of the ‘revelations of death’:
I f e H T p o b e a c H b i e  h  u e H T p o c T p e M H T e j i b H b i e  c m i b i ,  n o p o H C A a i o m n e  h  y H H H T o ^ c a io i i iH e  J J o h - K h x o t o b  
h  T a M J ie T O B , x y j i b T y p H b i e  3 a a a H H ,  B A o x H O B j u H o m n e  j i y H i n n x  j n o a e H ,  e B p o n e H C K a n  M o p a j i b ,  
n p H M H p a i o m a f l  c  y a c a c a M H  h o b h h  —  0 6 0  B c e M  3 a 6 b i T 0 .  O n c p b u i a c b  B e j iH K a a  T a f t H a  h c h 3 h h ,  h  B e e  
n p e a c H H e  y S e a c A e H m i  o ic a 3 a j iH C b  j i h u i h h m h .  H ) o k h o  H a c x o p o ,  c o b c T B e H H b iM H  c h j i b m h ,  6 e 3
n o cT o p o H H efi n o M o m u  BbiAyMbreaTb “ HOBbie y6e>KAeHHfl”  ... (A oSbiB aT b h x ) . . .  h o b m m h  npneM aM H
c  183
h  MeTOAaMH, h 6 o CTapbie npH eM bi h  m c t o a m  HHKyAa He to a h tc h ,
Shestov writes. It is also interesting to note here that Seeley also connects the story 
‘ / I . o b o a l h o ’ ,  which Shestov, as we saw above, singled out as the one where Turgenev for a 
moment questions his European convictions, and the tales from Senilia where, according to 
Shestov, Turgenev’s new outlook is evident -  under the label of Turgenev’s ‘most 
subjective works’.184 This may be a very apt observation which explains the mechanism
179 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 111.
180 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 317.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid, p. 318.
183 Shestov, Typzenee, p. 111.
184 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 317.
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behind Shestov’s selection o f them. Indeed, for him only something subjective is worthy of 
attention and testifies to the individual truth.
So -  to continue with Shestov’s interpretation o f Turgenev’s last writings -  he argues that 
they reveal Turgenev’s new suspicion that morality has no power over life. One o f the best 
examples to substantiate this claim is for Shestov the story ‘A Desperate Character’ 
( ‘OTHaflHHtm’). In it Shestov sees Turgenev’s sudden interest in those sides o f life from 
which he would have hitherto turned away as being unworthy of attention. ‘rLmia/maTb 
jieT TOMy Ha3aa’, Shestov writes referring to the ending of this story,
T y p r e H e B  He C T a n  6 b i  3aTpyaH 5m » BHHMaroui <J>h a o c o (])o b , a k ja c h  3aH jm >ix h  He H M e i o m u x  h h  
B03M03KH0CTH, h h  o x o T b i TpeB05KHTbc» n o  nycT aicaM  —  c y flb b o H  M h iu h  IIo jiT eB a , 6e3yaep>KHOrO  
nbflHHUbi h  aB ann opH C T a. Ero 6b i paccyA H Ji IIoT yrH H , npeAAOHCHBuiH eM y Ha3BaTb ABaAUaTb 
ropoA O B  O paH UH H. Mmna, k o h c h h o , He H a3Ban 6 b i  h  O AH oro, x p o M e I la p n ^ c a , h  Ha st o m  
ocHOBaHHH 6 b u i  6 b i  npH3HaH HHKyAa He roAHbiM H eA opocA eM  H3 A B opaH .185
186Now, however, ‘TypreHeB noHTH to to b  npeKAOHHTbca nepeA HeyAauHHKOM Mnmeii’, 
Shestov claims, and explains that Turgenev is getting to see a new and mysterious light in 
the human capacity for self-destruction. In these modem desperate characters he now sees 
not some specific social ideals, but an eternal angst and dissatisfaction, a desire to rebel 
altogether against the loftiest ideals. ‘BnepBbie, roBopio, 3a bcio AOAryio cboio xch3hb, 
TypreHeB no3BOJiaeT cede OTCTynHTb o t  CBoero eBponencKoro MHpoco3epuaHHA h 
BCTynHTb Ha t o t  nyn>, no KOTopoMy men cto a b  HeHaBHCTHbm eMy KJiaAOHCKaTeAb
1 on
/^ocToeBCKHH ’, Shestov concludes.
He writes o f Turgenev’s newly acquired indifference to the question o f social usefulness, of 
his new interest in those concepts, phenomena and people which appeared frightening and 
superfluous before, but now it increasingly seems to him, as Shestov asserts, that it is in 
them that the real essence of life lies. The last will be the first, Shestov quotes from the 
Bible and states that now Turgenev is at last asking himself, if  all those superfluous people,
185 Shestov, Typeenee, p. 115.
186 Ibid, p. 116.
187 Ibid.
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essentially useless for society and for themselves, will turn out to be the right ones? 
However, again Shestov’s statements cannot be refuted because on the surface Turgenev 
carried on behaving as he always did. For ‘“Pa3yM” —  to ,  h to  oh  h h to  Bee moan CHHTaioT 
b cede pa3yMOM —  npo/jojDKaji ynopHO c to a tb  Ha CTpaxce npeamHx BepOBaHHfi; h hobbic 
mbicjih, KaK 3 to  Bcer/ja dbiBaeT, npoxo^HJiH b ^yrny TypreHeBa KOHTpadaHflon, noa 
pa3HbiMH apubiKaMH, cKpbmaBmHMH h x HacToamnn cMbicn’.188 Thus, Shestov continues, 
Turgenev criticised Tolstoy for his Confession and expressed his disgust with respect to 
Dostoevsky, calling him a Russian de Sade. To summarise Shestov’s claim: OmHOHHHbiu 
symbolises a turning point in Turgenev’s outlook, his parting with European values which 
he previously treasured. Instead he is now tending to follow the route shown by 
Dostoevsky. However, he does not want to believe in this himself and continues to 
persevere in his mind with his old convictions, even though in his soul he has already 
parted with his past.
However, what Seeley writes on the subject largely undermines Shestov’s assertions. First 
o f all Seeley asserts a certain continuity in Turgenev’s writings, thus overturning Shestov’s 
insistence on Turgenev’s totally new revelations brought by the desperation o f old age. 
‘Karataev, like A Desperate Character’, Seeley writes drawing a parallel, ‘is a tragedy, and 
the protagonists o f the two sketches, conceived and written thirty-five years apart, reveal a
1 RQstartling affinity’. On the other hand, Seeley does underline that ‘the self-destructiveness, 
which in Karataev was no more than a drift, has become a drive in Misha Poltev’190 -  an 
assertion which gives at least some support to Shestov’s claims about the novelty of 
Turgenev’s existential experience as portrayed by his interest in characters such as Poltev. 
However, Seeley’s further claims render Shestov’s construction quite shaky, if  not 
altogether redundant.
Indeed, in contrast to Shestov’s statements about Poltev’s disdain for any ideals and 
underlying Turgenev’s newly-acquired indifference to social usefulness and the common
j88 Ibid, p. 119.
189 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 320.
190 Ibid.
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good, Seeley observes that ‘if  Misha Poltev is a rebel without a cause, it is not for want of 
social conscience or moral potential’.191 Having pointed to the ‘clash between education 
and temperament’ in Poltev as a possible source of his anxiety Seeley then notes that
‘Misha is debarred by his upbringing from thinking, from the use o f his mind, and is thus
1 00precluded from discovering the way to social service’. However, this unfulfilled drive for
being socially useful is clearly present in Misha’s character as Seeley observes, for,
importantly, ‘the very thought o f the poverty and injustice in Russia makes him feel 
1 01suicidal’. Moreover, according to Seeley’s interpretation Poltev is also permeated by 
religious feeling and ‘it may be the need to hold down that feeling which drives him to 
more excessive actions than would be called for by his temperament on its own’.194 Thus 
the picture that Seeley draws drastically differs from that imagined by Shestov and 
consequently (by being much more grounded in the text than Shestov’s) leads to a 
deconstruction o f Shestov’s conclusions on the changes in Turgenev’s latest outlook.
8.10. Summary of Shestov’s vision of Turgenev: Pro et Contra. The case of a missed 
similarity.
More generally, the example o f Shestov’s treatment o f A Desperate Character in a sense 
crowns a number of similar ones discussed above, demonstrating that, as in the case of 
Chekhov (explored in the previous chapter), Shestov largely distorts the picture with 
Turgenev as well, to tailor it to his own ends and to inscribe Turgenev’s case into Shestov’s 
own philosophical paradigm. In particular, through his unreserved faithfulness to his 
paradigm he reveals the orthodoxy of his beliefs which testifies to him being forever in 
essence a great romantic. In the same vein his idealism is ineradicable, for it is forever 
concealed in his all-pervasive fixed ideas of anti-rationalism and his struggle against 
speculative philosophy, as well as in his extremely authoritative discourse.
At the same time, to summarise our analysis, we should acknowledge that Shestov in his 
Turgenev is both right and wrong about the writer. He is right in emphasising the role of
191 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 322.
194 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
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death, the fear of it and its revelations in Turgenev’s life. He is right about the duality of 
Turgenev’s nature concealing within it both European and Russian elements and being tom 
by it -  his constant struggle between rationalism, idealism, a clear system of beliefs and 
convictions on the one hand, and angst, superstition and a longing for miracles on the other. 
But Shestov is wrong about the clear contrast between these two sides rather than their 
interplay and overlap (just as in the case of his own dichotomy between faith and reason). 
Equally, if  not even more importantly, he is also wrong about the eventual shift by 
Turgenev from one to the other, from the rational to the irrational -  in that there was no 
shift, no major movement to speak of -  Turgenev was always like that. His duality was 
inherent in his personality: his idealism and rationalism formed as integral and permanent a 
part o f him as his subversive longing for the irrational and his lack o f faith in the 
omnipotence o f scientific method. He remained an idealist until the very end, even if, with 
maturity, he parted with some of his former illusions about life and people. Remarkably, as 
we have demonstrated, Shestov is closer to Turgenev than he is capable o f realising, and 
thus by providing a critical unmasking o f the writer he is in fact exposing a great deal of 
very valuable self-criticism.
Thus, ironically, if  in the case o f Chekhov Shestov substituted what was very much a self- 
portrait for the writer’s real image and implied that in Chekhov he had met his twin, in the 
case o f Turgenev the situation is opposite: he draws a portrait which, he is sure, is least of 
all his own, while in fact the resemblance between the real protagonists is quite substantial. 
Both were permeated by duality and suffered from it -  ultimately tom between Western 
rationalism and deeply rooted idealism on the one hand and the Russian ‘wild and 
superstitious soul’ with its search for miracles and its torment with the eternal questions of 
existence on the other. At the same time, perhaps growing from common Eurasian roots, 
they were by nature simultaneously distinct romantics and idealists, as well as sceptics and 
nihilists -  an inseparable blend of Hamlet and Don Quixote (only Shestov fought against 
his idealism, while Turgenev embraced it and held on to it). Both encompassed the ability 
to present simultaneously the realistic and the fantastic, both shared a transparent and 
poignant literary style and an artistic appreciation o f life, the ability to reason in images. 
Both viewed philosophy as art rather than science and were sceptical o f scientific
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fundamentalists. In a way they were knights o f faith -  Turgenev in the form o f love, 
Shestov -  in the form of his religious search which went, in fact, far beyond theology.
Finally, both were in a certain, even if  restricted, sense the ‘saddest men’ -  Turgenev in his 
life, Shestov in his steadfast concentration on the tragic human predicament. The difference 
was largely in the temperaments, it seems: Turgenev was tamed in both literature and life 
(more in the latter than the former), while Shestov was rather tamed in life, but wild in his 
philosophical imagination. In fact both rebelled in their different ways against a tyrannical 
parent (a dictatorial and emotionally unbalanced mother in the case o f Turgenev and a 
dominant, repressive father with his strict Jewish Orthodox rules in the case of Shestov). 
Equally, both in their respective ways valued human freedom above all, and, interestingly, 
both were extremely helpful, noble and dignified men in social terms, always ready to assist 
those in need.
On the other hand, by failing to recognise their proximity Shestov (by somewhat 
schematising, if  not misinterpreting, Turgenev and his oeuvre, and bending them, as usual, 
to serve his own ends) managed to expose brilliantly the dangers of European rationalism 
and the utilitarian roots o f its idealism, the shallow nature of any petty-bourgeois 
philosophy with its comforting lies and philistine values, as if  anticipating the hypocritical 
and down-to-earth mentality which straddled and used idealism to its own cynical ends and 
which was to become predominant in the forthcoming century. In a sense through the case 
study o f Turgenev Shestov provided his grounds for choosing groundlessness, i.e. for 
opting for daring, for liberation from all bonds with its uncertainty, doubt and constant 
change. This is for Shestov the choice o f a mature human spirit which has had enough o f  
crawling, so it leaves the ground and takes off into the infinite: ‘oh  OTpLmaeTca o t  3cmjih h  
yxoflHT b npocTop SecKOHeHHOCTH. H MHHyraMH no Kpaimen Mepe, HaM HanHHaeT 
Ka3aTbCfl, h to  eme hcckojibko MraoBeHHH, h Hac HHHero yace He 6yneT yflepxcHBaTb h 
ocymecTBHTca BeHHaa MenTa H3MyneHHoro nejioBeica —  oh ocbo6o^htcb  o t  tjdkccth  h  
yimeT b 6ecnpeflejn>Hyio bbicb...’.195
195 Shestov, Typaenee, p. 105.
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In other words, using Turgenev with his alleged European-Russian, i.e. rational-irrational 
dichotomy, as a springboard for his own struggle, Shestov launched a most decisive 
crusade against utilitarianism in all forms, with its hypocrisy and winglessness, in favour of 
passion and unrestrained spiritual freedom -  a struggle which is indeed much closer to art 
than to speculative philosophy. And it is this struggle that exposes once again Shestov’s 
and Turgenev’s proximity in their ultimate quixotry -  which is, using Seeley’s words, ‘a 
compound o f faith and love -  as the prime mover in human history and the prime condition 
of human fulfilment’.196
196 Seeley, Turgenev. A Reading o f his Fiction, p. 331.
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Conclusion
Aesthetic ambivalence.
In this thesis we have argued that the nature o f Lev Shestov’s philosophy reflects the 
perception o f the universe provided by Art, or, if  you like, the philosophy o f artists (which 
in particular sheds some light on the reasons why Shestov, while remaining an isolated and 
relatively obscure figure, is held in such high esteem first and foremost by writers and poets 
rather than philosophers per se). Our main focus was therefore on Shestov’s ambivalent 
relationship with aesthetics which, in our view, offers the key to the interpretation o f his 
creative legacy from a literary perspective.
Indeed, aesthetics plays such a vital role in understanding Shestov's philosophical thought 
because in art it dominates, in a certain sense, over ethics -  in the sense in which form 
dominates content. Or at least art presumes an inseparable blend o f ethics and aesthetics 
with the latter having the upper hand. In Shestov's case this relationship is much more 
complex, which reflects the fact that despite, as it were, the poetic origin o f his thought 
Shestov himself was much more a philosopher than an artist. Moreover, in our view there 
was a certain on-going conflict in him between the two. It is, as we demonstrated, this 
conflict that is responsible for a certain paradox with which Shestov's philosophy is 
permeated: while being o f an artistic, even poetic, origin it often shows a certain deafness 
to aesthetics.
More precisely, Shestov’s writings are characterised by an applied approach to art whereby 
he implicitly attempts to separate ethical considerations from aesthetic ones. The problem 
represented by such a divide when analysing works o f art can be elucidated by the 
following lines o f Joseph Brodsky: ‘HcKyccTBO [...] -  cpe c^TBO nepe/jBPDKemifl, 
jiarmma^T, MejiticaiomnH b  OKHe, -  a He nepe^BH^eHHa 3Toro ijejib’,1 its origins are 
distinctly non-utilitarian, and hence any ‘conceptual’ considerations in it are secondary. 
And thus, any ‘applied’ approach to art, i.e. to an activity where any non-aesthetic concerns
1 Brodskii, ‘06  o a h o m  cTnxoTBopeHHH’ in CoHUHenm Hociupa EpodcKozo, vol. 5 (St Petersburg: 
Pushkinskii Fond, 1999), p. 146.
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are secondary, is bound to be distorting, for it ignores the inner laws by which artistic 
(notably, literary) reality exists. This is, as we argued, what Shestov’s treatment of 
literature suffers from. Equally relevant here is Milosz’s conjecture about Shestov's 
personal drama lying in his lack of poetic talent, which implies his inability ‘to approach 
the mystery o f existence more directly than through mere concepts’.2
Yet, Shestov’s proximity to art is multi-faceted. It is reflected in his brilliant literary style 
and his entry into philosophy through literature; in his spiritual extremism in rebelling 
against the world order and standing up for the individual existence -  for the ‘private’ 
against the ‘general’, as does art on the whole, which in a certain sense always defends the 
formula that the private is ‘greater’ than the general. On the other hand, as we argued, 
Shestov’s perception of the aesthetic aspect o f a literary piece is akin to watching a poet 
reading out a beautiful poem, but with the sound switched off. This is to say that Shestov is 
witnessing all the apparent passion and temperament of this performance and is inflamed 
by them, but them alone. He cannot appreciate the beauty of the text, but he can feel 
compassionate, as it were, about the pathetic aspect o f it. However, this metaphor, in fact, is 
not entirely precise, because it neglects the fact that Shestov approached literature first of 
all from a philosophical point of view and thus he did listen to the text very carefully, even 
if  with the sole purpose o f extracting its ideas. Therefore a more accurate image would be if 
we suppose that he can hear the sound, but the poetry is read in a language foreign to him 
and he is supplied with a literal translation only. Thus he is still denied the appreciation of 
poetic beauty, although he can follow all the philosophical ideas concealed in the text.
Philosophy in a struggle with itself.
Therefore, in our opinion, the central conflict o f Shestov’s philosophy is that between 
ethics and aesthetics, which in turn gives rise to his affinity for paradox and contradiction. 
Following Erofeev’s stance, one can view this conflict as resulting from a struggle between 
two visions: day-time (ordinary vision) and night-time (tragic vision).3 More generally, 
given the rebellious nature of Shestov’s entire thought which stands deliberately and
2 Milosz, p. 103.
3 See Erofeev, pp. 173-174.
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provocatively orthogonal to the mainstream philosophies, there is no better way for him to 
proceed than via the route of absurdities and contradictions, especially since the roots o f his 
philosophy stem from paradox -  that o f fighting against reason by means of reason. The 
words o f Tertullian about Christ, ‘The Son o f God was crucified; this does not bring shame, 
because it is shameful. And the Son o f God died; again this is believable because it is 
absurd. And having been buried, he rose from the dead; this is certain because it is 
impossible’,4 which Shestov liked so much to repeat, can be used as his own motto 
semantically, while Pascal’s statement ‘then let people not blame us any more for our lack 
o f clarity, since we practise this deliberately’,5 provides as it were a syntactic description of 
Shestov’s philosophy, reflecting his idea on the best form of philosophical expression.
In following Shestov’s thought through its entangled path paved with contradictions in his 
irrational and fundamentally artistic struggle against ‘speculation’, we essentially aimed to 
demonstrate that this struggle is mirrored in the struggle between his text and his subtext. 
Indeed, what he tries to defeat in the text seems to resurrect itself in the subtext. In other 
words, Shestov's philosophical struggle conceals within it the grains o f what Shestov 
rebelled against. Thus we exposed a certain dogmatism of his adogmatic philosophy, 
idealism hidden in the sheer extremity of his opposition to this very idealism, and his fight 
against reason on the very territory and by the means o f this very reason (to use Berdiaev's 
famous phrase).6 In the same vein, Shestov’s applied approach to art coexists with the 
indisputable impact o f aesthetics on his philosophical thought.
In other words, Shestov’s statements invariably conceal the seeds o f a reversed meaning, 
for he is storming against his own shadow, as it were rebelling against his own nature. Thus 
he argues against idealism and rationalism while both constitute his own intrinsic features. 
Hence, his uncompromising character and the spiritual extremism of his thought, reflected 
in his rather dictatorial, monological discourse, render his philosophical struggle self-
4 Tertullian, De praescriptione hereticorum. Cited in Milosz, p. 108.
5 Pascal, Pensees. Cited in Milosz, p. 103.
6 See B e r d i a e v ,  ‘ O c H O B H a a  n a e a  (J)hjioco(])hh J l t B a  U l e c T O B a ’ , p .  8 .
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defeating -  for his very extremism puts him a priori in the camp of idealists, hence 
ultimately overturning his entire revolt.
This phenomenon of bringing any concept to the extreme where it turns into its dialectic 
opposite, constitutes Shestov’s environment and provides the framework for his 
philosophy, and it is for this reason that we avoided using a deconstructive method in our 
analysis -  not so much because it would be too easy and too obvious, but because it would 
be simply counter-productive. Because it is this inner conflict of Shestov’s thought -  
ultimately reflected in that between his text and subtext -  the conflict between what he 
wants to be the case and what really is the case, that constitute his thought, and thus 
deconstructing it would mean destroying it altogether rather than making any discoveries 
about its design.
By the same token, if  philosophical thought can be divided into cautious and fearless, 
Shestov’s is certainly the latter, and this kind of philosophy is bound to contain the seeds of 
its own subversion, it is bound to stem from contradiction, almost par excellence. Therefore 
we opted for treating the contradictory nature of Shestov's philosophy as given -  almost as 
a background against which his ideas are unfolding -  and saw our task in following his 
thought through its daring journey.
A major role in the ‘self-subversion’ o f Shestov’s philosophy should be attributed to its 
extreme abstractness. As in the case of Dostoevsky’s heroes, whose thought by being often 
too abstract detaches itself from reality and becomes destructive, Shestov’s abstraction 
leads to a decisive split between all sorts of concepts: rational and irrational, mind and soul, 
speculation and revelation, reason and faith. As Stepanov writes, contrasting Shestov and 
Chekhov, Shestov is denied an understanding o f the mutual reversibility of the rational and
n
the irrational. That is to say that rationality or irrationality depends on the point of view on 
the object, and is therefore subjective. It is above all the dogmatism of Shestov’s adogmatic 
philosophy (observed by Erofeev)8 which prevents Shestov from sensing this reversibility,
7 Stepanov, p. 1004.
8 Erofeev, p. 171.
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from understanding that in essence reason and faith (Athens and Jerusalem) need not 
necessarily be opposed.
Rational and irrational: philosophical application of the poetic metaphor.
Another important point to make on the struggle of Shestov’s philosophy against its own 
self is that his abstraction, his applied approach to art from a philosophical rather than an 
artistic standpoint basically means that his fight against any Weltanschauung, against any 
uniting idea, is defeated by the very abstraction o f his approach. For it is precisely through 
details, through particularities, through those very private and liberating points o f departure 
(which Shestov so fiercely defended from the encroachment of general, scientific 
categories) that art (and notably literature) exists. On the other hand by his applied 
approach to art Shestov as it were betrayed the private to the general, i.e. acted in a way 
exactly opposite to his intentions. In this respect Andrei Belyi made a very perceptive 
remark, essentially implying that in such a treatment o f art that would reflect Shestov’s 
intentions only one method is possible -  that of art itself rather than that o f general 
philosophising which Shestov exercised, even though he did it in a brilliant literary manner 
and while declaring philosophy an art. ‘Ero Bepa b TBopnecTBO He mohcct no3BOjnm> eMy 
nojib30BaTbca HopMaMH no3HaHH5i. rioneMy ace oh  roBopHT c hbmh (j)opMoft cyameHHft? 
Be,zu> e^ HHCTBeHHbiH cnocofi ero ofipameHHJi k HaM He AOKa3aTejibCTBo: He mojkct oh  h to -  
jih6o ,HOKa3aTb. Oh moxcct noKa3 bisaT b ce6a, ho p jm  3Toro Ha#o 6bm> npopoxoM, 
xyaoacHHKOM’,9 Belyi wrote.
The same idea is expressed more explicitly and generally (i.e. regardless of Shestov) by 
Iurii Karabchievsky, who basically assigned philological science (essentially as Shestov 
philosophical science) to the domain of art: ‘OHjiojioraa -  Taxaa CTpaHHaa Beim>, h to  
jiiofioe BbicKa3aHHoe b Heft nojioxceHHe mohcct 6bm> 3aMeHeHO Ha npoTHBonojioxcHoe c Toft 
ace Mepoft Ha e^xcHocTH h flocTOBepHocTH. Kax rjib . xoro, a m ix  mchh jihhho OHa 
yfieflHTejibHa jihlub b Toft CTeneHH, b xaxoft caMa HBJweTca jiHTepaTypoft’. Along the 
same lines, although less radically (i.e. giving way to compromise), David Patterson 
commented on the unity of existential philosophy and literature:
9 Belyi, p. 482.
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.. .because Shestov is involved in existential philosophy, he has removed the focus of philosophy 
from the universal to the individual who must enact the drama of living and dying. Here the 
individual is in a sense superior to the universal; for Shestov, as well as Dostoevsky, there can be no 
abstract idea apart from the living individual. [...] Existential philosophy and literature stand in a 
relationship which is unifying rather than complementary; where existential thought is concerned, 
the literature assumes the aspects of the philosophy and the philosophy the aspects of literature.10
Andrei Belyi’s objection to Shestov’s claims to conduct literary analysis from the position 
o f a philosopher rather than an artist, which resonates with our statements about Shestov’s 
ambivalent relationship with aesthetics, in fact, points deep to the nature o f Shestov’s 
philosophising and its fundamental effects. More precisely, the underlying substance of 
Shestov’s reflections can be described as borrowing from art the essentially poetic 
metaphor o f the superiority o f the soul over the mind (spontaneity over reflection, faith 
over reason), of the irrational over the rational, and treating it philosophically (i.e. more 
scholastically than is suggested by its poetic origin, understanding it almost literally). As 
before, taking it to the extreme, to its logical conclusion, renders it nearing on absurdity and 
violates its poetic meaning. Indeed, Saint-Exupery’s phrase ‘One can see properly only 
with one’s heart. The main things are invisible to the eyes’,11 as well as Iskander’s ‘yM 6e3 
HpaBCTBeHHOCTH Hepa3yM eH; HpaBCTBeHHOCTb 5Ke pa3yM Ha n 6e3 yM a’, 12 offer this idea 
artistically and anticipate the appropriately artistic rather than applied interpretation o f it.
By the same token, Evgenii Vinokurov’s lines cited below, although almost precisely 
mirroring Shestov’s philosophical world, express its essence by poetic means and thus keep 
it alive, while Shestov’s treatment o f it, by translating it into philosophical formulae, as it 
were kills the original, does not allow this essential poetic metaphor to get across intact.
HacTana
n o p a  C n O K O H C T B H H , p a 3 M e p e H H O C T H , H O p M b l.  
M n p  x a o c a  n p n o S p e T a e T  C T p o i m o C T b .  
i l  C T a j i a p x H T e K T O H H K y  ^ e p e B b e B  
y r a A b i B a T b !  K o H C T p y x u H a  n p n p o f l b i
10 Patterson, p. 221.
11 In the French original: ‘On ne voit bien qu’avec le coeur. L’essentiel est invisible pour les yeux’. 
Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Le Petit Prince (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), p. 72.
12 Iskander, ‘noHeMHory o MHoroM’, p. 122.
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Bflpyr CTana npocTynaTb b  npe/jMeTax.
A no oceHHeMy 6yjibBapy,
He BHAH HH MeHH
H HH KHOCKa “MoJIflaBBHHO”
rneji lOHorna. KaK oh Maxan pyxaMH!
IlaTeTHHeH
6wji nyb e r o  B3J io x M a H e H H b iH , h  6p o B H  
B3J ie T a jiH  n a T eT H H H O , h  K a3a n o c b  -  
KOJIb H3f la i lH  C M O T p eT b ,
He BeTep -  natjjoc 
to pa3ayBaeT 4)OJinbi nnzpicaKa!
M MHe B^pyr CTano ctm/jho, 
cjiobho n p e^ aji a s to to  napHHiuKy, 
cjiobho b neM-TO r HHxce d a n  er o , 
hto SecKOHe.HHo oh npeB 3om eji MeHa 
H Tax BblCOKO
b HeBe^eHbe nonHajica Haao mhoio, 
hto yyK He flOTJiHyTbCfl /jo Hero,13
V inokurov writes, echoing Shestov’s philosophy almost three decades after his death. A 
concluding comment o f Czeslaw Milosz on poetry being an infinitely more supple and 
effective means for penetrating into the mystery o f  existence than philosophy is particularly 
relevant here: ‘B boptbe nporaB Heobxo^HMOCTH npocipaHCTBa h BpeMeHH > IIIecTOBy 
MeHbine noBe3Jio, nocKOJibxy oh 6bui Bcero-HaBcero (J)hjioco$ . EpoflCKHH yxBaTbiBaeT -  
yjiHuy, apxHTeKiypHyio aeTajit, aTM0C(})epy MecTa -  h H3BJieKaeT hx H3 noTOKa BpeMeHH, 
H3 npocipaHCTBa, hto6li coxpaHHTb HaBcerzja b KpHCTajitHbix Meipax’.14
Exposing the schism ‘between pen and soul’. Case-studies of Russian classics.
Perhaps as a result o f Shestov’s ‘double vision’, o f his aforementioned inner split he strives 
in his writings to unmask the authors under his study by ‘dragging’ the man from behind 
the writer. In other words, as we explained, Shestov effectively points to the schism 
between pen and soul, thus described by Joseph Brodsky: ‘every writing career starts as a 
personal quest for sainthood, for self-betterment. Sooner or later, and as a rule quite soon, a 
man discovers that his pen accomplishes a lot more than his soul. This discovery very often 
creates an unbearable schism within an individual [...] ...this schism is precisely what
13 Evgenii Vinokurov, omymaio HeboM k h c j i m h  Bxyc...’ in My3biKa (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 
1964), pp. 54-55.
14 Milosz, Eopbda c ydymbeM, p. 246.
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creates a writer, whose job therefore becomes making his pen catch up with his soul’.15 In 
our analysis o f this phenomenon we built on Michel Aucouturier's claim that Shestov 
continued the tradition of Russian ‘real criticism’ where a work of literature is only an 
excuse rather than an object of study. We argued that Shestov, by essentially anticipating 
the psychoanalytic trend as well as the ‘narrative psychology’ approach in literary 
scholarship, provided a ‘philosophical psycho-biography’ o f the writer focusing on the 
latter's existential experience read off his literary heroes and testified to by his narrative, 
understood effectively as self-narrative. It is in so doing that Shestov, we argued, in fact 
exposed the eternal schism between the achievements of an author's pen and his soul, or 
simply put, between the earthly man and the divine artist in him. We thus demonstrated 
Shestov's intrinsic involvement with the Romantic tradition in literature where the 
relationship between the two is central and is closely connected to that between the writer 
and his lyrical hero. At the same time, paradoxically again, his highly subjective 
psychological and irrationalist approach displays Shestov's drastic departure from the 
realist critical method prevalent at the time.
On the other hand he cannot be aligned with the then emerging Symbolist movement either, 
even though there is a certain, even if a somewhat reversed, affinity between their 
respective tendencies. More precisely, as Khodasevich points out, the Symbolists’ 
fundamental stance was their proclaimed intention to design their own lives as if  creating a 
literary text (zhiznetvorchestvo), thus not splitting the man and the writer. Shestov, on the 
other hand, believed that the writer is defined by the man, and the latter reveals himself 
through his capacity as the former (that is, his literature is simply a testimony to his 
existential experience). In other words, the Symbolists believed in the intervention of the 
writer into the man, while Shestov, on the contrary, saw the man looming behind the writer. 
Also while Shestov viewed the interplay between life and resulting literature as occurring 
naturally, without any external efforts, for the Symbolists their ‘ )KH3HeTBOpHecTBO ’ (the 
relationship between literature and ‘resulting life’) was an invented principle which they 
strove to implement (with quite disastrous consequences).
15 Joseph Brodsky, ‘The Power of the Elements’ in Less Than One, Selected Essays 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 157-163 (p. 161).
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Thus Shestov and the Symbolists, although preoccupied by the same phenomenon o f the 
complex union o f the man and the writer, viewed it from two opposite angles. In this 
connection a much closer analogy can be drawn, quite unexpectedly, between Shestov and 
Daniil Kharms who shared a similar, as it were mythological, vision of classical Russian 
writers. Indeed, in their treatment of these writers both Shestov and Kharms displayed a 
related pattern, when they created a mythological man out o f a writer who would then 
become an independent actor in the drama of life. At the same time Kharms endowed this 
drama with distinctly caricature and vaudeville-type features, while Shestov had no such 
intention. However, the effect of his treatment of writers borders by the spirit o f it on 
Kharms’s, although this caricature boundary in Shestov’s case is never crossed. This near 
proximity apparently testifies to the danger concealed in Shestov’s method o f a too 
intimate, almost familiar (‘ (jmMHJitapHbm ’) rapprochement to the personality o f the writer 
under study (a certain lack of ‘na(j)oc aHCTamjHii’, using Erofeev’s words).
In other words, an excessive (and often forced) identification o f literature and life leads to a 
vaudeville of sorts, thus highlighting that these two spheres are genuinely distinct and the 
schism between them is not really bridgeable (i.e. a direct blend of them is misleading). In 
particular, using Brodsky’s words, ‘ b  HCKyccTBe ^ o c t p d k h m u  -  fijiarozjapa c b o h c t b b m  
caMoro MaTepnajia -  Ta CTeneHb jinpH3Ma, (j)H3HHecKoro 3KBHBajieHTa KOTOpOMy b  
peajibHOM Mupe He cymecTByer. T o h h o  t b k h m  ace o6pa30M He 0Ka3tiBaeTca b  peajitHOM 
MHpe h  3KBHBajieHTa TparnnecKOMy b  HcxyccTBe, KOTOpoe -  TparHuecKoe -  cyTb 
ofiopoTHaa CTOpOHa jinpH3Ma -  h j i h  cjieflyiomaa 3a h h m  CTyneHb’.16 Thus the Symbolists’ 
efforts to create their lives according to literary laws led to farcial results (or at least to 
tragic ones, which eventually ended in farce).
At the same time Shestov’s exposure o f the schism between pen and soul was characterised 
by tendentiousness o f a different kind. Namely, he deliberately, it seems, misinterpreted 
Pushkin’s words about the paltriness o f the artist, turning the latter more into a villain than
16 Brodskii, ‘I I o o t  h  npo3a’ in Cohumhur Hocutpa EpodcKoeo (St Petersburg: Pushkinskii Fond, 
1999), vol. V, p.133.
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an insignificant individual arbitrarily endowed with literary talent. Somehow he wanted 
there to be an inverse law o f sorts: the greater one’s poetic talent the less noble one is as a 
man. To prove this point Shestov searched hard for vices in the lives o f classical writers in 
order to separate their human ego from their divine gift, and almost rejoiced at dubious 
discoveries (as in the case of Dostoevsky where Shestov was ready to believe 
unquestioningly Strakhov’s infamous letter to Tolstoy). Perhaps the significance o f this for 
him lay in the belief that there is a certain divine justice in such a peculiar distribution of 
artistic talent to otherwise unworthy individuals. This resonates highly on the one hand 
with Tsvetaeva’s words
H6o pa3 t o j io c  Te6e, n o3T ,
.ZfaH, ocTajibHoe b3hto,17
and on the other with Auden’s lines about time that forgives poets their sins for their ability 
to sustain the life o f language:
Time that is intolerant 
Of the brave and innocent,
And indifferent in a week 
To a beautiful physique,
Worships language and forgives 
Everyone by whom it lives;
Pardons cowardice, conceit,
Lays its honours at their feet.18
It also seems that for Shestov this reinforced the point of extreme importance that God 
behaves in His unpredictable ways -  providing more indirect evidence that for Him 
everything is possible.
Yet, paradoxically perhaps, in every writer under his study Shestov managed to uncover 
something new, original and hitherto unobserved. As Adamovich remarks, Shestov’s
17 Tsvetaeva, ‘Ectb cHacTJiHBuw h cHacTjiHBHuw’, vol. 2, p. 324.
18 W. H. Auden, ‘In Memory of W. B. Yeats (January 1939)’ in The English Auden. Poems, Essays 
and Dramatic Writings 1927-1939, ed. Edward Mendelson (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 
242.
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insights into the works o f Tolstoi, Dostoevsky, Pushkin and Chekhov are written ‘xaic 6 b i  
Ha nojiflx Toro, h t o  6 b i j io  o  h h x  CKa3aHO flpyrHMH, -  oTHacTH b  flonojmeHHe, OTHacTH b  
onpoBepxceHHe’.19 However, in Adamovich’s estimation ‘mecTOBCKHe ^ora^KH h HaMeKH 
A a io T  nopofi o n e H b  m h o t o ’ and ‘y3HaTt o t  Hero m o h c h o  o  HeKOToptix pyccKHx nHcaTejrax, 
-  m  h  He t o j i b k o  o pyccKHx [...] Koe-HTo oneHb cymecTBeHHoe, npn t o m  ocTaBineeca 
CKpbiTtiM’. A similar opinion is expressed by Schloezer: ‘Shestov breaks decisively with 
the existing [literary-critical] attitudes: as much with those of his predecessors, as with 
those o f his contemporaries. He sets off on his own path, where he is to advance all by 
him self.21 It is also through his study o f individual writers that the change in his 
philosophical views can be traced. Thus Shestov’s idealistic point of departure was 
embodied in the figure o f Pushkin who signified for Shestov, very much along the lines of 
Dostoevsky’s Pushkin speech, the grandeur o f Russian literature and culture with all its 
daring and celebration of life in its intensity.
Shestov’s later disillusionment and scepticism did not cancel out his appreciation of 
Pushkin and the everlasting tradition that the latter originated, of a fearless and joyful 
facing o f reality in literature. It is also from Pushkin that a blend o f romanticism and 
realism settled deep in Shestov’s consciousness, as did the profound understanding of 
moral and philosophical values. While these notes o f idealistic and simplified admiration 
became absent from the writings o f the mature Shestov, his affinity with Pushkin as a 
canonical symbol of Russian culture remained with him for ever and ran through Shestov’s 
works like a uniting thread of common sense, largely informing his concise and transparent 
literary style and his striving for freedom, for liberating the human spirit from any bonds.
In his treatment of Tolstoy Shestov focused on the writer’s intrinsic duality as a 
manifestation o f his inner contradictions which may be defined in different ways: the 
contradiction between Tolstoy’s behaviour and his principles; his instincts or urges and his 
beliefs; his ability to grasp details and his striving for a holistic vision instead; his search
19 Adamovich, p. 254.
20 Ibid, pp. 254-255.
21 Schloezer, ‘Preface’ to Leon Chestov, L ’hommepris aupiege, p. 10.
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for truth and his self-justification, or if  you like, self-deception; according to Shestov: 
between his philosophy and his preaching, which is ultimately the conflict o f the irrational 
and the rational. Shestov recognised in Tolstoy a great thinker who, Shestov believed, tried 
as hard as he could to become mediocre in order to escape from the tragedy of existence. It 
is this, according to Shestov, that facilitated Tolstoy’s duality which can be viewed as 
resulting in hypocrisy until one recognises the writer’s underlying suffering and tormenting 
doubt. Shestov's writings on Tolstoy show a slow transition from the former perception to 
the latter.
Equally, in his treatment o f Dostoevsky, whom Shestov regarded as his main teacher, he 
moved from an uncompromising vision and dictatorial discourse to a much more tolerant 
and deeply sympathetic interpretation. Shestov managed to uncover in the writer (in what 
was then a ground-breaking way) distinct Nietzschean themes which eventually became 
dominant in twentieth-century thought. Thus Shestov through tracing Dostoevsky’s 
intrinsic inner torment embodied in his oscillation between faith and faithlessness initially 
identified the writer with his Raskolnikov and his Underground Man. Later on Shestov 
distilled from such an interpretation the problem of theodicy and of individuality, having 
identified Dostoevsky’s concern with the individual in his struggle against the cold and 
suffocating indifference of the general, and having abandoned accusations about the 
writer’s underlying cruelty and obsession with power. He proclaimed Dostoevsky as the 
main and most genuine fighter against Reason and its poisons, tracing them to the story of 
the Fall, as, allegedly, presented in Dostoevsky’s writings.
Thus the central conflict which Shestov exposed in Dostoevsky's works and which largely 
shaped his own philosophical paradigm was that between the private and the general, 
between individuality and ‘ b c c m c t b o ’ understood in a broad sense, between man's irrational 
inner world and the rational means offered by reason to deal with it. This is by no means 
accidental, for Shestov's tragic perspective and generally the vector of his existential 
investigations were innately akin to Dostoevsky's concerns. Indeed, it appears that the 
spiritual design of both thinkers was similar in their deep interest in and, to an extent, 
identification with the pitfalls o f the underground consciousness and the tragic split in the
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human psyche. Metaphorically speaking, what brings Shestov and Dostoevsky really close 
together is their propensity to live their spiritual life extremely ‘close to the edge’.
Shestov’s originality in his approach to Chekhov was manifested in his perception of the 
writer as, first and foremost, free from illusion of any kind, as having become emancipated 
from the ‘idea’, and, as a result, as being a ‘singer of hopelessness’, whose heroes are 
stripped from everything and thus have to ‘create from the void’. The main shortcoming of 
this approach, as was demonstrated, lies in Shestov’s neglect of the aesthetic dimension 
which is crucial to Chekhov’s art. It is precisely the literary perspective that helps to 
disclose this essential misunderstanding on Shestov’s part which has much broader 
implications and reveals Shestov’s aesthetic ambivalence in more general terms. Chekhov’s 
poetics itself resists such an applied philosophical approach which looks for the ideological 
(or conceptual) rather than the artistic truth in literary works. On the other hand, as we 
argued, there is a clear meeting point between the writer and the philosopher -  in their 
intense involvement with the world. This involvement manifests itself in respecting human 
tragedy, in looking courageously into the gap between reality and the ideal, essentially 
searching for salvation and in defending the private against the general, and in the 
underlying disdain for scholastic philosophy and ‘self-evident’ truths.
However, ironically, in the case of Chekhov Shestov substituted what was very much a 
self-portrait for the writer’s real image and implied that in Chekhov he had met his twin. In 
the case o f Turgenev, on the other hand, the situation is opposite: as was demonstrated, 
Shestov drew a portrait which, he was sure, was least of all his own, while in fact the 
resemblance between the real protagonists was quite substantial. Both were permeated by 
duality and suffered from it -  ultimately tom between Western rationalism and deeply- 
rooted idealism on the one hand and the Russian ‘wild and superstitious soul’ with its 
search for miracles and its torment with the eternal questions o f existence on the other. The 
proverb which Shestov applied to Turgenev -  ‘scratch a Russian and you will find a Tatar’, 
was very much applicable to Shestov himself too. At the same time, perhaps growing from 
common Eurasian roots, they were by nature simultaneously distinct romantics and
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idealists, as well as sceptics and nihilists -  an inseparable blend o f Hamlet and Don Quixote 
(only Shestov fought against his idealism, while Turgenev embraced it and held on to it).
On the other hand, by failing to recognise his proximity to Turgenev Shestov managed to 
expose brilliantly the dangers of European rationalism and the utilitarian roots of its 
idealism, the shallow nature of any petty-bourgeois philosophy with its comforting lies and 
philistine values, as if  anticipating the hypocritical and down-to-earth mentality which 
straddled and used idealism to its own cynical ends and which was to grow prevalent in the 
then forthcoming century. In other words, using Turgenev with his alleged European- 
Russian, i.e. rational-irrational dichotomy, as a springboard for his own struggle, Shestov 
launched a most decisive crusade against utilitarianism in all its forms, with its hypocrisy 
and ‘winglessness’, in favour of passion and unrestrained spiritual freedom -  a struggle 
which is indeed so much closer to art than to speculative philosophy.
Yet, in all these cases Shestov invariably bent the truth, forcing the writers in question to fit 
his own paradigm. However, even by uncovering something that was not there, through 
‘Shestovising’ these writers, he nevertheless, with his unconventional method, spotted 
some features o f those thinkers that had been entirely concealed from previous critics. 
Ironically, it is in these shrewd and subtle psychological and literary details that Shestov’s 
talent (as far as the literary side is concerned) shines most, rather than in his often 
extravagant general philosophical claims. Perhaps this is because the latter belong to the 
domain o f the general and are largely artificial (designed to suit his paradigm) while the 
former belong to the domain o f the personal and show Shestov’s philosophising for all 
intents and purposes as artistic (thus supporting his treatment of philosophy as an art rather 
than a science).
However, curiously, for Shestov himself discovering a general pattern was clearly o f the 
most importance, for it was in this that he hoped to uncover the road to salvation, the key to 
a way o f coping with tragedy. Indeed, Shestov's treatment of the thinkers in question can be 
inscribed into a. paradigm that reflects his own existential struggle. Namely, as was 
previously mentioned, Shestov sought in every author a breaking point in his life
576
experience, a crisis leading to the total transformation o f his convictions. This can be 
explained by Shestov's own personal crisis o f 1895 (resulting in a serious nervous 
breakdown) which, despite being well documented, remains mysterious and elusive. It 
roughly coincides in time with the birth of Shestov's illegitimate son, and a sequence of 
involvements with gentile women. Finally Shestov married one but kept the marriage secret 
from his parents, most notably from his Jewish Orthodox father, until the latter's death. As 
we argued, Shestov's entangled identity and complex personal history were highly relevant 
to his ‘philosophy o f tragedy’. In particular, we have built on suggestions that connect 
Shestov's irrationalism to his early exposure to Hasidism and traced a link between the 
apophatic theology which underlies modem Russian religiosity and the Hasidic tradition 
which, arguably, influenced Shestov's thought. In this connection we have shown the 
relevance of his premonitions to the religious developments in contemporary Russia.
While standing on his own, outside any group, in his rather non-partisan attitude to 
philosophy and culture Shestov’s path lay nevertheless, as we explained, at a tangent 
bordering on many currents o f his epoch. Thus, as Blagova and Emelianov observe, 
Shestov’s philosophy of tragedy cannot be correctly understood ‘BHe H^eimo- 
HpaBCTBeHHon npobJieMaTHKH C ep e6 p jff lo r o  B exa, HeoTbeM JieM oft n acT b io  xoTopon 
HBjweTCfl 3K3HCTeHUHajibHaa npobjieM aTHKa norpaHHHHbix cuTyaitHH Me>X£y 5XH3Hbio h  
CMep T b io ’ .22 Equally, the utopian flavour of Shestov’s philosophising brings him close to 
the general spirit o f the time with, as Averintsev aptly observed, its general atmosphere o f 
utopia.
However, Shestov’s utopian philosophising did not annihilate his very practical streak and 
dependability as an individual. Thus in emigration Shestov continued to be highly active, 
displaying his readiness for action (to ‘agir’) in order to support his family, and after having 
made his entrance into the French intellectual elite, he played to an extent the role of a 
multiple conductor between cultures, engaging in diverse activities. Thus he taught in the 
Russian extension o f the Sorbonne and joined a Russian academic group organised by 
emigre professors. He published regularly in the outlets o f the Russian emigre press,
22 Blagova and Emelianov, p. 109.
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contributing to CoepeMennbie 3anucKu (1920-1940) and later to Bepcm u , Tlymb and 
PyccKue 3anucm  and actively participated in the founding o f a new literary journal, Okho. 
Shestov’s works were also published with celebrated French publishers such as, for 
example, Plon and Siecle. He frequently wrote for major French journals such as Nouvelle 
Revue Frangaise and Mercure de France and contributed to German philosophical 
periodicals. Also in Germany Shestov was elected a member o f the presidium of the 
Nietzschean Society and was a member o f the Kantian Society. Both in Paris and during his 
visits to Berlin he had meetings with such well-known Russian cultural figures as Remizov, 
Belyi, Berdiaev and others, and made friends with such outstanding European philosophers 
o f the time as Martin Buber, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The implications of 
these friendships and intellectual engagements paved the way to major developments in 
European philosophical thought. Thus Shestov can be viewed as a precursor o f Sartrean 
existentialism and a figure o f considerable influence in the French reception of the 
phenomenological movement, which in turn shaped all the major trends in French 
philosophy of the twentieth century. Thus, as Milosz points out, ‘Shestov was an active 
force in European letters, and his influence reached deeper than one might surmise from the 
number o f copies o f his works sold’.23 For Albert Camus, for example, Shestov was 
amongst a handful o f ‘the philosophers most important to the new “man o f the absurd’” ,24 
as Milosz reminds us.
Shestov’s cultural breadth and erudition are also noted by Louis Shein who writes that
o r
‘Shestov was well versed in both Greek and modem philosophy’. He also asserts 
Shestov’s cultural diversity by suggesting that ‘psychologically Shestov can be best 
understood only in the context o f the kussian intellectual milieu of his time’, while
9 (\‘thematically he must be seen in the context of the Western ideological search for truth’. 
By the same token, drawing on Berdiaev’s statement that it is the myth about the end that is
9 nmore important to Russians than the myth about origins (hence the apocalyptic tendencies
23 Milosz, p. 101.
24 Ibid.
25 Shein, p. 12.
26 Ibid.
27 Nikolai Berdiaev, PyccKan uden (Paris: IMCA-Press, 1946), p. 35.
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in Russian culture), one can say that in Shestov, remarkably, the myth about origins is 
equally important due to his steadfast preoccupation with the concept o f Original Sin.
On the other hand, Shestov’s multi-cultural contribution co-existed with a certain conflict 
with culture into which Shestov’s philosophical thought runs, as Erofeev penetratingly 
observes. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, Shestov’s rejection of idealism and positivism 
leads him in his opposition to cultural idealistic and rationalistic ‘restraints’ on human 
freedom to Freudian, Darwinist and materialist trends, thus landing him very close to the 
‘enemy’. Yet, his struggle conducted by a combination of philosophical and literary means, 
with its artistic origin and nature makes an invaluable contribution to culture by alerting 
society to the significance of individuality and resisting the spirit o f generalisation, 
hypocrisy and banality. That is why Viacheslav Ivanov addressed to Shestov the following 
perceptive words, calling him a raven with dead and alive water: ‘BameMy e^ HHOMy cjiOBy 
cyxc^eHo, ayMaeTca, b c h h o  3ByuaTb’, Ivanov wrote: ‘ h 6 o ,  ecjin c t p o h t b  KyjitTypy c BaMH 
Hejn>3fl, t o  Hejib3B CTpoHTt ee h  6e3 Bac, 6e3 Barnero ronoca, npeaocTeperaiomero o t  
OMepTBeHHH H OT flyXOBHOH TOpflOCTH. Btl n0X05KH Ha BOpOHa C MepTBOH H  HCHBOH 
BOflOH’. These words, in our opinion, can be taken as an epigraph to the whole creative 
legacy of Shestov.
Delineating the borders of reason (protecting art from science).
As we argued, throughout his entire career, in his uncompromising juxtaposition o f faith 
and reason, Shestov effectively protected art from science (or the private from the general). 
More precisely, Shestov's efforts amounted to delineating the borders o f the rational in its 
encroachment upon the domain of the irrational. It is this interpretation of his thought, we 
argued, that suddenly renders sensible and understandable his irrational (and thus 
extravagant and dismissible for many) struggle against Reason. In this connection we 
showed that Shestov's thought is a precursor not only o f existentialism, but also o f post­
modernism, sharing with the latter its concept o f ‘broken consciousness’, the 
acknowledgement o f a multiplicity o f truths and the assignment of equal validity to 
different standpoints.
28 Viacheslav Ivanov’s letter to Shestov of 10 Febr. 1936. Cited in Baranova-Shestova, I, p. 146.
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However, we also demonstrated Shestov’s essential misconception o f science, thus 
exposing a certain naivete in his struggle against scientific method. On the other hand, this 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature o f science, with its inevitable principles o f 
abstraction and generalisation, that Shestov constantly opposed to art, with the latter’s 
emphasis on the individual, is rather typical o f his time. For despite a certain tendency to 
merge different cultural and intellectual activities such as philosophy and literature, art and 
religion, poetry and science, the scientific and artistic spheres were at the time still 
considerably more segregated than they are now. Therefore it was extremely rare to 
combine a profound scientific and artistic background, displaying a proper understanding of 
both. Hence some fundamental logical errors that crept into Shestov’s philosophical 
analysis which we have exposed in this thesis (and what seems to be essentially novel).
However, perhaps paradoxically again, while both phenomena (of the irrational and 
rational, at least in the form of art and science) which Shestov perceived to be in conflict -  
a conflict in which he passionately took sides -  were misconstrued by him, the direct head- 
on encounter that Shestov forced upon them, like the powerful striking of two stones, 
produced, in his mind at least, a spark from which the flame of his whole philosophy was 
ignited. On the other hand, at a later stage, when the struggle was transferred to the 
religious plane and concerned the phenomenon o f faith with its highly subjective, fluid and 
varied definitions, Shestov's misconceptions must have been no longer of the same 
relevance. Indeed, his struggle then was predominantly centred around stripping faith from 
any rational elements (from any dogma), and his perception o f the former as a second 
dimension of thought must have become o f equal validity to any other existing perception.
Importantly, a great contributory factor in Shestov’s misconceptions (with respect to the 
nature o f art where aesthetic concerns are primary and especially of science where 
generalisation is inevitable and deliberate) was his tendency towards the limits explained at 
least in part by his very temperament, that Milosz calls ‘religious’, by his passion in search 
o f the answers to the ultimate questions. Thus he tended to take everything to the extreme, 
including art and science themselves. As was mentioned earlier in connection to his
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relationship to aesthetics, Shestov tried to search, as it were, for the limits of the human 
spirit. However, at the boundaries, i.e. when taken in excess, things tend to turn into their 
opposites (for instances, our virtues taken in excess turn into our shortcomings). Thus what 
for Shestov embodied reason changed its nature: ethical principles became petit-bourgeois 
utilitarian morality, used to validate and defend philistine values, and science turned into an 
oppressive dogmatic teaching, an instrument for stifling the individual; and then together, 
hand in hand, according to Shestov’s perception, they marched against the free spirit. Thus 
instead o f dealing with ethics and science Shestov ended up dealing with their excesses, 
that is to say -  their dialectical opposites.
Yet, speaking metaphorically again, Shestov’s naive rebellion against speculative 
philosophy, against reason as a poison at the core of man’s destiny, is akin to that o f a Don 
Quixote who is concentrated fully on the noble mission o f a saviour of mankind in his 
hopeless struggle against the windmills of modem civilisation. Even though Shestov’s 
crusade against rationalism, in his search for the liberation of man from his tragic 
predicament, is doomed, it carries within it an intoxicating flame, the passion o f ‘a priest 
angry at the sight o f holy vessels being desecrated’, as Milosz put it. And such a passion 
in standing up for the tragic individual is always time-resistant. Therefore some rather 
striking examples o f Shestov’s legacy (as interpreted by individual readers of his books) 
given by Shteinberg in his memoirs come as no surprise: ‘IHecTOBy 6buio /jaHO
OTKpOBeHHe, HTO HCT MaJIBIX H BeJIHKHX jnO flefi, HTO n e p e f l JIHKOM T O C nO flH H M  B ee paBHbl. 
M o n c e ii  3T0My y n n ji. H n c y c  H3 H a3ap eT a BOCKpecnji o to  yneHHe. Ho tojibko HlecTOB  
noKa3an b Harne H3BpanjeHHoe BpeMJi, h to  3 to  3HaHHT, Ha3Jio CnHH03e, Mapiccy h 
O penly’,30 a Russian-speaking admirer o f Shestov from Uruguay exclaimed to Shteinberg 
in 1953, fifteen years after Shestov’s death. Another encounter o f this kind recalled by 
Shteinberg was with a young Belgian and took place another ten years on. This young man 
claimed to have been saved by reading Shestov from his turbulent and debauched life 
resulting in suicidal attempts. H e  started reading Shestov by chance, at a time when he
29 Milosz, p. 102.
30 Shteinberg, p. 261.
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hated and despised himself and mankind alike. ‘51 pacxpbui xHHry Hayra#’, he told 
Shteinberg;
...Opa3bi 6buiH npocTbie, mhcjih TO>xe HecaoxcHbie ... h Bapyr MHe 3axoTejiocb ruiaxaTb. CTajio 
6ecKOHeHHO >xaJib ce6a h Bcex jnoaeft, h Bee MHpo3,aaHHe, h h BApyr nornm , hto Hejib3« HHKoro 
ocyxc^aTb, aa^xe caM oro ce6a. ST oro, kohchho, He 6 wjio b TexcTe, ho xax-TO hcxoahjio ot Hero, 
xax 3axjiHHaHHe Mexyiy cTpoxaMH. 51 cjibiman ro a o c  HaHBy, aohochbuihhch co CTpaHHU XHHrn: a 
Tbi npocHHCb, a Tbi He cnH, a Tbi h bo CHe doapcTByw!31
Contemplating these encounters Shteinberg comments that ‘ h c b o 3m o h c h o  o t m c t h t b  Ha 
nojiax KHur LQecTOBa xpacHbiM xapaHAamoM, Kaxne h m c h h o  a(j)opH3Mbi h j i h  H3peneHHa 
ero 3apjDxeHbi Taxofi B3pbiBHaTOH ayxoBHOCTbio’. It is the subtext concealed between the 
lines that opens up ‘npocBeT b  h h o h  MHp’, Shteinberg suggests. His conclusion about 
Shestov’s significance is that the latter was a product of the ‘dead time’ and a spokesman of 
decadence, while being at the same time a precursor of the new redemption: ‘IIIecTOB -  
aBJieHHe 6e3BpeMeHbJi h  npoayKT pa3Jio)xeHHJi, h o  o h  ace h  npe^BecTHHK, h  npe^Tena Toro,
9^
h t o  rpimeT 3a b c k o m  BceHejiOBenecxoro xpH3Hca’, Shteinberg writes.
These recollections reinforce once again the significance o f Shestov’s penetrating visions 
and premonitions. Indeed, he anticipated with great precision and intuition the dangerous 
consequences o f Western rationalism (contrasting it with the uncultured Russian belief in 
miracles and its fearless and wild search for the truth, harmony, beauty and faith). This 
rationalistic approach eventually became transformed into consumerism, shallow bourgeois 
values, stifled and suppressed emotions, social hypocrisy and the inability to deal with 
grief. In a sense Shestov’s suspicions o f Western rationalism and its implications resonate 
with Naum Korzhavin’s pungent lines at the end o f the same century:
3 a e c b  BM ecTo M bicjieH nycT axH .
H TOT, XaX 3TOT.
3aecb  flaxce nyBCTBOBaTb c th x h  
E C T b  T O H H b lH  M e T O f l.33
31 Shteinberg, p .  263.
32 Ibid, p .  264.
33 Naum Korzhavin, ‘ I lH C b M O  b  MocxBy’ in Cmuxu u y io b m u  (Moscow: Materik, 2004), p p .  274- 
275.
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Similarly perceptive was Shestov’s vision of the man of the future and of the forthcoming 
spiritual dangers. In Kolobaeva’s opinion, while Shestov can be labelled 
‘rHOceojiornHecKHH yronHCT’ he is simultaneously (if one looks deeper) a strikingly sober 
thinker who shook off many illusions and became to a large extent anti-utopian. Shestov’s 
work, Kolobaeva asserts, was ‘3HaHHTejibHO c b o h m  npeaynpexmaiomuM BHflemieM 
cTpamHbix ayxoBHbix onacHocTeft XX Bexa -  HacnjiHB yM03pHTejibHbix imen, 
pai^noHajiHCTHHecKoro yronH3Ma, rydnTejibHocTH paBHeHna j i h h h o c t h  florMaraxoH 
H^eojiornH h  MopanH, onacHocra o t  He^ooneHKH Hen3MeHHbix Hanaji HejioBenecxoH 
npnpoabi’.34 Thus Motroshilova states the ultimate righteousness of Dostoevsky and 
Shestov who warned us ‘o “paBHo^ynmoH cnjie”, h t o  -  nepe3 Hayxy [...] -  odpeTaeT 
BjracTb Haa cy^bdaMH MHpo3flaHHa h  nejiOBexa’. She exclaims, ‘He Taxaa j ih  
“paBHO^yniHaa cnjia” BJiacTByeT cero^Ha Ha  ^ b c c m h  HaMH, nojib3yacb pacxpbiTbiMH 
Hayxon h  pa3yMOM TaihiaMH aTOMHoro a^pa? H pa3Be He oxa3ajiacb npHHacraoH x s t o h  
Tpare^HH coBpeMeHHoro HejioBenecTBa cnenaa Bepa b  axodbi caMocToaTejibHoe h  b  ce6e 
Sjiaroe “mecTBHe” HayHHoro pa3yMa?’35
At the same time, as Erofeev put it, ‘IIIecTOBy yzjajiocb BecbMa BepHo npe^yra^aTb 
acTemxy 3 X3HCTeHHnajiH3Ma’. Moreover, ‘inecTOBCxaa H,ztea 0 6  HH^ HBHxiyajibHOH 
HCTHHe, o^SblTOH B a6 cOJIK)THOM O^ HHOHeCTBe, HJIH, HTO TO 5Ke, O MHOJXeCTBeHHOCTH 
h c t h h  [ . . . ]  aBHaacb o ^ h u m  H3 ocHOBonojiaraiomHX m o m c h t o b  “nojiH(})OHHHecxoH” 
3CTeTHXH, cbnpaBmeh HcxjHOHHTejibHyio poab ^jia pa3BHTHa 3ana^Horo ncxyccTBa XX 
Bexa’ .37
Of especial importance, testifying to Shestov’s lasting significance is his continuing impact 
on both the artistic and philosophical world, with a particular emphasis on the former. 
Indeed, despite his tendentiousness, ‘admirable monotony’ (to use Camus’s term) and 
aesthetic ambivalence Shestov has served as a catalyst o f sorts for the inner worlds of
34 Kolobaeva, p. 76.
35 Motroshilova, p. 135.
36 Erofeev, p. 181.
37 Ibid.
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prominent contemporary writers such as Joseph Brodsky, Czeslaw Milosz, Yves Bonnefoy 
and David Gascoyne -  to name just a few. Evidence o f Shestov’s continuing relevance lies 
in the extensive re-publication of his works in contemporary Russia and the on-going 
scholarly publications and debate on him. At the roots of this, in our view, there lies the fact 
that his thought defends what is most important for human beings -  our ‘irrational 
remainder’. The latter constitutes the essence of all things alive, all things temporal; it is the 
nucleus of life, o f a private and finite existence. In this approach Shestov coincides almost 
precisely with Joseph Brodsky, whom Milosz linked with Shestov, calling both ‘defenders 
o f the sacred in the age o f faithlessness’. Indeed, the following lines by Brodsky, partially 
quoted in the Russian translation in Chapter 6, express beautifully the very substance o f 
Shestov’s stance, illuminating in particular the direct relevance o f the artistic (notably, 
literary) approach to his thought that has been undertaken in this dissertation:
“Remember me,” -  
Whispers the dust.
[...] I’ve quoted these lines because [...] I recognize in them myself, and for that matter, any living 
organism to be wiped off from the available surface. “Remember me, whispers the dust”. And one 
hears in this that if we leam about ourselves from time, perhaps time, in turn, may leam something 
from us. What would that be? That inferior in significance, we better it in sensitivity.
This is what it means -  to be insignificant. [...] You are insignificant because you are finite. Yet the 
more finite a thing is, the more it is charged with life, emotions, joy, fears, compassion. For infinity 
is not terribly lively, not terribly emotional. [...] it is the anticipation of that inanimate infinity that 
accounts for the intensity of human sentiments.[...] This is [...] to suggest [...] that passion is the 
privilege of the insignificant.
So try to stay passionate, leave your cool to constellations. Passion, above all, is a remedy against 
boredom. Another one, of course, is pain -  physical more so than psychological, passion’s frequent 
aftermath; although I wish you neither. Still, when you are hurt you know that at least you haven’t 
been deceived (by your body or by your psyche). By the same token, what’s good about boredom, 
about anguish and the sense of the meaninglessness of your own, of everything else’s existence, is 
that it is not a deception.38
38 Joseph Brodsky, ‘In Praise of Boredom’ in On Grief and Reason (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1997), pp. 110-111.
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